民主主权与赚钱特权：以美联储为例

DemocraticSovereigntyandthePrerogativeto

MakeMoney:TheCaseoftheFederalReserve

ChristineDesan*

ABSTRACT

ThesurgeofexecutivepowerunleashedbytheSupremeCourthasreachedtheFederalReserve,provokingacrisisthatthejusticesseemsuddenlyanxioustoavoid.Butthedramaislongoverdue.Thecentralbankhasaconstitutionalstaturethatposesadirectchallengetounitaryexecutivetheory,theprincipleanimatingtheCourt’srecentcaselaw.CongressestablishedtheFederalReserveSystemtocarryoutacriticallegislativeprerogative—makingthesovereignmoneysupply.Congressusedaninstitutionalform—nationalbanking—innovatedpreciselytosecuresovereignmoney-makingfromexecutive(originallymonarchical)interference.Congressinturnassignedavitalresponsibility—thecapacitytomakemoneyoutofdebtinthepeople’sname—totheFed.Theconstitutionalconclusionfollows:Congress’sprerogativeovermoney-makingclearlysecurestheFed’sindependencefrompresidentialinterference.ThatconclusionislostincurrentscholarshipthattreatstheFedasfundamentallylikeotherindependentagencies.TheCourthasassumed,similarly,thattheunitaryexecutivepresidesoverarelativelyhomogeneous

*

LeoGottliebProfessorofLaw.HarvardLawSchool.

TheauthorwouldliketothankLarrySchwartzoltogetherwithRoyKreitnerandNadavOrianPeerfor

thevitaldiscussionsthatledtothisarticleandHilaryAllen,NikoBowie,MaryBridges,JohnCoates,BenDinovelli,GeraldEpstein,NoahFeldman,ThomasFerguson,HowellJackson,MarcJarsulic,Michael

Klarman,CharlieKrumholz,JamieMcAndrews,LevMenand,ConradMilhaupt,SashaNatapoff,IgnacioOrellanaGarcia,EmilyReimer,ToddRakoff,MorganRicks,DanRohde,DanTarullo,SusannahTobin,andLarryTribefortheirinsightsandcreativesuggestions.TheauthoralsothanksHayleeLevinand

GurbirSinghforresearchassistance.ThepaperwillappearinVolume21.1oftheHarvardLaw&PolicyReviewandmaynotbecopiedwithoutHarvardLaw&PolicyReview'swrittenpermission.

2

regulatoryfield.ThecaseoftheFedexposestheseparationofpowersasamorecomplicatedproject.Legislaturesbuiltdemocraticsovereigntybystrugglingforprerogativesthat,likemoney-making,protectedtheirlawmakingauthority.TheprerogativesclaimedbyCongressinformtheworkofeachagencyandofficial,includingwithintheexecutivebranch.TheCourtdismantlesdemocraticsovereigntywhenitdeniesthereachofthoseprerogatives.

/10.36687/inetwp247

JELcodes:E42,E58,K23,P16

Keywords:FederalReserve;centralbankindependence;moneycreation;democratic

sovereignty;legislativeprerogative;Congress;unitaryexecutivetheory;separationofpowers;constitutionalpoliticaleconomy;monetaryarchitecture

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION2

I.THEHISTORY:MONEYANDLEGISLATIVESOVEREIGNTY9

II.MONEY-MAKINGINDEMOCRATICTHEORY20

III.THEJURISPRUDENCEOFCONGRESSIONALAUTHORITYOVERMONEYCREATION29

IV.UNITARYEXECUTIVETHEORYANDTHEFED37

POSTSCRIPT:FROMMONEYTOINFORMATION43

CONCLUSION46

INTRODUCTION

ModerncentralbankingbeganinEnglandasadevicetoleverpowerfromaking’sgraspintoalegislature’shands.1Forcenturies,monarchscontrolledtheprocessthatcreatednewmoneybyconvertingmetalintocointhroughtheroyalmints.2Butmorethan300yearsago,theBritish

Parliamentestablishedanationalbanktocreateanewflowofmoney.Thatflowofmoney—

banknotes—wouldeventuallydwarfthestreamofcoincomingfromthemint.3Andthatwas

exactlythepoint.Parliamentinthatmomentclaimedcontrolovermoneyfromamonarch:bank-mademoneywouldentertheeconomybyarouteParliamentdictatedratherthantheking,whohadcontrolledcoinfromtheroyalmintforcenturies.4

Parliament’sgambitworked.TheBankofEnglandbecameakeyplayerintheconstitutionaldemocracybuiltbytheBritish.5ButParliamentwasnotalone.Againandagain,legislativeactorshavetakencontrolofmoney-makinginordertopryauthorityawayfromexecutiveor

1TheBankofEnglandbeganwasthefirstsustainednationalbankofissue—thatis,abankthatwouldlendtothegovernmentthroughnewlycreatedbankcredit(banknotes).Itwoulddevelopauthoritiesassociatedwithmoderncentralbanksoverthenexttwocenturies.SeeCHARLESGOODHART,THE

EVOLUTIONOFCENTRALBANKS14(1988).

2SeeTheCaseoftheMixedMoney,2Cobbett'sCompleteCollectionofStateTrials114(PrivyCouncilCourt1605)(confirmingmonarch’spowertodeterminecharacterandcontentofcoin).

3SeegenerallyNunoPalma,ReconstructionoftheMoneySupplyOvertheLongRun:theCaseofEngland,1270—1870,71ECON.HIST.REV.373(2017).

4DouglassC.North&BarryR.Weingast,ConstitutionsandCommitment:TheEvolutionofInstitutionsGoverningPublicChoiceinSeventeenth-CenturyEngland,XLIXJ.ECON.HIST.816,821(1989);

CHRISTINEDESAN,MAKINGMONEY:COIN,CURRENCY,ANDTHECOMINGOFCAPITALISM301-320

(2014);seegenerallyinfra

notes43-50.WarfinancedroveParli

ament’sinitiativeandgavethatbodytheleverageitneededtoestablishtheBank.HavingdeposedJamesII,WilliamIIIasnewrulerdesperately

neededtofundsformilitaryexpenses.“WilliamIIIandhisgovernmentfacedtwoalternatives:scalebackthewaragainstLouisXIVastheTorieswishedoradoptthefullradicalimplicationsoftheWhig

understandingofpoliticaleconomy....By1694WilliamwaspreparedtothrowinhislotwiththeWhigs.”STEVENPINCUS,1688:THEFIRSTMODERNREVOLUTION388(YaleUniv.Press,2009).

5See,e.g.,WALTERBAGEHOT,LOMBARDSTREET:ADESCRIPTIONOFTHEMONEYMARKET(JohnWileyandSons,Inc.1873,1999)(describingtheBank’sessentialpublicrole);PatrickK.O’Brien&Nuno

Palma,NotanOrdinaryBankbutaGreatEngineofState:TheBankofEnglandandtheBritishEconomy,1694-1844,76ECON.HIST.REV.305(2023)(documentingroleofBank).

4

4

othercompetingagents.LegislaturesinAmericausedthestrategyundertheBritishEmpire,at

theframingoftheConstitution,duringtheCivilWar,atthefoundingoftheFederalReserve,intheNewDeal.Eachtime,theyclaimedauthorityovermoney-makingtomakerealtheircapacitytoactforthosewhoelectedthem.6

Cuethecurrentmoment.TheTrumpadministrationaimsforcontrolofallthoseofficials

administeringthelaw.ThatincludesofficialsinagenciesdesignedbyCongresstoactwith

independencefromthepolicypreferencesofanygivenpresident.Trump’sargumenttosubvertthatdesignissimple.AccordingtoArticleIIoftheU.S.Constitution,“theexecutivepowershallbevestedinthePresident.”Thatstatementbestows“unitary”authoritytoimplementthelaw.

SofarasCongressreliesonthepresidentto“fillinthedetails”whenapplyingmoregeneral

standards,thatofficialneedsdiscretionandlatitude.7Thatbelongstothepresident,whoistheonlyactoraccountabletoallvoters.Thepresidentmusthavecontroloftheofficialswhoareactingforhim,sohemustbeabletoreplacethemashewishes.

TheSupremeCourthasacceptedTrump’sargumentononeterrainafteranother.8Itnowappearspoisedtooverturna90-yearoldprecedentthatprotectsCongress’sabilitytoinsulate

independentagencyleadershipfromremovalforpurelypartisanreasons.9Theprospect

threatensmethodsofexpertdecision-making,thecontinuityofinstitutionalknowledgeand

practice,andthetraditionofcivilservice—enoughtoalarmanyoneconcernedaboutAmericanruleoflaw.10ButtheCourt’slogicgoesfurther.ItwouldreachtheBoardofGovernorsoftheFederalReserve,threateningthecentralbank’sindependenceinanerasodedicatedtothe

propositionthatithasitsownacronym.CBIhasbecomeaglobalnorm,theaxiomaticbarriertoloosemonetarypolicyandtheparadeofhorriblesthatcouldfollow.11Evenjusticesdedicatedtounitaryexecutivetheoryareuneasyattheoutcome.TheyfloatuncertainexceptionsfortheFedfromthatapproachliketrialballoons.12

6Seeinfranotes

38-87.

7Humphrey’sExecutorv.UnitedStates,295U.S.602(1935)(cleanedup).

8See,e.g.,Trumpv.Wilcox,145S.Ct1415(2025);SeilaL.LLCv.CFPB,140S.Ct.2183(2020);FreeEnterpriseFundv.PublicCompanyAccountingOversightBoard,561U.S.477(2010).

9A1935case,Humphrey’sExecutorv.UnitedStates,295U.S.602(1935),upheldtheconstitutionalityofcommissionsdesignedtoensurepoliticalbalancewithmembersfrombothDemocraticandRepublic

partiesappointedfortermsthatcrossedpresidentialadministrations.Thatholdingisatstakeinthe2025caseTrumpv.Slaughter.606U.S.____(2025).

10See,e.g.,GERALDD.FELDMAN,THEGREATDISORDER:POLITICS,ECONOMICS,ANDSOCIETYINTHEGERMANINFLATION,1914-1924(1993).

11See,e.g.,FormerTreasurySecretaries,FederalReserveBoardChairsandGovernors,Councilof

EconomicAdvisorsChairs,andEconomistsBriefasAmiciCuriaeopposingtheapplicationforastayinTrumpv.Cook(2025).Inanunprecedentedgesture,asetoftheworld’smostinfluentialcentralbankersissuedajointpolicystatementonJanuary13,2026,defendingJeromePowell,ChairoftheU.S.FederalReserve’sBoardofGovernors.ThestatementrespondedtoperceivedoverreachbyfederalprosecutorswhoappearedtobeescalatingpresidentialpressureonPowellbyopeningacriminalinvestigationinto

costoverrunsattheFederalReserve.EsheNelson,GlobalCentralBankersExpressSupportforFedChairAfterCriminalInvestigation,N.Y.TIMES(January13,2026),

/2026/01/13/business/trump-powell-central-bank-support.html

.

12See,e.g.,Wilcox,145S.Ct.1415;SeilaLaw,140S.Ct.at2186,2245n.8.

5

5

Thehistoryofcentralbankingclearlycollideswithunitaryexecutivetheory.Legislaturesseizedpowerovermoney-makinginsignificantparttofenceouttheexecutive.ButtheSupreme

Court’scurrentlogic—barringtheinventionofanuncertainexception—wouldinvitetheexecutiverightbackin.Wereturntomonarchywithunitaryexecutivetheoryclaimingademocraticpedigree.Somethingisbadlyoff-track.

ThecaseoftheFedexposeswherewewentwrong.Unitaryexecutivetheorymistakesthe

separationofpowersbecauseitmistakesthepowerseachbranchwields.Severalproblemsareconspicuous.Executivediscretiontoimplementlawcaneasilyveerintoexecutivedisregardforalaw’ssubstance.13UnitaryexecutivetheoryalsodisablesCongressfromlawmakingdesignedtotakeeffectuponcertaincontingencies,asdeterminedbyactorsassignedtomakesuch

findings.14

Butanotherproblemliesburied:theexecutivecanencroachonareasoflegislativeprerogative.Thoseprerogativessupportlawmakingbutaredistinctfromit.Theyarebothfamiliar—manyarecenturiesold—andyetnoveltothecurrentdebate—wehaveforgottencertainprinciples

inherenttothedemocraticoperationofgovernment.Moretroublingyet,wehaveforgottenthatthoseprerogativesarepractices,notemptyhand-waving.Theyareprojectionsoflegislative

authoritythatareinstitutionalizedinourconstitutionalorderasanti-executivedevices,barriersagainstpresidentialoverreach.Thosedesignsembeddemocraticsovereigntyinarealworldofchecksandbalances.

Money-makingepitomizesalegislativeprerogative,itspurpose,andthepracticethateffectuatesit.Considertheprobleminthefoundationalformthatearlylegislatorsconfronted.Medieval

legislatorscouldclaimauthorityoverlawmakingincludingeventaxation.Butifacountryranonmetalcoinandthemonarchcontrolledthemint,thatrulercouldsubvertthelegislature’s

authority.He,oroccasionallyshe,needonlydebasethecointospendontheirowninitiative.

France’sPhilipIVandPhilipVI,andEngland’sTudors,HenryVIIIandElizabethI,all

diminishedthepoweroftheirownlegislaturesbydilutingcoinandspendingtheproceeds.15Bycontrast,whenParliamenttookcontrolofthewaymoneyenteredintosociety—whenitstarted

13PETERM.SHANE,MADISON’SNIGHTMARE:HOWEXECUTIVEPOWERTHREATENSAMERICAN

DEMOCRACY(2009);STEPHENSKOWRONEK,etal.,PHANTOMSOFABELEAGUEREDREPUBLIC:THEDEEPSTATEANDTHEUNITARYEXECUTIVE24-38(2021);seegenerallyLawrenceLessig&CassR.Sunstein,ThePresidentandtheAdministration,94COLUMBIAL.REV.2(1994).

14Courtstraditionallydubbedtheroleofthoseadministrativeactorsassignedtomakesuchfindings

“quasi-legislative.”Thetermfacilitatedlawmakinginaworldwithanunfoldingfutureandcooperativeagents,conditionsearlyandwidelyrecognizedasreal.See,e.g.,BrigAurorav.UnitedStates,11U.S.

382(1813)(upholdinglawconditioningeffectonevidencecertifiedbypresidentialproclamation);seegenerallyBriefforLegalHistoriansNoahA.RosenblumandNathanielDonahueasAmiciCuriaeLegalSupportingRespondent,Slaughter.606U.S.___(2025)(tracinghistory).

15DESAN,supranote

1

at162-170;seegenerallyNICOLASORESME,THEDEMONETAOFNICHOLAS

ORESMEANDENGLISHMINTDOCUMENTS(CharlesJohnsontrans.,1956);J.S.Roskell,PerspectivesinEnglishParliamentaryHistory,46BULLETINOFTHEJOHNRYLANDSLIBRARY(1963-64).Thestrategyhadpoliticalcosts,tobesure,butthestakesinvitedmonarchstotakethatcourseagainandagain.

6

6

makingmoney—itcutoffthatavenueofexecutiveabuse.Money-makingultimatelysecuredpoweroverthepursetothemodernlegislature.16

TheFederalReservedescendsfromthattradition.Itsbankeddesignisafunctionoflegislativeprerogative,notagatewayforexecutiveauthority.ArticleIoftheConstitutionconsolidatesthatprerogativeinthe“aggregatepowers”thatconcernmoney,revenue,andfinance.17That

authorityclearlyenablesCongresstoestablishprotectionsfromremovalforofficialsonthe

Fed’sBoardofGovernors18andforpresidentsoftheregionalFederalReserveBanks.19It

informsaswellasthelegalityoftheappointmentproceduresCongresshasestablishedforthoseofficers.20

Theprerogativetomakemoneyisperhapsthemostcloselyheldlegislativeprerogative.That

setstheFederalReserveapart.ButalthoughtheFedisdistinctive,evenextreme,itsauthorityisindicativeofalargerphenomenon.Legislativesovereigntyisacomplexcapacity.Itincludes

lawmakingbutdoesnotreducetoit.Rather,lawmakingisringedroundbyonelegislative

prerogativeafteranother.Legislatorsacquiredthosepowersovercenturies,buildingcapacityastheystruggledtomakerealtheirroleaslawmakers.

Thenextpagesspellouthowlegislatures“makemoney,”anactwerarelythinkaboutbutone

thatprotectslawmakingwhileremainingdistinctfromit.First,thehistoryexposeshow

legislatorsmaderealtheirlawmakingcapacitywhentheymadecompletetheirpowerover

money-making.Second,theessayshowshowthathistoryhasrootsinmonetarytheorythatis

alsodemocratictheory.Legislativeauthoritytoincurdebtonbehalfofacommunityallowsittocreatemoneyoutofthatdebt.Theactisactuallyself-executing;itneedsnodiscretionary

administrativeactiontocompleteit.Thehistoryandtheoryofmoney-makingsetupathirdsectiononthejurisprudenceofmoney-making.TheSupremeCourthasrepeatedlyblessed

Congress’sauthority,powerfullyordainingitsprerogative.Fourthandagainstthatbaseline,IanalyzethecrisiscreatedastheCourt’sunitaryexecutivetheoryreachestheFederalReserve.

Developedindisregardofthehistory,theory,andjurisprudenceonlegislativemoney-making,theunitaryexecutiveapproachprovokesanimpassethatunderminestheCourt’sownauthoritywhilelocatingtheFed—itselfaninstitutionwithdemocraticlineage—asananti-democratic

entity.

16Seeinfratextaccompanyingnotes

37

to

50

.Centurieslater,PaulTucker,formerdeputygovernoroftheBankofEnglandwouldcapturethedangerthatmotivatedParliamenttotakecontrolofmoney

creation.“Iftheexecutivebranchcontrolledthemoneycreationpower,itwouldattheveryleastbeabletodeferitsneedtogothelegislatureforextra‘supply,’andatworstcouldinflateawaytherealburdenofitsdebtstoreducetheamountoftaxationrequiringparliamentaryorcongressionalsanction.”PAUL

TUCKER,UNELECTEDPOWER:THEQUESTFORLEGITIMACYINCENTRALBANKINGANDTHEREGULATORYSTATE288(PrincetonUniv.Press,2018

17Knoxv.Lee,79U.S.457,535(1871);Normanv.BaltimoreandOhioR.R.,294U.S.240,303(1935).

1812U.S.C.§242.

1912U.S.C.§248(f).

2012U.S.C.§241(GovernorsappointedbythePresidentandconfirmedbytheSenateforfourteen-yearterms);§242(ChairofBoardappointedbyPresidentandconfirmedbytheSenateforfour-yearterm);§

305(specifyingappointmentprocedureforregionalbankpresidentsbyClassBandCbankdirectors).

7

7

Thearticleendswithapostscriptthatopensouttheargumentaboutlegislativeprerogatives.TheTrumpadministrationclaimsunprecedentedauthoritytoaccessanddeployinformationheld

acrossthefederalgovernment.Thatassertionconflictswithanotherlegislativeprerogative—theprerogativeofthelegislaturetogatherinformationthatissoundaccordingtomodernnormsofknowledge.Thedramarevealsinsharpdetailthatdemocraticsovereigntyisimmediatelyat

stakeacrossarangeofissues.

Thechecksandbalancesthatsupportthedemocraticdiffusionofpowerarenotpaperinventionsbuthard-wondevices.Legislatorshavestruggledtoclaimanarmyofprerogatives,alltooeasilyassumedbysubsequentgenerations.Theexampleofthecongressionalmoney-makinginvitesustorethinkthewaytheunitaryexecutivetheoryflattensdemocraticsovereignty,splittingoffonelegislativeprerogativeafteranother.Thepostscriptinvitesustoconsiderotherprerogatives.

Legislatorshavetheauthoritytospeakfreelyabouttheirpoliticalleaders,betheymonarchsorelectedofficials.Thatcapacityprotectsthelegislators’abilitytoidentifyabuseanddebate

reforms.21

Legislatorshavetheauthoritytoreceivepetitions.Thatcapacityprotectstheirabilitytounderstandthecircumstancesoftheirconstituents.22

Legislatorshavetheauthoritytoinvestigaterelevantissuesandrequireinformation,enforceablebycontemptandsubpoenaifnecessary.Thatcapacityprotectstheirabilitytocollectevidenceaboutconditionsinsociety.23

Legislatorshavetheauthoritytoresolveclaimsagainstthegovernment.Thatcapacityprotectstheirabilitytograntrelieffromthepublictreasurytothoseinjuredbypublicofficials.24

Legislatorshavetheauthoritytoauditspendingbytheexecutivebranch,evaluateadministrativeprograms,andassessitspolicyinitiatives.Thatcapacityprotectslegislators’abilitytohold

executiveactorsaccountable.25

21U.S.CONST.art.I,§6,cl.1;Gravelv.UnitedStates,408U.S.606(1971).ForBritishprecedent,seeTheEnglishBillofRightsof1689,art.9;ParliamentaryPrivilegeFirstReport,JointCommitteeon

ParliamentaryPrivilege(April9,1999),

https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt199899/jtselect/jtpriv/43/4303.htm

(lastaccessedJan.12,2025).

22U.S.CONST.amend.I;seealsoHouseRulesonPetitionsandMemorials.Forthewaypetitioning

functionedtoenlargelegislativeauthorityinthecolonialera,see,e.g.,BarbaraA.Black,TheConstitutionofEmpire:TheCasefortheColonists,124U.PA.L.REV.1158(1976);JACKP.GREENE,THEQUESTFORPOWER;THELOWERHOUSESOFASSEMBLYINTHESOUTHERNROYALCOLONIES,1689-1776(1963).

23SeegenerallyEastlandv.UnitedStatesServicemen’sFund,421U.S.491(1972);McGrainv.Daugherty,273U.S.135(1927);seealsoJurneyv.MacCracken,294U.S.125(1935)(upholdingSenate’sauthoritytousecontempt,includingdetention,toprotectsubpoenaeddocuments).

24SeegenerallyFloydDShimomura,TheHistoryofClaimsAgainsttheUnitedStates:TheEvolution

fromaLegislativeTowardsaJudicialModelofPayment,45LA.L.REV.625(1985);ChristineDesan,TheConstitutionalCommitmenttoLegislativeAdjudicationintheEarlyAmericanTradition,111HARV.

L.REV.1381(1998).

25SeegenerallyBowsherv.Synar,478US.714(1986)(confirmingauthorityofComptrollerGeneralandGeneralAccountabilityOfficetoperformsuchfunctions,notincludingtheexecutiveauthoritytoorder

8

8

Legislatorshavetheauthoritytoestablishproceduresfortheirdecision-making.Thatcapacityprotectstheirabilitytodeliberateinwaystheydetermine.26

Legislatorshavetheauthoritytocounttheelectoralvote.Thatcapacityprotectstheirabilitytopolicetheprocessestoelectthepresident.27

Legislatorshavethecapacitytooverseeexecutivebranchofficials.TheSenatecanevaluateandconsenttoapresident’schoicesforhigheroffice.Legislatorsinbothhouses,actingtogether,canimpeachandremoveanofficialfromoffice.Thosecapacitiesprotectthelegislature’sabilitytocheckincompetentorcorruptappointees.28

Legislatorshavetheauthoritytodeclarewar.Thatcapacityprotectsthelegislature’sabilitytodeterminetheelementalissueofanation’smoralandpoliticalplaceintheglobalorder.29

Ifmembersofalegislativebodycouldnotdebatefreely,receiveinformationfromthepeople,

investigateareasforaction,relievethoseharmedbythegovernment,controltheirown

procedures,overseeandauditexecutivespending,policethepresidentialvote,holdaccountablepublicofficials,anddetermineexistentialquestionsofnationalconductandsurvival,their

lawmakingrolewouldberenderedimpotentinonewayafteranother.Governancewouldbe

ineffectivelydebated,ill-founded,impervioustothoseinjured,shapedbylawsundemocraticallyenacted,subvertedbyexecutivenoncompliance,andadministeredbyofficialsunacceptableto

thepolity.Governanceastheprocessofdetermininganation’scourseintheglobalorderwouldbeneutered.Tobesure,itemizinganarrayoflegislativeprerogativestriggersconcernatareasoferosionandevasion.Thatiscompletelyconsonantwiththepointthattheyareessential.

Whenwesearchforthem,institutionalarrangementsoutsideasimplisticlawmakingv.law-

executingbinaryprotectmanyofthoseprerogatives.Thebattletoproduceandpreserve

informationoffersacurrentexample.Forafarolderone,considerthepowerCongressinheritedfromcoloniallegislaturestoresolveclaimsformoneyfromthepublictreasury.Noonecalls

thatactivity“lawmaking.”Itis,instead,legislativeadjudication.30Thatprerogativepreserves

Congress’sabilitytosafeguardpublicmoneys:itdisallowsanyotheractorfromunlimitedaccesstotheresourcesuponwhichthegovernment’scapacitydepends.

changesinbudgetimplementation);seealsoHENRYROSEVEARE,THETREASURY,1660-1870:THEFOUNDATIONSOFCONTROL46-74(1973)(detailingtheHouseofCommons’slongstruggletosecureaccountabilityintheCrown’sexpenditures).

26U.S.CONST.art.I,§5,cl.2.;seealsoU.S.CONST.art.1,§5,cls.1,3,6;U.S.CONST.art.1,§8,cl.18(provisionsadditionallysupportingthisauthority).

27U.S.CONST.,Amendment12;ActofFeb.3,1887,ch.90,24Stat.373(ElectoralCountAct);Pub.L.No.117-328,div.P,136Stat.4459(Dec.29,2022)(ReformActof2022).

28U.S.CONST.,Art.II,sec.2,cl.2(adviceandconsent);U.S.CONST.Art.1,sec.2,cl.5,andsec.3,cl.6(impeachmentproceedings).

29U.S.CONST.Art.I,sec.8,cl.11.FortheerosionofCongress’sauthoritytodeclarewaranditsimpact,see,e.g.,OonaHathaway,HowtheErosionofU.S.WarPowersConstraintsHasUndermined

InternationalLawConstraintsontheUseofForce,14HARV.NAT’LSEC.J.(2023);CurtisA.Bradley&JackL.Goldsmith,CongressionalAuthorizationandtheWaronTerror,118HARV.L.REV.2047(2005).

30SeegenerallyShimomura,supranote

24;

Desan,supranote

24

.

9

9

Astheexampleoflegislativeadjudicationshows,Congresscanalsoinstitutionalizehelpfromotheractorswithoutcedingitsprerogative.Until1855,Congressinsistedondoingtheworkofclaimsresolutionwithoutassistance.Overwhelmedbytheworkofarapidlygrowing

population,CongressthenestablishedtheU.S.CourtofClaims.31TheSupremeCourtupheldCongress’sauthoritytoestablishatribunaltocarryoutitsprerogative.TheU.S.Courtof

ClaimsisanArticleIIIcourt,thusimmunefromexecutiveinterference.32

Thehistory,theory,andjurisprudencerecapturedherehavebeenmissinginthedebateovertheFederalReserve.Theabsenceisduepartlytothenatureofprerogatives.Someofthemare

expresslyidentifiedintheconstitutionaltext.Thatinvitesthemtobeconsidereddiscretelyandgivenself-containeddoctrinalgenealogies.33Otherprerogatives—includinglegislativecontrolovermoney-making—areimplicit;theyareoperatingpremisesthatwereandareassumed.34

Thosepremisespervasivelyinformconstitutionaldesignbutareonlyobviousonceweexcavateitsstructure.Second,thedebateovertheFedhastracedthelineageofthatinstitutionbackwardstosearchforprecedents,ratherthanstartingwiththecapacity—moneycreation—thatisthe

congressionalprerogativeatstake.Oncethatanimatingcapacity(tocreatemoney)isleftaside,theFedappearsmuchmorelikeanyotheradministrativeagency.Thesameargumentsforor

againstthelogicoftheunitaryexecutiveapplyandtheyexhausttherepertoire.35Finally,thestrategyoflumpingtheFedinwithotheradministrativeagencieshassomethingofanin

31ActofFebruary24,1855,10Stat.612(1855).

32Gliddenv.Zdanok,370U.S.530(1962).WhiletheCourtofClaims(todaytheCourtofFederal

ClaimsandtheFederalCircuit)wasanArticleIIIcourt,Congressmaintainedcertainlimitsonitsactivity.Thele