香江策论：事件点评美伊战云投射国际秩序重构战略资源迎来反转式价值重估

表1：地缘冲突对油价、油运影响冲突事件阶段 日期窗口 冲突事件阶段 日期窗口 布伦特油价BDTI(原油运价)BCTI(成品油运价)特点预警期 2011.02.07- 7.4%02.2116.0%1.3%利比亚是北非重要的轻质低硫原油出口国，其地缘动荡直接引了全球原油供应中断的实质性担忧。冲突爆发后，地中海及欧冲突期 2011.02.21- 6.2%36.1%23.6%大幅增加，同时战区高昂的战争险保费直接推升了原油与成品

区域的能源供应链被迫重构，导致寻找替代油源的吨海里需求03.07 的运价中枢。预警期 2019.09.0209.13

12.9% 11.1% -3.4% Abqaiq是全球最大的原油处理设施。事件初期，核心供应源遭物理打击引发极度恐慌，原油风险溢价急剧拉升。然而，沙特沙特Abqaiq 后迅速动用库存并以超预期的速度恢复产能，使得油价在爆发遇袭爆发期

2019.09.14- -11.1% 31.8% 3.5%09.30

迅速回吐涨幅。但对于航运市场而言，中东供应链的脆弱性暴使得原油买家紧急寻求跨区替代货源，导致原油运力（BDTI）后期出现滞后性飙升。俄乌冲突全面升级

预警期 2022.02.10-02.24

冲突爆发后，俄罗斯作为全球顶尖的原油及成品油双料出口国4.5% 32.6% 17.2% 遇制裁预期。这引发了全球能源贸易流向的根本性重塑（欧洲用俄油，转向美湾、中东；俄油远端运往中印）。这种长距离2022.02.24-

力替代和极端避险情绪，造就了油价与原成品油运价的历史级爆发期

03.10 15.3% 83.9%

同步暴涨。红海危机

预警期 2023.11.01-11.15冲突期 2023.11.16-

-5.3% -9.8% 3.6% 红海危机并未导致全球产油量下降，因此油价基本面稳定。但海是中东、印度精炼成品油（如柴油、航煤）运往欧洲的关键户。随着冲突在冲突期（实质化，大量成品油轮被迫绕行好望2024.01.02 -6.2% -5.9%

角，BCTI上涨。2024伊以冲突

预警期 2024.04.01-04.13爆发期 2024.04.13-

3.5% 5.7% -18.0% 尽管伊朗发动了史无前例的本土袭击，但由于袭击前有预告、双方在反击后均表现出一定程度的克制（并未立即升级为全面争），市场恐慌情绪迅速消退。油价、油运在反击发生后反而04.27 -2.3% -7.5%

体回调。2025美国轰炸伊朗核

预警期

2025.04.01- -13.2% 2.8% -9.4%04.15 伊朗原油长期处于受制裁状态，其表内出口量有限，因此军事击并未对全球公开原油市场的供给产生边际恶化。美国轰炸核设施 冲突期 2025.06.21- -8.0% 4.3% 1.7%06.22

施后地缘风险溢价当日回吐。美委冲突

预警期 2025.10.30-11.13

-1.9% 5.5% 12.6% 委内瑞拉是重质原油生产国，但多年制裁使其产能及出口影响边缘化。但是区域性冲突扰乱了美洲及加勒比海地区的成品油易网络，导致区域内成品油轮出现供需错配，迫使原本低成本短途贸易（委国至美湾）转变为高成本的长途贸易（委国油运冲突期 2025.11.132026.01.03

-3.7% -16.2%

远东），支撑了BCTI的逆势上涨。2026美伊冲突

预警期 2026.01.01-01.152026.01.15-

% 13.7% 10.6% OPEC剩余产能的调节，市场对“断油”的恐慌已如对“航路中断”敏锐。BDTI成为油价的领先指标，在预警期提Source: HTI

冲突期

至今 11.0% 20.6% -3.2%

一周完成双位数增长。图1：历次地缘冲突中油价、油运及Brent看涨期权成交量表现Source:Bloomberg, HTIAPPENDIX1SummaryEvent:U.S.-IrantensionsintensifiedinJanuaryandenteredaphaseof“high-pressurecoercion+parallelnegotiations”inFebruary.AttheendofJanuary,U.S.pressureonIranescalatedtobothmilitaryandsanctionsdimensions:theU.S.militarysignificantlyreinforceditspresenceintheMiddleEastandstrengthenedforcedeploymentandair-strikeassetsintheregion.Atpresent,theU.S.hasdeployedtwocarrierstrikegroupsintheMiddleEast,carryingacombined~140–150carrier-basedaircraft,whileaircraftincludingtheF-22,F-35A,andB-1B/B-52HhavealsobeenaddedatMiddleEastbases.TheU.S.alsointensifiedsanctionsonseniorIranianofficialsandthe“shadowfleet”assistingIran’soiltrade,continuingits“maximumpressure”policy.Regionalmilitaryconfrontationhasclearlyintensified.AfterenteringFebruary,withOmanmediating,theU.S.andIranlaunchedindirecttalksagainstthebackdropofhigh-pressureconfrontation.TworoundsoftalkswereheldonFebruary6andFebruary17,respectively,andathirdroundisplannedforFebruary26inGeneva.Commentary:TheimpactofMiddleEastgeopoliticsmaybeapproachingashort-termextreme,buttheonce-in-a-centurygreattransformationandtherestructuringoftheinternationalorderarebecomingmoredeeplyentrenched.Therevaluationofstrategicresourcessuchasgold,aerospace&defense,nonferrousmetals,andevencrudeoilislikelytobetheprevailinglong-termtrend.First,thecurrentturbulenceinthePersianGulfisonlyamicrocosmoftheeraofinternationalorderrestructuring.Itreflectshegemonismandthejunglelawofthestrongpreyingontheweak.Itisneitherthebeginningofinstabilitynorwillitbringinstabilitytoanend.ThePersianGulfsituationisunlikelytoseeaneasyorlastingturnaround.Second,marketfeedback:oiltankershippinghasoutperformedoilprices,indicatingthatthemarketispricing“transportationrisk”aheadof“supplydisruption,”andtheprobabilitythattheU.S.canresolvetheIranissueinonedecisivecampaignisnothigh.Inrecentperformance(Table1,Figure1),duringthewarningphase(2026.01.01-01.15),Brentcruderose4.9%,whilethecrudetankerfreightindex(BDTI)surged13.7%;afterenteringtheconflictphase(from2026.01.15todate),oilpricesonlythenpostedafurthercatch-upgainof11.0%,whileBDTIcontinuedtostrengthen,rising20.6%.ThisisbecauseBrent(oilprices)mainlytradesglobalsupply-demandbalance+riskpremium(geopolitics/policy/sanctions),whereasBDTI/BCTI(oilshipping)mainlytradetransportdistanceanddemand+fleetsupply+routeriskcosts.Againstthebackdropofstill-bufferingU.S.shalesupplyelasticityandOPEC+adjustmentcapacity,geopoliticaleventsoftenaffectoilpricesintheformofshort-termpulses;iftheydonotcausesustainedsupplydisruptions,priceshocksareoftendifficulttosustainovertime.Bycontrast,aslongaswar-riskinsurance,routerisks,shipownerrisk-avoidancebehavior,andfleetsupplyaredisrupted,tankerfreightratesmayreactearlierandmorepersistently.Infact,despitethecontinuousdeploymentofsubstantialU.S.forcestotheMiddleEast,theWhiteHousehasstillemphasizedthatTrump’spreferredapproachtohandlingtheIranissueisdiplomacy.OnFebruary24,IranianDeputyForeignMinisterRavanchistatedthatifallpartiesshowpoliticalwillingness,IranandtheU.S.couldreachanagreementquickly,andIranispreparedtodosoassoonaspossible;butifIranisattackedorinvaded,Iranwillrespondaccordingtoitsestablisheddefenseplans.Onthesameday,IranianArmedForcesChiefofStaffMousavialsostatedthatiftheU.S.makesanymistake,Iranwillinflictmajorcasualtiesontheenemy.Overall,bothsides’statementsexhibitatypical“dual-trackparallel”pattern:ontheonehand,signalingwillingnesstonegotiate;ontheotherhand,reinforcingdeterrencepostures.Thismakesthesituationmorelikely,intheshortterm,toremaininacriticalstateof“talkingwhilepressuring,pressuringwhileprobing.”Lookingtohistory,comparedwiththepreviousRedSeacrisis:bothwereMiddleEastgeopoliticaldisruptions,butthecoreriskspricedbythemarketwerenotthesame.ThecoreoftheRedSeacrisiswastheblockageoftheRedSea-Suezrouteandrisingreroutingcosts,withamoredirectdisruptiontotherefined-producttransportationchain,andthereforeBCTIusuallyshowedgreaterelasticity.DatashowthatduringtheRedSeacrisis(2023.11.01-2024.1.2),Brentfell11%,BDTIfell15%,whileBCTIrose14.5%.Further,theRedSeacrisisultimatelydidnotevolveintoa“large-scalesupplydisruption,”butinsteadenteredastateof“prolongeddisturbance,repeatedattacks,androuterestructuring.”Bycontrast,thecoreofthecurrentU.S.-IranescalationliesinriskstoMiddleEastcrudesupplyandthesecurityofpassagethroughtheStraitofHormuz.Withintankershipping,themarketisfirstpricingtheriskpremiumonthecrudetransportationchain,whichiswhyBDTIhasperformedmorestrongly.PhasedatashowthatinthisroundofU.S.-Iranescalation,BDTIhassignificantlyoutperformedBCTI(warningphase:BDTI+13.7%,BCTI+10.6%;conflictphase:BDTI+20.6%,BCTI-3.2%),indicatingthatthemarket’spricingfocushasshiftedfrom“refined-productrouteefficiencydisruption”to“crudesupplyandtransitsecurityrisk.”ThereasonisthatalthoughBDTIandBCTIarebothtankerfreightindices,theydifferincargotype,vesseltype,androutestructure,andthereforealsodiffersignificantlyinsensitivitytothesamegeopoliticalevent:BDTI(BalticDirtyTankerIndex)mainlyreflectsthetransportmarketforcrudeoilandheavyoilproducts,withcorevesselclassesincludingVLCC,Suezmax,andAframax.TypicalscenariosincludeMiddleEast-Asiaandtransatlanticcrudetransport,anditspricingismorereadilyaffectedbycrudeexporttempo,securityofkeychokepointssuchasHormuz,war-riskinsurance,andshipownerrisk-avoidancebehavior;BCTI(BalticCleanTankerIndex)mainlyreflectsthetransportmarketforrefinedproducts(suchasdiesel,gasoline,jetfuel,etc.),withcorevesselclassesmainlyMR/LR.TypicalscenariosincludeMiddleEast/IndiarefineriesexportingrefinedproductstoEuropeandAsia,anditspricingismorereadilyaffectedbychangesinrefineryexportflows,regionalsupply-demandmismatchesinrefinedproducts,andtransitefficiencyonroutessuchastheRedSea-Suezcorridor.Third,keyobservationpointsgoingforward:althoughthethirdroundoftalksissetforFebruary26,theriskofmilitaryconflictisstillrising.Therefore,intheshortterm,themorecriticalquestioniswhetherU.S.militarydeploymentafterthetalksescalatesintoalarge-scalewar.ChangesinU.S.troopdeploymentafterthetalks:Scenario1:ifthereistroopwithdrawal,apauseinreinforcement,ormarginalcoolingindeployments,itwouldimplypossibleeasingoftensions,andstrategicresourcessuchasgold,defense,andenergymayenterashort-termvolatileconsolidation;Scenario2:ifU.S.deploymentcontinuestostrengthen,itwouldimplyrisingriskofescalation,andglobalstrategicresourcesincludinggold,defense,energy,nonferrousmetals,andrareearthsarelikelytocontinuerising.Scenario3:iftheU.S.ultimatelytakesmilitaryactionagainstIran,wejudgeitspreferredoptionwouldstillmorelikelybe“sustaineddeepairstrikes+short-termdecapitation-styleoperations,”ratherthansendinggroundtroopsintoIran;theimpactonglobalcapitalmarketswouldbeastrongerversionofScenario2.TheU.S.militaryhasnowcompletedoneofthelargestforceconcentrationsintheMiddleEastsincethe2003IraqWar.Large-scalemilitaryassetdeploymentcarrieshighmaintenancecosts,whichtendstonarrowthedecisionow.Suchamassivedeploymentisnotonlyadeterrencetool,butalsocanforcepolicymakerstochoosewithinarelativelyshortperiodamong“continuedpressure,limitedstrikes,orpullbackandde-escalation.”Inaddition,thepotentialimpactofU.S.domesticpoliticalconstraintsonforeignpolicydirectionmustalsobeconsidered.Lastweek,theSupremeCourtrejectedTrump’stariffpolicy.Againstabackdropofrisingdomesticpressure,strongerpolitical-performanceincentives,and2026beingamidtermelectionyear,theexecutivebranchmayhavestrongerincentivestoadoptatougherexternalposture.Inotherwords,itcannotberuledoutthattheU.S.mayhopetostrengthenitspoliticalnarrativeandgainpointsthroughacontrollableexternalactionthatvisiblydemonstratesexecutioncapability.Conclusion:IfthisroundofU.S.-IranconflictultimatelydoesnotevolveintoaprolongedclosureoftheStraitofHormuzoralarge-scalegroundwar,thenafterbenefitingfromriskaversionandrisingvolatilityandbecomingfullypriced,theralliesinoilshippingandcrudeoilwillreverttofundamentallogic;amongthem,theriskpremiuminoilshippingmaypersistlongerthantheoilpriceriskpremium.However,inthemediumterm,amidtheturbulentperiodofinternationalorderrestructuring,thePersianGulfsituationmaymovetowardatug-of-warpatternof“militaryhighpressure+repeatedprobing,”andthestrategic-resourceattributesofcrudeoilarelikelytocommandahighervaluation.Bycontrast,fromamedium-tolong-termperspective,therevaluationmomentumofstrategicresourcessuchasgoldanddefenseappearsstronger:theformerbenefitsfromthecontinuedstrengtheningofinternationalorderrestructuring(includinggeopolitical,internationaleconomicorder,andinternationalfinancialorderdimensions),whilethelatterbenefitsfromrisinggeopoliticalsecurityconcerns,expectationsforhighermilitaryspendingandequipmentinvestment,andmark