2026年年中世界经济形势与展望报告（英）

WorldEconomicSituationand

Prospects2026

MID-YEARUPDATE

WorldEconomicSituationandProspects2026

MID-YEARUPDATE

TheWorldEconomicSituationandProspectsasofmid-2026updatestheWorldEconomicSituationandProspects2026

releasedon8January2026.Thereportisprepared

bytheGlobalEconomicMonitoringBranchinthe

EconomicAnalysisandPolicyDivisionoftheUnitedNationsDepartmentofEconomicandSocialAffairs.

WorldEconomic

SituationandProspectsasofmid-2026

Summary

TheglobaleconomyisunderstressasthecrisisintheMiddleEastcloudsthegrowthoutlook,stokesinflationarypressures,andaddstouncertainty

acrossfinancialmarkets.Globalgrowthisnow

projectedat2.5percentin2026and2.8percentin2027—downwardrevisionstoanalreadysubduedoutlook.Althoughtheserevisionsaremodest,

forecastuncertaintyhasrisenconsiderably,as

outcomeshingeontheconflict’sdurationand

scale;afaster-than-expectedresolutioncould

restoreconfidence,whileaprolongeddisruptionwoulddeepenthedowngrade.

TheclosureoftheStraitofHormuz—through

whichaboutonefifthofglobaloilandliquefiednaturalgassuppliespass—isdrivingfuel,

fertilizer,andfoodpriceshigherandstrainingglobalsupplychains.Globalinflationisnow

expectedtoreach3.9percentin2026—0.8

percentagepointsabovetheJanuaryforecast—reversingadisinflationarytrendanderoding

householdpurchasingpower.Financialmarketvolatilityhasincreased,withrisksofrenewed

portfoliooutflowsandtighterexternalfinancingconditionsiftheconflictpersists.Centralbanksareexpectedtoholdrateshigherforlongerto

curbinflation,whilegovernmentsfacerising

fiscalpressuresfromweakergrowthalongside

necessaryexpenditurestocushioncrisisimpacts.

Resilientlabourmarketsandartificialintelligence(AI)-driventradeandinvestmentsupportglobal

activitybutareunlikelytofullyoffsetwidespreadheadwinds.Theoutlookismostchallengingfor

fuel-andfood-importingdevelopingeconomies,wheresurgingimportcostsriskwidening

fiscaldeficits,strainingexternalbalances,

anddeepeningfoodinsecurity.Low-income

households—whichspendthelargestshareoftheirbudgetsonfoodandenergy—bearthe

heaviestburden,withmillionsatriskofbeingpushedintopoverty.Combinedwithdecliningaidflowsandmountingdebt-servicecosts,

thesepressuresthreatentoreversehard-wondevelopmentgainsandfurtherslowprogresstowardtheSustainableDevelopmentGoals.

III

Contents

Summary II

Globalmacroeconomictrends 1

Globaloverview 1

Inflation 6

Internationalfinance 7

Internationaltradeanddevelopment 9

Labourmarkets 11

Monetarypolicy 11

Fiscalpolicy 12

Industrialpolicy 13

Internationalcooperation 14

Productivitygrowthinachangingworld 15

Productivityandthemedium-termgrowthchallenge 15

ProductivitygrowthforsharedprosperityandtheSDGs

19

Regionaleconomicoutlook

22

Developedeconomies

22

NorthAmerica

22

Europe

22

DevelopedAsiaandthePacific

23

Economiesintransition

23

Developingeconomies

24

Africa 2

4

EastAsia 2

4

SouthAsia 2

5

WesternAsia 2

6

LatinAmericaandtheCaribbean 2

6

Table

1Growthofworldoutputandgrossdomesticproduct2

Figures

1Growthofeconomicoutput 1

2Historicandfuturespricesofcrudeoilandnatural

gas 3

3Priceindicesofselectedcommodities 3

4Growthofglobalindustrialproductionand

merchandisetrade 4

5Revisionsto2026inflationforecastsbetween

JanuaryandMay2026 4

6Cumulativefoodpriceinflationinselectedcountry

groups 7

7Volatilityofselectedfinancialandcommodity

marketindicators,quarterlyaverage 8

8Non-residentportfolioflowstoemerging

economies 8

9ShareofmigrationstockintheGulfCooperation

Councilcountries,byregionoforigin 9

10StraitofHormuztransitvolumeandBaltic

ExchangeDirtyTankerIndex 9

11Worldmerchandisetradegrowthbycategory 10

12Centralbankmonetarypolicystances 11

13Generalgovernmentfiscalbalance,bycountry

group 13

14Ten-yeargovernmentbondyieldsinselected

developedeconomies 13

15Labourproductivity 16

16Growthoflabourproductivityinselected

developedeconomies 16

17Growthoflabourproductivityofdevelopingregions17

18Growthingrossfixedcapitalformation 17

19Changesinskills-adjustedhumancapitalin

selectedregions,1970vs.2015 18

20R&DinvestmentsasashareofGDP 19

GLOBALMACROECONOMICTRENDS1

Globalmacroeconomictrends

Globaloverview

ThecrisisintheMiddleEasthasdelivered

anothermajorshocktotheworldeconomy,

testingtheresilienceofglobalgrowth,stoking

inflationarypressuresandfurtherchallenging

theprospectsforsustainabledevelopment.

Headinginto2026,economicactivitywasseen

asbeingsupportedbyfirmlabourmarkets,

sustainedconsumerspendingandrobusttrade

growth,evenaspersistenttradetensionsand

geopoliticaluncertaintywerecloudingthe

outlook.Commencing28February2026,the

MiddleEastconflicthastriggeredasevereenergyshock,sendingfuel,fertilizerandtransportcostshigherandcausingfar-reachingsupplychain

disruptions.Asaresult,thenear-termoutlook

hasshiftedtowardslowergrowthandheighteneduncertainty,withsignificantimplicationsfor

developingcountriesandprogresstowardtheSustainableDevelopmentGoals(SDGs).

Globalgrowthisprojectedat2.5percentin2026and2.8percentin2027(0.2and0.1percentage

pointsbelowtheJanuaryforecasts)(figure1andtable1)—amodestdownwardrevisiontoan

alreadysubduedoutlook,withgrowthinmany

regionsfurtherdepressedbelowpre-pandemic

trends.Afterthreeyearsofdisinflationfollowingthepost-pandemicpricesurge,globalinflation

isnowprojectedtoriseagain,reaching3.9per

centin2026beforeeasingto3.1percentin2027(0.8and0.2percentagepointsabovetheJanuaryprojections).Thisbaselinescenarioassumes

thatBrentcrudeoilpricesremainabove$100per

barrelthroughmid-2026,beforeeasinggraduallytoward$80perbarrelinthesecondhalfofthe

yearanddecliningmodestlyinto2027amid

graduallyimprovingsupply.Pricesareexpectedtostayabovepre-conflictlevelsaslingering

uncertaintyandunresolvedinfrastructure

damagesustainastructuralriskpremium,

consistentwithcurrentfuturespricing(figure2).

Besidesdirectdamagetoenergyinfrastructure,theclosureoftheStraitofHormuz—through

whichnormallyaroundonefifthofglobaloilandliquefiednaturalgas(LNG)supplies

Figure1

Growthofeconomicoutput

DevelopingeconomiesWorld

Developedeconomies

ForecastsMay2026

ForecastsJanuary2026

201520162017201820192020

Percentage8

2025e2026f2027f

-2

-4

-6

6

4

2

0

Projections

2021

2022

2023

2024

Source:UNDESA,basedonestimatesandforecastsproducedwiththeWorldEconomicForecastingModel.

Note:e=estimates;f=forecasts.

2WORLDECONOMICSITUATIONANDPROSPECTSASOFMID-2026

Table1

Growthofworldoutputandgrossdomesticproduct

ChangefromWorldEconomicSituationandProspects2026

Annualpercentagechange

2010.2019

average

2024

2025a

2026b

2027b

2026

2027

World

3.2

2.9

3.0

2.5

2.8

.0.2

.0.1

Developedeconomies

2.0

1.8

1.7

1.5

1.7

.0.1

.0.1

UnitedStatesofAmerica

2.4

2.8

2.1

2.0

2.0

0.0

-0.2

Japan

1.3

-0.2

1.2

0.8

1.1

-0.1

0.1

EuropeanUnion

1.6

1.1

1.5

1.1

1.4

-0.2

-0.2

Euroarea

1.4

0.9

1.4

0.9

1.2

-0.2

-0.2

UnitedKingdomofGreatBritainandNorthernIreland

2.0

1.1

1.4

0.7

1.0

-0.4

-0.3

Otherdevelopedcountries

2.6

1.6

1.4

1.6

1.9

0.0

0.0

Economiesintransition

2.4

4.5

2.4

2.2

2.4

0.0

.0.1

South-EasternEurope

2.0

3.5

2.4

3.0

3.5

-0.4

0.1

CommonwealthofIndependentStatesandGeorgia

2.4

4.6

2.4

2.1

2.3

0.0

-0.2

RussianFederation

1.9

4.3

1.0

1.0

1.2

0.0

-0.3

Developingeconomies

5.2

4.3

4.6

3.9

4.3

.0.3

0.0

Africac,d

3.8

3.7

4.3

3.9

4.2

-0.1

0.1

NorthAfricac,d

3.5

3.3

4.6

3.7

3.9

-0.4

-0.1

EastAfrica

6.3

5.5

6.7

5.6

6.0

-0.2

0.3

CentralAfrica

2.7

3.3

2.9

3.4

3.2

0.4

-0.1

WestAfrica

4.5

4.7

4.8

4.7

4.8

0.3

0.1

SouthernAfrica

2.4

1.6

1.8

2.0

2.3

0.0

0.1

EastandSouthAsiae

6.7

5.1

5.2

4.5

4.6

-0.1

-0.1

EastAsia

7.0

5.0

5.0

4.4

4.4

0.0

0.0

China

7.7

5.0

5.0

4.6

4.5

0.0

0.0

SouthAsiae,f

5.7

6.0

6.1

4.6

5.6

-1.0

-0.3

Indiaf

6.7

7.1

7.5

6.4

6.6

-0.2

-0.1

WesternAsiag

4.2

2.1

3.6

1.4

4.3

-2.7

0.3

LatinAmericaandtheCaribbean

1.6

2.3

2.5

2.3

2.7

0.0

0.2

SouthAmerica

1.2

2.3

3.0

2.5

2.6

0.0

0.1

Brazil

1.4

3.4

2.3

2.0

2.3

0.0

0.0

MexicoandCentralAmerica

2.7

1.8

1.3

1.7

2.6

-0.1

0.1

Caribbeanh

0.4

2.2

1.4

1.1

2.4

-0.5

0.7

Leastdevelopedcountriesd,e

5.3

4.3

4.6

4.4

4.4

.0.2

.0.6

Landlockeddevelopingcountriese

5.3

4.9

6.0

4.9

5.1

0.0

0.2

SmallislanddevelopingStates

3.9

5.0

3.8

2.6

3.4

.0.2

0.6

Middle.incomecountries

5.6

4.4

4.6

4.0

4.3

.0.3

.0.1

Memorandumitems

Worldtradei

4.5

3.3

5.0

2.7

3.2

0.5

0.0

Worldoutputgrowthwithpurchasingpowerparity(PPP)weightsj

3.6

3.3

3.4

2.9

3.3

-0.2

0.0

Source:UNDESA,basedonestimatesandforecastsproducedwiththeWorldEconomicForecastingModel.

Notes:aestimate;bforecast;cexcludesLibyaduetoconflict;dexcludesSudanduetoconflict;eexcludesAfghanistanasnoforecastshavebeenmadefortheeconomy;fgrowthratesareonacalendar-yearbasis;gexcludesStateofPalestineduetoconflict;hexcludesGuyanaasthecountry’srapidexpansionofoilproductionsubstantiallyincreasesregionalaveragegrowthnumbers;iincludesgoodsandservices;jbasedon2017benchmark.Estimatesandforecastsarebasedondataandinformationavailableupto1May2026.

GLOBALMACROECONOMICTRENDS3

Figure2

Historicandfuturespricesofcrudeoilandnaturalgas

lndex,1February=100

140

Brentcrudeoilspotprices

(U.S.dollarsperbarrel)

120

100

Brentcrudefutures

(U.S.dollarsperbarrel)

80

60

40

DutchTTFnaturalgas

futures(Euro/MWh)

20

0

JanAprJulOctJanAprJulOct

20262027

Source:UNDESA,basedondatafromIntercontinentalExchangeandUnitedStatesEnergyInformationAdministration.

Note:TTF=TitleTransferFacility;MWh=megawatthour.

Figure3

Priceindicesofselectedcommodities

Index1February=100

180

Brentcrude

oilspotprice

140

Automobilegasolinespotprice(UnitedStates)

100

Naturalgasspotprice

(Germany)

60

FebMarApr

2026

,

220

28February

Kerosenespotprice

(UnitedStates)

pass—hasseverelycurtailedenergysupply,

drivingcrudeandnaturalgaspricessharply

higher(figure3).Downstreamrefinedproducts,

includinggasolineandjetfuel,havefolloweda

similartrajectory.Disruptionsarealsoaffecting

adjacentcommoditymarkets:aroundonethirdofglobalseabornefertilizertradenormallytransitsthewaterway,whiletheregion’simportantrole

insupplyingothercriticalinputs—including

aluminium,helium,andnaphtha—isintensifyingsupplychainvulnerabilitiesacrossindustriesanddrivingupinputcostsforimporters.

Theresultingoilsupplyshockrisksbeingamongthelargestinmodernhistory.Tankertransits

throughtheStraitcollapsedtonearzeroafter

March5,cuttingoffaround20millionbarrelsperday(mb/d)ofgrosssupplyfroma100mb/dglobalmarket.Alternativesources—otherproducers,

alternativepipelines,sanctionedoilintransitandinventorydrawdowns—havecushionedtheblowtosomeextentsincethattime.Thedisruption

isparticularlyacuteforAsia,whichreceives

around80percentofalloiltransitingtheStrait.Inventorydrawdownsareabsorbingpartofthe

Index,1February=100

Naphtha

180

Urea

140

Polyethylene

100

Helium

60

FebMarApr

2026

220

28February

Source:UNDESA,basedondatafromCEIC,TradingEconomicsand

I

.

Note:Thedataseriesarebasedona7-daymovingaverage.

4WORLDECONOMICSITUATIONANDPROSPECTSASOFMID-2026

shortfallfornow,butasstocksaredepleted,thefullweightofthesupplygapwillincreasingly

workthroughsupplychains.

Theenergymarketshockisexertingbroader

macroeconomicpressure.Highercostsare

erodinghouseholdpurchasingpowerand

compressingbusinessmargins,whileheighteneduncertaintyisdampeningbusinessconfidence

andinvestment.Withinflationrising,central

banksareexpectedtoholdrateshigherthan

previouslyanticipated,contributingtoincreasingsovereignbondyieldsandtighteningglobal

financialconditions.Financialmarketshave

becomemorevolatile,thoughpressureshavesofarremainedcontained.Whilehigh-frequency

indicatorsofactualactivity—suchasindustrialproduction,merchandisetrade,andretail

sales—pointedtosolideconomicconditionsin

early2026(figure4),thecombinedheadwindsarealreadyvisibleinmoreforward-lookingsurvey

data,includingweakeningpurchasingmanagers’indicesandconsumersentimentindicators.

Countrylevelimpactsvary,shapedbydiffering

exposuretotheconflict’stransmissionchannels

aswellasthecapacitytorespond.Therelativelymodestdowngradetoglobalgrowthassumes

thatthescopeanddurationofthedisruptionarecontained,andthatimpactsamongthelargest

economiesarepartlymitigatedbycountry

specificfactors.U.S.growthisexpectedtobe

supportedbyresilientconsumerspending—

buoyedbytaxcuts—andstrongartificial

intelligence(AI)-driveninvestment.China,

despitebeinganoilimporter,iscushionedby

itsdiversifiedenergymix,strategicreserves,

andpolicysupport,evenasitnavigatesa

protractedpropertysectoradjustmentand

subdueddomesticdemand.Incontrast,prospectsinEurope—whereexposuretoglobalenergy

pricevolatilityremainsacute—haveweakened,addingtoanalreadysluggishpre-conflict

growthtrajectory.

Amongothereconomies,theIslamicRepublicofIranandmanyGulfstatesfacethemostseveredisruptions,includinginfrastructuredamage,

loweroilandgasoutput,andweakertourism

Figure4

Growthofglobalindustrialproductionandmerchandisetrade

Percentage(year-on-year)

6

Merchandisetrade

(3-monthmovingaverage)

4

2

Industrialproduction

(3-monthmovingaverage)

0

-2

-4

20222023202420252026

Source:UNDESA,basedondatafromCPBNetherlandsBureauforEconomicPolicyAnalysis.

revenues.Whileotherenergyexporterscould

temporarilybenefitfromhigherexportrevenues,thesegainsmaybepartlyoffsetbysoftening

globaldemand.Energy-importingdeveloping

economies—particularlyacrossAsia—face

growthheadwinds,inflationarypressures,and

balance-of-paymentsstrainsfromterms-of-tradelosses,insomecasescompoundingelevated

debtburdensandconstrainedpolicyspace.

Thesepressuresarealsogivingrisetonear-termoutputrisks.Severaleconomieshaveadopted

shortenedworkweeks,schoolclosures,orwork-from-homemandatestoconservefuel—measuresthat,whileeasingdemand,entailforegone

outputandincomelosses.InAfrica,rising

energyandfoodimportcostsriskexacerbatingexistingfiscalpressures,withlimitedbufferstocushiontheimpactonhouseholds.Asaregion,LatinAmericaandtheCaribbean,withseveral

netenergy-exportingeconomies,appears

somewhatinsulatedthoughitremainsonalow-growthtrajectory.

Manyvulnerableeconomies—includingthe

leastdevelopedcountries(LDCs),landlocked

GLOBALMACROECONOMICTRENDS5

developingcountries(LLDCs)andsmallislanddevelopingStates(SIDS)—entered2026with

constrainedfiscalspace,elevateddebt-serviceburdensandsubduedgrowth,leavinglimitedroomtoabsorbnewshocks.TheMiddleEast

crisishasdeepenedthesevulnerabilities,

thoughtransmissionchannelsdiffer.The2026

growthoutlookismodestlyreviseddownward

forLDCs,whereexposurerunsthroughfuel

supplychains:mostcountrieslackdomestic

refiningcapacityandrelyonimportedfuel

products,leavingthemvulnerabletoprice

spikesandsupplydisruptions.ForLLDCsasa

group,downwardpressuresarebroadlyoffsetbyterms-of-tradegainsoffuel-exportingcountries,leavingtheaggregate2026growthoutlook

broadlyunchanged.ForSIDS,growthin2026

isalsomodestlyreviseddownward.Tourism

dependenceisakeyvulnerability:risingfuel

costspushupairfaresanddampenarrivals,whilehighermaritimetransportcostsaddtobroader

inflationarypressure.

Thedurationanddegreeofdisruptionlargely

determinetheextentofthedowngradetothe

globalgrowthforecast.Inanadversescenario—

whereBrentcrudetemporarilysurgesabove$150perbarrelbeforegraduallydecliningtoaround

$100byend-2026—globalgrowthwouldreach

only2.1percentin2026and2.6percentin2027,

0.4and0.2percentagepointsbelowthebaseline.Suchascenariocouldtriggeradeteriorationin

financialmarketsentiment,tighteningcredit

conditionsandamplifyingvulnerabilitiesin

highlyindebtedeconomies.Thesepressures

couldbefurtherexacerbatedbylingeringtrade

tensions.Ontheupside,afaster-than-expected

resolutionoftheconflictandstabilizationof

energymarketscouldrestoreconfidence,ease

inflationarypressures,andimprovegrowth

prospects.Stronger-than-expectedproductivitygainsfromAIinvestmentcouldprovidean

additionalliftoverthemediumtermthoughthesebenefitsriskbeingconcentratedindeveloped

economies,leavingmostdevelopingcountries

behindandwideningexistingglobalinequalities.

Thedowngradedeconomicoutlookunderstates

thetruescaleofthesetback—theconflict

threatenstoreversehard-wondevelopment

gainsandfurtherslowprogresstowardthe

SDGs.Estimatesindicatethatthecurrentprice

shockscouldpushanadditional45millionpeopleintoacutefoodinsecurity,bringingtheglobal

totaltoarecord363million—morethandouble

pre-pandemiclevels.1Spilloversarefalling

disproportionatelyonfuel-andfood-importing

economiesinsub-SaharanAfricaandSouthAsia,wherefiscalbuffersarethinnestandvulnerabilitytoterms-of-tradelossesgreatest.Atthehouseholdlevel,low-incomefamilies,whichdevotealargershareofspendingtofoodandenergyandhave

theleastcapacitytoabsorbrealincomeshocks,beartheheaviestburden,withpovertylevelssettoriseinconsequence.Womenandgirlscanbedisproportionatelyaffected—astheyoftenhavefewereconomicresources,thedisruptionscan

translatedirectlyintoincreasedpoverty,hungerandunpaidcareburdens,whiletheiraccessto

essentialservicescouldbecurtailed.2

Therenewedpressurescompoundanalready

acutedevelopmentfinancingsqueeze:theSDG

financingandinvestmentgapstandsat$4trillionannually,3aidflowsaredecliningsharply,and

debt-servicecostsarecrowdingoutspending

onhealthandeducation.Ontheenvironmental

front,highenergypricesriskdrivingareturntocarbon-intensivefuels,evenasoverthelonger

termtheymayfurtherstrengthenthecasefor

renewables,acceleratingastructuralshiftaway

fromfossilfuels.Higher-incomecountriesthat

shieldtheirpopulationsfromtheshock—throughconsumptionsubsidiesthatsustaindemandanddriveglobalenergypriceshigher,orthrough

exportrestrictionsthattightenglobalsupply—

effectivelyconcentratetheadjustmentburdenonlessadvantagedcountriesthatlackresourcestocushiontheblow.

1WorldFoodProgram(2026).

AGlobalFoodCrisis

.Rome.

2UNWomen(2026).

Beyondtheheadlines:WhattheongoingconflictsreallymeanforwomenandgirlsintheMiddleEast

.

3UnitedNations(2026).

FinancingforSustainableDevelopmentReport2026:ImplementingtheSevillaCommitment

.NewYork.

6WORLDECONOMICSITUATIONANDPROSPECTSASOFMID-2026

Infiation

Theconflicthasinterruptedaglobal

disinflationarytrendevenasinflationhadyet

toreturntotargetinmanyeconomies.4The

supplyshockcompoundspre-existingprice

pressures,withuneveneffectsacrossregions

(figure5).Indevelopedeconomies,inflationis

forecasttoincreasefrom2.6percentin2025to

2.9percentin2026,anupwardrevisionof0.5

percentagepointsfromtheJanuaryforecast.Inseveralcountries—includingtheUnitedStatesofAmericaandtheUnitedKingdomofGreatBritainandNorthernIreland—coreinflationwasstill

elevatedwhentheenergypriceshockstruck.

Amongdevelopingeconomies,theriseissharper,withinflationprojectedtoacceleratefrom4.2percentin2025to5.2percentin2026(1.3percentagepointshigherthanprojectedinJanuary),as

manycountrieswerealreadygrapplingwith

entrenchedpricepressures.Thegreateststrain

fallsonenergy-importingcountriesinparts

ofSouthAsiaandsub-SaharanAfrica,where

limitedfiscalspaceandweakermonetarypolicyframeworksamplifypass-throughtodomestic

prices.China,bycontrast,isanotableexception:

althoughinflationisprojectedtoedgeupfromrecentlows,subdueddomesticdemandis

expectedtokeeppricepressurescontained.

Theenergypriceshockrisksaggravating

acutefoodsecurityvulnerabilities.Developingeconomies—particularlyLDCsandLLDCs—havefacedcompoundingfoodpriceincreasesover

thepastdecade,leavinghouseholdswithlittleresiliencetoabsorbfurtherpressure(figure6).Foodinflation,whichhadbeenmoderatingintoearly2026,wasalreadyedgingupwardbefore

theconflictandhassincebeenreinforcedby

theenergypriceshock,withtheFAOFoodPriceIndexrisinginMarchandApril2026.Moreover,pressuresmayprovepersistent:unlikefreight

costs,higherfertiliserpricestransmitwitha

lag,meaningfoodinflationcouldintensifywellintothenextplantingseasonevenasenergy

pricesmoderate.

Figure5

Revisionsto2026inflationforecastsbetweenJanuaryandMay2026

ForecastsJanuary2026ForecastsMay2026

Percentage

02468101214

+0.5

+1.1

+1.3

+0.8

+0.4

+5.1

+3.4

+0.7

Source:UNDESA,basedonestimatesproducedwiththeWorldEconomicForecastingModel.

Notes:RegionalandcountrygroupaveragesareGDP-weighted.

Afghanistan,Argentina,theStateofPalestine,Sudan,andtheBolivarianRepublicofVenezuelaareexcluded.

Akeyriskisthatanenergypriceshockcould

triggereffectsthatprovedifficulttocontain.

Firmsfacinghigherinputandfreightcostsmayseektoprotectorexpandmargins,embedding

inflationintofuturepricingdecisionswhilewagepressuresaddafurther,albeitmoregradual,risk.Inthiscontext,shouldinflationexpectations

becomede-anchoredfromtheirtargetranges,

suchdynamicswouldbecomehardertocontain.

Unlike2022—whenacomparableenergyshock

hitanoverheatedglobaleconomyburdened

withpandemic-eraimbalances—demandtoday

ismoresubdued,labourmarketslesstight,and

supplychainsmorestable.Oilmarketswere

alsowell-suppliedbeforetheconflict.These

factorslimit,thoughdonoteliminate,therisk

ofapersistentinflationepisodeandsupport

agradualeasingofpricepressuresinto2027,

providedthedisruptionremainscontainedand

thedestructionofproductiveassetsintheregionisaddressed.Yetevenascenarioofmoderating

Developedeconomies

Economiesintransition

Developingeconomies

Africa

EastAsia

SouthAsia

WesternAsia

LatinAmericaandtheCaribbean

4UnitedNations(2026).

WorldEconomicSituationandProspects2026

.NewYork.

GLOBALMACROECONOMICTRENDS7

Figure6

Cumulativefoodpriceinflationinselectedcountrygroups

2014-20172018-2021

Percentage

40

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

Developedeconomies

2022-2025

Economiesintransition

LandlockedSmallisland

developingcountriesdevelopingStates

Leastdevelopedcountries

Developingeconomies

Source:UNDESA,basedondatafromFoodandAgricultureOrganizationoftheUnitedNations.

Notes:Thefigureshowsmedianvaluesforcountrygroups.Thesamplecovers125economies.

averageinflationcarriesrisks:theinteractionofenergy,food,andfreightshocksislikelytokeeppricedynamicsmorevolatileandlesspredictablethanbefore2021,complicatingdecision-makingbyhouseholds,firms,andgovernments.

Internationalfinance

PriortotheMiddleEastcrisis,globalfinancial

marketswereonafirmerfootingthanmight

havebeenexpected:2025hadendedona

stronger-than-anticipatednote,supported

bylower-than-announcedtariffs,AI-driven

investmentmomentum,andbroadlyfavourablefinancialconditions.Theconflicthasinterruptedthattrajectory,revivinginflationarypressures,

promptingrenewedvolatility(figure7),

andtighteningfinancialconditions.Whilemarketfunctioninghasremainedintact,theriskofasharperandmoredisorderlyadjustmenthasrisen.

Acrossmarkets,impactshavetended

tovary.Equitypricesfellsharplyatthe

outbreak—particularlyinEuropeandAsia,

commensuratewiththeirgreaterdependenceonMiddleEasternenergy—buthavesincebroadly

recovered.Currencymarketsandpreciousmetal