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BISWorkingPapers
No1367
TheAIinvestmentrace
byPhurichaiRungcharoenkitkul
MonetaryandEconomicDepartment
July2026
JELclassification:G01,G32,L13,O33
Keywords:artificialintelligence,investment,contesttheory,circularfinancing,boom-bustcycle,financialfragility,network
BISWorkingPapersarewrittenbymembersoftheMonetaryandEconomicDepartmentoftheBankforInternationalSettlements,andfromtimetotimebyothereconomists,andarepublishedbytheBank.Thepapersareonsubjectsoftopicalinterestandaretechnicalincharacter.TheviewsexpressedinthispublicationarethoseoftheauthorsanddonotnecessarilyreflecttheviewsoftheBISoritsmembercentralbanks.
ThispublicationisavailableontheBISwebsite
(www.bis.o
rg).
©BankforInternationalSettlements2026.Allrightsreserved.Briefexcerptsmaybereproducedortranslatedprovidedthesourceisstated.
ISSN1020-0959(print)
ISSN1682-7678(online)
1
TheAIInvestmentRace∗
PhurichaiRungcharoenkitkulŤ
7July2026
Abstract
TheAIbuild-outranksamongthelargesttechnology-driveninvestmentboomsinUShistory.Itsscale,relianceondebtandcircularequitytiesraisequestionsabouttheboom’ssustainabilityandfinancialstability.Westudyadynamiccontestinwhichfirmscompetingforafewdominantpositionsover-commitresources.Theover-investmentleavesthesectorexposedtorevenuedisappointmentthatcouldturnboomintobust.
Thelargertheboom,thedeepertheeventualbust.Theracetocommitearlythroughdebtandcircularfinancingalsomakesabustmorelikely.Calibratedtobalancesheetanddealdata,themodelpointstoover-investmentofaround1.5timestheefficientlevel,risingtoaroundthreetimeswheredemandislesselastic.Anetworkanaly-sisshowsthatstressinonefirmcouldcascadetoothersthroughchainsoffinancialexposures.
JEL:G01,G32,L13,O33
Keywords:artificialintelligence,investment,contesttheory,circularfinancing,finan-cialfragility,boom-bustcycle,network
1Introduction
Technologicalbreakthroughsaretypicallyaccompaniedbyinvestmentboomsandbuoyantmacroeconomicactivity.Exuberanceaboutthepromiseofnewtechnologiesintensifiescom-petitionamongfirmseagertocaptureashareoftherevenues.Theracetogetaheadcanresultinexcessiveinvestmentthatmakestheboomunsustainableandpronetoadisruptive
*IthankDenisGorea,BenoitMojon,FernandoPerez-Cruz,DanielRees,AndreasSchrimpf,VatsalaShreeti,FrankSmets,FabrizioZampolliandBISseminarparticipantsforhelpfulcomments.Errorsareminealone.ViewsexpresseddonotnecessarilyreflectthoseoftheBankforInternationalSettlements.
†BankforInternationalSettlements.Email:
phurichai.rungcharoenkitkul@
2
end.Thisfragilityisfurtheraggravatedbytheleveragethataccompaniestherapidramp-upofinvestment.Thisboom-bustpatternrecursacrosshistory,fromtheUScanalmaniainthe1830sandtheBritishrailwaymaniainthe1840s,totheroaring20sandthedotcomboominthelate90s.Theseepisodesallendedinsharpcorrections(Figure
1
,panel(a)),withwidereconomicfallout.
ThecurrentAIbuild-outboomsharesmanyofthesecharacteristics.Totalcapitalex-penditure(capex)bythemajorhyperscalershasgrownrapidlyoverthepastfewyearsandissettoexceed$700billionin2026alone.Overthecomingyears,aggregateinvestmentinAIinfrastructuresiswidelyexpectedtorunintothetrillions.
1
ThepotentialdemandforAIservicesisclearlyvastandcouldjustifyasubstantialexpansionincomputationalpower.Yetrelativetoitspre-boomtrough,thecurrentbuild-outisontracktooutgroweverypreviousepisodeonlythreeyearsin(Figure
1
,panel(a)).Totheextentthatcontestmotivesalsoshapeinvestmentdecisionsthistimearound,thetendencytowardexcessivecommitmentraisesquestionsaboutthesustainabilityofthecurrentboom.
ThefinancingofthecurrentAIboomalsodisplaysthefinancialvulnerabilitiesthatchar-acterisedearlierboom-bustepisodes.Althoughmanyhyperscalersholdlargecashbalances,therapidcapexexpansionhasledsometoresortincreasinglytoborrowing,notonlythroughbondissuancebutalsothroughspecialpurposevehiclesandnon-banklenders.Somefirmshavealsoengagedinso-calledcircularfinancing,inwhichafirmengaginginthebuild-outtakesanequitypositioninanAIlabinexchangeforthelab’scommitmenttopurchasefuturecompute.Sucharrangementshaveenabledgreaterdeploymentofcapital,buttheyalsocreateinterconnectedness,showninpanel(b)ofFigure
1
.RisingleverageandmorecomplexfinancingstructureshaveraisedquestionsaboutthefinancialstabilityrisksofthecurrentAIboom.
Inthispaper,weexaminetheserealandfinancialforcesdrivingtheAIboominasimplesetup.Wedevelopadynamiccontestmodel,inwhichcoalitionsofAIfirmscompetewitheachotherinawinner-take-mostenvironment.
2
AggregateinvestmentdeterminestotalAIoutput,butmostoftherewardgoestoasmallnumberofcontestwinnersratherthanbeingsharedproportionately.Asaresult,eachcoalitioninvestsheavilytooutcompeteitsrivalsandimproveitschanceofcapturingthereward.Thiscontestmotivecreatesexternalitiesaseachcoalitiondoesnotinternalisetheeffectofitsinvestmentonothers’returns.Thesectorasawholebecomespronetoexcessiveinvestmentrelativetothesociallyoptimallevel.
3
1See
Huang
(
2025
)and
VanNieuwerburgh
(
2026
).
2Eachcoalitionconsistsofahyperscalerandalab.Thisabstractionallowsustofocusonthebuild-outcompetitionthatdrivesaggregateinvestment.Welaterrelaxthisabstraction.
3TheseexcessesraisequestionsaboutthesustainabilityofAIspending,thereversalofwhichcoulddisruptglobalgrowthmomentum.See
BIS
(
2026
)onthemacroeconomicimplicationsofAIexuberance.
3
Figure1:AIboomanditsfinancing
(a)AIinvestmentboomandhistoricalepisodes
Multiplesofpre-boomtrough
4
3
2
1
012345678910
Yearssincetrough
Roaring20sDotcomboom
Canalmania
Railwaymania
AIboom
0
(b)AI’scircularfinancingstructure
CoreWeave
Neo-cloud
Equityinvestment,cashdeployed($46B)Purchasecommitment,multi-year($879B)
$38B
$6.3B
$22B
~$1B
AMD
Chipmaker
Nvidia
Chipmaker
$13B$300B$13B~$25B
$90B
$5B
Microsoft
Hyperscaler
Anthropic
AILab
Hyperscaler
Oracle
Hyperscaler
Amazon
Hyperscaler
Meta
Hyperscaler
$12B
$35B
OpenAI
AILab
xAI
AILab
$100B
$250B
$4.5B
$3B+
$7B
Note:Panel(a)showsinvestmentduringfiveinnovation-ledboomsasmultiplesofeachepisode’s
pre-boomtrough:canals(US,from1835),railways(GB,from1843),the1920s(US,from1921),dotcom(US,from1995)andAIhyperscalercapex(from2023,with2026fromannouncedguidance).Panel(b)showsthenetworkofequitystakesandcompute-purchasecommitmentslinkinghyperscalers,chipmakers,AIlabsandtheleadingneocloud,withthickeredgesforlargerdeals.Sources:SECfilings(10-K,10-Q,8-K),companyannouncements,earnings-callguidance,andfinancialpress.
4
Wethenstudyhowthiscontestinteractswithfinancialfragility.Coalitionsfundthebuild-outnotonlyfromtheirownresourcesbutalsothroughleverageandcircularstakesintheirpartnerfirms.Thesetupyieldsthepaper’scentralresult:anAIboomcreatesfragilitythatunderminesitself.Themorecapacitythesectorbuilds,thehighertheproductivitybaritmustcleartosustaintheboom,soalargerboomisbothmorelikelytodisappointandmoredamagingwhenitdoes.Unliketheusualfinancialacceleratorwhichamplifiesanexogenousshocktobalancesheets,thevulnerabilityhereisendogenouslygeneratedbytheboomitself.Thefinancingstructureisalsocentraltothemechanism,withdebtandcircularstakesbothpropellingtheboomandexacerbatingthelossesduringbusts.Thedebt-financedcapitalisspecialised,soasynchronisedretrenchmentforcesitintoathinresalemarketandtherecoveryratefallsthemorethesectorasawholehasborrowed,deepeningthebust.Firmsforeseethisfire-salewhentheychoosetheirleverageandpullbackcorrespondingly,yetthecontestmotivestillleavesthemover-building.Theequitystakesbehindcircularfinancingaddtothatfragilityratherthandiversifyingitaway.Realandfinancialexuberancearethusboundtogether:thecompetitionthatover-buildstheboomisalsowhatselectsthefragilefinancingthatturnsitintoabust.
Togaugethemagnitudesinvolved,wecalibratethemodeltoAIfirms’balancesheetsandtothepublicdealrecords.Theconcentrationofthesectorgivesunusual,ifincomplete,visibilityintofirms’financialpositions,lendingdisciplinetothecalibration.Thebaselineresultsareplausibleandmaterial.Thecontestexternalityalonedeliversover-investmentofaround1.5timesthesocialoptimum,andseveraltimeshigherwheredemandforAIservicesislesselastic.Anticipatingthefiresalelowersborrowingsomewhat,butthecontestmotivestillleavesover-investmentaround1.4times.Thefinancingstructurethencreatesvulnerabilitiesthatcanreduceneteconomicsurplus(totaloutputminuscostofcapital)bymorethanhalfrelativetotheboom.Oncethebuild-outissufficientlylarge,whichweestimateataround$3tn,neteconomicsurplusturnsnegativeinexpectation.Industryprojectionsof$3–4tnoverallcapexoverthecomingyearsthusplacethesectorintheregionofsignificantdownsiderisks.
Finally,werelaxthecoalitionabstractionandconsiderthenetworkstructurewithbi-lateralfinanciallinkagesbetweenhyperscalers,AIlabs,chipmakersandneoclouds.Anewvulnerabilityemerges,asashocktoonefirmcouldpropagateandbecomesystemic.Circularfinancingisagaincentral.Becauseahyperscalerholdsequityinthelabsitbacks,thefailureofonelabcouldhitthehyperscaler’sbalancesheet,forcingaretrenchmentfromanotherlab,distributingthestressfurther.Thereachofsuchacascadewidensasthebuild-outgrowsandasfundingconcentratesonthebackersthatbridgeseverallabs.
5
Relatedliterature.Thepaperdrawsonandcontributestothreeliteratures.Thefirstisthetheoryofcontestsandinnovationraces,inwhichfirmscompetingforaprizeover-investrelativetothesocialoptimum(
Tullock
,
1980
;
Loury
,
1979
;
Konrad
,
2009
),withthepatent-racetradition(
Reinganum
,
1989
;
GilbertandNewbery
,
1982
;
AghionandHowitt
,
1992
;
AkcigitandKerr
,
2018
)theclosestanalyticalantecedent.Ourover-investmentoperatesonamargindistinctfromtheclassicbusiness-stealingresultof
MankiwandWhinston
(
1986
).There,freeentryisexcessiveontheextensivemargin:toomanyfirmsenterthemarket.Herethesetofcompetitorsisfixedandthedistortionisintensive,aseachincumbentover-buildscapacitybecausepartofthereturntoamarginaldollarissharetakenfromrivalsratherthanoutputcreated.Weembedthiscontestinconcaveaggregateproductionwithboundedsectoraldemand,whichdisciplinesthesizeofthewedge,andweaddadynamictimingdimension.Thenoveltyofourworkrelativetothisstrandisthattheover-investmentisself-undermining.Theproductivityabuild-outmustreachtorepayitselfriseswithitsscale,sothecontestdoesnotmerelyinflateinvestmentbutco-determinestheboomandthebust.
Thesecondliteratureismacro-financeandtheamplificationofshocksthroughbalancesheets.Webuildontheleverageandcollateralcyclesof
BrunnermeierandPedersen
(
2009
),
Geanakoplos
(
2010
)and
AdrianandBoyarchenko
(
2015
),thenet-worthfeedbackof
Kiyotaki
andMoore
(
1997
),
BernankeandGertler
(
1989
)and
GertlerandKiyotaki
(
2010
),thefire-saleandintangible-capitalchannelsof
Lorenzoni
(
2008
),
Bianchi
(
2011
)and
CrouzetandEberly
(
2021
),thecomplexity-drivenfeedbackof
CaballeroandSimsek
(
2013
),andthefinancial-networkmodels(
AllenandGale
,
2000
;
Elliottetal.
,
2014
;
Acemogluetal.
,
2015
;
Allen,
Babus,andCarletti
,
2012
;
Cabrales,Gottardi,andVega-Redondo
,
2017
).Ourmechanismdepartsfromthisworkintwoways.First,thebustisendogenoustotheboomratherthantheconsequenceofanexogenousshocktonetworthorcollateral,becausetheproductivitythresholdforavertingcollapseriseswiththecontest-driveninvestmentitself.Second,theshockpropagatesthroughanetworkofequitycross-holdings,sothatasinglefirm’sfailurereachesothersinthenetwork,achannelthatbilateralandown-balance-sheetmodelsdonotgenerate.
ThethirdliteratureistheeconomicsoftheAIboomitself.Closesttoourfocus,
Caballero
(
2026
)interpretsthebuild-outasaspeculative-growthepisode,inwhichcoordinatedopti-mismaboutthetechnologysustainsaboom,whichisfragiletouncertainpayoff.
Wachter
andWachter
(
2026
)combineabottom-upreconstructionofhyperscalercapitalexpenditurewithatheoryofrareproductivitybooms,inferringtheobservedinvestmentasarevealedbetonalargeadvanceinAIproductivityandtracingitsimplicationsforgrowthandassetprices.Wesharetheirdiagnosisoftheboom’sfragilityandadvanceacomplementaryhy-
6
pothesisgroundedoncontestexternalitiesandtheirinteractionwithfinancialfragility.Acontestfordominancethatdrivesthebuild-outalsogeneratesfire-saledestructioninthebust,creatinganendogenouscycle.Oneadvantageourapproachaffordsistheabilitytoquantifyover-investmentandfragility,throughobservablefinancingstructureandbuild-out,whichweexploittocalibratethemodel.TherestoftheliteratureexaminestheAIboomfromvariedperspectives.
Acemoglu
(
2024
)questionstheaggregateproductivitygainsofAIandwarnsofover-investment,
KorinekandVipra
(
2025
)studiestheconcentrationthatscalinglawsimply,and
Eisfeldtetal.
(
2023
)examinesAI’sasset-pricingimplications.Onthedescriptiveside,
VanNieuwerburgh
(
2026
)discussesthecontemporaneousmacropicturethatweformaliseinamodel.
Aldasoroetal.
(
2026
)and
Erenetal.
(
2026
)documentthedebt-issuance,off-balance-sheetandbank-exposuredynamicsthatourfinancingblocktakesasitsempiricalcounterpart.Finally,thecapital-structure-and-product-marketinteraction(
BranderandLewis
,
1986
;
BoltonandScharfstein
,
1990
)andthemoral-hazardfoundationfordebtcapacity(
Holmstr¨omandTirole
,
1997
)providethefinancial-frictionsbuildingblocks.
Outline.Section
2
setsoutthedynamiccontestmodel.Section
3
derivestheanalyticalresultsunderthesymmetricspecification.Section
4
calibratesthesymmetricmodeltocurrentAIcoalitionsandreportstheheadlinemagnitudes.Section
5
extendsthemodeltothebipartitefinancingnetworkandshowshowasinglelab’sfailurecascadesacrossfirms.Section
6
concludes.
2Model
Themodelhastwobuildingblocks:(i)aphysicalenvironmentgoverninginvestmentandthecontestforsectorrevenue,and(ii)afinancingstructuredescribinghowinvestmentisfunded.Inthissection,wedescribeeachinturn,specifytheoptimisationproblemsfacedbycoalitionsandabenevolentplanner,andstatetheequilibriumconcept.
2.1Environment
Therearenidenticalcoalitions,eachconsistingofahyperscalerandanAIlaboratory,treatedasajointdecision-maker.Thisabstractionisolatesthecontestandfinancingexternalitiesfromtheeffectsofadetailedownershipnetworkandasymmetricleverage,whichwereturntoinSection
5
.
Therearethreeperiods.Inperiod1,eachcoalitionkchoosesaninvestmentlevelI1,k,financedbyacombinationofequityanddebt.Becausethecontestrewardsearlyscale,
7
thisperiod-1commitmentisstrategicallydecisiveand,oncesunk,isexposedtothelaterproductivitydraw.Inperiod2,theAIproductivityρ∈[
0
,
2
]isdrawnfromasymmetricbetadistribution,Beta(2,2)withmeanof1.ρ>1capturesfasterAIadoptionandbreakthroughcapabilities,whileρ<1representsdisappointments.Afterobservingtheproductivity,thecoalitionsdecidehowmuchtoinvestinthesecondperiod,I2,k.Inperiod3,thecontestresolves,debtsinperiods1and2arerepaidatgrossrateRd
4
,andtheaggregateAIpayoffisdeterminedanddistributedtowinningcoalitions’equityholders.
Coalitionk’sinvestmentsoverthetwoperiodsdictateitseffective“compute”:
Qk(ρ)=(I1,k+θI2,k(ρ))ν(1+ψγk)(1)
θ∈(0,1)discountssecond-periodcapacity,whichisdeployedlaterandhaslesstimetoac-cumulatetrainingtimebeforethecontestresolves.Capacitydeployedearlythusenjoysanearly-deploypremium.ν∈(0,1]reflectssupplyfriction(GPUrationing,powerandcoolingbottlenecks).(1+ψγk)representsthestrategicsynergywithinthecoalition.γk∈[
0
,
1
]istheshareof‘circularfinancing’,takingtheformofthehyperscaler’sequitystakeinthelabinexchangeforthelab’scompute-purchasecommitments.Thehyperscalerwantstolockindemandforitsbuild-out,butcannotenforcethelab’spromisetopurchasecompute.Anequitystakealignsthetwosides’interests,makingthecommitmentcredible.Morecircularfinancingthusyieldsaproductivitybenefitfromcloserpartnershipatrateψ,microfoundedasthedeadweightlossavoidedbyresolvingthisbilateralhold-up(seeAppendix
B.1
).Equa-tion(
1
)characterisesQkunderpartnershipcontinuation;ifthepartnershipisdisrupted(aconditionderivedinProposition
4
),partnership-anddebt-financedcapitalarepartiallyde-stroyedthroughassetspecificity,withsurvivingfractionsgovernedbyparametersintroducedinSection
2.2
.
TheaggregateAIsectorrevenuedependsontotaleffectivecomputefromallcoalitionssubjecttoaconcavesectordemandfunction:
Theexponentβ<1capturesdiminishingreturnsatthesectorlevel,arisingfromdemandsaturationforAIservices,complementaryinputbottlenecksandsubstitutionwithalternativetechnologies.
ThecontestawardsK≤nwinningslotsthroughKindependentTullocklotterieswith
4Forsimplicity,weignorematuritiesandassumethesamegrossinterestrateforalldebts.Thismakesperiod-1debtcheaper,favouringearlycommitment.Theheadlineover-investmentresultisunaffected,however,andtheeffectonthebustprobabilityissmallunderourcalibration,asshowninAppendix
C
.
8
replacement.IneachlotterycoalitionkwinswithprobabilityI,kQk(ρ)/ΣjI,jQj(ρ).The
samecoalitioncanwinmultipleslots,andeachslotpaysΘ(ρ)/K.Theexpectednumberofslotscoalitionkwinsistherefore
anditsexpectedgrosscontestpayoffisπk(ρ)Θ(ρ)/K=I,kQk(ρ)Θ(ρ)/ΣjI,jQj(ρ).Thepa-
rameterKcancelsinexpectedpayoffsandonlyrepresentsthenumberofwinnersthatsharecontestrevenueinanygivendraw.Theexponentε≥0isthecontesthead-startelasticity:committedperiod-1capacitycapturescontestsharethatthesamecapacitydeployedlatercannotreplicate.Reachingthefrontierfirstlocksinusers,buildstheusage-and-dataadvan-tagethatkeepsamodelahead,anddrawsinthedevelopersandresearcherswhocompoundthelead,soalatecomerwithequalcomputearrivestoamarketalreadytaken.Appendix
B.2
providesonemicrofoundationthroughadiscrete-choicedemandsystem.Settingε=0neststhesimpleTullockcontestπk=KQk/J,whileε>0introducesthehead-startadvantage.Thecontestisalottery-with-replacementvariantofthetop-Kcontestof
ClarkandRiis
(
1996
).
2.2Financingstructure
EachcoalitionholdscashWk>0whichisdividedintointernalequityEk=(1−γk)WkandcircularfinancingCk=γkWk.Internalequityisdeployeddirectlyatopportunitycostrfandisnotsubjecttowithdrawal.Circularfinancingisbundledwithacompute-purchasecommitment,carriesthesamenominalcostofcapital,providesthestrategicbenefitψ,andisfragileinthesensethatpartnership-financedcapitalispartiallyimpairedwhenρfallsbelowthebustthreshold.Theextentofcircularfinancingγk∈[
0
,
1
]isacoalitionchoicevariable.CoalitionkmayborrowBt,kinperiodt∈{1,2},withdebtsrepaidattheendofperiod3fromtherealisedcontestpayoffatgrosscostRd.
OfthecircularbudgetCk,thecoalitioncommitsc1,k∈[0,Ck]todeploymentinperiod1,holdingtheremainderforperiod2.InProposition
4
,weshowthatifproductivityisabovea
_
certainbustthreshold,ρ≥ρ,deploymentresumes,drawingontheretainedbudgetc2,k(ρ)≤Ck−c1,kandonperiod-2borrowingB2,k(ρ)againstmark-to-marketcollateral,uptothe
_
optimumthatriseswiththerealiseddraw.Whenρ<ρ,theremainderisheldascashand
9
noborrowingtakesplaceinperiod2.Investmentineachperiodisthen
I1,k=Ek+c1,k+B1,k(4)
I2,k(ρ)=c2,k(ρ)+B2,k(ρ)(5)
Debtcapacityineachperiodisboundedbypledgeableincome,following
Holmstr¨omand
Tirole
(
1997
):thelenderrequiresthecoalitiontoretainenoughofitspayofftointernaliseeffortcosts.Theperiod-1boundistakeninexpectationovertheproductivitydrawandtheperiod-2boundismarkedtomarketagainsttherealisedρ,
whereµ∈(0,1)isthepledgeablefraction.
5
Amoral-hazardmicrofoundationappearsinAppendix
B.3
.
Whentherealisedρfallsbelowanendogenousthreshold,period-2deploymentcornersatzeroandperiod-1capitalissubjecttoimpairment.Ofperiod-1circulardeploymentc1,k,onlyfractionα∈(0,1)survivesasaproductiveinvestmentclaim;thecomplementaryfraction1__αisdestroyedthroughpartnershipunwind(anon-renewalofthecompute-purchasecommitment).Ofperiod-1debt-financedcapitalB1,k,afractionislosttoafire-saleofspecialisedinfrastructure.Thefire-saleisanindustryequilibrium:inacommonbustallncoalitionsliquidateatonceintoamarketwhosenaturalbuyers,theotherhyperscalers,areconstrainedatthesametime,sotherecoveryfallswiththequantitysold.Adownward-slopingdemandforthespecialisedcapitalthenyieldsalossratethatislinearinthesector’sdebt-financedstock,
ζef=min{ζ+δB1,ζmax},(8)
sothebustdestroysζefB1,kofcoalitionk’sdebt-financedcapital.HereB1isthesector’s(symmetric)debt-financedstockpercoalition,ζisthevolume-independentspecificityloss,δ=cncombinestheprice-impactslopecandthebuyerconcentrationn,andζmaxcapsthelossatthescrapfloor.Eachcoalitiontakesthesectorlossrateasgiven,sotheequilibriumrateisthefixedpointζef=ζ+δB1(Appendix
B.4
derives(
8
)fromacash-in-the-marketclearingcondition).Thecircular-survivalparameterαremainsareduced-formsummaryof
5Circularflowsbetweenhyperscalersandlabscouldgeneratebookrevenuesmistakenforgenuineincomeduetotheiropacity,inflatingthecollateralbehindperiod-2borrowing.Themainanalysisabstractsfromthisbook-inflationchannel,whichweleavetofuturework.
10
67
within-coalitionheterogeneityindistressoutcomes.
2.3Problemsandequilibrium
Thecoalition’sproblemistochooseperiod-1actions(γk,c1,k,B1,k),subjecttotheperiod-1debt-capacityconstraint(
6
),takingrivals’choicesasgivenandanticipatingthattheperiod-2actions(c2,k(ρ),B2,k(ρ))willoptimiseagainsttherealisedρsubjecttotheperiod-2collateralconstraint(
7
).Thecoalition’sexpectedpayoffis
Thefirsttermistheexpectedcontestrevenue,thesecondtheopportunitycostofcash,
thethirdexpecteddebtservice(period-2borrowingispositiveonlywhenρ≥bythe
optimisationderivedbelow),andthelasttwoconvexfrictiontermsinthecircularshareandthedeploymentratio.Theconvex-costparametersκ,ϕ>0capture,respectively,therisinggovernancecostofscalingcircularfinancingandtheadjustmentcostoffront-loadingdeployment.Thecoalitionmaximises(
9
)subjecttothebudgetidentities(
4
)–(
5
),thedebt-capacityconstraints(
6
)–(
7
),andthecircularcap0≤c1,k≤Ck,0≤c2,k(ρ)≤Ck__c1,k.
Inperiod2thecoalitionobservestheproductivitydrawρanddecideshowmuchfurther
tobuild.Whenthenewsisgood(ρ≥),expansionpays:thecoalitiondeploysadditional
capacity,drawingonitsretainedcircularbudgetc2,k(ρ)andfreshborrowingB2,k(ρ),untileitherthemarginalreturnisdrivendowntothecostofcapitalRdoritexhauststhecollateral
limit(
7
),whicheverbindsfirst.Whenthenewsisbad(ρ<),expansiondoesnotpayeven
atthefirstdollar,sothecoalitionholdsbackfromdeployingandborrowing.Thethreshold
separatingthetworegimesriseswiththescaleoftheperiod-1build,whichwecharacterise
inProposition
4
.
Definition1(SymmetricNashequilibrium).Asymmetricpure-strategyNashequilibrium
isacommonactionprofile(γ*,c,B,{c(ρ),B(ρ)}ρ∈[0,2])suchthateachcoalitionk,taking
6αfollowsfromanequity-sidedefaultboundaryinthespiritof
Leland
(
1994
),wherepartnershipcon-tinuationswitchesoffonceproductivityfallsbelowanendogenousthreshold;theindustryfire-salelossrateζeffollows
ShleiferandVishny
(
1992
):specialisedassetssoldwhentheirnaturalbuyersareconstrainedrecoverbelowuse-value.WedistinguishthisdiscountfromsecularGPUobsolescence,aseparate,additiveforce.Notethatpartofthedebt-finan
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