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BISWorkingPapers

No1367

TheAIinvestmentrace

byPhurichaiRungcharoenkitkul

MonetaryandEconomicDepartment

July2026

JELclassification:G01,G32,L13,O33

Keywords:artificialintelligence,investment,contesttheory,circularfinancing,boom-bustcycle,financialfragility,network

BISWorkingPapersarewrittenbymembersoftheMonetaryandEconomicDepartmentoftheBankforInternationalSettlements,andfromtimetotimebyothereconomists,andarepublishedbytheBank.Thepapersareonsubjectsoftopicalinterestandaretechnicalincharacter.TheviewsexpressedinthispublicationarethoseoftheauthorsanddonotnecessarilyreflecttheviewsoftheBISoritsmembercentralbanks.

ThispublicationisavailableontheBISwebsite

(www.bis.o

rg).

©BankforInternationalSettlements2026.Allrightsreserved.Briefexcerptsmaybereproducedortranslatedprovidedthesourceisstated.

ISSN1020-0959(print)

ISSN1682-7678(online)

1

TheAIInvestmentRace∗

PhurichaiRungcharoenkitkulŤ

7July2026

Abstract

TheAIbuild-outranksamongthelargesttechnology-driveninvestmentboomsinUShistory.Itsscale,relianceondebtandcircularequitytiesraisequestionsabouttheboom’ssustainabilityandfinancialstability.Westudyadynamiccontestinwhichfirmscompetingforafewdominantpositionsover-commitresources.Theover-investmentleavesthesectorexposedtorevenuedisappointmentthatcouldturnboomintobust.

Thelargertheboom,thedeepertheeventualbust.Theracetocommitearlythroughdebtandcircularfinancingalsomakesabustmorelikely.Calibratedtobalancesheetanddealdata,themodelpointstoover-investmentofaround1.5timestheefficientlevel,risingtoaroundthreetimeswheredemandislesselastic.Anetworkanaly-sisshowsthatstressinonefirmcouldcascadetoothersthroughchainsoffinancialexposures.

JEL:G01,G32,L13,O33

Keywords:artificialintelligence,investment,contesttheory,circularfinancing,finan-cialfragility,boom-bustcycle,network

1Introduction

Technologicalbreakthroughsaretypicallyaccompaniedbyinvestmentboomsandbuoyantmacroeconomicactivity.Exuberanceaboutthepromiseofnewtechnologiesintensifiescom-petitionamongfirmseagertocaptureashareoftherevenues.Theracetogetaheadcanresultinexcessiveinvestmentthatmakestheboomunsustainableandpronetoadisruptive

*IthankDenisGorea,BenoitMojon,FernandoPerez-Cruz,DanielRees,AndreasSchrimpf,VatsalaShreeti,FrankSmets,FabrizioZampolliandBISseminarparticipantsforhelpfulcomments.Errorsareminealone.ViewsexpresseddonotnecessarilyreflectthoseoftheBankforInternationalSettlements.

†BankforInternationalSettlements.Email:

phurichai.rungcharoenkitkul@

2

end.Thisfragilityisfurtheraggravatedbytheleveragethataccompaniestherapidramp-upofinvestment.Thisboom-bustpatternrecursacrosshistory,fromtheUScanalmaniainthe1830sandtheBritishrailwaymaniainthe1840s,totheroaring20sandthedotcomboominthelate90s.Theseepisodesallendedinsharpcorrections(Figure

1

,panel(a)),withwidereconomicfallout.

ThecurrentAIbuild-outboomsharesmanyofthesecharacteristics.Totalcapitalex-penditure(capex)bythemajorhyperscalershasgrownrapidlyoverthepastfewyearsandissettoexceed$700billionin2026alone.Overthecomingyears,aggregateinvestmentinAIinfrastructuresiswidelyexpectedtorunintothetrillions.

1

ThepotentialdemandforAIservicesisclearlyvastandcouldjustifyasubstantialexpansionincomputationalpower.Yetrelativetoitspre-boomtrough,thecurrentbuild-outisontracktooutgroweverypreviousepisodeonlythreeyearsin(Figure

1

,panel(a)).Totheextentthatcontestmotivesalsoshapeinvestmentdecisionsthistimearound,thetendencytowardexcessivecommitmentraisesquestionsaboutthesustainabilityofthecurrentboom.

ThefinancingofthecurrentAIboomalsodisplaysthefinancialvulnerabilitiesthatchar-acterisedearlierboom-bustepisodes.Althoughmanyhyperscalersholdlargecashbalances,therapidcapexexpansionhasledsometoresortincreasinglytoborrowing,notonlythroughbondissuancebutalsothroughspecialpurposevehiclesandnon-banklenders.Somefirmshavealsoengagedinso-calledcircularfinancing,inwhichafirmengaginginthebuild-outtakesanequitypositioninanAIlabinexchangeforthelab’scommitmenttopurchasefuturecompute.Sucharrangementshaveenabledgreaterdeploymentofcapital,buttheyalsocreateinterconnectedness,showninpanel(b)ofFigure

1

.RisingleverageandmorecomplexfinancingstructureshaveraisedquestionsaboutthefinancialstabilityrisksofthecurrentAIboom.

Inthispaper,weexaminetheserealandfinancialforcesdrivingtheAIboominasimplesetup.Wedevelopadynamiccontestmodel,inwhichcoalitionsofAIfirmscompetewitheachotherinawinner-take-mostenvironment.

2

AggregateinvestmentdeterminestotalAIoutput,butmostoftherewardgoestoasmallnumberofcontestwinnersratherthanbeingsharedproportionately.Asaresult,eachcoalitioninvestsheavilytooutcompeteitsrivalsandimproveitschanceofcapturingthereward.Thiscontestmotivecreatesexternalitiesaseachcoalitiondoesnotinternalisetheeffectofitsinvestmentonothers’returns.Thesectorasawholebecomespronetoexcessiveinvestmentrelativetothesociallyoptimallevel.

3

1See

Huang

(

2025

)and

VanNieuwerburgh

(

2026

).

2Eachcoalitionconsistsofahyperscalerandalab.Thisabstractionallowsustofocusonthebuild-outcompetitionthatdrivesaggregateinvestment.Welaterrelaxthisabstraction.

3TheseexcessesraisequestionsaboutthesustainabilityofAIspending,thereversalofwhichcoulddisruptglobalgrowthmomentum.See

BIS

(

2026

)onthemacroeconomicimplicationsofAIexuberance.

3

Figure1:AIboomanditsfinancing

(a)AIinvestmentboomandhistoricalepisodes

Multiplesofpre-boomtrough

4

3

2

1

012345678910

Yearssincetrough

Roaring20sDotcomboom

Canalmania

Railwaymania

AIboom

0

(b)AI’scircularfinancingstructure

CoreWeave

Neo-cloud

Equityinvestment,cashdeployed($46B)Purchasecommitment,multi-year($879B)

$38B

$6.3B

$22B

~$1B

AMD

Chipmaker

Nvidia

Chipmaker

$13B$300B$13B~$25B

$90B

$5B

Microsoft

Hyperscaler

Anthropic

AILab

Google

Hyperscaler

Oracle

Hyperscaler

Amazon

Hyperscaler

Meta

Hyperscaler

$12B

$35B

OpenAI

AILab

xAI

AILab

$100B

$250B

$4.5B

$3B+

$7B

Note:Panel(a)showsinvestmentduringfiveinnovation-ledboomsasmultiplesofeachepisode’s

pre-boomtrough:canals(US,from1835),railways(GB,from1843),the1920s(US,from1921),dotcom(US,from1995)andAIhyperscalercapex(from2023,with2026fromannouncedguidance).Panel(b)showsthenetworkofequitystakesandcompute-purchasecommitmentslinkinghyperscalers,chipmakers,AIlabsandtheleadingneocloud,withthickeredgesforlargerdeals.Sources:SECfilings(10-K,10-Q,8-K),companyannouncements,earnings-callguidance,andfinancialpress.

4

Wethenstudyhowthiscontestinteractswithfinancialfragility.Coalitionsfundthebuild-outnotonlyfromtheirownresourcesbutalsothroughleverageandcircularstakesintheirpartnerfirms.Thesetupyieldsthepaper’scentralresult:anAIboomcreatesfragilitythatunderminesitself.Themorecapacitythesectorbuilds,thehighertheproductivitybaritmustcleartosustaintheboom,soalargerboomisbothmorelikelytodisappointandmoredamagingwhenitdoes.Unliketheusualfinancialacceleratorwhichamplifiesanexogenousshocktobalancesheets,thevulnerabilityhereisendogenouslygeneratedbytheboomitself.Thefinancingstructureisalsocentraltothemechanism,withdebtandcircularstakesbothpropellingtheboomandexacerbatingthelossesduringbusts.Thedebt-financedcapitalisspecialised,soasynchronisedretrenchmentforcesitintoathinresalemarketandtherecoveryratefallsthemorethesectorasawholehasborrowed,deepeningthebust.Firmsforeseethisfire-salewhentheychoosetheirleverageandpullbackcorrespondingly,yetthecontestmotivestillleavesthemover-building.Theequitystakesbehindcircularfinancingaddtothatfragilityratherthandiversifyingitaway.Realandfinancialexuberancearethusboundtogether:thecompetitionthatover-buildstheboomisalsowhatselectsthefragilefinancingthatturnsitintoabust.

Togaugethemagnitudesinvolved,wecalibratethemodeltoAIfirms’balancesheetsandtothepublicdealrecords.Theconcentrationofthesectorgivesunusual,ifincomplete,visibilityintofirms’financialpositions,lendingdisciplinetothecalibration.Thebaselineresultsareplausibleandmaterial.Thecontestexternalityalonedeliversover-investmentofaround1.5timesthesocialoptimum,andseveraltimeshigherwheredemandforAIservicesislesselastic.Anticipatingthefiresalelowersborrowingsomewhat,butthecontestmotivestillleavesover-investmentaround1.4times.Thefinancingstructurethencreatesvulnerabilitiesthatcanreduceneteconomicsurplus(totaloutputminuscostofcapital)bymorethanhalfrelativetotheboom.Oncethebuild-outissufficientlylarge,whichweestimateataround$3tn,neteconomicsurplusturnsnegativeinexpectation.Industryprojectionsof$3–4tnoverallcapexoverthecomingyearsthusplacethesectorintheregionofsignificantdownsiderisks.

Finally,werelaxthecoalitionabstractionandconsiderthenetworkstructurewithbi-lateralfinanciallinkagesbetweenhyperscalers,AIlabs,chipmakersandneoclouds.Anewvulnerabilityemerges,asashocktoonefirmcouldpropagateandbecomesystemic.Circularfinancingisagaincentral.Becauseahyperscalerholdsequityinthelabsitbacks,thefailureofonelabcouldhitthehyperscaler’sbalancesheet,forcingaretrenchmentfromanotherlab,distributingthestressfurther.Thereachofsuchacascadewidensasthebuild-outgrowsandasfundingconcentratesonthebackersthatbridgeseverallabs.

5

Relatedliterature.Thepaperdrawsonandcontributestothreeliteratures.Thefirstisthetheoryofcontestsandinnovationraces,inwhichfirmscompetingforaprizeover-investrelativetothesocialoptimum(

Tullock

,

1980

;

Loury

,

1979

;

Konrad

,

2009

),withthepatent-racetradition(

Reinganum

,

1989

;

GilbertandNewbery

,

1982

;

AghionandHowitt

,

1992

;

AkcigitandKerr

,

2018

)theclosestanalyticalantecedent.Ourover-investmentoperatesonamargindistinctfromtheclassicbusiness-stealingresultof

MankiwandWhinston

(

1986

).There,freeentryisexcessiveontheextensivemargin:toomanyfirmsenterthemarket.Herethesetofcompetitorsisfixedandthedistortionisintensive,aseachincumbentover-buildscapacitybecausepartofthereturntoamarginaldollarissharetakenfromrivalsratherthanoutputcreated.Weembedthiscontestinconcaveaggregateproductionwithboundedsectoraldemand,whichdisciplinesthesizeofthewedge,andweaddadynamictimingdimension.Thenoveltyofourworkrelativetothisstrandisthattheover-investmentisself-undermining.Theproductivityabuild-outmustreachtorepayitselfriseswithitsscale,sothecontestdoesnotmerelyinflateinvestmentbutco-determinestheboomandthebust.

Thesecondliteratureismacro-financeandtheamplificationofshocksthroughbalancesheets.Webuildontheleverageandcollateralcyclesof

BrunnermeierandPedersen

(

2009

),

Geanakoplos

(

2010

)and

AdrianandBoyarchenko

(

2015

),thenet-worthfeedbackof

Kiyotaki

andMoore

(

1997

),

BernankeandGertler

(

1989

)and

GertlerandKiyotaki

(

2010

),thefire-saleandintangible-capitalchannelsof

Lorenzoni

(

2008

),

Bianchi

(

2011

)and

CrouzetandEberly

(

2021

),thecomplexity-drivenfeedbackof

CaballeroandSimsek

(

2013

),andthefinancial-networkmodels(

AllenandGale

,

2000

;

Elliottetal.

,

2014

;

Acemogluetal.

,

2015

;

Allen,

Babus,andCarletti

,

2012

;

Cabrales,Gottardi,andVega-Redondo

,

2017

).Ourmechanismdepartsfromthisworkintwoways.First,thebustisendogenoustotheboomratherthantheconsequenceofanexogenousshocktonetworthorcollateral,becausetheproductivitythresholdforavertingcollapseriseswiththecontest-driveninvestmentitself.Second,theshockpropagatesthroughanetworkofequitycross-holdings,sothatasinglefirm’sfailurereachesothersinthenetwork,achannelthatbilateralandown-balance-sheetmodelsdonotgenerate.

ThethirdliteratureistheeconomicsoftheAIboomitself.Closesttoourfocus,

Caballero

(

2026

)interpretsthebuild-outasaspeculative-growthepisode,inwhichcoordinatedopti-mismaboutthetechnologysustainsaboom,whichisfragiletouncertainpayoff.

Wachter

andWachter

(

2026

)combineabottom-upreconstructionofhyperscalercapitalexpenditurewithatheoryofrareproductivitybooms,inferringtheobservedinvestmentasarevealedbetonalargeadvanceinAIproductivityandtracingitsimplicationsforgrowthandassetprices.Wesharetheirdiagnosisoftheboom’sfragilityandadvanceacomplementaryhy-

6

pothesisgroundedoncontestexternalitiesandtheirinteractionwithfinancialfragility.Acontestfordominancethatdrivesthebuild-outalsogeneratesfire-saledestructioninthebust,creatinganendogenouscycle.Oneadvantageourapproachaffordsistheabilitytoquantifyover-investmentandfragility,throughobservablefinancingstructureandbuild-out,whichweexploittocalibratethemodel.TherestoftheliteratureexaminestheAIboomfromvariedperspectives.

Acemoglu

(

2024

)questionstheaggregateproductivitygainsofAIandwarnsofover-investment,

KorinekandVipra

(

2025

)studiestheconcentrationthatscalinglawsimply,and

Eisfeldtetal.

(

2023

)examinesAI’sasset-pricingimplications.Onthedescriptiveside,

VanNieuwerburgh

(

2026

)discussesthecontemporaneousmacropicturethatweformaliseinamodel.

Aldasoroetal.

(

2026

)and

Erenetal.

(

2026

)documentthedebt-issuance,off-balance-sheetandbank-exposuredynamicsthatourfinancingblocktakesasitsempiricalcounterpart.Finally,thecapital-structure-and-product-marketinteraction(

BranderandLewis

,

1986

;

BoltonandScharfstein

,

1990

)andthemoral-hazardfoundationfordebtcapacity(

Holmstr¨omandTirole

,

1997

)providethefinancial-frictionsbuildingblocks.

Outline.Section

2

setsoutthedynamiccontestmodel.Section

3

derivestheanalyticalresultsunderthesymmetricspecification.Section

4

calibratesthesymmetricmodeltocurrentAIcoalitionsandreportstheheadlinemagnitudes.Section

5

extendsthemodeltothebipartitefinancingnetworkandshowshowasinglelab’sfailurecascadesacrossfirms.Section

6

concludes.

2Model

Themodelhastwobuildingblocks:(i)aphysicalenvironmentgoverninginvestmentandthecontestforsectorrevenue,and(ii)afinancingstructuredescribinghowinvestmentisfunded.Inthissection,wedescribeeachinturn,specifytheoptimisationproblemsfacedbycoalitionsandabenevolentplanner,andstatetheequilibriumconcept.

2.1Environment

Therearenidenticalcoalitions,eachconsistingofahyperscalerandanAIlaboratory,treatedasajointdecision-maker.Thisabstractionisolatesthecontestandfinancingexternalitiesfromtheeffectsofadetailedownershipnetworkandasymmetricleverage,whichwereturntoinSection

5

.

Therearethreeperiods.Inperiod1,eachcoalitionkchoosesaninvestmentlevelI1,k,financedbyacombinationofequityanddebt.Becausethecontestrewardsearlyscale,

7

thisperiod-1commitmentisstrategicallydecisiveand,oncesunk,isexposedtothelaterproductivitydraw.Inperiod2,theAIproductivityρ∈[

0

,

2

]isdrawnfromasymmetricbetadistribution,Beta(2,2)withmeanof1.ρ>1capturesfasterAIadoptionandbreakthroughcapabilities,whileρ<1representsdisappointments.Afterobservingtheproductivity,thecoalitionsdecidehowmuchtoinvestinthesecondperiod,I2,k.Inperiod3,thecontestresolves,debtsinperiods1and2arerepaidatgrossrateRd

4

,andtheaggregateAIpayoffisdeterminedanddistributedtowinningcoalitions’equityholders.

Coalitionk’sinvestmentsoverthetwoperiodsdictateitseffective“compute”:

Qk(ρ)=(I1,k+θI2,k(ρ))ν(1+ψγk)(1)

θ∈(0,1)discountssecond-periodcapacity,whichisdeployedlaterandhaslesstimetoac-cumulatetrainingtimebeforethecontestresolves.Capacitydeployedearlythusenjoysanearly-deploypremium.ν∈(0,1]reflectssupplyfriction(GPUrationing,powerandcoolingbottlenecks).(1+ψγk)representsthestrategicsynergywithinthecoalition.γk∈[

0

,

1

]istheshareof‘circularfinancing’,takingtheformofthehyperscaler’sequitystakeinthelabinexchangeforthelab’scompute-purchasecommitments.Thehyperscalerwantstolockindemandforitsbuild-out,butcannotenforcethelab’spromisetopurchasecompute.Anequitystakealignsthetwosides’interests,makingthecommitmentcredible.Morecircularfinancingthusyieldsaproductivitybenefitfromcloserpartnershipatrateψ,microfoundedasthedeadweightlossavoidedbyresolvingthisbilateralhold-up(seeAppendix

B.1

).Equa-tion(

1

)characterisesQkunderpartnershipcontinuation;ifthepartnershipisdisrupted(aconditionderivedinProposition

4

),partnership-anddebt-financedcapitalarepartiallyde-stroyedthroughassetspecificity,withsurvivingfractionsgovernedbyparametersintroducedinSection

2.2

.

TheaggregateAIsectorrevenuedependsontotaleffectivecomputefromallcoalitionssubjecttoaconcavesectordemandfunction:

Theexponentβ<1capturesdiminishingreturnsatthesectorlevel,arisingfromdemandsaturationforAIservices,complementaryinputbottlenecksandsubstitutionwithalternativetechnologies.

ThecontestawardsK≤nwinningslotsthroughKindependentTullocklotterieswith

4Forsimplicity,weignorematuritiesandassumethesamegrossinterestrateforalldebts.Thismakesperiod-1debtcheaper,favouringearlycommitment.Theheadlineover-investmentresultisunaffected,however,andtheeffectonthebustprobabilityissmallunderourcalibration,asshowninAppendix

C

.

8

replacement.IneachlotterycoalitionkwinswithprobabilityI,kQk(ρ)/ΣjI,jQj(ρ).The

samecoalitioncanwinmultipleslots,andeachslotpaysΘ(ρ)/K.Theexpectednumberofslotscoalitionkwinsistherefore

anditsexpectedgrosscontestpayoffisπk(ρ)Θ(ρ)/K=I,kQk(ρ)Θ(ρ)/ΣjI,jQj(ρ).Thepa-

rameterKcancelsinexpectedpayoffsandonlyrepresentsthenumberofwinnersthatsharecontestrevenueinanygivendraw.Theexponentε≥0isthecontesthead-startelasticity:committedperiod-1capacitycapturescontestsharethatthesamecapacitydeployedlatercannotreplicate.Reachingthefrontierfirstlocksinusers,buildstheusage-and-dataadvan-tagethatkeepsamodelahead,anddrawsinthedevelopersandresearcherswhocompoundthelead,soalatecomerwithequalcomputearrivestoamarketalreadytaken.Appendix

B.2

providesonemicrofoundationthroughadiscrete-choicedemandsystem.Settingε=0neststhesimpleTullockcontestπk=KQk/J,whileε>0introducesthehead-startadvantage.Thecontestisalottery-with-replacementvariantofthetop-Kcontestof

ClarkandRiis

(

1996

).

2.2Financingstructure

EachcoalitionholdscashWk>0whichisdividedintointernalequityEk=(1−γk)WkandcircularfinancingCk=γkWk.Internalequityisdeployeddirectlyatopportunitycostrfandisnotsubjecttowithdrawal.Circularfinancingisbundledwithacompute-purchasecommitment,carriesthesamenominalcostofcapital,providesthestrategicbenefitψ,andisfragileinthesensethatpartnership-financedcapitalispartiallyimpairedwhenρfallsbelowthebustthreshold.Theextentofcircularfinancingγk∈[

0

,

1

]isacoalitionchoicevariable.CoalitionkmayborrowBt,kinperiodt∈{1,2},withdebtsrepaidattheendofperiod3fromtherealisedcontestpayoffatgrosscostRd.

OfthecircularbudgetCk,thecoalitioncommitsc1,k∈[0,Ck]todeploymentinperiod1,holdingtheremainderforperiod2.InProposition

4

,weshowthatifproductivityisabovea

_

certainbustthreshold,ρ≥ρ,deploymentresumes,drawingontheretainedbudgetc2,k(ρ)≤Ck−c1,kandonperiod-2borrowingB2,k(ρ)againstmark-to-marketcollateral,uptothe

_

optimumthatriseswiththerealiseddraw.Whenρ<ρ,theremainderisheldascashand

9

noborrowingtakesplaceinperiod2.Investmentineachperiodisthen

I1,k=Ek+c1,k+B1,k(4)

I2,k(ρ)=c2,k(ρ)+B2,k(ρ)(5)

Debtcapacityineachperiodisboundedbypledgeableincome,following

Holmstr¨omand

Tirole

(

1997

):thelenderrequiresthecoalitiontoretainenoughofitspayofftointernaliseeffortcosts.Theperiod-1boundistakeninexpectationovertheproductivitydrawandtheperiod-2boundismarkedtomarketagainsttherealisedρ,

whereµ∈(0,1)isthepledgeablefraction.

5

Amoral-hazardmicrofoundationappearsinAppendix

B.3

.

Whentherealisedρfallsbelowanendogenousthreshold,period-2deploymentcornersatzeroandperiod-1capitalissubjecttoimpairment.Ofperiod-1circulardeploymentc1,k,onlyfractionα∈(0,1)survivesasaproductiveinvestmentclaim;thecomplementaryfraction1__αisdestroyedthroughpartnershipunwind(anon-renewalofthecompute-purchasecommitment).Ofperiod-1debt-financedcapitalB1,k,afractionislosttoafire-saleofspecialisedinfrastructure.Thefire-saleisanindustryequilibrium:inacommonbustallncoalitionsliquidateatonceintoamarketwhosenaturalbuyers,theotherhyperscalers,areconstrainedatthesametime,sotherecoveryfallswiththequantitysold.Adownward-slopingdemandforthespecialisedcapitalthenyieldsalossratethatislinearinthesector’sdebt-financedstock,

ζef=min{ζ+δB1,ζmax},(8)

sothebustdestroysζefB1,kofcoalitionk’sdebt-financedcapital.HereB1isthesector’s(symmetric)debt-financedstockpercoalition,ζisthevolume-independentspecificityloss,δ=cncombinestheprice-impactslopecandthebuyerconcentrationn,andζmaxcapsthelossatthescrapfloor.Eachcoalitiontakesthesectorlossrateasgiven,sotheequilibriumrateisthefixedpointζef=ζ+δB1(Appendix

B.4

derives(

8

)fromacash-in-the-marketclearingcondition).Thecircular-survivalparameterαremainsareduced-formsummaryof

5Circularflowsbetweenhyperscalersandlabscouldgeneratebookrevenuesmistakenforgenuineincomeduetotheiropacity,inflatingthecollateralbehindperiod-2borrowing.Themainanalysisabstractsfromthisbook-inflationchannel,whichweleavetofuturework.

10

67

within-coalitionheterogeneityindistressoutcomes.

2.3Problemsandequilibrium

Thecoalition’sproblemistochooseperiod-1actions(γk,c1,k,B1,k),subjecttotheperiod-1debt-capacityconstraint(

6

),takingrivals’choicesasgivenandanticipatingthattheperiod-2actions(c2,k(ρ),B2,k(ρ))willoptimiseagainsttherealisedρsubjecttotheperiod-2collateralconstraint(

7

).Thecoalition’sexpectedpayoffis

Thefirsttermistheexpectedcontestrevenue,thesecondtheopportunitycostofcash,

thethirdexpecteddebtservice(period-2borrowingispositiveonlywhenρ≥bythe

optimisationderivedbelow),andthelasttwoconvexfrictiontermsinthecircularshareandthedeploymentratio.Theconvex-costparametersκ,ϕ>0capture,respectively,therisinggovernancecostofscalingcircularfinancingandtheadjustmentcostoffront-loadingdeployment.Thecoalitionmaximises(

9

)subjecttothebudgetidentities(

4

)–(

5

),thedebt-capacityconstraints(

6

)–(

7

),andthecircularcap0≤c1,k≤Ck,0≤c2,k(ρ)≤Ck__c1,k.

Inperiod2thecoalitionobservestheproductivitydrawρanddecideshowmuchfurther

tobuild.Whenthenewsisgood(ρ≥),expansionpays:thecoalitiondeploysadditional

capacity,drawingonitsretainedcircularbudgetc2,k(ρ)andfreshborrowingB2,k(ρ),untileitherthemarginalreturnisdrivendowntothecostofcapitalRdoritexhauststhecollateral

limit(

7

),whicheverbindsfirst.Whenthenewsisbad(ρ<),expansiondoesnotpayeven

atthefirstdollar,sothecoalitionholdsbackfromdeployingandborrowing.Thethreshold

separatingthetworegimesriseswiththescaleoftheperiod-1build,whichwecharacterise

inProposition

4

.

Definition1(SymmetricNashequilibrium).Asymmetricpure-strategyNashequilibrium

isacommonactionprofile(γ*,c,B,{c(ρ),B(ρ)}ρ∈[0,2])suchthateachcoalitionk,taking

6αfollowsfromanequity-sidedefaultboundaryinthespiritof

Leland

(

1994

),wherepartnershipcon-tinuationswitchesoffonceproductivityfallsbelowanendogenousthreshold;theindustryfire-salelossrateζeffollows

ShleiferandVishny

(

1992

):specialisedassetssoldwhentheirnaturalbuyersareconstrainedrecoverbelowuse-value.WedistinguishthisdiscountfromsecularGPUobsolescence,aseparate,additiveforce.Notethatpartofthedebt-finan

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