AI威胁态势报告+AI+Threat+Landscape+Report

TABLEOF

CONTENTS.

·AITHREATLANDSCAPEREPORT2026

ExecutiveSummary

3

AIPhishing&SocialEngineering

5

HowthreatactorsareusingAIinPhishing&socialengineeringattacks

7

AIPhishingIsOutpacingDefenderCapacity

8

NotableAttackCases

10

AI-assistedMalwareAttacks

11

NotableMalwareCases

12

ThreatActorsOperationalizingAIAcrossCampaignWorkflows

15

NotableThreatActorsUsingAIinCampaigns

18

TheuseofAIbyFinancially&IdeologicallyMotivatedThreatActors

23

SupplyChainAttacks:PoisoningtheEcosystemfromtheInside

28

MaliciousAIModelsandPackagesinOpenEcosystems

29

TeamPCPSupplyChainCompromise

30

MaliciousSkillsinAIAgentMarketplaces

30

AICodingAgentDependencyPoisoning

31

AI-SpecificVulnerabilities

32

PromptInjection

33

JailbreakingandGuardrailBypass

33

DataPoisoningandTrainingDataAttacks

33

MemoryandContextManipulation

34

AgenticAIExploitation

34

RAGandVectorStorePoisoning

34

APIandAccessControlAbuse

34

AdversarialInputs

35

AIImpersonationAttacks:MalwareandPhishingCam-paignsAbusingAIBrandTrust

36

NotableIncidents

37

DarkAIMarketplace:UndergroundLLMServicesSoldtoCy-bercriminals

40

ClosingThoughts

44

References

45

2

©2026CybleInc.Allrightsreserved.

AITHREATLANDSCAPEREPORT2026

©2026CybleInc.Allrightsreserved.3

EXECUTIVESUMMARY

Thecyberthreatlandscapehasenteredanewphase,onedefinednotby

thesophisticationofindividualattackersbutbytheindustrializationofattack

operations.AIhasmovedfromanexperimentalcapabilityintooperational

infrastructure,anditsimpactisnowvisibleacrosseverymajorcategoryof

cyberthreat.

Threatactorsarenotreinventingtheirplaybooks;theyarecompressingthemosttime-consumingparts.Reconnaissancethatoncetookdays,phishingcontentthatoncerequirednative-languagespeakers,malwarethatoncedemandedskilleddevelopers,andsocialengineeringthatoncedependedondirecthumaninteractionareallbeingacceleratedbyAItoolsthatarewidelyaccessible,inexpensive,andincreasinglyindistinguishablefromlegitimateuse.

Acrossalldisruptedoperations,noevidencehasbeenfoundthatAIprovidesthreatactorswithnovelcapabilitiestheycouldnototherwiseobtain,buttheaccelerationitselfhassignificantconsequencesfordefenders.

Thisreportexamineshowthatshiftisplayingoutacrosseightinterconnectedthreatareas.AIisbeingweaponizedacrosstheentireattacklifecycle,fromAI-generatedphishinganddeepfakesocialengineeringtoLLM-assistedmalwaredevelopment,runtimecodegeneration,andself-rewritingevasiontechniques.

Nineteenconfirmedthreatactorgroups,spanningRussian,Chinese,Iranian,

NorthKorean,andfinanciallymotivatedcriminaloperators,havebeen

observedintegratingAIintotheircampaigns,usingitforreconnaissance,lure

generation,vulnerabilityresearch,malwaredevelopment,andtrusted-service

abuse.

Atthesametime,theAIsupplychainhasbecomeanactiveattacksurface,

withthreatactorspoisoningmodelrepositories,compromisingCI/CDpipelines,

manipulatingagentskillmarketplaces,andengineeringmaliciouspackages

specificallydesignedtodeceiveAIcodingassistantsratherthanhuman

developers.

AITHREATLANDSCAPEREPORT2026

©2026CybleInc.Allrightsreserved.4

AIsystemsthemselvesarenowprimarytargets.Thevulnerabilitiesbeingexploited,promptinjection,jailbreaking,datapoisoning,memorymanipulation,agenticexploitation,RAGpoisoning,andAPIabuse,donotrequireexploitingtraditionalsoftwareflaws.

Theyrequireunderstandinghowamodelprocessesinstructions,retrievesinformation,storescontext,andinteractswithconnectedtools.Inparallel,threatactorsareexploitingthetrustusersplaceinAIbrands,impersonatingChatGPT,Claude,DeepSeek,andGeminithroughfakeinstallersites,maliciousbrowserextensions,andsharedconversationlinkshostedontrustedAIplatformdomains.

UnderpinningallofthisisastructuredundergroundAImarketplacewhere

purpose-builtmaliciousmodels,jailbrokencommercialwrappers,andspecialist

attack-as-a-serviceplatformsaresoldthroughdarkwebforums,Telegram

channels,andprivatenetworks,usingsubscriptionmodels,lifetimelicenses,

andone-timeflatfeesthatmakeAI-assistedattackcapabilityaccessibleto

anyoperatorregardlessoftechnicalskill.

WhatstartedasahandfulofexperimentaltoolshasmaturedintoacriminalecosystemthatmirrorsthecommercialmechanicsoflegitimateSaaS,withversionedproductupdates,tieredpricing,anddedicatedsupportcommunities.

Theconvergenceofthesetrendsdefinesthecurrentthreatenvironment.AIisnotsimplyaddingnewtoolstoattackerplaybooks;itisconnectingandacceleratingtheentireoperation.

Organizationsthathavenotyetupdatedtheirsecuritystrategiestoaccount

forAI-enabledthreatsfacealandscapewherethequalityfloorofattackshas

risensharply.Thetechnicalbarriertoentryhasdroppedsignificantly,andthe

defenders’traditionaldetectionsignals,suchaspoorgrammar,knownmalware

signatures,andrecognizableattackinfrastructure,arebecomingunreliable.

Aneffectiveresponserequiresafundamentalrethinkofhowsecurityteams

detectthreats,validateidentities,governAI-integratedworkflows,andbuild

resilienceagainstattackchainsthatcombinemultipleAI-enabledtechniques

inasingleoperation.

AITHREATLANDSCAPEREPORT2026

AIPHISHING&SOCIALENGINEERING

©2026CybleInc.Allrightsreserved.5

·AITHREATLANDSCAPEREPORT2026

Phishinghaslongbeenthemostcommonandcostlyentrypointforcyberattacks.AIhasnotchanged

thatreality;ithasmadeitsignificantlyworse.WhatAIintroducesisnotanewtypeofattackbutadramatic

improvementinthequality,speed,andscaleatwhichexistingattackscanbeexecuted.

Defendersthatoncereliedonspottingpoorgrammar,awkwardphrasing,orgenerictemplatesnowfacecampaignsthatarepolished,contextuallyaware,andpersonalizedatscale.

ThescaleofAI’simpactonphishingisnolongerspeculative.Datafromacrosstheindustrypaintsaconsistentpictureofacceleration:

AIPHISHINGBYTHENUMBERS

KeyindicatorsshowingtherapidgrowthandeffectivenessofAI-drivenphishing

nl

1,265%

spike

Phishingattackshave

increasedby1,265%since

ChatGPT'slaunchinlate

2022,markingoneofthe

sharpestescalationsin

thehistoryofthe

82.6%

14xsurge

InDecember2025,

AI-generatedphishing

attackssurged14x,with

theirshareofallreported

attacksrisingfrom4%to

56%overtheholiday

season-atrendthat

continuedinto2026.

24-54%

moreeffective

82.6%ofphishingemails

nowcontain

AI-generatedelements,

showinghowdeeply

automatedtoolinghas

becomeembeddedin

attackworkflows.

AIphishingisnow24-54%

moreeffectivethan

traditionalhuman-crafted

methods,withAI-generated

emailsachievinga54%

click-throughrate

comparedto12%for

manual

AIisreshapingphishingatscale-faster,moreconvincing,andfarmoreeffective.

•InDecember2025,AI-generatedphishingattackssurged14x,withtheirshareofallreportedattacksjumpingfrom4%to56%overtheholidayseason,atrendthatheldinto2026.

•AIphishingisnow24–54%moreeffectivethantraditionalhuman-craftedmethods,withAI-generatedemailsachievinga54%click-throughratecomparedtojust12%formanualattempts.

•82.6%ofphishingemailsnowcontainAI-

generatedelements,reflectinghowdeeply

automatedtoolinghasembeddeditselfinto

attackworkflows.

•Phishingattackshavespiked1,265%sinceChatGPT’slaunchinlate2022,markingoneofthesharpestescalationsinthehistoryofthethreat.

©2026CybleInc.Allrightsreserved.6

©2026CybleInc.Allrightsreserved.7

AITHREATLANDSCAPEREPORT2026

HowTHREATAcToRsAREUslNBAllNPHlsHlNB&SoclALENBlNEERlNBATTAcks

AIisenhancingphishing,socialengineering,andattackpreparation

<>

3.AI-generatedphishingkits

InNovember2025,a

phishingkittrackedas

COINBAITwasidentified,

withdevelopmentlikely

acceleratedbyAI

code-generationtools.

Itimpersonatedamajor

cryptocurrency

exchangeanduseda

polishedReact

singleapplication

builtwithLovableAIto

harvestcredentials.

4.Deepfake-enabledsocialengineering

Threatactorsare

cloningexecutive

voicesandvideo

footagetosupport

fraudandtargeted

intrusions.Inone

February2024case,

deepfake

impersonation

contributedtoa$25.6

millionfraud,showing

howfakevideocalls

andAI-generated

personasarebecoming

operationaltools.

2.Luregenerationandpersonalization

LLMshelpgenerate

hyper-personalized,

culturallynuancedlures

thatmirrorthetoneofa

targetorganizationor

locallanguage.This

reducesthe

grammaticaland

contextualerrors

defendershave

historicallyreliedonto

spotphishingattempts.

1.Reconnaissance

andtargetdevelopment

ThreatactorsuseLLMsto

rapidlysynthesize

open-sourceintelligence,

profilehigh-valuetargets,

identifykey

decision-makers,andmap

organizationalhierarchies.

Thisresearchhelps

attackersbuildphishing

luresusingjobtitles,project

names,reporting

relationships,andrealistic

communicationstyles,

compressingdaysof

manualworkintohours.

Reconnaissanceandtargetdevelopment

AIistransformingthepreparationphasethat

makesphishingattackscredibleinthefirst

place.State-sponsoredactorsareusingLLMs

torapidlysynthesizeopen-sourceintelligence,

profilehigh-valuetargets,identifykeydecision-

makerswithindefensesectors,andmap

organizationalhierarchies.

Theoutputofthatresearchfeedsdirectlyintophishinglures,personalizedwithjobtitles,internalprojectnames,reportingrelationships,andcommunicationstylesthatmakemessagesappeartocomefromaknownandtrustedsourceratherthananunknownattacker.

Whatoncetookateamdaysofmanualresearchcannowbecompletedbyasingleoperatorinhours,beforeasinglephishingemailissent.

Luregenerationandpersonalization

LLMsallowthreatactorstogeneratehyper-personalized,culturallynuancedluresthatmirrortheprofessionaltoneofatargetorganizationorlocallanguage,largelyerasingthegrammatical

andcontextualtellsthatdefendershavehistoricallyreliedontoidentifyphishingattempts.

AI-generatedphishingkits

InNovember2025,aphishingkit,trackedasCOINBAIT,wasidentified,withitsconstructionlikelyacceleratedbyAIcode-generationtools.Thekitmasqueradedasamajorcryptocurrencyexchangetoharvestcredentials.ItwasbuiltusingtheAI-poweredplatformLovableAI,wrappingtheoperationinafullReactsingleapplicationwithcomplexstatemanagement,alevelofsophisticationindicativeofcodegeneratedfromhigh-levelprompts.

Deepfake-enabledsocialengineering

Threatactorshaveclonedvideofootageandvoicerecordingsofexecutivestoconvinceemployeestotransfersubstantialfunds,withoneincidentinFebruary2024resultingina$25.6millionfraud.Deepfakeuseisnowmovingbeyondisolatedincidentstoactivecampaigninfrastructure,withthreatactorsdeployingfakevideocallsandAI-generatedpersonasasstandardcomponentsoftargetedintrusions.

©2026CybleInc.Allrightsreserved.8

AITHREATLANDSCAPEREPORT2026

AIPhishingIsOutpacingDefenderCapacity

Beyondenablingfastercampaignexecution,AI-poweredphishingiscreatingasecondarycrisisinsideSecurityOperationsCenters,onethatcompoundsthethreatbydegradingtheveryteamsresponsibleforcatchingit.

•AI-generatedluresnowarriveinhighvolumeswithenoughvariationtoappearunique,eliminatingtheabilitytoidentifyanddismisssimilaralertsinbulkandforcingindividualreviewofeverycase.

•Polishedimpersonationandcontextualpersonalizationhaveremovedthequickvisualjudgmentsanalystsoncereliedon,makingeachalertmoretime-consumingtoinvestigatethanbefore.

•Short-livedinfrastructureandfreshlyregistereddomainsreturninconclusiveresults

fromreputation-basedtools,pushingmoreoftheanalyticalburdenontohumanreviewers.

•Asthevolumeofuncertaincasesgrows,experiencedanalystsarepulledawayfromcomplex,high-riskthreatstorevisitalertsthatwereneverfullyresolved.

•High-riskincidents,credentialtheft,malwaredelivery,andtargetedintrusionsincreasinglygetburiedinthenoise,wideningthewindowbetweeninitialaccessanddetection.

•Theasymmetryisstructural:AIreducesthecostandeffortoflaunchingattackswhilesimultaneouslyraisingthecostandeffortofdefendingagainstthem,agapthatwidenswitheveryimprovementinattackertooling.

High-VolumeVariation

AI-generatedluresnowarriveinhighvolumeswith

enoughvariationtoappearunique,preventing

analystsfromidentifyinganddismissingsimilaralertsinbulkandforcingindividualreviewofeverycase.

SlowerTriage

Polishedimpersonationandcontextualpersonalizationhaveremovedthequickvisualjudgmentsanalystsoncereliedon,makingeachalertmoretime-consumingto

investigatethanbefore.

WeakReputationSignals

Short-livedinfrastructureandfreshlyregistereddomainsreturninconclusiveresultsfrom

reputation-basedtools,pushingmoreoftheanalyticalburdenontohumanreviewers.

AnalystOverload

Asthevolumeofuncertaincasesgrows,experiencedanalystsarepulledawayfromcomplex,high-risk

threatstorevisitalertsthatwereneverfullyresolved.

High-RiskIncidentsBuried

Credentialtheft,malwaredelivery,andtargeted

intrusionsincreasinglygetburiedinthenoise,wideningthewindowbetweeninitialaccessanddetection.

StructuralAsymmetry

AIreducesthecostandeffortoflaunchingattackswhilesimultaneouslyraisingthecostandeffortofdefendingagainstthem,agapthat

widenswitheveryimprovementinattackertooling.

Al-powEREDpHlsHlNBlscREATlNBAsEcoNDARycRlslslNslDESEcuRlTyOpERATloNsCENTERs

BylNcREAslNBANALysTwoRkLoADANDsLowlNBDETEcTloN.

©2026CybleInc.Allrightsreserved.9

NOTABLEATTACKCASES

ExamplesofhowthreatactorsareusingAIinphishingandsocialengineeringcampaigns

UNC1069—CryptocurrencySectorTargeting

ANorthKoreanthreatactorcompromisedaTelegramaccountbelongingtoacryptocurrencyexecutive,builtrapportwiththevictim,andsentaCalendlylinktoaspoofedZoommeeting.Duringthecall,thevictimsawwhatappearedtobeadeepfakeCEOandwasguidedthroughaClickFixattackthatlaunchedamulti-stageinfectionchain,ultimatelydeployingsevenmalwarefamiliestostealcredentials,browserdata,sessiontokens,andcryptocurrencywalletinformation.

APT42—IranianState-SponsoredPhishingAugmentation

APT42usedgenerativeAImodels,includingGemini,toenhancereconnaissanceandtargetedsocialengineering.ThegroupusedAItosearchforofficialemailaddresses,researchpotentialbusinesspartners,andcreatepersonastailoredtoeachtarget’sbiographytoimproveengagement.

FAMOUSCHOLLIMA—FakeLinkedinProfilesandJobInterviews

TheDPRK-associatedgroupFAMOUSCHOLLIMAusedGenAItocreaterealisticLinkedinprofileswithbelievablebackgroundsandAI-generatedprofileimagestodeceiverecruiters,andpotentiallyusedAItogenerateplausibleresponsesduringjobinterviewsaspartofeffortstoinfiltrateprivatecorporations.

ClickFixcampaignviaAIPlatforms

InDecember2025,threatactorsabusedthepublicsharingfeaturesofgenerativeAIservicessuchasChatGPT,Copilot,DeepSeek,Gemini,andGroktohostdecep-tivesocialengineeringcontent.AttackersmanipulatedAItoolsintogeneratingseeminglylegitimatetroubleshootinginstructionscontainingmaliciouscommands,thenpromotedtrusted-domainsharelinksthroughmaliciousadvertisingtodistributeinformation-stealingmalwaretargetingWindowsandmacOS.

theGOVERSHELLbackdoor.OpenAIlaterconfirmedthatthegroupusedChatGPTtohelpcraftphishingemailsandassistinmalwaredevelopment.Asthecampaignmatured,theactorshiftedtorapport-buildingphishingthroughmulti-emailconversationsbeforedeliveringamaliciouslink.

AI-AssistedBiometricPhishing-BrowserPermissionAbuseActivesinceearly2026,thiscampaignusedluressuchas“IDScanner,”“TelegramIDFreezing,”and“HealthFundAI”totrickvictimsintograntingbrowsercameraandmicrophoneaccess.Onceapproved,maliciousscriptscapturedliveimages,video,audio,devicedetails,contactinformation,andapproximatelocation,thenexfiltratedthedatatoattacker-controlledTelegrambots.Emoji-basedformattingandstructuredannotationsinthecodesuggestgenerativeAImayhavebeenusedtoacceleratescriptdevelopment.

InboxPrimeAI-Phishing-as-a-ServiceKit

FirstobservedinOctober2025,InboxPrimeAIisaphishingkitbuiltforundergroundcybercrimenetworks.ItsAI-poweredemailgeneratorcreatesphishingemailsfromsimpleinputssuchastopic,tone,language,andindustry.Itusesspintaxtovarymessages,includesabuilt-inspamcheckertoreducedetection,andauto-matessenderidentityrotationacrosscompromisedGmailaccountstoimitatelegitimateusers,vendors,orexecutives.

Keytakeaway:AIisbeingusedtoimprovetargeting,scaledeception,andincreasethecredibilityofsocialengineeringoperations.

UTA0388—China-AIignedSpearPhishingwithLLMAssistance

ica,Asia,andEuropewithphishingemailsimpersonatingseniorresearchersfromfabricatedinstitutions.The

UTA0388targetedorganizationsacrossNorthAmer-campaigndeliveredamaliciousarchivecontaining

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

UNC1069:Targetingthecryptocurrencysector

NorthKoreanthreatactorUNC1069compromisedaTelegramaccountbelongingtoacryptocurrencyexecutive.ItusedittobuildrapportwithavictimbeforesendingaCalendlylinktoaspoofedZoommeetinghostedonattacker-controlledinfrastructure.Duringthecall,thevictimwaspresentedwithwhatappearedtobeadeepfakevideoofaCEOfromanothercryptocurrencycompany.

ThethreatactorthenexecutedaClickFixattack,directingthevictimtoruntroubleshootingcommandsthatinitiatedamulti-stageinfectionchain,ultimatelydeployingsevendistinctmalwarefamiliesdesignedtoharvestcredentials,browserdata,sessiontokens,andcryptocurrencywalletinformation.

APT42:Iranianstate-sponsoredphishingaugmentation

TheIraniangovernment-backedgroupAPT42

leveragedgenerativeAImodels,including

Gemini,tosignificantlyaugmentreconnaissance

andtargetedsocialengineering,usingAIto

searchforofficialemailaddressesofspecific

entities,researchpotentialbusinesspartnersto

establishcrediblepretexts,andcraftpersonas

tailoredtoeachtarget’sbiographytomaximize

engagement.

FAMOUSCHOLLIMA:FakeLinkedInprofilesandjobinterviews

DPRK-associatedgroupFAMOUSCHOLLIMA

usedGenAItocreaterealisticLinkedInprofiles

completewithbelievablebackgroundsandAI-

generatedprofileimagestodeceiverecruiters,

andpotentiallyleveragedAItogenerateplausible

responsesduringjobinterviewsaspartofa

campaigntoinfiltrateprivatecorporations.

©2026CybleInc.Allrightsreserved.10

·AITHREATLANDSCAPEREPORT2026·········

ClickFixcampaignsviaAIplatformsInboxPrimeAI:Phishing-as-a-servicekit

InDecember2025,threatactorsbeganabusingtheFirstobservedinOctober2025,InboxPrimeAI

public-sharingfeaturesofgenerativeAIservices,isapurpose-builtphishingkitrapidlygaining

includingChatGPT,Copilot,DeepSeek,Gemini,adoptionacrossundergroundcybercrime

andGrok,tohostdeceptivesocialengineeringnetworks.AtitscoreisanAI-poweredemail

content.BymanipulatingAItoolsintogeneratinggeneratorthatproducesfullycomposedphishing

seeminglylegitimatetroubleshootinginstructionsemailsfromahandfulofdropdowninputs,topic,

withembeddedmaliciouscommands,attackerstone,language,andindustry,eliminatingthe

createdshareablelinkshostedontrustedAIneedforanycopywritingskill.

platformdomains,whichwerethenpromoted

throughmaliciousadvertisingtodistributeTheAIenginealsoappliesspintaxvariations,so

WindowsandmacOSsystems.activelyevadingsignature-basedfilters.Abuilt-

information-stealingmalwaretargetingbothnotworecipientsreceiveidenticalmessages,

inspamcheckerthenanalyzeseachgeneratedUTA0388:China-alignedspearphishingwithemailandsuggestscorrectionstoremove

LLMassistancedetectiontriggersbeforesending.Ontopof

this,thekitautomatessenderidentityrotation

UTA0388isaChina-alignedthreatactortargetingacrosscompromisedGmailaccounts,mimicking

organizationsacrossNorthAmerica,Asia,andtheidentitiesoflegitimateusers,vendors,or

.

fromfabricatedinstitutions,sociallyengineering

Europe.Emailsimpersonatedseniorresearchersexecutiveswithhighfidelity

targetsintoclickinglinksthatledtoamaliciousTheconvergenceofAI-generatedlures,deepfake

archivecontainingtheGOVERSHELL

backdoor.social

engineering,andAI-builtphishing

OpenAIlaterconfirmedthatUTA0388leveragedinfrastructurecreatesanenvironmentwhere

ChatGPTtocraftphishingemailsandassistintraditionaldetectionsignalsarenolonger

malwaredevelopment.reliable.Campaignsthatoncerequireddaysof

preparationandleftvisibletracesoferrorcan

.

Asthecampaignmatured,thegroupshiftedtonowbeproducedinhoursbyasingleoperator

rapport-buildingphishing,establishingbenign

Recommendations

•Enforcehardware-basedMFA(FIDO2/passkeys)onallcriticalsystems;stolencredentialsalonebecomeuselesswithoutthephysicalkey

•Nevertrustvoiceorvideocallsasidentityverification;alwaysconfirmhigh-stakesrequestslikefundtransfersthroughaseparate,pre-establishedcontactmethod

•Retrainstafftounderstandthatpolishedwriting,familiarfaces,andtrustedplatforms(Zoom,Calendly,AItools)arenolongerreliablesignalsoflegitimacy

•EnforceDMARC,DKIM,andSPFonalldomains,andreplacesignature-basedemailfilterswithbehavioralAI-drivendetectionthatdoesn’trelyonspottingerrors

•Requiredualauthorizationandout-of-bandconfirmationforanyfinancialoraccess-changerequest,regardlessofhowlegitimatethesourceappears

•Auditandminimizeyourorganization’spublicfootprintonLinkedInandcompanywebsites;AIreconnaissancetoolsharvestthisdatatocraftpersonalized,convincinglures

multi-emailconversationswithtargetsbefore

introducingamaliciouslink.Signsofunsupervised

LLMusagewereevidentthroughout:emails

simultaneouslyusedthreedifferentidentities

acrossthefriendlyname,senderaddress,and

signatureblock;fabricatedphonenumbers

followedsequentialpatterns;andsometargets

receivedemailsentirelyinthewronglanguage.

AI-assistedbiometricphishing:Browser

permissionabuse

Activesinceearly2026,awidespreadsocial

engineeringcampaignluredvictimsthrough

themessuchas“IDScanner,”“TelegramID

Freezing,”and“HealthFundAI”,trickingusersinto

grantingbrowser-levelcameraandmicrophone

accessundertheguiseofidentityverificationor

accountrecovery.

Oncepermissionsweregranted,malicious

scriptssilentlycollectedliveimages,video

recordings,audio,devicespecifications,contact

details,andapproximatelocation,exfiltrating

everythingtoattacker-controlledTelegrambots.

Analysisofthecampaign’scoderevealedemoji-

basedformattingandstructuredannotations

embeddedwithintheoperationallogic,patterns

increasinglyassociatedwithgenerativeAIbeing

usedtoacceleratemaliciousscriptdevelopment.

©2026CybleInc.Allrightsreserved.11

AITHREATLANDSCAPEREPORT2026

AI-assistedMalwareAttacks

Malwareoperationsaremovingintoamoreadaptiveph