2026年全球后量子与密码安全趋势报告 2026 Global State of Post-Quantum and Cryptographic Security Trends

2026GlobalStateofPost-QuantumandCryptographicSecurityTrends

JANUARY2026

SPONSOREDBYENTRUST

IndependentlyconductedbyPonemonInstituteLLC

ENTRUST

SECURINGAWORLDINMOTION

ponemn

INSTITUTE

Contents

Foreword3

Introduction

7

KeyFindings

10

Post-Quantum:TheThreatandtheReadinessJourney

11

CryptographicSecurityandManagement

16

TrendsinPKIandHSMs

22

RegionalDifferences

32

Methods

35

Limitations

39

22026GlobalStateofPost-QuantumandCryptographicSecurityTrendsENTRUST

32026GlobalStateofPost-QuantumandCryptographicSecurityTrends

FOREWORD

CryptographicSecurityIsataTippingPoint

Cryptographicsecurityhasquietlybecomeoneofthemostcritical–andleastvisible–foundationsofmodernbusiness.Itunderpinsidentity,access,data

protection,andsystemavailabilityacrosseverydigitalinteraction.Yettoday,

thatfoundationisunderunprecedentedstrain.Externalmandates,acceleratingthreattimelines,andexpandingcryptographicsprawlareconvergingfasterthanmostorganizationscanadapt.

Thisyear’sstudyexamineshoworganizationsarerespondingtotheseshifts.Enterprisesfaceimmediateoperationalpressurefromrapidly

shorteningcertificatelifecycles,growing

volumesofkeysandsecrets,andincreasingly

fragmentedcryptographicownershipacrosshybridenvironments.Furthermore,thepost-quantum(PQ)threatisnolongertheoretical.Organizationsare

beingaskedtopreparefortheeventualfailureofRSAandECCencryption–whilestillmaintainingsecurity,uptime,andcompliancetoday.

Whatmakesthismomentespeciallychallenging

isnotanysinglechange,butthecompounding

effectofmanychangeshappeningatonce.Short-livedcertificatesdramaticallyincreaseoperational

workload.PQmigrationintroducesnewarchitecturalandgovernancecomplexity.Expandinguseof

encryptionacrosscloud,DevOps,andZeroTrustinitiativesmultiplieskeyvolumes.Andlimited

visibilityacrosscryptographicassetsmakesallofthishardertomanage.Together,theseforcesaretransformingcryptographicsecuritytoatippingpoint–wherelegacyapproachescannolongerkeeppace.

Inthe2026GlobalStateofPost-QuantumandCryptographicSecurityTrends,weaskedthe

PonemonInstitutetoexaminehoworganizationsarenavigatingthisconvergenceofpressures.

Drawingoninsightsfrom4,149seniorIT,security,andriskleaders,acrosstheUnitedStates,UnitedKingdom/Ireland,Canada,DACH,Indonesia,andSingapore,thereportrevealswherereadiness

isadvancing,whereitisfallingbehind,andwhyvisibility,governance,andcrypto-agilityhave

becomeessentialcapabilitiesforresilienceintheyearsahead.

TheQuantumThreatIsHere,ButHowPreparedAreWe?

Againstthebackdropofrisingoperationalstrain,

thepost-quantumthreataddsanewandurgent

dimension.WhilePQoftendominatesheadlines,thestudyshowsit’scollidingwithexistingcryptographicchallenges–notreplacingthem.

From“harvestnow,decryptlater”styleattacksthattargetlong-lifedataanddevicestothe

availabilityofNISTpost-quantumcryptography(PQC)standards,thePQeraiseffectivelyhere.

Indeed,24%ofglobalrespondentsexpectthearrivalof

cryptographicallyrelevantquantumcomputers

(CRQCs)thatwillbreaktraditionalpublickey

cryptographysuchasRSAandECCwithin10years,witharesounding51%forecastingthatthiswill

happeninassoonasfiveyears.

Quantum-safeencryption,alsoreferredtoas

PQC,istheuseofnewcryptographicalgorithms

forthecontinuedprotectionofourdigitaluniversefromthisimminentquantumthreat.Generalglobalguidanceisthathigh-prioritysystemsmustbe

migratedtoPQCby2030or2031,withallsystemsmigratedby2035.Yetonly36%ofrespondentscitegovernmentpolicyandpublic-privatecoordinationonquantumreadinessasmorethanadequatetoday.

IntheU.S.,theNSA,NIST,andCISAareallurging

organizationstostarttheirmigrationnow.TheNSAhasadvisedthatallU.S.nationalsecuritysystemswillbequantum-safeby2033.Also,NIST’sinitial

42026GlobalStateofPost-QuantumandCryptographicSecurityTrends

publicdraftoftheTransitiontoPost-Quantum

CryptographyStandards,or

NISTInteragency

Report8547

,statestheintenttodeprecateclassicalasymmetricalgorithms–likeRSA–by2030,then

fullydisallowingthemby2035.

EU-specificguidanceisthatorganizationsperformaquantumthreatanalysisby2026,migrateall

high-riskusecasestoPQCby2030,andtransitionallmedium-riskusecasesby2035.IntheUK,the

NationalCyberSecurityCentre(NCSC)hasadvisedorganizationstocompleteafullcryptographic

inventoryandPQCmigrationplanby2028,migratecriticalsystemsandhighestprioritydatatoPQCby2031,andcompletetheirmigrationby2035.

Despitestronggovernmentguidance,only38%

oforganizationsreportthattheyareactively

preparingforPQ,whichisalsoaslight3%year-

over-yeardrop.Yethalfofrespondentsalso

indicatedthataquantumattackwouldhaveaseriousimpactontheirorganizationandindustry,including58%thatthoughtsuchanattackcouldresultinthelossofaccesstoencryptedcriticalinfrastructureand59%expressingconcernovertheexposureoflong-termsensitivedatasuchashealthrecordsand

tradesecrets.

Crypto-AgilityIstheFoundationofPQCMigration

FororganizationsactivelypreparingforPQ,progressvariessignificantly.Whilemanyhavebegunbuildingcryptographicstrategies,farfewerhaveestablishedthefoundationalcrypto-agilityneededtoexecute

thoseplansatscale.OfthoseactivelypreparingforPQ,44%arebuildingtheircryptographicstrategy,

while32%arecompilingtheircryptographic

inventoryand/orensuringorganizationcrypto-agility.Thelatterrepresentsa5%year-over-yeardrop,

signalingthatthebiggestchallengetoattaining

quantumresistancetodayisalackofcrypto-agility.Only26%oforganizationsreporthavingafully

implementedcrypto-agilitystrategy,withanother31%havingapartiallyimplementedone.

Thisinabilitytodiscover,orinventory,an

organization’scryptographicestateincluding

algorithms,protocols,libraries,keys,and

dependencieslikeAPIsandthird-partyintegrationsmakesitextremelydifficulttotransitionfromone

cryptographicsystemtoanotherwithoutimpactingalltheinfrastructurearoundit.Typicalblindspots

includelegacysystems,shadowIT,andsupplychainpartners.Quitesimply,youcan’tmigratewhatyoucan’tsee.Indeed,41%ofrespondentssaythattheinabilitytoimprovevisibilityintotheircryptographicinventoryistheirtopimpedimenttoattaining

quantumresistance,roughlyonparwith43%lastyear.UseofaC

ryptographicSecurityPlatform

(CSP)tounifycryptographichardware,software,andcredentialscanbeinvaluabletothiseffortandwillalsohelpkeeptheinventorycurrent,essentiallyprovidingalivingcryptographicbillofmaterials.

ChangingPainPointsonthePathtoQuantumResistance?

Twootherconcernsrespondentscitedontheir

pathtoquantumresistancethathavesignificantlyincreasedinrelativeimportanceyear-over-year

arealackofadequatebudget(39%vs.31%)andinsufficientin-houseexpertise(38%vs.28%).

However,theseshiftslikelyhavelesstodowith

realincreasesinimportanceandmoretodowith

previousconcernsbeingsomewhatmitigatedoverthepastyear.Respondentsreporteddecreased

concernovernothavingtherightscaleand

technologiestosupporttheextracomputingpowerrequiredbynewalgorithms(31%,downfrom38%)whichislikelyrelatedtorapiddevelopmentsinthepowerandscaleofAIoverthepastyear.Also,there

52026GlobalStateofPost-QuantumandCryptographicSecurityTrends

wasdecreasedconcernregardingthesecurityof

newcryptographicalgorithms(32%,downfrom40%)thatlikelyreflectsanincreasedcomfortlevelwith

theNISTPQCalgorithmsthathavebeenavailablesinceAugust2024.

DACHOvertakesU.S.LeadinPQPreparedness

38%oforganizationsgloballyareactivelypreparingforPQ–rangingfromahighof45%intheDACH

tojust31%intheUK/Ireland.Lastyear,theU.S.ledtheglobalpackinPQpreparednessat48%buthassincedeclinedto40%,andwhilestillsecondoverallthiseight-pointdropputsitsignificantlybehind

organizationsintheDACHregion.Onepossible

explanationisthatorganizationsintheDACHregionaresubjecttomorestringentEuropeanprivacy

laws,creatingaddedurgencytoattainquantumresistance.

Thequasi-goodnewsisthatanother29%globally

haveatleastevaluatedthepotentialimpactofPQ,

rangingfromahighof31%intheU.S.andSingaporetoalowof26%inIndonesia.However,itismore

thanalittledisconcertingthat31%oforganizationshavenotevenconsideredthepotentialimpactofthequantumthreat.Yetthosewhoreportbeingentirelyunsureif/whattodoregardingPQhasdropped

significantlyfrom9%to2%year-over-year.

OntheRoadtoQuantumResistance

OfthosepreparingforPQ,38%aretestingPQC

while33%areimplementingPQC.Respondentsarerelativelyevenlysplitbetweentheadoptionofa

hybridapproachthatcombinesPQCwithtraditionalpublickeycryptography(36%)vs.pursuingapurePQCapproach(35%).OfnotehereisNIST’sinitial

publicdraftoftheTransitiontoPost-Quantum

CryptographyStandards(draftNISTIR8547)thatprovidesastructuredframeworkfororganizationstoseamlesslyrealizequantum-safeencryptionbyapplyingahybridmigrationapproach.

CryptographicSecurityManagementBecomesanUrgentPriority

Beyondpost-quantumreadiness,thestudyrevealsfoundationalweaknessesinhoworganizations

inventory,manage,andgoverncryptographicassetstoday.Withanintensifyingthreatlandscapeand

moredata,devices,andpeopletosecure,CISOsandtheirteamsarefeelingthecrunch.Only43%ofrespondentsindicatethattheirorganizations

haveafulldatainventorythatidentifieswheredataresidesandflows,whohasaccess,andhowitis

used,while25%areintheprocessofcompiling

suchaninventory.Plus,lessthanhalfofrespondents(48%)reportthattheirorganizationshavestepsin

placetosecureconfidentialdataformorethan

10years.

Similarly,just43%ofglobalrespondentssaythey

havecompletevisibilityoftheircryptographic

estate,rangingfromahighof53%inCanadatoa

lowof33%intheDACHregion.Thelatterbeing

somewhatsurprisinggiventhatthisregionleadsin

globalPQpreparednessaccordingtothosesurveyed,asmentionedabove.Only43%reporthavingfull

orcompletevisibilityintocertificatesacrosstheirorganizationandjust40%havefullorcompletevisibilityintokeysandsecrets.

Overtwo-thirdsofrespondents(68%)citethe

managementofcryptographicassetsaseither

extremelyorverydifficult.Commonconcerns

includeinsufficientstaff(45%),lackofskilled

personnel(42%),isolatedandfragmentedsystems(41%),difficultybuildinganaccurateinventoryofkeys,secrets,andcertificates(37%),andnoclearownership(36%).

Whileorganizationsmayfeeltheystillhavetime

toaddressthesecryptographicinventoryand

managementgaps,theCA/BrowserForumhas

removedanysuchbufferwiththepassageofBallotSC081v3.ThesenewrulesphaseTLScertificate

maximumvalidityfrom398daystodaytoa47-daylimitby2029,includingastagedrolloutstarting

March15,2026!Thischangeforcesnearmonthly

certificaterenewals,makingvisibilityandautomationessentialnow.

TrendsinDeploymentofPKIandHSMs

Today,PKIisessentialtoestablishingandmaintainingtrustedidentities–userandmachine–underpinningaZeroTrustapproach.

Privatecloud-basedappsandmobiledevice

authenticationsthatusePKIcredentialsdeclinedsignificantlyyear-over-year,whilethisyear’stop

threecitedapplicationsusingPKIcredentialswereprivatenetworksandVPNs(52%),SSLcertificatesforpublic-facingwebsitesandservices(50%),anddocument/messagesigning(45%).

Atthesametime,PKItechnologiesareperenniallycitedasasignificantareaofpossiblechangeand

62026GlobalStateofPost-QuantumandCryptographicSecurityTrends

Quitesimply,youcan’tmigratewhatyoucan’tsee.

uncertainty.Consistentwithlastyear’sstudy,thetoptworeportedsourcesofuncertaintyaretheevolutionofPKItechnologyitself(49%),along

withexternalmandatesandstandards(43%).

Regardingthelatter,currentregulatorychangesandnationalidentityinitiatives(eIDAS2.0,digitalidentitywallets)arepushingPKItosupportinteroperable,

auditable,andprivacypreservingcredentialing.Thebiggestyear-over-yearchangeherewasbudget

beingatopsourceofchange/uncertaintyfor42%ofrespondents,up12%fromtheyearbefore.

TheNo.1reportedchallengetodeployingPKI-

enabledapplicationsisthatexistingPKIisincapableofsupportingnewapplications–citedby46%of

globalrespondents,upfrom34%ayearearlier.

Meanwhileat37%,unclearownershiptoppedthelistagainasthemainchallengetodeployingandmanagingPKI.

Consistentwithongoingskillsetandresourcing

shortages,organizationalpreferencetousean

internalcorporateCAsignificantlydeclinedyear-

over-year,from60%to46%withincreasingrelianceonthirdpartiesandmanagedservices.

Sameaslastyear,CommonCriteriaEALLevel

4+wascitedasthemostimportantsecurity

certificationwhendeployingPKIinfrastructureby54%ofrespondents,downmarginallyfrom57%

theyearprior.FIPS140-2wasthesecondmost

importantcertification;however,itsimportancehassignificantlydeclinedyear-over-yearfrom55%

to32%.

AndtheHSMpartycontinues,withmore

organizationsusingHSMs(60%vs.55%theyear

prior)andusingHSMstosecurePKI(63%vs.51%

prior).ThetoptwoHSMusecasesaredatabase

encryptionandencryptionandtokenization

solutions,eachcitedby49%ofrespondents.ThetopareasofHSMdeploymenttosecurePKIareonline

rootsandofflineroots.

Ingeneral,PKIandHSMdeploymentsareevolvingfromstaticon-premsystemstocloud-enabled

andPQ-readyplatformsthatareautomatedandauditablewithdata-in-useprotectionstomeetoperationalandcompliancerequirements.

NavigatingtheYearAhead

With47-daycertificatesandQ-Dayonthehorizon,coupledwithanever-intensifyingthreatlandscape,cyberleadersneedtopreparetheirorganizationsnow.Centraltothiseffortiscompilingafull

cryptographicinventory,improvingcrypto-agility,andadvancingtheorganization’sPQjourneyin

accordancewithgovernmentandstandardsbodyguidance.LearnhowEntrustcanhelpyounavigatetheyearahead.

Introduction

82026GlobalStateofPost-QuantumandCryptographicSecurityTrends

Introduction

Thepurposeofthisresearchistoprovideimportantinformationabouttrendsinpost-quantum,cryptographicsecurity,PKIs,andHSMs.PonemonInstitutesurveyed4,149ITandITsecuritypractitionerswhoarefamiliarwiththeuseofthesetechnologiesintheirorganizations.

ThecountriesinthisresearcharetheUnitedStates(552respondents),UnitedKingdom/Ireland(573

respondents),Canada(396respondents),DACH(553respondents),Indonesia(369respondents),andSingapore(482respondents).

Thepost-quantumthreatiscomingquickly,butwillorganizationsbeprepared?

Quantumcomputingisarapidlyemerging

technologythatharnessesthelawsofquantum

mechanicstosolveproblemstoocomplexfor

classicalcomputers.Thequantumthreat,sometimesreferredtoas“post-quantum,”istheinevitability

thatwithinthedecadeitwillbecapableofbreakingtraditionalpubliccryptographysuchasRSA

andECC.

Only38percentofrespondentssaytheir

organizationsarepreparingforthepost-quantumthreat,aslightdecreasefrom41percentinlast

year’sreport.AsshowninFigure1,ofthese

respondents,44percentfrom2024and2025arebuildingapost-quantumcryptographystrategy.

Thirty-twopercentofrespondentssaytheir

organizationsaretakinganinventoryofits

cryptographicassetsand/orensuringitis

crypto-agile.Thisisadeclinefrom38percentofrespondentsinlastyear’sreport.Testingwithin

organizations’systemsandapplicationsincreasedsignificantlyfrom10percentofrespondentsto

21percent.

FIGURE1.Atwhatstageinpreparingforthepost-quantumthreatisyourorganization?

44.0%

44.0%

Ourorganizationisbuildingapost-quantum cryptographystrategy

32.0%

38.0%

Ourorganizationistaking aninventoryofitscryptographicassetsand/orensuringitiscrypto-agile

21.0%10.2%

Ourorganizationistestingwithinitssystemsandapplications

3.0%

7.9%

Unsure

01020304050

FY2025FY2024Percentage(%)

92026GlobalStateofPost-QuantumandCryptographicSecurityTrends

Thefollowingsummarizesthemostsignificantresearchtrendsinpost-quantumandcryptographictrends.

OrganizationsbelievethePQthreatisimminent.

Seventy-fivepercentofrespondentsagreeandsayaquantumcomputerwillbecapableofbreaking

traditionalpublickeycryptographywithin5years(51percent)orinfiveto10years(24percent).

Only12percentsayitwillneverhappen.

Thebiggestchallengetoreducingthequantumthreatandmigrationtopost-quantum

cryptography(PQC)continuestobetheinabilitytoimprovethediscovery/inventoryoftheir

organizations’cryptographicassets.Forty-onepercentofrespondentsinthisyear’sstudyvs.43

percentofrespondentsinlastyear’sstudysaytheinabilitytoimprovevisibilityintotheircryptographicassetsisthegreatestconcern.Twoconcernsthat

haveincreasedsignificantlyarethelackofan

adequatebudget(39percentinthisyear’sstudyvs.only31percentinlastyear’sstudy)andlackofin-houseexpertise(38percentinthisyear’sstudyvs.only28percentinlastyear’sstudy).

Fiftypercentofrespondentssayasuccessfulquantumattackwouldhaveaseriousimpactontheirorganizationsandindustries.Fiftypercentratethepotentialimpactasserious,butonly36

percentofrespondentsratetheadequacyof

governmentpolicyandpublic-privatecoordinationonquantumreadinessasmorethanadequate.

Asuccessfulquantumattackagainstorganizationsandindustriescouldresultinthelossofaccess

toencryptedcriticalinfrastructure(58percentofrespondents)andexposureoflong-termsensitivedatasuchashealthrecordsandtradesecrets

(59percentofrespondents).

Thelackofvisibilityintothecryptographic

estate,certificates,andkeysandsecretsputsorganizations’cryptographicsecurityatrisk.

Only43percentofrespondentssaytheir

organizationshavefullorcompletevisibilityintotheirorganizations’cryptographicestate,only

43percentofrespondentssaytheyhavefullorcompletevisibilityintocertificatesacrossthe

organization,andonly40percentsaytheyhavefullorcompletevisibilityintokeysandsecretsacrosstheorganization.

Privatecloud-basedapplicationsandmobile

deviceauthenticationapplicationsthatusePKIcredentialsdeclinedsignificantlyfrom2024.

Privatecloud-basedapplicationsusingPKIdeclined

themost(56percentofrespondentsin2024

vs.32percentofrespondentsthisyear).Mobiledeviceauthenticationdecreasedfrom60percentofrespondentsto41percentofrespondents).

ThetopapplicationsusingPKIcredentialsare

privatenetworks(52percentofrespondents),SSLcertificatesforpublic-facingwebsitesandservices(50percentofrespondents),anddocument/

messagesigning(45percentofrespondents).

Internalcorporatecertificateauthorities(CAs)aremostoftenusedtodeployPKIsbuthave

declinedsincelastyear.Forty-sixpercentof

respondentsinthisyear’sreportuseCAstodeployPKIand60percentofrespondentsinlastyear’s

study.Business-partner-providedserviceincreasedthemost,from18percentofrespondentsinlast

year’sreportto40percentofrespondentsinthisyear’sstudy.PrivateCAsrunningwithinapubliccloudincreasedfrom21percentofrespondentslastyearto37percentofrespondentsthisyear.

ThemostimportantsecuritycertificationwhendeployingPKIinfrastructureisCommonCriteriaEALLevel4+(54percentinthisyear’sstudyvs.

57percentofrespondentsinlastyear’sstudy).

ThesecondmostimportantcertificationisFIPS

140-2Level3.However,itsimportancehasdeclinedsignificantly,from55percentofrespondentsto32percentofrespondents.

Thebiggestuncertaintyandconcernabout

theevolutionofPKIarePKItechnologiesand

externalmandatesandstandards.Whenasked

whatthegreatestareasofchangeanduncertaintytoPKIwillbe,49percentofrespondentssayitisPKItechnologies,anincreasefrom43percentin2024,andexternalmandatesandstandards,anincrease

from37percentofrespondentsin2024.Budgetandresourcesincreasedsignificantlyto43percentof

respondentsvs.30percentofrespondents.

MoreorganizationsuseHSMsanduseHSMstosecurePKI.Sixty-sixpercentofrespondentsinthisyear’sresearchvs.55percentofrespondentsinlastyear’sresearchsaytheirorganizationsuseHSMs.

Sixty-threepercentofrespondentsinthisyear’s

researchvs.51percentofrespondentsinlastyear’sresearchsaytheirorganizationsuseHSMstosecurePKI.Q36

ThetopareasofdeploymenttosecurePKIare

onlinerootsandofflineroots.Accordingtolast

year’sresearch,47percentsaidtheyaredeployedtosecurePKIinonlinerootsand42percentsaidtheyaredeployedtosecurePKIinofflineroots.

KeyFindings

112026GlobalStateofPost-QuantumandCryptographicSecurityTrends

KeyFindings

findingsfromlastyear’sEntruststudyareincluded.

Inthissectionwepresenttheresearchresultsindetail.Thereportisorganizedaccordingtothefollowingtopics.Wheneverpossible,trendsinresearch

Post-Quantum:

TheThreatandtheReadinessJourney

CryptographicSecurityandManagement

TrendsinPKI

SecurityandHSMs

Post-Quantum:TheThreatandtheReadinessJourney

Organizationsbelievethepost-quantumthreatisimminent.AsshowninFigure2,75percentofrespondentsagreeandsayaquantumcomputerwillbecapableofbreakingtraditionalpublickeycryptographywithinfiveyears(51percent)orinfiveto10years(24percent).Only12percentsayitwillneverhappen.

FIGURE2.Whendoyoubelieveaquantumcomputerwillbecapableofbreaking

traditionalpublickeycryptography,suchasRSAandECC?

60

50

PercentageofRespondents(%)

51%

40

30

20

10

24%

11%12%

2%

0

5to10years

Within5years

NeverUnsure

Morethan10years

122026GlobalStateofPost-QuantumandCryptographicSecurityTrends

Thebiggestchallengetoreducingthequantumthreatandmigrationtopost-quantumcryptography(PQC)continuestobetheinabilitytoimprovethediscovery/inventoryoftheirorganizations’

cryptographicassets.Post-quantumcryptographyconsistsofencryptionalgorithmsortoolsthatcanwithstandattacksfrombothtraditionalandquantumcomputers.

AccordingtoFigure3,41percentofrespondentsinthisyear’sstudyvs.43percentofrespondentsinlastyear’sstudysaytheinabilitytoimprovevisibilityintotheircryptographicassetsisthegreatestconcern.Twoconcernsthathaveincreasedsignificantlyarethelackofanadequatebudget(39percentinthisyear’sstudyvs.only31percentinlastyear’sstudy)andlackofin-houseexpertise(38percentinthisyear’sstudyvs.only28percentinlastyear’sstudy).

Concernsthathavedecreasedarenothavingtherightscaleandtechnologiestosupporttheextracomputingpowerrequiredbynewalgorithms(31percentofrespondentsinthisyear’sstudyvs.38percentinlastyear’sstudy)andthepost-quantumcryptographicalgorithmsproposedarenewandmaynotbesecureafter

deployment(32percentofrespondentsinthisyear’sstudyvs.40percentofrespondentsinlastyear’sstudy).

FIGURE3.WhatareyourgreatestconcernswhenitcomestothequantumthreatandmigrationtoPQC?

Threeresponsespermitted

41%

43%

Theinabilitytoimprovethediscovery/inventoryofourorganization’scryptographicassets

(e.g.,keys,certificates,secrets,algorithms,etc.)

39%31%

38%28%

33%

Nothavinganadequatebudget

Nothavingin-houseexpertise

37%

Theinabilitytohaveanenterprise-widestrategy

33%27%

32%

Nothavingseniorleadershipandboardsponsorship

40%

Thepost-quantumcryptographicalgorithmsproposedarenewandmaynotbesecureafterdeployment

31%

38%

Nothavingtherightscaleandtechnologiestosupporttheextracomputing

27%24%

26%

powerrequiredbynewalgorithmsThe“harvestnow,decryptlater”threatduetolong-termencrypteddatathatisatrisk

Theabilitytotestallour

32%

organization’ssystems,endpoints,andnetworksandmanagethetransition

IIII

010203040

FY2025FY2024Percentage(%)

132026GlobalStateofPost-QuantumandCryptographicSecurityTrends

Fiftypercentofrespondentssayasuccessfulquantumattackwouldhaveaseriousimpactontheir

organizationsandindustries.Respondentswereaskedtoratetheimpactasuccessfulquantumattackwouldhaveontheirorganizationand/orindustryfrom1=noimpactto10=seriousimpactandtheadequacyof

governmentpolicyandpublic-privatecoordinationonascalefrom1=notadequateto10=morethanadequate(7+responses).

AsshowninFigure4,50percentratethepotentialimpactasserious(7+onthe10-pointscale)butonly36percentofrespondentsratetheadequacyofgovernmentpolicyandpublic-privatecoordinationonquantumreadinessasmorethanadequate(7+onthe10-pointscale).Q7,8,9

FIGURE4.Apotentialquantumattackisconsideredseriousandcoordinationonquantumreadinessbetweengovernmentandthepublic-privatesectorislackingOn