无限潜力-从一系列日间人工智能演习后的病毒提升场景行动后报告中获得洞察（英文）

ANTONSHENK,MATTCHESSEN,BARBARADELCASTELLO,GREGORYSMITH,RICHARDS.GIRVEN

InfinitePotential—

Insightsfromthe

ViralUpliftScenario

After-ActionReportfromaSequenceofDayAfter

ArtificialGeneralIntelligenceExercises

iii

AboutThisReport

TounderstandhowtheUnitedStatesshouldprepareforandrespondtopotentialartificial

intelligence(AI)andartificialgeneralintelligence(AGI)developments,theRANDGeopoliticsof

AGIInitiativeconductsDayAfterAGIexercisesusingtheRANDInfinitePotentialplatform+EachexercisesimulatesaNationalSecurityCouncilPrincipalsCommitteeconveningtorecommendaU+S+governmentresponsetofrontierAIdevelopments+ParticipantsconfrontascenariothatposesbothanacutecrisisforU+S+nationaloreconomicsecurityandasignpostonthepathtoatransformativeAIfuture+GuidedbyasimulatedNationalSecurityAdvisor,theyrole-playasPrincipalsCommittee

members—diagnosingthescenario’simplicationsforU+S+nationalsecurity,deliberatingovercoursesofactionpreparedbytheirstaffs,andrecommendingapathforwardtothePresidentoftheUnitedStates+

ThisreportdrawsontenrunsoftheViralUpliftscenario,whichunfoldedacrosstwoturns+Inthefirst,participantsconfrontedaglobalpandemictriggeredbystudents’accidentalreleaseofanAI-engineeredvirus+Inthesecond,participantsfacedintelligencerevealingthatmultiplestateand

nonstateactorswereracingtoacquiresimilarAI-enabledbiologicalweaponcapabilities+ThescenariowasdesignedtosurfacepolicyoptionsforreducingboththeriskandimpactofAI-modelmisuseingeneratingnovelbiologicalthreats+Acrossalltenruns,theexercisesilluminatedcriticaldecision

points,capabilitygaps,andinstitutionalchallengesthatmayemergeasAIreshapesthestrategic

landscape—enablingpolicymakerstobetterprepareforanuncertainbutpotentiallytransformativetechnologicalfuture+

Thisreportisintendedforpolicymakers,AIpolicyresearchers,andmembersofthebroader

publicseekingtounderstandpotentialAIcrisesandtheanalyticcapabilitiesthatmaybenecessarytorespondtothem+

CenterfortheGeopoliticsofArtificialGeneralIntelligence

RANDGlobalandEmergingRisksisadivisionofRANDthatdeliversrigorousandobjective

publicpolicyresearchonthemostconsequentialchallengestocivilizationandglobalsecurity+This

workwasundertakenbythedivision’sCenterfortheGeopoliticsofArtificialGeneralIntelligence

(AGI),whichiscommittedtohelpingdecisionmakersunderstand,anticipate,andpreparetonavigatethenationalsecurityandgeopoliticalimplicationsofAGI+Thecenterconvenesleadingtechnologists,strategists,economists,politicalscientists,andoutsideexpertstoconsiderthefeasibilityand

effectivenessofprospectiveAGI-enabledcapabilities;thedomesticandinternationalimplicationsoftheiruse;andthestrategiesandpoliciesthatgovernments,businesses,andcivilsocietycouldadopttorespondtonewrealities+Formoreinformation,visit

http://www+rand+org/geopolitics-of-agi

+

iv

Funding

ThiseffortwasindependentlyinitiatedandconductedwithintheCenterfortheGeopoliticsofArtificialGeneralIntelligenceusingincomefromoperationsandgiftsfromRANDsupporters,

includingphilanthropicgiftsmadeorrecommendedbyDALHAPInvestmentsLtd+,ErgoImpact,FoundersPledge,CharlottesochFredriksStiftelse,GoodVentures,Longview,andCoefficient

Giving+RANDdonorsandgrantorshavenoinfluenceoverresearchfindingsorrecommendations+

Acknowledgments

WewouldliketothanktheGeopoliticsofAGICenterleadershipand,inparticular,JoelPredd

andEmmaBordenfortheirinvaluableassistanceinexecutingtheexercisessummarizedinthis

document+Wewouldalsoliketothanktheexerciseparticipants,withoutwhomthisreportwouldnotbepossible+

v

Contents

AboutThisReport iii

FigureandTables vi

InfinitePotential—InsightsfromtheViralUpliftScenario 1

ApplyingGamingtotheProblemofArtificialGeneralIntelligence 2

ExerciseStructure 4

Two-TurnStructure 4

SettingandDataCollection 5

ScenarioSummaryandResearchObjectives 5

ExercisesandParticipants 7

KeyIssues 8

CapabilitiesandPlaybookstoEnhanceU.S.NationalPreparedness 10

NextSteps 14

APPENDIX++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++15

CapabilitiesandResponsePlaybooks 15

References 18

AbouttheAuthors 19

vi

FigureandTables

Figures

Figure1+GamePlayandAnalysisProcess+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++5

Tables

Table1+ScenarioSummary+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++6Table2+ParticipantSummary+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++7TableA+1+SummaryofProposedCapabilities++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++15TableA+2+SummaryofProposedResponsePlaybooks+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++16

1

InfinitePotential—InsightsfromtheViralUpliftScenario

Inthisreport,wepresentananalysisofteniterationsoftheViralUpliftscenario,inwhich

participantsrole-playingNationalSecurityCouncilPrincipalsCommitteemembersrespondedtoartificialintelligence(AI)–enabledbiological(AI-bio)crises+Thescenariounfoldedacrosstwo

escalatingphases:ParticipantsfirstconfrontedanaccidentalpandemiccausedbybiologicalweaponsthatnonstateactorscreatedusingadvancedAItools,thenfacedintelligencerevealingthatmultiplegovernmentswereracingtoacquiresimilarcapabilities+

Acrosstenexercises,119participants—drawnfromseniorgovernmentofficials,RANDanalysts,andsubject-matterexperts—surfacedfivecriticalpatternsconcerningboththechallengesposedbyAI-enabledbiologicalthreatsandthepolicyoptionsforcounteringthem:

1+GovernancestrategiesdividedsharplybetweenrestrictingAIcapabilitiesandtargetingdangerousactors.ParticipantsconsistentlydebatedwhethertofocusoncontrollingaccesstoadvancedAIsystemsorondisruptingtheactorswhomightmisusethem+Allgroups

acknowledgedtheneedforbothapproaches,butfundamentaldisagreementspersistedoverwheretoplaceemphasis+SomearguedthatrestrictingdistributionofbiologicallycapableAImodelswasessentialtoreducingrisk;otherscounteredthatsuchrestrictionsweretechnicallyinfeasible,giventheproliferationofopen-sourcemodels+

2+Resilience,notcontainment,mustanchorU.S.preparednessforandresponsetoAI-

enabledbiologicalthreats.Acrossalltenexercises,nogroupidentifiedacrediblepathtoputthegeniebackinthebottlefordual-useAIcapabilities+Participantsinsteadpivotedtowardbuildingdefensivecapacity—expandingmedicalcountermeasure(MCM)production,forgingpublic-privatepartnershipsforrapidthreatresponse,anddevelopingtechnicalmechanismstodetectandcounterAI-generatedpathogens+

3+ChinapolicyexposeddeeptensionsbetweencooperationonsharedbiologicalthreatsandcompetitionoverAIleadership.EveryexercisesurfaceddebateoverengagingBeijing+

ParticipantswhoassessedthatChinawouldprioritizethesharedglobalriskofAI-enabled

pandemicsadvocatedforscientificcooperationandjointgovernanceframeworks+ThosewhoarguedthatChinawouldexploitthecrisistoadvanceitsownAIcapabilitiesfavoredunilateralactionandalliedcoordination+Nogroupreconciledthesecompetingimperatives+

4+ExistinglegalauthoritiesandregulatoryframeworksareinadequateforAI-enabled

biologicalcrises.Inalltenexercises,participantsidentifiedcriticalgapsinexistingauthoritiesformanagingAI-enabledthreats+Groupsconsistentlyconcludedthatcurrentdual-use

researchoversightmechanisms—designedfortraditionalbiotechnology—cannotkeeppacewiththespeedandscaleofAI-enabledbiologicalcapabilities+Thegroupscalledfornew

2

emergencypowers,reformedinternationalframeworks,andenhancedauthoritiestocompelprivate-sectorcooperation+

5+Enhancedbiologicalsurveillanceandearlywarningsystemsemergedasthehighest-

prioritycapabilityneeds.EveryexercisehighlightedthecriticalimportanceofdetectingAI-engineeredpathogensbeforetheyspreadwidely+Participantsconsistentlyprioritized

investmentsinnext-generationsequencing,AI-poweredanomalydetection,andreal-timedatasharing—emphasizingthattraditionaldiseasesurveillancelacksthespeedtocounter

deliberatelyengineeredthreats+

ApplyingGamingtotheProblemofArtificialGeneralIntelligence

AIhasbecomeatopicofinterestandconcernwithintheU+S+policymakingcommunity+There

hasbeenincreasinginterestinartificialgeneralintelligence(AGI)anditspotentialtoaffectareas

criticaltonationalsecurity,fromeconomicgrowthtomilitarypower+1However,whileAGI’spotentialimpactisincreasinglyrecognized,thistechnologyremainshypothetical,andexactlyhowtodefinethistechnologyiscontested+SomedefineAGIasanAIthatcouldteachtechnologythatcouldperform

everyintellectualtaskahumancouldperform,whileothersfocusontheabilityforsuchanAIto

rapidlyreachsuperhumanlevelsofcapability+Theworldhasnotyetseenan“AGI”anddoesnotfullyagreeonwhatAGIevenis+2Thisuncertainty,coupledwiththepotentialsizeoftheimpactsthatAGImighthave,meansthatmuchoftheresponsetoAGImayoccuronlyoncethetechnology,or

technologieslikeit,hasbeendevelopedanddeployed+

ButthatdoesnotmeanthatanalysisofAGI’snationalsecurityimplicationsisnotimportant+

Instead,analysisofAGI’simpactsmustoccurunderconditionsofuncertainty+Onewaytoclarifyandexplorethisuncertaintyisthroughgaming,whichcanbeausefultoolforexploringtherelationshipswithinapolicyproblemwhenthoserelationshipsareunknownand/orwhenthefactorsimportanttothatproblemarenotyetfullyunderstood+3Gamesandexercisesallowresearcherstoexplorethese

uncertainproblemsincollaborationwiththeirparticipants,drawingontheirdecisionsanddiscussionstoidentifyhowaproblemisstructured,whatfactorswillbeparticularlyimportantforresolvingor

managingit,andthestrengthoftherelationships+

TheDayAfterAGIexerciseswithintheInfinitePotentialplatformwerelaunchedtoanalyzeanelementofthepolicyproblemAGIpresents;thepotentialimpactsofAGIaresolarge,yetso

uncertaininhowspecificallytheywillmanifest,thatitisunlikelythattheU+S+governmentwillbeabletoaddressthechallengesofAGIprimarilythroughpreemptivepolicymaking+Rather,itismorelikelythatU+S+policywithregardtoAGIwillevolvethroughcrisesandspecificincidentsthatdemanda

response+However,itisstillpossibletoprepareforcrisesthroughcontingencyplanningand

1JimMitreandJoelB、Predd,ArtificialGeneralIntelligence’sFiveHardNationalSecurityProblems,RANDCorporation,PE-A3691-4,February2025、

2ForanexplorationofdifferentwaystodefineAIcapabilities,seeMeredithRingelMorris,JaschaSohl-Dickstein,NoahFiedel,TrisWarkentin,AllanDafoe,AleksandraFaust,ClementFarabet,andShaneLegg,“LevelsofAGIforOperationalizing

ProgressonthePathtoAGI,”Proceedingsofthe41stInternationalConferenceonMachineLearning,PMLR235,2024、

3EdwardParson,“WhatCanYouLearnfromaGame?”inRalphL、Keeney,RichardJ、Zeckhauser,andJamesK、Sebenius,eds、,WiseChoices:Decisions,Games,andNegotiations,HarvardBusinessSchoolPress,1996、

3

preparationsothatifandwhenanAGIormerelyanadvancedAIcrisisoccurs,theUnitedStateshasgreatercapabilitytorespondandbringthecrisistoaconclusion+

ThisseriesofgamesandexerciseswasdesignedtoanswerthreekeyquestionsabouthowtheUnitedStatescouldpreparefortheuncertainbutpotentiallysignificantimpactsofAGIandbuildknowledgeaheadofsuchcrises:

1+WhatkeyissueswereparticipantsintheseexercisestryingtomakesenseofinthefaceofAIorAGI-relatedcrises,andwhatinformationdidtheyseektohelpthemmakejudgments

aboutthoseissues?

2+Whatcapabilitiesdidparticipantswishtheyhadorwishtodevelopinresponsetothecrisis?

3+Whatplaybooksdidparticipantsidentifyneedtobewrittenandvalidatedtoadequatelyrespondtothecrisispresentedtothemintheexercise?

Eachofthesequestionsimpliescertainactionsthatmaybeworthtakingnow,inadvanceofa

similarAGIcrisis,shouldoneoccur+Thekeyissuesparticipantsidentified,thejudgmentstheysoughttomake,andthequestionstheyaskedimplyareasofuncertaintythatcouldbeclarifiedtoanswerthequestionsinadvanceofanycrisis+Inturn,thelistsofcapabilitiesandplaybooksthatparticipants

desiredduringtheexerciseimplyareasforinvestmentanddevelopmentbytheU+S+governmentorotheractors,eithernoworinthefuture,whensuchcapabilitiesbecamemorenecessary+

Toanswerthesequestions,wedesignedaseriesofscenario-basedexercisestoconfront

participantswithdifferentpotentialAGI-relatedcrises+Eachscenariopresentedparticipantswith

differentAIcapabilitiesandtheirimpactsontheworld,rangingacrossmultiplelevelsofAGI-relatedprogressandcapability,dependingontheproblembeingpresentedtotheparticipants+4Byworkingthroughthesecrisesinanexercise,participantswerepromptedtothinkaboutcrisisresponseoptionsthatcouldexplicitlyorimplicitlyidentifytheissues,capabilities,andplaybooksthatcouldhelpresolvethecrisesiftheyeveroccurredintherealworld+

Theexercisestructure(describedinmoredetaillater)wasdesignedtobeeasytoplay;itwouldberunintwohourswithnopreparationrequiredofparticipantssothattheexercisecouldberun

multipletimeswithdiverseaudiencestogatherinputonpotentialwaystorespondtocrisesfroma

broadersetofparticipants+BreadthofparticipantswasconsideredparticularlydesirablebecauseoftheuncertaintysurroundingAGIandthewidevarietyofimplicationsitmighthave+Undersuch

uncertainty,leveragingdifferentexperiencesfromdifferentaudienceswasconsideredvaluableforidentifyingthesetofissues,capabilities,andplaybooksthatmightaddressthescenarioathand+

Resultsofscenarioswerecompiledtoidentifycommonissues,playbooks,andcapabilitiesthatparticipantsdiscussedduringtheruns+Theresultsoftheseruns,capturedbydedicatednotetakers,werethencompiledintoafter-actionreports,suchasthisdocument,thatdiscussparticipant

discussion,actions,andbehavioracrossmultipleexercises+Thisafter-actionreportsummarizestheresultsoftenrunsoftheViralUpliftscenario+

4Inthefuture,additionalanalysiswillidentifytrendsacrossasufficientlylargenumberofrunsofanindividualscenariotopermitjudgmentsaboutthebestpoliciesfortheU、S、governmentandotheractorstopursue、Analysismayalsobewrittenidentifyingtrendsacrossdifferentscenarios、

4

ExerciseStructure

Theresearchteamdesignedscenario-basedexercisestoconfrontparticipantswithplausible

AI/AGI-relatedcrisesspanningmultiplecapabilitylevelsanddomainsofimpact+Thesescenariosaimtostimulatecrisis-responsethinkingthatwouldreveal,eitherexplicitlyorimplicitly,theissues,

capabilities,andplaybooksrequiredforeffectivereal-worldresponse+

InfinitePotentialexercisesaretwo-hourtabletopexercisespatternedaftertheDayAfterformat,withtento16participantsledbyafacilitator,whosejobistoelicitresponsesanddiscussionfromthegroup+Theexercisestructureprioritizesaccessibilityandbreadth—eachsessionrunstwohourswithnoadvancepreparation,enablingmultipleiterationswithdiverseparticipantgroups+Thisdesign

philosophyreflectsAGI’sbroaduncertainty:Giventhetechnology’sunclearimplicationsacross

domains,incorporatingvariedprofessionalexperiencesandperspectivesenhancesthelikelihoodofidentifyingcomprehensiverequirementsforcrisisresponse+

Participantswereselectedbasedontheirexperience,institutionalknowledge,andexpertise+Inthetenrunssummarizedhere,participantstookontherolesofmembersoftheNationalSecurityCouncilPrincipalsCommittee,withthefacilitatorplayingtheroleoftheNationalSecurityAdvisorconveningthemeeting+Participantswereaskedtoengageinlightrole-playoftheirassignedroles,representingtheequitiesoftheirassignedpositionsbutnotbeingboundtothemorthemodelofanyformeror

currentoccupantofthatposition+Theparticipantswereaskedtodiagnosetheimplicationsofthe

scenarioforU+S+nationalsecurity,discusscoursesofactionpresentedbytheirstaffs,andrecommendapathaheadforthePresident+

However,theparticipantswerenotaskedtoassumethatanyparticularU+S+administration

wouldbeinofficeatthetimeoftheexercisescenario+Instead,theywereaskedtoconsiderthescenariofromtheperspectiveofanadministrationconfrontingthisissue,drawingontheirhistorical

knowledgeofU+S+nationalsecurity+

Two-TurnStructure

Eachexerciseunfoldsovertwoturnsthatescalatethecrisis:

•Turn1beginswithparticipantsreceivingintelligenceandopen-sourceinformationaboutanemergingAGI-relatedcrisis+Asubject-matterexpertbriefstheteamontheunfolding

situation,afterwhichparticipantscanaskclarifyingquestionsabouttheevents+Thefacilitatorthenguidesthegroupthroughstructureddiscussionsofpolicyobjectives,availableresponseoptions,andthepotentialramificationsofdifferentcoursesofaction+

•Turn2progressesthescenario—typicallyanescalationthatworsensthecrisis,althoughthesituationsometimesdevelopsalonganunexpectedtrajectory+Followinganotherexpert

briefingontheseaccelerateddevelopments,participantsagainexplorepolicyissuesandresponseoptionswiththeirenhancedunderstandingofthecrisisdynamics+Theturn

5

concludeswitharetrospectiveevaluationwhereparticipantsassesstheirinitialresponsesandstrategies+5

SettingandDataCollection

Togroundthecrisisinrealisticnear-termconditions,gameplayissetinahypotheticalfutureof12to18monthsfromthecurrentdate+ThistimeframewasselectedbecauseAI’srapidpaceof

improvementmotivatesexploringwhatapotentialAIcrisiscouldlooklikeintheshortterm+Participantsareinstructedtoassumethetechnologicalandgeopoliticallandscapewillnothavechangedsignificantly,withtherealitiesofthecurrentyearpersistingintheexercise+

Duringeachexercise,notetakerscapturedparticipantdiscussions—whicharethenreviewedandcompiledtoidentifyrecurringissues,capabilities,andplaybooksacrossgroups+ThisreportanalyzesresultsfromteniterationsoftheViralUpliftscenario,examininghowparticipantsapproachedAI-enabledbiosecuritycrisesandidentifyingthemeasurestheydeemedmostcriticalforeffective

response+

Figure1displaystheprocessdescribedfortheViralUpliftscenario,fromthegatheringofplayersandrunningtheexercisethroughtheidentificationofkeyissues,capabilities,andplaybooksfromtheexercises+

Figure1.GamePlayandAnalysisProcess

ScenarioSummaryandResearchObjectives

IneachexerciseusingtheViralUpliftscenario,participantsengagedintwoturns(seeTable1)+InTurn1,studentsaffiliatedwitharadicalstudentgroupusedajailbrokenopen-sourceAImodel

alongsideanAIbiologicaltooltoengineeramodifiedSARS-CoV-2(COVID)variant+TheAI

enabledthegrouptoovercometechnicalbarriersinviralengineeringbyinterfacingwiththebiological

5Insomeiterations,teamsalsoengageinbackcastingexercisestoidentifypreventivemeasuresormitigationstrategiesthatcouldhavebeenimplementedbeforethecrisisbegan、

6

toolandprovidingstep-by-stepguidance+Theresultingneo-COVIDviruswasaccidentallyreleased,causingaglobalpandemicwithrelativelylowfatalityratesbutdemonstratingtheproliferation

potentialofAI-enabledbiologicalweaponcapabilities+

InTurn2,intelligencerevealedmultiplestateandnonstateactorsattemptingtoacquiresimilar

AI-enabledcapabilitiesfordevelopingbiologicalweapons+Thesethreatsincludedaforeign

governmentpursuinganoffensivebiologicalweaponprogramagainstanothernation,aterroristgroupseekingtoengineerricin-producingEscherichiacolibacteriawhileofferingtoselltheinformationto

otherterroristorganizations,andthediscoveryofapotentiallydangerousnewbiologicalAItoolataU+S+biotechnologycompany+

Table1.ScenarioSummary

Turn

Time

ScenarioSynopsis

Decisions

Turn1

Late2025

NonstateactorscreateAI-enabled

biologicalweapons,resultinginthe

accidentalreleaseofanengineeredvirusthatbecomesapandemic.

HowshouldtheU.S.governmentrespondtoproliferationofbiologicalweapon

capabilitiesthroughAI?

Turn2

+3months

AdditionalstateandnonstateactorsgainaccesstoAIcapableofsupportingthe

creationofbioweapons.Inaddition,AI

technologycontinuestoadvance,and

more-capableAIthatcanprovidegreatersupportforbioweaponcreationbeginstoproliferate.

HowshouldtheU.S.governmentrespondtoescalatingAI-enabledbiologicalthreatsfrommultipleactors?

ScenarioResearchObjectives

ThisscenariowasdevelopedtoexplorepolicyoptionsforaddressingacommonthreatvectorinexistingliteratureaboutadvancedAI:theAI-enabledcreationofdangerouspathogensbystateandnonstateactors+Thisthreatisregularlycitedasanear-termriskincurrentpolicydiscussions,

althoughthespecificthreatssuchtoolsmightposeremainlargelyundefined+6Giventhisuncertaintyandthepotentialseverityofbiologicalcrises,wedevelopedthisscenariotoexplorehowtheU+S+

governmentmightrespondtoAI-enabledbiosecuritythreatsandtoidentifypreparatoryactionsthatcouldreducetheimpactsoffuturecrisesinvolvingtheseemergingcapabilities+

TheAItoolsdepictedinthescenarioarecapableofhuman-levelperformanceacrossmost

elementsofbiologicalscience,includingthedesignandsynthesisofnovelpathogens+However,thescenariodoesnotspecifywhetherthesetoolsconstituteAGIinthebroadestsenseofthatterm;

rather,theyrepresenthighlycapableAIsystemsthathaveachievedtransformativeimpactinthe

biologicalsciences+Thescenarioinvitesplayerstoconsiderwhetherandhowsuchcapabilitiesmighttransfertootherdomains,althoughitdoesnotspecifysuchcross-domaincapabilities+

6JohnHalstead,“ManagingRisksfromAI-EnabledBiologicalTools,”GovAIblog,August5,2024、

7

ExercisesandParticipants

TenexerciseswereconductedbetweenAprilandDecember2025+Threeexercisescontaineda

mixofcurrentorformerseniorprincipalsplayingPrincipalsCommitteeroleswithwhichtheyhad

directexperience(seeTable2)+FourexercisesinvolvedmostlyorallRANDanalystsandresearchers,withsomeparticipantsfromotherresearchorganizations+ThreeexercisesconsistedofcurrentU+S+governmentstaffmemberswhoworkeddirectlyonbiologicalresearchandbiosecurityissues+

Table2.ParticipantSummary

Exercises

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

CurrentorformerU.S.governmentprincipals

0

1

12

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

CurrentorformerU.S.governmentstaff

2

0

0

3

0

0

10

15

15

9

SeniorRANDorotheranalysts

7

11

0

12

1

5

6

0

0

0

JuniorRANDorotheranalysts

8

0

0

0

8

7

0

0

0

0

Theexercisesincorporatedthreedistinctparticipantcategoriestocapturethediverseperspectivesrequiredforeffectivecrisisresponse+Currentgovernmentofficialsincludedbothpoliticalappointeesandcivilservantsholdingmidlevelandseniorpositionsresponsibleforpolicyformulationand

implementationacrosstheiragencies+Themajoritywerecareercivilservants,supplementedby

militaryofficersfromtheDepartmentofWarandrepresentativesoftheDepartmentofState,

DepartmentoftheTreasury,DepartmentofCommerce,andtheintelligencecommunity+7Former

governmentofficialsbroughtseasonedexpertisefromacrossmultipleadministrations,including

formerdeputysecretariesandseniorpoliticalappointeeswithsubstantialdecisionmakingauthority+Theseparticipantstypicallypossessedmorethanfiveyearsofexperienceinseniorstrategy,planning,andimplementationrolesforhigh-levelnationalsecurityandtechnologypolicydecisions+RANDandexternalanalystscontributedspecializedknowledgeofAI,AIpolicy,andnationalsecurity

implications+Externalparticipantsweredrawnfromleadingacademicinstitutionsandthinktanksrecognizedforexpertiseinemergingtechnologypolicy+

7TheDepartmentofWarisdesignatedtheDepartmentofDefenseunderPublicLaw81-216,NationalSecurityActAmendmentsof1949、

8

KeyIssues

Participants’assessmentsofthreatstoU+S+nationalsecurity—andthepolicyresponsesthey

recommended—consistentlyhingedonhowtheyjudgedasetofkeyissues+RANDanalystswho

observedtheexercisesandreviewedtranscriptsidentifiedtheseissuesasthemostcriticalinaffectingparticipants’judgments+Mosttypically,participantsagreedontheseissues’importancebutdisagreed,oftensharply,onhowtoresolvethem—reflectiveofgenuineunderlyinguncertainties+EnablingbetterjudgmentsontheseissuesimpliesdifferentcollectionandanalysisrequirementsfortheU+S+

government+

KeyIssue1.AIasForceMultiplierVersusGameChangerforBiologicalThreats

ParticipantsinallexercisesdebatedthedegreetowhichAIgenuinelyenablesthedevelopmentofbiologicalweapons,asopposedtosimplyloweringbarriersforexistingcapabilities+Keyuncertaintiesforparticipantsincludedunderstandinghoweffectivelygeneral-purposeAImodelscouldinterface

withspecializedbiologicaltoolsandhowquicklysuchcapabilitieswouldadvance,aswellasexactly

howmuchupliftanonexpertwouldreceivefromworkingwithsuchamodel+Insixoftheten

exercises,participantswerealsouncertainabouthowrapidlyAImodelswouldovercomeremainingbottlen