【英文】国际能源署IEA：清洁能源技术供应链数据-挑战与潜在解决方案

CleanEnergy

TechnologySupplyChainData

Challengesandpotentialsolutions

INTERNATIONALENERGYAGENCY

TheIEAexaminesthefullspectrum

ofenergyissues

includingoil,gasand

coalsupplyand

demand,renewable

energytechnologies,

electricitymarkets,

energyefficiency,

accesstoenergy,

demandside

managementandmuchmore.Throughitswork,theIEAadvocates

policiesthatwillenhancethereliability,

affordabilityand

sustainabilityofenergyinits

32Membercountries,13Associationcountriesandbeyond.

Thispublicationandanymapincludedhereinarewithoutprejudicetothestatusoforsovereigntyoveranyterritory,tothedelimitationof

internationalfrontiersandboundariesandtothenameofanyterritory,cityorarea.

Source:IEA.

InternationalEnergyAgencyWebsite:

IEAMembercountries:

Australia

Austria

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CzechRepublicDenmark

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Finland

France

GermanyGreece

HungaryIreland

ItalyJapanKoreaLatvia

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LuxembourgMexico

Netherlands

NewZealandNorway

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Portugal

SlovakRepublicSpain

Sweden

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RepublicofTürkiyeUnitedKingdom

UnitedStates

TheEuropean

CommissionalsoparticipatesintheworkoftheIEA

IEAAssociationcountries:

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Indonesia

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Singapore

SouthAfricaThailand

UkraineVietNam

CleanEnergyTechnologySupplyChainDataAbstract

Challengesandpotentialsolutions

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Abstract

EnergysecurityintheAgeofElectricityisinextricablylinkedtosecuringthesupplychainsforcleanenergytechnologiesandtheequipmentandmaterialsusedtomanufacturethem.Ascountriescontinuetopursueenergytransitionsandtodirectinvestmentstothesetechnologies,guidedbyindustrialstrategies,adetailedunderstandingoftheirsupplychainshasanessentialroletoplay.Theavailabilityofgood-quality,timelydataiscrucialtogainingthisunderstandingandtoidentifyingandaddressingsupplychainvulnerabilities.

ThisreportisprovidedasaninputtothediscussionstakingplaceaspartoftheGlobalCleanPowerAllianceSupplyChainsMission–aninitiativeestablishedbytheGovernmentoftheUnitedKingdomtoadvancepracticalsolutionstostrengthencleanpowersupplychains.Thisreportaddressesthedatacomponentofthisinitiativeandexploresthechallenges–andpotentialsolutions–tothepaucityofgranularandtimelydataassociatedwithcleanenergytechnologysupplychains.

CleanEnergyTechnologySupplyChainDataAcknowledgements

Challengesandpotentialsolutions

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Acknowledgements

ThisreportwaspreparedbytheEnergyDataCentreandEnergyTechnologyPolicyDivisionoftheInternationalEnergyAgency.ThestudywasdesignedanddirectedbyZuzanaDobrotkova,HeadofAnnualEnergyDataandStatistics.PeterLevi,HeadoftheTechnologySupplyChainUnit,providedstrategicguidanceandinputtothiswork.PrincipalcontributorswereJackJaenschandFaidonPapadimoulis.Valuablecommentsandfeedbackwereprovidedbyseniormanagement,includingNickJohnstoneandTimurGül.

LizzieSayereditedthemanuscript.Per-AndersWidellprovidedessentialsupportthroughouttheprocess.ThanksalsototheIEACommunicationsandDigitalOfficefortheirhelpinproducingthereport,particularlytoPoeliBojorquez,AstridDumondandIsabelleNonain-Semelin.

TheworkbenefitedfromfinancialsupportprovidedbytheGovernmentoftheUnitedKingdom,andfromdiscussionsduringtwotechnicalworkshopshostedbytheIEAin2025conveningseveralgovernmentrepresentativesandrelevantinternationalorganisations.

SeveralexpertsfromoutsideoftheIEAprovidedvaluableinput,commentedandreviewedthisreportandactivityparticipatedinthetwotechnicalworkshops.Theyinclude:AndreaAndrenelli(TradeandAgricultureDirectorate,OECD);JaneChandler(UnitedKingdom,DepartmentforEnergySecurityandNetZero);FernandodeOliveira(TradeandAgricultureDirectorate,OECD);BrigetteDemerais(NaturalResourcesCanada);GaelGrooby(WorldCustomsOrganization);NataliaHoffmanRamos(Brazil,MinistryofMinesandEnergy);BirteHolstJoergensen(TechnicalUniversityofDenmark);PremyslawKowalski(TradeandAgricultureDirectorate,OECD);AtsushiKurosawa(TheInstituteofAppliedEnergy,Japan);SamLowe(Australia,DepartmentofClimateChange,Energy,theEnvironmentandWater);VeronicaPiatkov(Australia,DepartmentofClimateChange,Energy,theEnvironmentandWater);SimonStrickland(UnitedKingdom,CabinetOffice);NarayanSubramanian(IndependentConsultant);EvdokiaTapoglou(EuropeanCommission,JointResearchCentre);JacopoTattini(EuropeanCommission,DGGROW);RobertTowers(UnitedKingdom,DepartmentforEnergySecurityandNetZero);DanielWeaver(UnitedKingdom,

DepartmentforEnergySecurityandNetZero).

CleanEnergyTechnologySupplyChainDataTableofcontents

Challengesandpotentialsolutions

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Tableofcontents

ExecutiveSummary 6

Introduction 8

Energysecurityrisksareevolving 8

Cleanenergytechnologysupplychainsarecomplex 9

Geographicalconcentrationposesrisks 13

Economicopportunitiesexist 17

TheSupplyChainsMission 18

Theexistingdatalandscape 20

Scopeofthisreport 21

Datacategories 23

Datasources 25

Dataquality 27

Boundaryissues 31

Useofexistingdata 32

Policyconsiderations 34

Dataframeworks 34

Domesticactions 36

Actionsrequiringinternationalco-operation 39

Prioritisingpotentialactionstoco-ordinatefortheSupplyChainsMission 41

CIeanEnergyTechnoIogySuppIyChainDataExecutivesummary

ChaIIengesandpotentiaIsoIutions

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Executivesummary

EnergysecurityintheAgeofElectricityisinextricablylinkedtosecuringthesupplychainsforcleanenergytechnologiesandtheequipmentandmaterialsusedtomanufacturethem.AscountriescontinuetopursueenergytransitionsandmakeinvestmentsinthedepIoymentandmanufacturingofthesetechnoIogies-guidedbyindustriaIstrategies-adetaiIedunderstandingoftheirsuppIychainshasanessentiaIroIetopIay.

Theavailabilityofgood-quality,timelydataiscrucialtounderstandingcleanenergytechnologysupplychainsandaddressingvulnerabilities.RiskstosuppIychainscanarisefrominterdependenciesacrosstechnoIogiesandbetweengeographies,amongotherfactors.Today,theavaiIabIedatashowsthatmanycIeanenergytechnoIogysuppIychainsarehighIyconcentrated,andthereforevuInerabIetopotentiaIdisruptionscausedbothbyhumanactivity,suchastraderestrictionsandconfIict,andbynaturaIhazards-exacerbatingriskstoenergysecurity.

High-quality,timelydataonenergytechnologysupplychainsisessentialforevidence-basedpolicymaking.ThiscouIdincIude,forexampIe,understandingwhichcountrieshaveundeveIopedmineraIresourcesthatcouIdbeminedandrefinedcompetitiveIytosatisfyfuturedemandanddiversifysuppIy,orthepotentiaItodeveIopacompetitivemanufacturingbaseinaparticuIarcountrytopositionitinagivencIeanenergysuppIychain.ToreducevuInerabiIitiesinthesuppIychain,betterdatacouIdheIpuncoveragivencountryorindustry’sexposuretoaparticuIartradepartnerforagiventechnoIogy,ortoapotentiaIincreaseinpriceforacertainmateriaIorcomponent.SuchdatacouIdaIsoheIpidentifyopportunitiestoincreasestrategictradepartnershipsforaparticuIarmineraI,materiaIcomponentortechnoIogy.

Thereiscurrentlynoauthoritative“one-stop-shop”sourceforenergytechnologysupplychaindataglobally.Differentdatasources-somepubIicandothersproprietary-areneededtocomposeevenapartiaIpictureofthesuppIychainsofinterest,withvaryingdegreesofquaIityandcoverage.Inaddition,thecIeanenergytechnoIogysuppIychainisdeveIopingrapidIy,andsystemsofdatacoIIectionmustbeabIetokeeppaceastechnoIogies,resourceavaiIabiIitiesandcoststructureschangeovertime.

StrengtheningglobalsupplychainsforcleanpoweristhegoaloftheSupplyChainsMissionwhichwasestablishedbytheUnitedKingdomin2025undertheGlobalCleanPowerAlliance(GCPA).TheMissionaimstoworkwithinternationaIpartnerstoidentifyanddeIiverthechangesneededtodiversifycIean

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powersupplychainsandresolvebottlenecks.ThisreportsupportstheworkoftheDatapillaroftheMissionbyprovidingahigh-levelassessmentofthecurrentstatusofdatarelevanttocleanenergysupplychainsandproposingamenuofpossibleactionstoaddressdatachallenges,bothatthenationallevelandthroughinternationalcollaboration.

Whilethisworkisrelevantformanycountries,emergingmarketsanddevelopingeconomiescouldparticularlybenefit.Betterdatacouldsupportstrategicexpansionoftheirfootprintincleanenergytechnologysupplychains,contributingtoincreasedindustrialisationandeconomicdevelopment.Ifsuccessful,suchexpansionwouldalsohelptoincreasediversificationofcleanenergysupplychainsglobally,strengtheningtheenergysecurityofallcountries.

Governmentactionwillbeessentialtoimprovetheavailabilityandqualityofdataoncleanenergytechnologysupplychains.Examplemeasuresincludemandatoryreportingandensuringadequatestaffingandresourcesfordatacollectionandpublication.Whilethishasacost,theinvestmentindatacollectionrequiredissmallwhencomparedtothebenefitsofthecommercialinvestmentandindustrialisationitcouldenable,andofresultingimprovementsinenergysecurity.Theactionsofindividualgovernments,whileessential,willbeinsufficientontheirown.Giventheglobalnatureofhowcleanenergytechnologysupplychainsevolve,aholisticapproach,drawingoninternationalcollaboration,willbeneededtoimprovethecurrentstateofenergytechnologysupplychaindata.

Therearemanypotentialactionsgovernmentscantaketoaddresssupplychaindatachallenges-theSupplyChainsMissioncanbeakeyforuminwhichtoco-ordinateandprioritise.ThisreportculminatesinasetofsuggestedgovernmentactionsasaninputtothediscussionstakingplaceundertheSupplyChainsMission.Inthenext6months,itissuggestedthatgovernmentscouldmaptheentitlesresponsiblefordatacollectionactivitiesdomesticallyanddesignateresponsibilityforco-ordinatingrelevantefforts,aswellasbeginningtoengagewithinternationalentitiesactiveinthisspace.Inthenextyear,itissuggestedthatgovernmentsmaywishtoestablishorenhancetheregulatoryframeworksupportingdatacollectionactivitiesnationally,andtoestablishcollaborationsontheseactivitieswithindustryandacademiaacrosstheworld.Ifgovernmentsco-ordinatetheiractions,theireffortscanbemultiplied,andthechallengesaroundsupplychaindatathatthisreportidentifiescanbemademoretractable.

CleanEnergyTechnologySupplyChainDataIntroduction

Challengesandpotentialsolutions

Introduction

Cleanenergytechnologysupplychains

1

aregainingincreasingattentionfrompolicymakersduetotheirimportanceforenergytransitions,energysecurityandindustrialdevelopment.However,thedatausedtotrackandunderstandcleanenergysupplychains–whichisacrucialinputtoevidence-basedpolicymaking

–is,inmanycases,limited,incomplete,orofpoor-quality.

Thisreportprovidesanoverviewofdatarelevanttocleanenergytechnologysupplychains:itssources,characteristicsanduses.Thereportalsosummarisesthedataqualityissuesencounteredintheavailabledatasourcesandtheimplicationsofthoseissues.Thecomplexityoftrackingcertaintypesofdatathatcoverresourcesspanningacrossmanydifferentsupplychains,isalsodiscussed.Itconcludeswithaseriesofpolicyconsiderations,includingamenuofpotentialactionstoaddresstheissuesidentified.

ThereportisprovidedasaninputtothediscussionstakingplaceundertheDatapillaroftheSupplyChainsMissionlaunchedin2025throughthe

GlobalClean

PowerAlliance

(GCPA).Theworkunderthispillarisguidedbythebeliefthatbetterdataenablesmoreeffectivepolicyanalysisanddecision-making,whichinturncanstrengthenenergysecurityandindustrialdevelopment,atthesametimeassupportingeffortstotrackprogressinenergytransitions.

Energysecurityrisksareevolving

Whilemuchhaschangedsincetheoilcrisesofthe1970sfirstbroughttheissueofenergysecurityintosharpfocus,itremainsapressingconcernformanycountries.Asenergysystemsbecomemoreelectrifiedandmoredecentralised,theconceptofenergysecurityhasexpandedbeyonditsinitialconcentrationonoilsupply.Energysecuritynowencompassesnotonlyfuelsbutalsocleanenergytechnologies.Thesetechnologiesusewidelyavailableandrenewableresources,suchassunshine,windandambienttemperature,whichareinherentlymoresecurethanfossilfuelsduetotheiruniversalaccessibility.

Thepotentialimpactsofdisruptionstofossilfuelandcleanenergytechnologysupplychainsdiffer.Forcleanenergytechnologies,thepotentialbottlenecksandscarcityofsuppliesthatcouldaffectenergysecurityarenotrelatedtotheextractionandtransportoffuels,butinsteadtotheavailabilityofmaterialsandequipmentusedtogenerate,convertanduseelectricity.Forfossilfuels,the

1Inthecontextofthisreport,‘cleanenergytechnologysupplychains’refersbroadlytoarangeoftechnologies,componentsandmaterialsthatunderpintheAgeofElectricity,includinggridtechnologiesandcriticalminerals.

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CleanEnergyTechnologySupplyChainDataIntroduction

Challengesandpotentialsolutions

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impactsofsupplydisruptionscanbefeltbyconsumersinamatterofdays.Bycontrast,disruptionstocleanenergytechnologysupplychainsmostlyaffectthebuild-outofnewfacilitiesorthereplacementofexistingones.However,astheworldentersthe

AgeofElectricity

thecentralityofthesesupplychainsinconsiderationsaroundenergysecurityisonlysettoincrease.

Cleanenergytechnologysupplychainsarecomplex

Cleanenergytechnologysupplychainsaregenerallylessmatureandmorecomplexthanfossilfuelsupplychains,inwhichfuelsareextracted,cleaned,refined,orotherwiseprocessedandcanthenbedirectlytradedascommodities.Bycontrast,cleanenergytechnologysupplychainsconsistofmultiplesteps,withinputsofmaterials,componentsandservicesinvolvedateachstage,oftenencompassingdozensofminerals,metals,othermaterialsandcomponents(manyofwhichhaveproprietarydesigns)eachofwhichareoftentradedbetweenmultiplecountries.Differentdesignvariantswithinagiventechnologycategorycanimplysubstantialdifferencesinsupplychainarrangements,ascanbeseenintheexamplesofcrystallineandthin-filmsolarPVsystems(see

Figure1).

Figure1.

Simplifiedsupplychainforcrystallinesiliconandthin-filmsolarPVsystems

IEA.CCBY4.0.

Source:IEA(2022),

SpecialReportonSolarPVGlobalSupplyChains.

Cleanenergytechnologysupplychainstendtohaveamuchgreaterreliancethanfossilfuelsupplychainsonawidevarietyofcriticalminerals,includingrareearthelements(REEs

2

),copper,nickel,lithium,cobalt,manganese,graphite,siliconandplatinumgroupelements.

Figure2

showstheprevalenceofsomeofthesemineralsacrossthesupplychainsforproducingelectricvehicle(EV)batteries.Astechnologiesprogressrapidly,supplychainsaresubjecttoconstantchanges.Forexample,themetalsusedinbatterieskeepevolvingbasedontheiroverallperformance,aswellastheiravailabilityandpriceonthemarket.In2020,lithiumnickelmanganesecobaltoxide(NMC)batteriessuppliedover90%oftheelectriccarbatterymarketglobally,whilelithiumironphosphate(LFP)batteriessuppliedlessthan10%.However,

by2024,almosthalfofthismarketwassuppliedbyLFP

batteries

,displacing,inpart,chemistriesbasedonnickelandcobalt.Thisshiftwasinitiallydrivenbyhighnickelandcobaltpricesin2021-2022,butcontinuedevenasmineralpricesthendeclined,asaresultofinnovationsthatimprovedtheenergydensityofLFPandincreasedpricecompetitionintheEVmarket.

Figure2.

Electricvehiclebatteryminerals’supplychainfromextractiontoend-use,bymineralvalue,2023

MiningMineralsProcessingRefinedmineralsCathodematerialBatterydemand

China

Australia

SouthAmerica

Africa

Other

SoutheastAsia

China

North

America

Other

Europe

LFP

SouthAmerica

NMC

OtherIndonesia

GrLiCo

Ni

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Notes:Gr=graphite;Li=lithium;Co=cobalt;Ni=nickel;LFP=lithiumironphosphate;NMC=lithiumnickelmanganesecobaltoxide.Flowsarescaledbasedontheeconomicvalueofamineralorthecombinedvalueofmineralsusedinthecathodeorelectricvehiclebattery.Allflowsarerepresentedonamaterialpriceterm.

Source:IEA(2025),

TheStateofEnergyInnovation2025.

2REEsencompass15lanthanides(metallicchemicalelementswithatomicnumbers57–71),alongwithscandiumandyttrium.

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CleanEnergyTechnologySupplyChainDataIntroduction

Challengesandpotentialsolutions

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Cleanenergysupplychainsuseavastarrayofdifferentmineralandmaterialresources,andtheirusevariesbytechnology.Batteriesrequirelithium,cobalt,manganeseandnickel,whilethemagnetsinsomewindturbinesandelectricenginesrequireREEs(

Figure3

).Electricitynetworks,electricappliancesandequipmentandEVsallrequirecopper.Electrolysersandfuelcellsrequirenickelorplatinumgroupmetals,dependingonthetechnologytype.Thequantitiesofcriticalmineralsandotherrawmaterialsneededforcleanenergytechnologiescanbesignificant:Solarandwindgenerallyrequiremoresteel,aluminiumand,insomecases,cementperunitofcapacitythanfossilfuel-basedgeneratingtechnologies.Forexample,anonshorewindplantrequiresninetimesmoremineralresourcesthanagas-firedplantwiththesamecapacity.Formoreanalysisandmodellingrelatedtocriticalmineralsandtheglobalenergysystem,pleaseseetheIEAs

GlobalCriticalMineralsOutlook2025

.

Thesupplychainsforcleanenergytechnologiestypicallyspanacrossmanydifferentcountries.Inaglobalisedworldwithunevenlydistributedresources,itisunrealisticforcountriestoseektolocateentirecleanenergysupplychainswithintheirborders.Instead,totapintothegrowingmarketsforcleanenergytechnologies,countriesareracingtopositionthemselvesinthesupplychainsforthesetechnologies,includingbydevisingindustrialstrategiesinordertobuildorexpandtheirmarketshares.Themultiplestepsinthecomplexsupplychainsforcleanenergytechnologiespresentseveralpotentialopportunitiesforcountriesseekingtogainastrategicposition.Manyofthesedonotdependonthepresenceofamineraldepositortheavailabilityofothernaturalresources.Differentpolicymeasurescansupporttheexpansionofsupplychains,suchasoverarchingindustrialstrategies,targetedRD&Dsupport,taxanddutyexemptions,ormoreinterventionistpolicies,suchassubsidisingthecostofenergyormaterials.

Energysecurityconsiderationsrelatedtocleanenergytechnologiesgobeyondtheriskstosupplyofphysicalassets.Deploymentofcleanenergytechnologiestakesplaceinthecontextofincreasingelectrification,whichbringswithitnewcybersecuritychallengesrelatedtotheITsystemsrequiredtomanageelectricitygeneration,transmission,distributionandconsumption.Asdigitalcontrols,sensorsandconnecteddevicesproliferateinordertointegratecleanenergytechnologiesintothesystemandoperatesystemsclosertotheirlimitsexposuretocyberriskisgrowinginscaleandcomplexity.

CleanEnergyTechnologySupplyChainDataIntroduction

Challengesandpotentialsolutions

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Figure3.Globalaveragerawmaterialrequirementsforselectedenergytechnologies,2021

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Note:Whilethisfiguredepictsrawmaterialrequirementsin2021,theseremainquitestableintimeandhavenotchangedsignificantlysincethen.

Source:IEA(2023),

EnergyTechnologyPerspectives2023.

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Thecomplexityofcleanenergytechnologysupplychainsmeanstheyencompassmultipledifferentsourcesofvulnerabilitythatcouldimpactenergysecurity:

Unduedependenceonasingleproducer,whetheritbeacountry,acorporateentityoranindividualfacility.

Maritimeorotherchokepointsintradingroutes.

Conflict,geopoliticalinstability,piracy,cyber-attacksorotherrisksstemmingfromhumanactivitythatcanaffectproductionandtrade.

Naturalhazardsandweather-relatedrisksthatcanaffectproductionandtrade.

Competitionformaterialsorcomponentswithothersectorswithhigherwillingnesstopay,affectingcostsandavailability(forexampledefence,aerospace,medicalequipmentorelectronics).

‘Dumping’andothernon-marketpracticesthatcanaffecttheappetiteforinvestmentandfuturelevelsofsupply.

Verylongpermittingprocedurespreventingagileadjustmentsofsupplychains.

Complexframeworksforenvironmentalandsocialstandards,whichcanaffectlevelsofcomplianceandtheabilitytodocumenttheacceptabilityofmaterials,componentsandfinalproducts.Thisincludesthelackof

traceabilityincritical

mineralsupplychains

.

Alackofsubstitutabilityorrepairabilitywithrespecttoagivenmineral,materialorcomponent.

Alackofappropriatelyskilledlabour.

Systematiclimitationsinaccesstotheinvestmentrequiredtobuild-outprocessingandmanufacturingfacilities,suchasinthecaseofseveraldevelopingeconomies.

Manyoftheseriskscanbepartiallyalleviatedbypolicychoicesmadebygovernments,buttheinverseisalsotrue–certainpolicychoicesmayexacerbaterisks.Inthiscontext,high-quality,up-to-datedataarecrucialinputstoevidenced-basedpolicydesign.

Geographicalconcentrationposesrisks

Supplychainsareespeciallyvulnerabletotherisksassociatedwithgeographicconcentration.Thiscanleadtoinformationasymmetries,inefficientpricinginthemarketandtheexercisingofmarketpower,orothersignsofmarketconcentration.Concentrationinaparticulargeographyexacerbatesotherrisks,suchaslackofdiversityintradingroutesorvulnerabilitytonaturalhazardsorhuman-causedrisks.

Concentrationinonecountryorregioncanbearesultofnaturalresourceendowmentsforparticularmetalsorminerals,asdepositscanbehighlyconcentrated.Forexample,over

halfoftheworld’scurrentlyknowncobalt

reservesarelocated

intheDemocraticRepublicofCongo.However,refiningand

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otherprocessingofmetalsandmineralsalsoplayacrucialroleandcanbeevenmoreconcentratedthanthedepositsthemselves.

Marketconcentrationcanresult,inpart,fromthecomparativeadvantageofcertainregionsthathaveabundantresources,butlowproductioncosts,policiesthattransfercostsfromproducerstotaxpayersandcertainmeasuresthataffecttradealsocontributetoconcentrationinthesupplychain.Thesizeofdifferenteconomiesalsocontributestotheconcentrationobservedindifferentmarkets.

Thedownstreamstepsinsupplychainstendtobelessconcentratedthanthoseupstream.Forexample,inthesolarPVsupplychain,thePeople’sRepublicofChina(hereafter,“China”)accountsformorethan95%ofglobalwaferproduction,whereassubstantialsharesofglobalcellandmoduleproductiontakeplaceinSoutheastAsia–albeitinmanycasesinfactoriesownedbyChinesecompanies.Batteryproductionissimilarlymoreconcentratedattheupstreamsteps(e.g.anodeandcathodeproduction)andlesssoatthedownstreamcellproductionstep.Incontrast,themanufacturingofthemaincomponentsofwindturbines–nacelles,bladesandtowers–moreoftentakesplacein(orcloserto)thedeploymentlocation.Formoreinformationonthemanufacturingandtradeofcleanenergytechnologies,pleaseseetheIEA’s

EnergyTechnologyPerspectives

2024

.

Diversificationisfundamentaltoeffortsenhanceenergysecurity–thisisastrueforcleanenergytechnologysupplychainsasitisforoilandgas.Asthevolumeofinternationaltradecontinuestogrowforallgoodsworldwide,theriskofseverecongestionandphysicalsupplydisruptionsatchokepointsalongthemainshippingroutesincreases.Thesecanbecausedbygeopoliticalinstabilities,naturalhazardsandweather-relatedevents,piracyoraccidents.Establishingalternativeroutes,forexamplebybuildingnewrailcorridors,andst