野村-评估哪些经济体受去美元化冲击最大-Gauging who is most exposed to de-dollarization-20260306

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SpecialReport

GlobalMarketsResearch

6March2026

Gaugingwhoismostexposedtode-dollarization

•Shouldde-dollarizationstarttogaintraction,evenamodest

repatriationofUSDassetscouldsignificantlyappreciatethe

valueofthecurrenciesofthosecountriesmostheavilyexposed.

•ToassessthelevelofexposuretoUSportfolioassets,includingthemixofUSequitiesanddebtsecurities,wescaleeach

country’sholdingsbyitstotalforeignportfolioassetsorGDP.

•Outsidethepureoffshorefinancialcenters,itisnaturalthat

manyoftheworld’slargesteconomiesarethelargestholdersofUSportfolioassets,butwefindthatthisisnotalwaysthecase:somemiddle-sizedeconomies,inDMandEM,havebecome

disproportionatelyexposed.

•Wefindstrongevidencethatcentralbanksinmanycountries

havemadeaconsciousefforttodiversifytheirforeignreserveassetsintogold.Centralbanks’totalholdingsofgoldsurpassedtotalforeignofficialholdingsofUSTsecuritiesinSeptember

2025,andcouldovertaketotalforeignnon-official(i.e.,private)holdingsofUSTsecuritieslaterthisyear.

•Whetherthisdiversificationintogoldbycentralbanksisa

harbingerofabroaderde-dollarizationtrendinthemuchlargerprivatesectorremainstobeseen.

ResearchAnalysts

GlobalEconomics

RobSubbaraman-NSL

rob.subbaraman@

+6564336548

AsiaFXStrategy

ManthanShingala-NSL

manthan.shingala1@

+6564336427

ProductionComplete:2026-03-0610:03UTC

SeeAppendixA-1foranalystcertification,importantdisclosuresandthestatusofnon-USanalysts.

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Contents

Executivesummary3America’sexorbitantprivilege4Thecaseforde-dollarization5MeasuringforeignexposuretoUSportfolioassets6TrackinghowforeignexposuretoUSportfolioassetshaschangedovertimeatacountrylevel12Theincreasedglobaldemandforgold14RecentSpecialReports17AppendixA-118

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Executivesummary

Shouldde-dollarizationstarttogaintractionevenmodestrepatriationofUSDassetscouldsignificantlyappreciatethevalueofthecurrenciesofthosecountriesmostheavily

exposed,therebyerodingexportcompetitivenessandpossiblyweakeningdomestic

demandtoo.Atacountrylevel,weexaminethelargestforeignholdersofUSportfolio

assets,includingthemixofUSdebtsecuritiesandequities,andimportantly,toassess

thelevelofexposure,wescaleeachcountry’sholdingsbyitstotalforeignportfolioassetsornominalGDP.Outsidethepureoffshorefinancialcenters,itisnaturaltoassumethatmanyoftheworld’slargesteconomiesarethelargestholdersofUSportfolioassets,butweshowthisisnotalwaysthecase:somemiddle-sizedeconomiesinoursampleof

around50countries,acrossbothDMandEM,havebecomedisproportionatelyexposed.

Wefindthat:

1.SevencountriesholdmorethanhalfoftheirtotalforeignportfolioassetsintheUS–Canadaistheextremeat91%,followedbytheUK,Israel,Mexico,Colombia,AustraliaandKorea.

2.Sevencountrieshaveoverone-thirdoftheirtotalforeignportfolioassetsinUSequities–Canadaagainistheextremeat65%,followedbyAustralia,theUK,Korea,Israel,NorwayandSweden.

3.SevencountriesholdUSportfolioassetsthatexceedthevalueoftheirGDP–Ireland(3xlarger),NorwayandSingapore(2xlarger),HongKong,Switzerland,

CanadaandTaiwan.

4.Since2019,mostcountriesinoursamplehaveincreasedtheirshareofUS

portfolioassets(outoftotalforeignportfolioassets),particularlySingapore,Mexico,

Australia,UK,Canada,Israel.ButChinaandBrazilhavereducedtheirshares.

5.ForUSdebtsecurities,two-thirdsofthecountrieshavereducedtheirshare,partlyduetothemoveintogold.BrazilandChinaarethemoreextremeexamples.

6.Bycontrast,forUSequities,mostcountrieshavesignificantlyincreasedtheirshare,especiallyinMexico,Australia,Korea,Singapore,UK,ColombiaandCanada.

7.Centralbanks’holdingsofgoldsurpassedforeignofficialholdingsofUST

securitiesinSeptember2025,and,onourestimates,couldovertakeforeignnon-

official(i.e.,private)holdingsofUSTsecuritieslaterthisyear.Whetherthisisa

harbingerofabroaderde-dollarizationtrendinthemuchlargerprivatesectorremains

tobeseen.

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America’sexorbitantprivilege

TheUS’sconsistentglobaleconomicoutperformance,itsstatusastheepicenteroftheAIrevolutionanditsexorbitantprivilegeofissuingtheworld’sonlyreservecurrencyhas

resultedinseeminglyinsatiableglobaldemandforUSDassets.Sincetheglobalfinancialcrisis,foreigninvestorshavepurchasedanet~USD2trnofUSequities(Figure1,grey

line);addtothatthemassivesharepricevaluationgains,andtotalforeignholdingsofUSequitieshaveskyrocketedtoUSD21.5trn(redline)asofSeptember2025,eclipsingthe

USD15.8trnholdingsofUSdebtsecurities(Figure2).TotalforeignholdingsofUS

portfolioassets(equitiesplusdebtsecurities)havetripledtoUSD37.3trnfromUSD11.9trnin2010,largelyduetotheequitycapitalgains.[1]Byassettypein2024(latestdata),

foreigninvestorsowned33%ofUStreasuries,27%ofUScorporatedebtand18%ofUSequitiesoutstanding,accordingtoUSTreasurydata.

Fig.1:Foreigninvestors’cumulativenetpurchasesandtotalholdings(includingvaluationeffects)ofUSequities

Note:WetakethestockofInternationalInvestmentPosition(IIP)USequityliabilitiesasatQ41998,andaccumulatethesubsequentquarterlyflowofBOPUSequityinflows

(debitminuscredit).ThedifferencebetweenUSequityliabilitiesandtheaccumulationofUSequityinflowscanapproximatethevaluationeffects.

Source:CEIC,BureauofEconomicAnalysis,Nomura

Fig.2:Foreigninvestors’cumulativenetpurchasesandtotalholdings(includingvaluationeffects)ofUSdebtsecurities

Note:WetakethestockoftheInternationalInvestmentposition(IIP)ofUSdebt

securitiesliabilitiesasatQ41998andaccumulatethesubsequentquarterlyflowofBOPUSdebtsecuritiesinflows(debtminuscredit).ThedifferencebetweenUSdebtliabilitiesandtheaccumulationofUSdebtinflowscanapproximatethevaluationeffects.

Source:CEIC,BureauofEconomicAnalysis,Nomura

1.WeareinterestedindecomposinghowmuchofthissurgeinUSforeignportfolioliabilitiesisduetonew

foreigninvestmentsintheUSversusvaluationeffects(assetpriceappreciation)onoutstandinginvestments.Therearetwodifferentdatasourcestodecomposethesetwoeffects:USbalanceofpayments(BOP)dataonportfolioinflowsmeasure(theflowof)newinvestmentsbyforeignersintheUSeachquarteratbook

value,whileUSIIPdataonportfolioliabilitiesmeasure(thestockof)alloutstandingforeigninvestmentsintheUSatmarketvalue.TakingthestockofIIPUSportfolioliabilitiesasatQ41998,weaccumulatethe

subsequentquarterlyflowofBOPUSportfolioinflows(debitminuscredit).ThedifferencebetweenUSportfolioliabilitiesandtheaccumulationofUSportfolioinflowscanapproximatethevaluationeffects.

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Thecaseforde-dollarization

However,thereisalimittotheworld’sinsatiabledemandforUSDassets.TheUS’stotalnetinternationalinvestmentposition(thesumofforeignportfolio,directandother

investmentassetsminusliabilities)hasswelledfrom-USD2.5trn(16%ofGDP)in2010to

-USD27.6trn(89%ofGDP)asofSeptember2025.IftheUScontinuestorunlarge

currentaccountdeficits,attheextreme,theeconomywilleventuallybeownedby

foreigners,althoughmarketswouldforceabreakingpointwellbeforethen,aspressuresmountfromincreasingoutflowsofnetinterestpayments,dividendsandprofits,aprocessthatcouldaccelerateifglobalinvestorsstarttopriceinahigherUSriskpremium.ThewarintheMiddleEastisaninterestingeventstudy,asitshowedthatUSDstillbehaveslikeaglobalreservecurrency:therewasglobalcapitalflighttoUSDsafety,althoughthebroadUSDindexstrengthenedonlymodestlyandUSTbondssoldoff,eventhoughtheUS

economyhasbecomemoreresilienttohigheroilandgasprices.Overall,itremainshighlyuncertainif–letalonewhen–de-dollarizationwillgaintraction,butitisarisk.

Tobesure,notonlyistheprospectof“de-dollarization”hotlydebated,butthenotionitselfseemstomeandifferentthingstodifferentpeople.Wethinkitisimportanttodistinguishtheliteversionofde-dollarizationfromheavierversions.Theliteversiondescribesa

declineinthebroadUSDindex,fueledbyanarrowingofUS-foreigninterestrate

differentials,increasedFXhedgingofUSDexposureandhighUSmarketvaluationsthatencouragediversificationintonewinvestmentallocationsandawayfromalreadylargeholdingsofUSDassets.Theliteversionofde-dollarizationdescribesamorecyclical

declineintheUSDindexdrivenbyariseinincrementaldiversificationofnewforeign

investmentsintonon-USDassets,aswellasUSresidentsdiversifyingmoreintoforeignassets.Itcouldbearguedthatthisliteversionofde-dollarizationhasbeenplayingout.

Heavierversionsofde-dollarizationrefertoamorestructuraldeclineinthebroadUSDindex,includinganerosionofthestatusofUSDasthepremierglobalreservecurrency.

Proponentsoftheheavierversionemphasizeforeigninvestorsstartingtoderiskfrom

USDassets(i.e.,outrightsellingofexistingUSDholdings).De-riskingcouldbesparkedbyamassiveAIcrashortheerosionoftrustinUSpoliciesandinstitutions–includingtheruleoflaw,Fedindependenceandforeignrelations–reachingatippingpoint.

Thepurposeofthisreportisnottotakeastandontheliteorheavierversionsofde-

dollarization.Indeed,thenotionthatthereiscurrentlynoalternativetothedepthand

liquidityofUScapitalmarketsisapowerfulcounterargumenttoasuddenshifttothe

heavierversion.Instead,wetakeadeepdiveintothedatatogaugewhichcountries

wouldbemostaffectedshouldde-dollarization–liteorheavy–gaintraction.WerevealhowsomecountrieshaveamassedadisproportionateexposuretoUSportfolioassetsrelativetotheiroverallholdingsofforeignportfolioassetsornominalGDP.

Shouldde-dollarizationstarttogaintraction–particularlyifitistheheavierversion–evenamodestrepatriationofUSDassetscouldsignificantlyappreciatethevalueofcurrenciesofthosecountriesmostheavilyexposed,therebyerodingtheirexportcompetitiveness.

Ontheotherhand,thesecapitalinflowscouldboostdomesticliquidityandbuoylocal

assetmarkets.However,thischannelcouldbemorethanoffsetbynegativemultiplier

effectsondomesticcapexandjobsfromtheexportslump,alargelossofinternationalnetworthaccruedintheUSandnegativecontagioneffectsstemmingfromaslumpinUS

assetmarkets.AnewstudybyMITprofessorKristinForbesdescribeshowtheUSaftertheGFChasshiftedfromhavingan“exorbitantprivilege”toprovidinga“generous

giveaway”intheformofUSequityvaluationgainstoothercountries,butonethatcouldreverse.Theimplicationtothosecountriesmostexposedtode-dollarizationwouldbestrongercurrencies,weakerexportsandpossiblyalsoweakerdomesticdemand.

Inwhatfollowsisaseriesofchartsandtablesinwhichweexaminethelargestforeign

holdersofUSportfolioassets,basedondatafromtheUSFederalReserveandTreasuryInternationalReportingCapital(TIC)system.Weshowhowthedevilisthedetailsofthedata,onceholdingsofUSportfolioassetsarescaledbyeachcountry’stotalforeign

portfolioassetsornominalGDP.Wealsoanalyzethemixofeachcountry’sholdingsofUSdebtsecuritiesandequities,andhowtheseholdingshavechangedsince2019.

Finally,therecentsurgeinthepriceofgoldisregardedbysomepeopleasaharbingertode-dollarization.Wetakeadeepdiveintocentralbanks’rapidaccumulationofgold,andshowhowthecentralbanksinmanyEMeconomieshavebeenleadingthistrend.

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MeasuringforeignexposuretoUSportfolioassets

WelimitouranalysistoforeignholdingsofUSportfolioassets,whichcompriseequityanddebtsecurities.Theseareliquidassetsthatcaneasilybeboughtandsold.Wedonot

coverotherinternationalinvestmentsintheUS,suchasforeigndirectinvestments,whicharelessliquid,nordowecoverinternationalbankloansanddeposits.Figure3showsthe

30largestforeignholdersofUSportfolioassets,valuedintrillionsofUSD,asof

September2025.Asabloc,theeuroareaisthelargestholder,whilethelargestsinglecountryholdersareUK,CaymanIslands,CanadaandJapan.Itisnoteworthythatmanyoffshorefinancialcenters(OFCs)–CaymanIslands,Luxembourg,Ireland,Switzerland,Belgium,Singapore,HongKongandBermuda,BritishVirginIslands–areamongthe

largestholders(althoughtheoriginalsourceholderscouldbeinvestorsfromother

countries,butitisverycomplextotracethefundsback).ThecompositionofUSportfolioassetholdingsvariessignificantlybycountry.Forexample,UK,CaymanIslandsand

CanadaareamongthelargestholdersofUSequities,whileJapan,UKandLuxembourgarethelargestholdersofUSdebtsecurities.

Fig.3:HoldingsofUSportfolioassetsinUSDtrillion,asofSeptember2025

Note:EuroblocandothertopholdersofUSportfolioassetsasofSeptember2025

Source:USFederalReserve,Nomura

OutsidethepureOFCs,itisnaturalthatmanyoftheworld’slargesteconomiesarethe

largestholdersofUSportfolioassets,butasweshow,thisisnotalwaysthecase.Indeed,excludingthepureOFCs,in2025,someofthelargestUSDvalueincreasesinholdingsofUSportfolioassetswereaccruedbymid-sizedeconomies:Ireland,Singapore,Norway,

Switzerland,KoreaandTaiwan(Figure4).

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Fig.4:Top12increasesintheUSDvalueofholdingsofUSportfolioassetsin2025

Rank

USportfolioassets

USequities

USdebtsecurities

ChangeinholdingsfromDec2024toSep2025(USDbn)

1

UK565

UK345

UK219

2

Canada388

Ireland295

Japan168

3

Japan357

CaymanIslands273

Belgium146

4

Ireland324

Canada271

Canada117

5

CaymanIslands314

Japan189

Luxembourg107

6

Luxembourg231

Singapore167

Norway69

7

Singapore193

Switzerland154

France65

8

Norway192

Luxembourg125

Bermuda44

9

Switzerland173

Norway123

CaymanIslands41

10

France165

France100

Taiwan37

11

Belgium165

SouthKorea92

Ireland29

12

SouthKorea113

Netherlands82

UAE28

Source:USFederalReserve,Nomura

Tobettergaugewhichcountriescouldbemoreaffectedbyde-dollarization,itisimportanttoscaleeachcountry’sholdingsofUSportfolioassetsbytotalholdingsofforeignportfolioassets(includingreserveassets),orbynominalGDP.ThisisdoneinFigures5and6forthetop30countries(weexcludepureOFCs),rankedfromhighesttolowest.Wewould

highlightfiveinterestingfindings:

1.SevencountriesholdmorethanhalfoftheirtotalforeignportfolioassetsintheUS.Canada,isattheextremewith91%,followedbyUK,Israel,Mexico,Colombia,AustraliaandKorea.

2.Sevencountries’USportfolioassetsexceedthevalueoftheirannualGDP:Ireland(3xlarger)NorwayandSingapore(2xlarger),followedbyHongKong,

Switzerland,CanadaandTaiwan.

3.Sevencountrieshaveoverone-thirdoftheirtotalforeignportfolioassetsinUSequities:Canada,attheextremewith65%,followedbyAustralia,UK,Korea,Israel,NorwayandSweden.

4.Onlythreecountrieshaveoverone-thirdoftheirtotalforeignportfolioassetsheldinUSdebtsecurities:Philippines,BrazilandPeru.

5.China’sexposuretoUSportfolioassetsisrelativelylow,ranking30thwhenscaledbyitstotalforeignportfolioassets,andoutsidethetop30whenscaledbyitsGDP.

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Fig.5:Top30rankingofholdingsofUSportfolioassets,asa%oftotalforeignportfolioassets,includingofficialreserves,asofSeptember2025

Note:HoldingsofUSportfolioassetsasa%oftotalforeignportfolioassets(includingtotalofficialreserveassets)is

calculatedbasedonlatestavailableInternationalInvestmentPosition(IIP)dataforeachcountryandcorrespondingdataforholdingsofUSportfolioassets,whichformostcountriesisSeptember2025.DataforTaiwanandMalaysiaasofDecember2024,forNewZealandandPolandasofJune2025,andforIrelandasofMarch2025.WeremoveKuwait,UAEand

BelgiumfromthedatasetbecauseholdingsofUSportfolioassetsexceedtotalforeignportfolioassets(possiblybecauseofdifferentaccountingtechniquesbetweentheUSFederalReserveandcountry'sIIPassets).WealsoremovepureoffshorefinancialcenterssuchasBermuda,BritishVirginIslands,CaymanIslandsandPanamafromthedataset.

Source:IMF,CEIC,USFederalReserve,Nomura

Fig.6:Top30rankingofsharesofholdingsofUSportfolioassets,includingofficialreserves,asofSeptember2025

Rank

USportfolioassets

USequities

USdebtsecurities

USportfolioassets

USequities

USdebtsecurities

%oftotalforeignportfolioassets(includingofficialreserves)

%ofnominalGDP

1

Canada90.7

Canada64.7

Philippines39.9

Ireland305.4

Ireland204.2

Ireland101.2

2

UK68.2

Australia48.7

Brazil39.2

Norway230.9

Norway172.2

HongKong83.1

3

Israel60.2

UK41.0

Peru36.2

Singapore204.2

Singapore139.1

Taiwan82.6

4

Mexico58.1

SouthKorea38.2

Taiwan32.5

HongKong151.5

Switzerland102.1

Singapore65.1

5

Colombia57.1

Israel36.3

Colombia32.2

Switzerland145.7

Canada96.8

Norway58.8

6

Australia57.0

Norway35.0

Japan28.5

Canada135.8

HongKong68.4

Switzerland43.6

7

SouthKorea52.3

Sweden33.8

India28.5

Taiwan101.8

Sweden66.6

Japan40.7

8

EuroArea48.5

Switzerland32.3

UK27.2

UK93.6

Denmark64.7

Canada38.9

9

Japan48.5

Mexico32.1

Canada26.0

Sweden75.7

UK56.3

UK37.3

10

Norway47.0

Singapore30.7

Mexico26.0

Denmark71.9

Australia41.1

EuroArea24.7

11

Switzerland46.1

Denmark29.8

Thailand25.0

Japan69.1

Netherlands37.7

Israel23.1

12

Peru45.1

NewZealand27.1

Israel23.9

Israel58.2

Israel35.0

Thailand18.3

13

Singapore45.1

EuroArea26.9

Indonesia21.6

EuroArea55.4

SouthKorea33.6

France14.9

14

Brazil44.5

Colombia25.0

EuroArea21.6

Netherlands51.2

EuroArea30.7

Peru14.7

15

Philippines42.1

SaudiArabia23.4

Luxembourg17.5

Australia48.1

Japan28.4

Netherlands13.6

16

Taiwan40.0

Ireland22.6

Chile16.6

SouthKorea46.0

Finland26.8

Colombia13.0

17

SaudiArabia38.9

Japan19.9

China15.7

France34.9

NewZealand21.8

Chile12.9

18

Sweden38.4

Chile19.6

SaudiArabia15.5

Finland31.6

France20.0

Philippines12.9

19

NewZealand36.5

Luxembourg18.9

Poland15.4

SaudiArabia29.6

Taiwan19.2

SouthKorea12.4

20

Luxembourg36.4

Netherlands17.6

Singapore14.4

NewZealand29.3

SaudiArabia17.8

SaudiArabia11.8

21

Chile36.2

Malaysia16.2

SouthKorea14.1

Chile28.2

Chile15.3

Sweden9.1

22

Ireland33.8

France13.6

Switzerland13.8

Thailand24.1

Germany12.5

Brazil8.0

23

Denmark33.2

Cyprus12.9

Norway12.0

Colombia23.1

Malaysia11.1

Malaysia7.9

24

Thailand32.9

Finland12.8

Malaysia11.5

Malaysia19.0

Colombia10.1

NewZealand7.5

25

India32.9

Germany9.9

Ireland11.2

Peru18.3

Mexico7.5

Denmark7.3

26

Malaysia27.6

HongKong9.0

HongKong10.9

Germany17.5

Austria7.3

Australia7.0

27

Netherlands23.9

Peru8.9

Romania10.4

Philippines13.6

SouthAfrica7.2

Mexico6.0

28

France23.8

Argentina8.4

France10.2

Mexico13.5

Thailand5.8

Poland5.5

29

Indonesia22.3

SouthAfrica8.4

NewZealand9.4

SouthAfrica11.2

Spain4.4

India5.3

30

China22.1

Thailand7.9

Australia8.3

Spain9.3

Portugal4.1

Germany5.0

Note:HoldingsofUSportfolioassetsasa%oftotalforeignportfolioassets(includingtotalofficialreserveassets)iscalculatedbasedonlatestavailableIIPdataforeach

countryandcorrespondingdataforholdingsofUSportfolioassets,whichformostcountriesisSeptember2025.DataforTaiwanandMalaysiaareasofDecember2024,forNewZealand,Poland,Italy,andFinlandareasofJune2025,andforIrelandasofMarch2025.TheholdingsofUSportfolioassetsasa%ofnominalGDP,iscalculatesbyusingthetrailing4quarternominalGDPcorrespondingtothelatestavailableIIPdataforeachcountry.WeremoveKuwait,UAE,andBelgiumfromthedatasetfor"%oftotalforeignportfolioassets(includingofficialreserves)"