2026全球私募市场现状报告：布局未来新机遇

TheStateof

PrivateMarkets2026

Buildingforwhat’snext

TheStateof

PrivateMarkets2026

Tableof

Contents

09

Whyclaritymatters

Asprivatemarketsmoveintothemainstream,

investorsaredemandingbetterdata,consistent

reportingstandardsandtheanalyticaltoolstosee

theirtotalportfolioclearly.

03

Awatershedmoment

Privatemarketshavegrownfasterthanthe

infrastructuresupportingthem.Betterdata,

commonstandardsandanalyticalrigorare

closingthegap.

04

Highlights

14

Fivethemesfor

investorsnow

Fiveforcesareredefiningprivatemarkets

in2026:stressinprivatecredit,aliquidity

drought,theAIbuild-out,theriseof

evergreenfundsandtheblurringofasset-

classboundaries.Weexamineeachofthem.

36

Conclusion

Privatemarketsarematuring—

andsoistheinfrastructureof

dataandanalyticsneededto

navigatethemwithconfidence.

37

Ourdataset

05

Performancesnapshot

Venturecapitalclosed2025withitsfirst

double-digitannualreturnsince2021.

Elsewhere,thepicturewasnotasbright.

TheStateof

PrivateMarkets2026

Awatershedmoment

3

Awatershed

moment

Privatemarketsaretransformingtheglobal

financialecosystem,becomingacornerstoneofinstitutionalandwealthportfoliosalike.

Withrapidgrowthinrecentyearshascomeacommensurateriseinexpectationsfor

transparency,dataqualityandthekindof

rigorous,timelyinsightintoholdingsand

exposuresthatsophisticatedallocatorsnowapplyacrosstheirentireportfolio.These

aredemandsthatprivatemarketswerenothistoricallybuilttomeet.Navigatingthatgapiswhatthisreportsetsouttoexplore.

AsIwritethisinthespringof2026,the

dynamicsplayingoutacrosstheindustryareinstructive.Pocketsofstresshaveemerged—mostacutelywithintheprivate-creditmarket—suggestingamisalignmentofexpectationsbetweeninvestorsandmanagers.Butwhat

shouldnotbeunderestimatedarethegenuinequestionsarisingaroundtheintegrityof

valuations,thegapbetweenexpectedand

realizedliquidityinsemi-liquidstructures,andexposureconcentrationsthatlargelywent

undetecteduntildislocationsinpublicmarketsmadethemdifficulttoignore.Asthese

realitiessuggest,theinfrastructuresupportingprivatemarketshasnotkeptpacewiththe

quantumofcapitalflowingintothem.

Formuchofprivatemarkets’history,opacitywaspartofthevalueproposition,rewarding

patientcapitalandcreatingbarriersthat

justifiedtheilliquiditypremium.Thatcompactisincreasinglyunderpressurefrommultiple

directions:theexpansionofprivatemarkets

intowealthandretirementchannels,the

liquiditygapbeingbridgedbyevergreen

andothersemi-liquidstructures,andthe

growingexpectationthatprivateexposuresbeevaluatedwithinatotal-portfolioframework

alongsidepublicholdings.

Noneofthatisstraightforward.Integration

withoutsufficientdataqualitydoesn’t

produceclarity;itproducesfalseprecision,

whichmaybethemoredangerousoutcome.

Consistentmarks,transparentfeetreatment

andstandardizedreportingarenotbyproductsbutprerequisitesforprivatemarkets

scalingresponsibly.

“Theinfrastructuresupporting

privatemarketshasnotkeptpacewiththecapitalflowingintothem.”

MSCIhasspentdecadesbuildingthedata

infrastructureandanalyticalframeworksthatunderpinhowpublicmarketsareunderstood,measuredandmanaged.Wearenowapplying

thatsameexpertise,rigorandindependencetoprivatemarkets—withtheconviction

thatbetterdataandcommonstandardswilldefinewhattheassetclasscanultimatelybecomeandhelpinvestorsnavigatewith

greaterconfidence.

Wehopetheresearchandinsightsinthis

inauguraloutlookprovevaluable.Wewelcomeyourfeedback,andencourageyoutoreach

outtodiscussanythingwithinthesepagesfurther.Ourcommitmentistocontinuetoinnovateinprivatemarkets,tobuildthe

essentialinfrastructureneededtohelptheindustryscale—andscalewell.

LukeFlemmer

HeadofPrivateAssets

TheStateof

PrivateMarkets2026

Highlights

4

Highlights

01

02

Transparencyinhighdemand

Afifthoftheworld’slargestinstitutionalportfoliosisnowinprivatemarkets,yetinvestorsarebeingaskedtomakefaster,total-

portfoliodecisionswithdatathatisoftenoldbythetimeitarrives.Risingexpectationstoanalyzeinvestmentsacrossthetotal

portfolioarefuelingdemandfordatadesignedtonarrowthegapbetweenreportingperiods.Thequestionisnotwhether

investorswanttoknowwhattheyown,it’swhethertheindustrycanconsistentlyprovidethatleveloftransparency.

Anexpectationscrisishitsprivatecredit

Investorsarelearningthatsemi-liquidindeedmeanssemi-liquid,ashigh-profilebankruptciesinlate2025triggeredawaveof

redemptionrequestsinunlistedprivate-creditevergreenfunds.SubsequentconcernsaboutAIthreateningsoftwareinvestments

sparkedvolatilityinlistedvehicles,raisingquestionsaboutwhetherpricemovesreflectgenuinedeteriorationinfundamentals

oruncertaintyamplifiedbyincompleteinformation.Smallerclosed-endprivate-creditfundsareshowingmateriallyhigherwrite-

downratesthanlargerpeers,suggestingdistressmaybemoreuneventhanexpected.

03

Investorsarewaiting(andwaiting)fortheirmoneyback

Private-equityexitshaveslowedasmanagerscontinuetoholdontoportfoliocompaniesratherthansellatpricesthemarketwill

bear,andcompaniesstayprivatelonger.Theresultisanongoingliquiditydroughtreshapinghowgeneralpartnersreturncashto

investors,spurringtheuseofcontinuationvehiclesandsuperchargingactivityinthesecondarymarket.

04

Locked-upcapitalimpactsfundraising

Formanagers,thepressureiscreatingamarketofhavesandhave-nots,withnearlytwo-thirdsofGPsrankingfundraising

astheirtopchallenge.That’snotsurprisingwhenthe50largestmanagershavecapturedmorethan4percentagepointsof

additionalmarketsharesince2021,reflectingabroadershiftofcapitaltowardestablishedmanagers.

05

AIisreshapingthelandscape

AI-relatedassetsnowaccountforroughly16%ofglobalprivateequity—USD739billion,ofaUSD4.5trillionuniverse—

whiletrillionsinnewcapitalmayberequiredtobuildtheinfrastructurebehindit.Asurgeindata-centerconstructioniscreating

opportunitiesacrossassetclasses,withstronghistoricalreturnsondata-centerinvestments,thoughtherisksaregrowingasthe

facilitiesthemselvesbecomemorecomplexandcapital-intensive.Forinvestors,theAIwaveisnotasingleallocationdecisionbut

areasontoreassessexposuresacrosstheentireportfolio.

06

Evergreenfundsmarkastructuralshift

WhatwasonceanichestructurehasclearedUSD500billioninassets,growingmorethan30%inasingleyear.Inrecent

months,however,concernsaboutvaluationqualityandredemptionmanagementhaveshiftedfromtheoreticaltourgentasgates

havegoneupacrosssomeofthelargestfunds.

07

Privatemarketsblurtraditionalasset-classboundaries

Private-creditfundsoftencarrymeaningfulequityexposure,whilethematicinvestmentssuchasdatacentersspan

infrastructure,realestate,privateequityandbeyond.Evendeal-levelanalysismaymissimportantdynamics,suchasdeclining

durationinagingcreditportfolios.Asaresult,fundclassificationsaloneofferanincompleteviewofunderlyingrisks.Amore

granularapproach—andultimatelyafactor-basedlens—canbettercaptureexposuresacrossstrategies,supportingamore

integrated,total-portfolioapproachtoassetallocation.

TheStateof

PrivateMarkets20265

Performance

snapshot

01

TheStateof

PrivateMarkets2026

01

Performancesnapshot

6

Venturecapitalresurgent

Returnsforclosed-endfundsthroughyear-

end2025wereheadlinedbyventurecapital’sstrongfourthquarter,closingwitha7.2%

quarterlyreturnandcappinga22.0%annualgain.Privateequitymorebroadlywasmoresubdued,withbuyoutlagginginboththe

fourthquarter(upjust2.0%)andforthefullyear(up10.1%).

Privatecreditendedtheyearup1.8%in

thefinalquarterfora2025returnof9.8%.

Investorattention,however,hasalreadyshifted

tofirst-quartermarks,wheretherealquestionishowvaluationsmovedalongsidethevolatilityin

listedequitymarketsandtheongoingredemptionchallengesinevergreenfunds.

Realestate,meanwhile,extendeditsdifficultrunwithanotherslightlynegativequarter,apatternthathaslargelydefinedtheassetclasssince

2021.Its2025returnwastheweakestofthereal-assetstrategiesforafourthconsecutiveyear.

Calendar-yearandquarterlyreturns(Percentage)

Annual

2023

2025

2024

Privateequity

5.9

5.8

13.3

Venturecapital

-2.1

5.3

22.0

Expansioncapital

9.3

8.9

6.3

Buyout

9.6

5.7

10.1

Privatecredit

10.2

7.5

9.8

Directlending

11.9

7.1

10.9

Opportunisticlending

11.4

8.5

9.6

Realestatedebt

5.4

6.2

5.8

Privaterealassets

1.4

2.6

7.6

Privaterealestate

-6.1

-2.7

2.0

Naturalresources

1.5

3.6

4.5

Infrastructure

8.5

6.6

12.8

2025

Q1Q2Q3Q4

1.8

2.1

4.3

3.0

3.5

4.9

6.3

7.2

2.4

2.0

0.6

1.3

1.8

4.5

1.6

2.0

2.0

3.7

1.9

1.8

3.0

4.3

1.7

1.5

1.5

3.5

2.4

1.9

1.5

1.81.6

0.8

1.7

3.3

1.3

1.2

0.6

1.7

-0.1

0.7

-0.2

1.7

2.32.0

0.9

1.2

2.9

5.0

QuarterlyreturnsarecalculatedinUSDusingtheModifiedDietzmethodandarenotannualized.Calendar-yearreturnsrepresentcompoundedquarterlyreturns.MSCIPrivateCapitalClosed-EndFundIndexes.DataasofQ42025.Source:MSCIPrivateCapitalUniverse

TheStateof

PrivateMarkets2026

01

Performancesnapshot

7

Some

headachespersist

Zoomingoutfrom2025,weseethatventurecapital’sinternalrateofreturnof19%,whileelevatingitafterathree-yearstretchof

decidedlymixedreturns,wasstillwellbelowitsoutsizedgainsofthe2020-2021era.

Infrastructureclaimedthesecondstrongest

returnin2025at12%,buoyedinpartby

continuedinvestmentinAI-drivendata-centerprojects,cappingoffadecadeofconsistentlypositivereturns.

Buyout’smiddlingIRRof9%in2025isa

reminderthattheassetclassisstillworking

throughanenvironmentofhigherinterestratesandweakerexits.Realestate,meanwhile,

remainsdownfromthemiddle-of-the-packreturnsitregisteredformostofthepast

decadepriortointerest-ratespikes.

One-yearIRR(Percentage)

Expansioncapital

Buyout

Venturecapital

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

-10

-20

-30

20162025

20162025

20162025

DirectlendingOpportunisticlendingRealestatedebt

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

-10

201620252016202520162025

PrivaterealestateInfrastructureNaturalresources

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

-10201620252016202520162025DataasofQ42025.Source:MSCIPrivateCapitalUniverse

●

DataasofQ42025.Source:MSCIPrivateCapitalUniverse

TheStateof

PrivateMarkets2026

01

Performancesnapshot

8

Buyinghigh,exitinghigher

Entrymultiplesforbuyoutdealscontinued

theirupwardclimbthrough2025,withthe

mediandealpricedat11.3xEBITDA—stillshyofthe11.7xpeakseenin2022,butreflectiveofamarketwheredealpricinghasremainedstubbornlyelevated.Themorestrikingstory,however,isontheexitside.Exitmultiples

reachedtheirhighestlevelinoveradecade,

withthemedianat13.2xEBITDAandtop-

quartileexitsapproaching18x.Whileoverallexitactivityandcashflowsremainmuted,thedealsthataregettingdonearecommandingmeaningfulpremiums,suggestingthat

qualityassetscontinuetoattractbuyers

evenasthebroaderdistributionenvironmentstayssluggish.

EBITDAmultipleatentry

●75thpercentile●50thpercentile25thpercentile

18

16

14

12

10.6

11.5

11.7

10.2

10.9

11.3

10

8.4

8.7

9.2

9.6

9.8

8

6

4

20152016201720182019202020212022202320242025

EBITDAmultipleatexit

75thpercentile50thpercentile25thpercentile

18

●

16

14

1010.110.0

10.8●11.1

●10.4

●●

···●

1211.812.112.011.4·11.713.2

8

6

4

20152016201720182019202020212022202320242025

TheStateof

PrivateMarkets2026WhyClarityMatters9

WhyClarity

Matters

02

TheStateof

PrivateMarkets2026

Demandfordata

andtransparency

Limitedpartners(LPs)aredrivingthepushfor

transparencyinprivatemarketswithalevelof

pressureandcollectivemomentumnotseen

beforeinthehistoryoftheassetclass.1Investors—institutionalandprivatewealthalike—

expectgeneralpartners(GPs)todelivertimely,detailedinsightsatnotonlythefundbutalsotheindividualholdingslevel,andtheywantthose

insightstoreflectcurrentmarketandcompany-specificdynamics.LPswantclearer,data-drivenwaystocompareriskandreturnacrosslisted

andunlistedassets,supportedbyemergingframeworks,benchmarksandanalyticsthatenablethemtoseetheirtotalportfolioclearly.

Simplyput,theywantgreatervisibilityintotheirinvestments.

Themessageislanding.Morethantwo-thirds

(68%)oflargeGPsandoverhalf(52%)oftheirsmallercounterpartscitedmanaginginvestor

expectationsandreportingasamongtheirtop-fivechallenges

inMSCI’slatestannualsurvey

ofmorethan100GPsworldwide.2

GPsincreasinglywanttransparencytoo.

Athirdofrespondentstooursurveysaidtheylackaccesstoprivate-assetdata

theyfullytrust.Aquartersaidtheyneed

betterstandardization,dataintegrationand

customizationincorporatedintoperformancemanagement.

Thedemandfortransparencyreflects

themovementofprivatemarketstothe

investmentmainstream.Seventrillion

dollars,ornearlyafifth(19%)ofassetsin

publicpensionandsovereignwealthfunds

globally,wasinvestedinunlistedequity,

creditandrealestateasofDecember2024,upfrom13.5%adecadeearlier.3Someof

thelargestpensionfundsseektoinvestas

muchas40%oftheirtotalportfolioinprivatemarkets.4Investorswhoarebeingaskedto

makefaster,total-portfoliodecisionsmay

finditdifficulttodosoifasignificantshare

oftheirtotalportfoliocanonlybeanalyzedinquarterlyhindsight.

02

10

WhyClarityMatters

One-fifthoftheworld’s

largestportfoliosisalreadyinprivatemarkets

USD7T

Publicpensionandsovereign

wealthfundshaveallocatednearlyUSD7trilliontoprivatemarkets.

Source:“SovereignWealthFundsandPublicPension

FundsAreReshapingPrivateMarkets,”GlobalPrincipalInvestorsReport,BCG,December2024

19%

AllocationstoprivatemarketsaccountfornearlyafifthoftotalAUMinpublicpensionsandsovereignwealthfunds,upfrom13.5%in2014.

Source:“SovereignWealthFundsandPublicPension

FundsAreReshapingPrivateMarkets,”GlobalPrincipalInvestorsReport,BCG,December2024

9%

TheestimatedcompoundannualgrowthrateofprivatemarketsAUMthrough

2033,morethantwicetherateofpublicmarketAUM.

Source:“AvoidingWipeout:HowtoRidetheWaveofPrivateMarkets,”Bain&Company,August2024

1.Weusethetermprivatemarketsbroadlyheretorefertoaseriesofassetclassescomprisingprivateequity(includingventurecapitalandbuyout),privatecredit,realestateandinfrastructure.

2.LargeGPs,definedasthosewithatleastUSD5billioninassetsundermanagement(AUM),represented45%ofrespondents;GPswithbetweenUSD1and5billioninAUMmadeuptheremainder.

3.“GlobalPrincipalInvestorsReport–SovereignWealthFundsandPublicPensionFundsAreReshapingPrivateMarkets,”BCG,December2024.

4.“TheCalPERSPrivateEquityTurnaround,”AntonOrlich,ManagingInvestmentDirector,PrivateEquity,January20,2026.Seealso,“Enablingawhole-of-fundviewforCanadianpensionstoacceleratedata-driveninsights,”StateStreet,April2025.

TheStateof

PrivateMarkets2026

02

WhyClarityMatters

11

Thepremiumthatprivate-marketinvestmentsofferinreturnforawillingness

Buyouthasoutperformedpublicmarketsformorethan25years(Indexlevel)

MSCIUSBuyoutClosed-EndFundIndex

MSCIUSASmallCapIndex

AdjustedMSCIUSASmallCapIndex

2000

tocommitcapitalfora

decadeormoremayholdvalueforthosewhose

horizonsspangenerations.

Investmentsinbuyoutfunds,forexample,

have

outperformedtheirpublic-marketequivalents

,onaverage,overthe25yearsendedSept.30,2025,accordingtoMSCIanalysis.

1500

1000

500

0

200020052010201520202025

AdjustedMSCIUSASmallCapIndexmirrorstheallocationsandattributesofprivateholdings,includingleverage.DataasofQ32025.

TheStateof

PrivateMarkets2026

02

WhyClarityMatters

12

“Benchmarkingtoolsinourindustryarechallenging.LPsarealwayslookingforcomparables,anditishardtofinda

databasetocompareagainstours.”

GP

privatemarketscancreatevalueandevenbestrategicallydesirablefromtheperspectiveofmarketparticipants.Butiftheobjectiveisto

broadenparticipationandattractnewpoolsofcapital,privatemarketswilllikelyexchangesomeofthatimbalanceforscaleandtrust.

Challengesremain.Asdiscussedinthisreport,

gapsinprivate-creditdisclosure

leaveLPs

strugglingtoindependentlyassesscredit

quality,concentrationriskoremergingstresswithintheirportfolios,eventhoughthesearefoundationaltoriskmanagement.Someassetownershavesaid

theystillrelyonpublic-

marketproxies

asbenchmarksforprivate-

assetperformance,acknowledgingthatthis

isnotanoptimalapproach.Fortheirpart,GPs

inoursurvey

saidtheystruggletoidentify

benchmarksthatfittheirstrategies.

Increasingly,however,data,standards,

methodologiesandtechnologyarefallinginto

placeforarevolutionintransparencyinprivatemarkets.Thetransformationwilldependon

bothacommitmenttoopennessfrommanagersandcontinuedpressurefrominvestors.

Godeeper

Transparency,Data&TotalPortfolioThinking

withMSCI,sLukeFlemmer

AligningBenchmarkswithAsset-Class

Reality:TheCaseforPrivate-CapitalIndexes

The2025GeneralPartnerSurvey

Thebenchmarkingproblemisn’tthesameproblemforeveryGP

ChallengescitedbysmallGPs(Surveyresponses)

Dataaccuracy/credibilityissues

57%

Identifying/selectingappropriatebenchmarks

43%

Difficult/complicatedprocess

29%

ChallengescitedbylargeGPs(Surveyresponses)

Identifying/selectingappropriatebenchmarks

40%

Dataaccuracy/credibilityissues

20%

Competitor/peercomparisonissues

20%

SmallGPsmanagebetweenUSD1and5billioninassets.LargeGPsmanagemorethanUSD5billion.Source:“The2025GeneralPartnerSurvey,”MSCI,June12,2025

TheStateof

PrivateMarkets2026

02

WhyClarityMatters

13

HowMSCIishelping

Therecentrepricingoftheprivate-credit

AllCountryPrivateCreditIndexinlateMarchdemonstrateshowtheindexreflectedstressinrealtime—withoutwaitingweeksforthefullyreporteddata.Bythetimethequarterlymarkispublished,thedailyindexhasalreadyspentmostofthepriorquarterreflectingthatsameinformation.

Adailyindexdoesnotindependentlyappraise

theeconomicvalueofunderlyingloans.Rather,itestimateswhereGPmarksareheadingbeforethequarterlyindexcatchesup.

Adailyviewofprivatecredit

marketshighlightsthevalueofmorefrequentandtimelyperformancedata.ThechartshowsthedailyMSCIAllCountryPrivateCreditIndexalongsidethequarterlyMSCIGlobalPrivate

CreditClosed-EndFundIndexfromDec.31,2009toMarch26,2026.

Eachorangedotrepresentsaquarterlyreturnthatbecomesavailableroughlythreemonthsafterthequartercloses,whilethegreenlineisavailablecontinuously.ThedropintheMSCI

DailyindexanticipatesquarterlyGP-reportedreturns

MSCIAllCountryPrivateCreditIndex(dailyindex)MSCIGlobalPrivateCreditClosed-EndFundIndex(quarterlyindex)

4500

4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

200920112013201520172019202120232025

TheMSCIAllCountryPrivateCreditIndexhasbeenbacktestedtoJan.1,2010.Foreaseofcomparison,thequarterlyindexlevels(shownasmarkers)aredisplayedwithouttheirreportinglagofroughlyonequarter.DataasofMarch26,2026.

TheStateof

PrivateMarkets202614

Fivethemesforinvestorsnow

03

TheStateof

PrivateMarkets2026

03

Fivethemes

forinvestorsnow:

Privatecredit

15

THEMEONE:PRIVATECREDIT

Thepictureinprivatecredit

2026beganwithaseriesofremindersfor

investorsofboththedisruptivepotentialandopportunitythataccompanyAI.

Anthropic’sannouncementinJanuary

ofaseriesofopen-sourceplug-insfor

ClaudeCoworkrattledfinancialmarketsasinvestorsgrappledwiththepotentialofAItodisplacedemandforbusinesssoftware.Stocksofsoftwarecompaniesfell,drivenbyfearstheirbusinessmodelswouldbe

upendedbyAItools.5

Theconcernsreverberatedacrossprivate

marketstoo.Sharesofexchange-listed

businessdevelopmentcompanies(BDCs),whichprimarilyextendprivate-creditloans,declined11%betweenJanuary30and

March11,drivenbysimilarfears.6BDCswithhigherallocationstosoftwareborrowers

underperformedtheirpeers.Similarly,semi-liquidprivate-creditfundsfieldedawaveofredemptionrequests,settingoffconcern

aboutstrainsonprivatecreditmorebroadly.

Atthesametime,short-termearnings-

growthforecastsforU.S.softwareactuallyrosethroughoutFebruary.Thatpromptsthequestionwhetherinvestorsacrossasset

classesarerepricingbusinessmodelsfasterthandisruptionisarriving.

5.“Anthropic'snewAItoolsdeepenselloffindataanalyticsandsoftwarestocks,investorssay,”Reuters,Feb.32026.

6.BasedontheperformanceoftheMSCIUSListedBDCIndex.

TheStateof

PrivateMarkets2026

03

Fivethemes

forinvestorsnow:

Privatecredit

16

Privatecredit’ssoftwareproblem

Fortheprivate-creditmarket,thefearssparkedbytheClaudeannouncementcompoundedconcernsoverstressmoregenerallythatbeganin2025withthebankruptciesofsubprimeautolenderTricolorHoldingsandcarpartscompanyFirstBrands

Group.7

Unlikethestressfollowingthosebankruptcies,

whichraisedbroadconcernsaboutprivate-credit

underwriting,thesell-offinbusinesssoftware

appearedtargeted.InlistedBDCs,atleast,investorswerenotsimplyreducingexposuretotheasset

classbutdifferentiatingbasedonunderlyingportfolioexposures.

Softwareborrowerscarryadistinctriskprofile.OurdatashowsthatIT-sectorprivate-creditborrowerscarrymediannet-debt-to-EBITDAratiosro