版权说明:本文档由用户提供并上传,收益归属内容提供方,若内容存在侵权,请进行举报或认领
文档简介
AI
THREATLANDSCAPE
REPORT61
About
HiddenLayer
&
Resources2
TABLE
OF
CONTENTS04FOREWORD05
SECURITY
FOR
AI
SURVEY
INSIGHTSATA
GLANCE11
AI
THREAT
LANDSCAPE
TIMELINE26
PART
2:
RISKS
FACED
BY
AI-BASED
SYSTEMS26
AttacksonModelFoundations30
Attacks
AgainstGenAI33
AgenticSystemsSecurity39
AISupplyChainSecurity47
PART
3:
ADVANCEMENTS
IN
SECURITY
FOR
AI47DefensiveFrameworksandInitiatives51TheStateof
AIRedTeaming51NewGuidance&Legislation57
Part
4:
Predictions
and
Recommendations57Predictions
for202660
Recommendations
for
the
Security
Practitioner17
PART
1:
RISKS
POSED
BY
ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE17
RiskstoSociety20
AI-PoweredCybercrime13
WHAT’S
NEW
IN
AI3Agentic
AIrepresents
aprofoundleap
forward.
These
systems
arenolongerlimited
toresponding
toprompts.
They
can
set
goals,
calltools,interact
with
other
systems,
generate
code,initiate
transactions,
and
adapt
dynamically
to
changing
environments.Properlyharnessed,theypromiseunprecedentedoperationalefficiency,acceleratedinnovation,andentirelynewmodelsof
productivity.Butautonomychangestheriskequation.When
AI
systems
are
empowered
to
take
action,
the
attack
surface
expands
dramatically.
The
same
capabilities
that
enable
agentsto
automatebusinessprocesses
canbemanipulated
to
automate
exploitation.
The
samereasoningloops
that
drive
efficiency
can
beredirectedtowardmaliciousobjectives.
As
AI
gainsagency,adversariesgainleverage.Make
no
mistake,thedefiningAIsecuritychallengeofthisera
is
not
hypotheticalsuperintelligence.
It
is
theweaponization,manipulation,andcompromiseofautonomoussystemsbybadactors.Agentic
architecturesintroducenewlayers
of
vulnerability,including
toolpoisoning,memorymanipulation,model
contexthijacking,multi-agent
collusion,identity
abuse,
data
exfiltration
via
action
chains,
and
the
exploitation
of
decision-makingloops.
Theserisksarenot
theoretical.
They
are
emergingnow
across
commercial
enterprises
and
federal
environments,
experimenting
with
AI-driven
automation.Traditionalcybersecurityprinciplesremainessential,buttheyarenolongersufficientontheirown.Securingagentic
AIdemandscontinuous
validation
of
model
behavior,real-time
inspection
of
agent
actions,
guardrails
around
tool
access,
and
controls
thataccountforsystemscapableofindependentexecution.TheconvergenceofAIsecurityandapplicationsecurityhasneverbeenmoreurgent.Inthisyear’sreport,weexaminehowtheriseofagenticAIisreshapingthethreatlandscape.Wedetailthenovelattackpatternstargetingautonomous
systemsandanalyzehowadversariesareadaptingproven
tactics
toexploit
AI-driven
workflows.
We
sharefindings
fromsecurityand
AIleadersdeployingagentsinproductionenvironments,along
withdata-driveninsights
fromour
worksecuringenterprise
AIsystems.Finally,
wehighlightadvancementsinprotectivecontrolspurpose-builtforagenticarchitectures.Asorganizationsracetowardautonomy,securitymust
movejustas
quickly.
Innovationwithout
protection
invites
disruption.Autonomy
without
oversight
invites
abuse.Let
thisreport
serve
as
a
guide
fornavigating
the
agentic
eraresponsibly.
Whether
you
arebuilding,
deploying,
or
defending
autonomoussystems,
weinvite
youto
joinusinsecuring
AInot
justasatool,butasanactorinourdigital
world.Weareproudtopresentthe2026HiddenLayer
AIThreatLandscapeReport.TitoCEO&Co-Founder(UnassistedbyLLMs)
FOREWORDWeareenteringthenextphaseofthe
AIrevolution.
Whatbeganaspredictivemodelsand
generativeinterfacesisrapidlyevolvingintoautonomous,agenticsystemscapableofplanning,
reasoning,
and
acting
on
our
behalf.
In
2026,
no
mission,
enterprise,
orgovernmentagency
willremainuntouchedby
AIagentsoperatingacross
workflows,networks,andcriticalinfrastructure.4This
year’s
surveyreveals
a
growing
disconnectbetweenhow
AI
systems
arebeing
deployed
andhow
they
arebeing
secured.OrganizationsarerapidlyoperationalizingAIwithincreasingautonomy,
while
security
programs
remain
largely
optimized
for
staticmodels
and
traditional
application
controls.Foundationalsafeguards
such
as
encryption
and
secure
deployment
arenow
common,but
the
operational
controlsrequired
tomanage
agenticbehavior,provideruntime
visibility,
conduct
adversarialtesting,
and
implement
AI-specific
incident
response
remainunevenlyimplemented.AsAIsystemsgaintheabilitytoact,
integrate,andmakedecisionsindependently,thesegapsare
nolonger
theoretical;
they
arebecoming
sources
of
systemicenterpriserisk.Thatriskisamplified
by
limiteddetection
confidence
andfragmented
accountability.Nearly
one-third
of
organizationscannotdefinitivelydeterminewhethertheyexperiencedanAI
security
breach
in
the
past
year,even
as
attacks
remainsteady
orincrease
and
frequently
originate
frompublicmodels,
chatbots,andagent-enabledsystems.ShadowAI
furthererodes
control,
with
most
organizations
acknowledginguntracked
deployments
thatbypass
governance,monitoring,and
approval
processes.
In
agentic
environments,delayeddetection
and
unclear
ownership
are
not
just
inefficiencies;they
enable
autonomous
systems
to
propagate
harm
faster
than
traditional
security
models
were
designed
to
handle.At
the
same
time,AI
has
become
foundational
to
businessoperations.Mostorganizationsnowconsiderbothinternally
operated
and
third-partyAI
systems
critical
to
revenue,
customer
experience,
and
operationalresilience,
yet
confidencein
vendor
securityremainslimited.
Taken
together,
the
findingsreinforce
a
core
conclusionreflected
throughoutthis
report:AI
systems
should
be
assumed
exploitable,
notmerely
vulnerable.
Securing
AIin
an
agentic
erarequires
a
shift
awayfromone-timecontrolsandpolicyassertionstoward
continuousaccountability,runtimemonitoring,enforceablegovernance,
third-party
assurance,
and
securitymechanismsdesignedforsystemsthatevolveandactbeyondhuman-in-the-loop
oversight.state
that
AI
projects
are
critical
orimportanttorevenue
generationoverthenext18months.say
AIiscritical
orimportant
to
customer
experience,
and
96%
to
core
business
operations,raising
theimpactof
AIsecurity
failures.oforganizationsreportthat
most
or
all
internallyoperatedAI
modelsare
criticaltobusiness
success.report
that
embedded
third-party
AI
modelsarealso
business-critical,
extending
risk
beyond
internal
deployments.88%78%97%92%SECURITY
FOR
AI
SURVEY
INSIGHT
S
AT
A
GLANCEAI’sCriticalRoleinBusiness
Success56Top
Sourcesof
AI
Attacks◉
Criminalhacking
groups—52%◉
Third-partyserviceproviders—45%◉
Freelancehackers—38%◉
Competitors—35%◉
State-sponsoredactors—31%TopMotivations
for
AI
Attacks◉
Financialgain
—50%◉
Sensitivedataexfiltration—
48%◉
Businessdisruption—
42%◉
Modeltheft
—
39%◉
Competitiveadvantage—
27%reportuncertainty,indicatingpersistent
gapsinmonitoring
and
detection
as
AIsystems
gain
autonomy.say
attacks
on
AI
systems
haveincreased
or
remained
the
samecompared
to
theprevious
year.Third-partyapplicationsAttackson
agentsInference
attacks
on
predictive
models31%71%Malware
in
models
pulled
frompublicrepositoriesAttack
oninternalorexternal
chatbot69%RisingAttacks—With
Uneven
Detection
Confidenceoforganizations
definitely
know
whether
they
experienced
anAI
securitybreachin
thepast12months.Sources
&Motivations
of
AI
AttacksAttack
Vectors
for
AIBreaches35%14%31%13%6%ChallengesinSecuring
Agentic
AI◉
76%reportthatshadowAI—unapprovedoruntrackedAIdeployments—isadefiniteorprobableproblem,
butonly34%partner
externally
for
detection.◉
93%use
open-weight
models
from
repositories
such
asAWS,
Azure,
andHuggingFace,increasing
exposure
to
supplychainrisk,
yet
fewer
thanhalfreport
consistently
scanninginbound
models
for
malicious
content
or
integrity
issues.Top
Third-Party
GenAIApplicationsinUse◉
ChatGPT—77%◉
MicrosoftCopilot—68%◉
Gemini—57%◉
Claude—
32%◉
Salesforce—27%41%
58%28%North
America58%
Europe41%Asia31%South
America28%
Africa20%Unknown10%31%GLOBAL
ORIGINS
OF
AI
ATTACKSHowever,
53%
report
that
their
organizationhas
optednot
to
disclose
an
AI
incident
due
to
reputationalconcerns.85%53%ofleadersagreethatcompanies
should
be
legally
requiredtodisclose
AIsecuritybreaches.Disclosure,
Transparency,andRegulatoryPressure20%7Time
andResourcesDevoted
to
AI
Security◉
Onaverage,professionalsreportspending46%oftheirtimeaddressing
AIriskandsecurity.◉
91%haveaddedbudgetfor
AIsecurityin2025.◉
However,
only
58%
allocate
10%
ormore
of
AI
spending
torisk
and
securitymitigation,
suggestingunderinvestmentrelativetodependency.TopFrameworksUsed
toGuide
AISecurity◉
Gartner
AITrust,Risk,andSecurityManagement—57%◉
GoogleSecure
AIFramework—56%◉
IBMFrameworkforSecuringGenerative
AI—53%◉
NISTAIRiskManagementFramework—48%◉
Databricks
AISecurityFramework—41%8Buildingrelationships
betweenAIandsecurity
teamsCreatinganinventoryof
AImodelsDeterminingsourceof
origin
for
modelsScanningandauditing
AImodelsExtending
detection
&response
to
AIassetsOnly
29%
have
a
dedicated
AIincidentresponseplan.Only
19%reportperforming
manualorautomated
AIred
teaming.have
implemented
an
AI
governancecommittee
or
executive
structure.report
clearly
defined
AI-related
roles
between
security
and
data
scienceteams.of
organizationsreportinternal
debate
or
conflict
overAI
security
control,highlightingtheneedforclearerteam
alignments.SECURITYMEASURES
&GAPS
IN
AGENT
IC
AI
DEFENSE83%73%68%Governance,Frameworks,and
AccountabilityMostCommon
AI
SecurityPractices50%54%58%29%32%32%19%SurveyHighlights◉
1in8
AIbreachesarearesultof
AIagents◉
Over1/3rdof
AIbreachesarearesultof
AI
chatbots◉
GovernanceExists-ButIt’sChaotic•83%have
governancecommittees,
73%reportconflict,andonly68%haveroleclarity◉
Open-weight
models
are
the
top
source
of
AI
breaches•Malwareinpublicrepositoriesaccountsfor35%ofbreaches,
yet93%oforganizationsstillusethemAI
CriticalityAIprojectsratedcriticalorimportanttorevenue
generationOrganizations
saying
all
ormost
operated
AImodels
are
criticaltobusinesssuccess
YEAR-
OVER-YEARExposure
&DisclosureOrganizationsidentifying
shadow
AI
as
aknown
orprobablerisk
2025
2026Organizations
admittingtheywithhelddisclosure
due
to
backlashconcernsOrganizationsreporting
theyprobably
don’tknow,
don’tknow,
orhaveno
waytoknowifan
AIbreachoccurred
33%
26%
97%
89%Visibility
&DetectionOrganizations
definitively
know
that
they
have
experiencedan
AI-specificbreachOrganizationalDynamicsOrganizationsreportinginternaldebateorconflictover
AIsecurityinitiatives
45%
67%
53%
61%
88%
96%
76%
73%
76%
74%
本报告来源于三个皮匠报告站(),由用户Id:619989下载,文档Id:1236342,下载日期:2026-05-259Risksrelatedtotheuseof
AIEvolution
of
risks
faced
by
AI-
basedSystemsPoisoningattacksInference
attacks(Model
evasion
&
theft)AI
supply
chain
attacks(Modelhijacking:
serialization
vulnerabilities
&
graph
backdoors)GenAIprompt
attacks(Guardrailbypass,
indirectprompt
injection,
promptobfuscation)Attacksagainstagenticsystems
AI
THREAT
LANDSCAPE
IN
A
NUTSHELL10◉
AnthropiclaunchesClaude3.7Thinking◉
OpenAIlaunchesGPT-4.5andDeepResearch◉
Storm-1516
disinformation
operation
targets
elections
inGermany◉
Basilisk
Venom
attack
shows
how
hidden
promptscancreatebackdoorsinmodels◉
OWASPstartstheir
AgenticSecurityInitiative◉
Cloud
Security
Alliance
releases
Agentic
AI
ThreatModelingFrameworkMAESTROo-
MAR
◉
OpenAIadoptsMCPacrossitsproducts◉
MicrosoftintegratesagentsintoCopilotStudio◉
Googlereleases
Gemini
2.5Pro
-thinkingmodel
with
advancedreasoningo-
APR
◉
Salesforcereleases
Agentforce3.0◉
ResearchersatCyLabdemonstratedata
poisoningattacks
with0.1%ofpoisoneddataset◉
CVPR
2025papers
takebackdoor
and
evasion
attacksonmodelstothenextlevel◉
HiddenLayerdemonstratesTokenBreak-amethodtobypass
guardrailmodels◉
Asana
discloses
amajor
cross-tenantbreach
caused
byabugintheirMCPserver◉
Backslash
Security’s
research
finds
hundreds
of
misconfiguredMCPservers◉
HiddenLayerpublishesthe
APE
taxonomy
forclassificationofpromptattackso-
MAY◉
Anthropiclaunches
Claude
4
andmakes
Claude
Code
generallyavailable◉
MS
announcesnative
support
forMCP
on
Windows
11◉
DockercreatesMCPcatalogue◉
HiddenLayer’s
researchersdemonstrate
parameter
abuseinMCPservers◉
MITRE
proposes
a
defender-focused
framework
SAFE-AI◉
The
first
AISBOM
generator
toolunveiled
atRSA
2025conference
AI
THREAT
LANDSCAPE
TIMELINE
2025AIMilestones,RisksPosedby
AI,RisksFacedby
AI,SecurityInitiativesMicrosoft
introduces
Agent
Flows-An
AI
workflow
automation
in
Copilot
StudioGooglelaunchesMCPToolboxforDatabasesGoogle
introduces
Agent2Agent
protocol
for
inter-
agentcommunicationTeenagerdiesafterconfidingsuicidalthoughtsto
ChatGPTPaper
“Machine
Unlearning
Failsto
Remove
DataPoisoning”publishedatICLR2025Researchersprove
simpleinterference
can
fool
trafficsignrecognitioninself-drivingcars◉
Anoveluniversalbypassforallmajor
LLMsunveiled
byHiddenLayer◉
InvariantLabs
discoversMCP
vulnerability
that
allowsfor
tool
poisoning
attacks◉
SpiderLabspublishes
AgentIn
theMiddle-
a
techniqueofabusing
A2Aprotocol◉
ModelSigningProjectv1.0releasedbyOpenSSFAI/ML
WorkingGroup◉
OpenAIlaunches
Operator
-
one
of
the
first
AI
agents◉
ServiceNowlaunches
AI
Agents&Orchestrator◉
Googleagreestoinvest$1billioninto
Anthropic◉
A
studypublishedinNatureMedicinerevealsmedical
LLMshighlypronetopoisoning◉
Modelgenealogytechniquecalled
ShadowGenes
publishedbyHiddenLayer◉◉◉◉◉◉JANFEBJUN11◉
AWSintroducesKiro
AI-anagenticIDE◉
Cognitionacquires
Windsurf
AIIDE◉
MicrosoftcreatesDataverseMCPServer◉
Microsoft
introduces
EdgeCopilot-anAImodefortheEdgebrowser.◉
PerplexityAIintroducesComet-a
browserwithanintegrated
AIassistant◉
Man
dies
by
suicide
after
receiving
encouraging
messagesfromChatGPT◉
Vinciworksreports
over
50
casesinvolving
fakelegalcitations
generatedby
AI◉
CERT-UAdiscovers
LAMEHUG,an
infostealerthat
reliesonLLM◉
HiddenLayer
demonstrateshiddenpromptinjectionsthatcanhijack
AIcodeassistants◉
Critical
RCE
Vulnerability
found
in
mcp-remote
package◉
Coalition
for
Secure
AIpublishesPrinciples
for
Secure-by-Design
AgenticSystems
AUG◉
OpenAIreleasesGPT-5◉
ManhospitalizedaftertrustingChatGPTadvice◉
Man
murders
his
mother
and
kills
himself
after
ChatGPTfuelshisparanoiddelusions◉
Anthropic
releases
report
detailing
the
first
fully
automatedcybercrimecampaign◉
Anthropic’sReporthighlights
theuse
of
AIinromancescams
and
remote
worker
fraud◉
The
firstknown
AI-poweredransomware,PromptLock,
isdiscoveredbyESET◉
HiddenLayerunveils
VISOR
-
a
technique
ofmodifying
modelbehaviorusingimages◉
HiddenLayerdemonstratespersistent
logical
backdoors◉
Major
supply
chainbreach
through
Salesloft’sDrift
AIchatbot
impacts
hundreds
of
businesses◉
S1ngularity
becomes
the
first
known
supply
chain
attack
that
scans
forandleverageslocallyaccessibleLLMs
SEP◉
AnthropiclaunchesClaude4.5Sonnet&Opus◉
OperalaunchesNeonagenticbrowser◉
Googleintroduces
AgentPaymentProtocol◉
Nvidiaintendstoinvest$100billionintoOpenAI◉
ASML&Mistral
AIenterstrategicpartnership◉
Disinformation
campaign
spreads
deepfakes
targetingMoldova’selection◉
HiddenLayerunveilspractical
code
assistant
AI
viruses◉
Koi
discovers
the
firstmaliciousMCP
serverin
the
wild
OCT◉
OpenAIlaunchesChatGPT
Atlasagenticbrowser◉
Amazon
Bedrock
AgentCore
becomes
generally
available◉
Researchersprove
that
even
aslittle
as
250malicious
documentscanpoisonLLMs◉
TheVirus
InfectionAttack
(VIA)
is
introduced
at
NeurIPS2025◉
Deserialization
vulnerability
in
Keras
(CVE-2025-49655)isdisclosedbyHiddenLayer◉
CoSAIpublishes
AIIncidentResponseFramework
v1.0
NOV
◉
AnthropicreleasesClaudeOpus4.5◉
Googlelaunches
Antigravity-anagent-firstIDE◉
ReleaseofClawdbot(nowOpenClaw)-a
free,open-
sourcepersonal
AIassistant◉
Anthropicunveils
the
first
AI-driven,large-scale
cyber
espionagecampaign◉
details
several
strains
of
novel
AI-poweredmalware◉
UK
consumers
warned
over
AI
chatbots
givinginaccurate
financial
advice◉
HiddenLayer
publishes
EchoGram-a
vulnerabilityundermining
AI
guardrails◉
GoogleGemini3DeepThink◉
Mistral
AIlaunchedtheMistral3family◉
OpenAIreleasesGPT-5.2◉
GoogleaddsMCPsupportforGoogleservices◉
WIRED
enquiryuncovers
one
of
the
firstinstances
ofdeepfake-as-a-service◉
Sexualized
deepfake
content
generated
with
Grokfloods
xAI◉
The
Chameleon’s
Trap
campaignusesphishing
emails
withhiddenpromptinjections◉
HiddenLayerresearchersport
ShadowLogicbackdoorinto
agentic
settings◉
Checkmarx
reveal
model
confusion
attacks
on
HuggingFace◉
OWASPformallylaunchestheir
AIBOMProject◉
OWASPreleasesTop10for
Agentic
Applications◉
NISTreleasespreliminary
draft
of
their
Cyber
AIProfileDEC,
2025
-
EARLY
JAN,
2026
JUL12
WHAT’S
NEW
IN
AIAyearhaspassedsinceourpreviousAIThreatReport,andthelandscapeofgenerativeAIhasshiftedsignificantly,withthepaceof
improvements
through2025matching,andinsomecasesexceeding,thatofthepreviousyear.Amongthesedevelopments,
themost
significantinclude
theevolutionofdeepreasoningmodels,alongside
smaller,highly
specializedEdge
AImodels,and
therapidpopularizationofagentic
AIsystems.2025InflectionPointsGenerative
AImodelshave
continued
to
growin
scale,
capability,
and
versatility,
and
over
thepast
12months,haveintroducednewcapabilitiessuchasreasoningandself-improvement.
Thesecapabilitieshavebecomecentral
tohowmodern
foundationmodels
operate.What
began
with
early
reasoning
models
such
asDeepSeek
and
OpenAI’s
O1
has
since
led
to
moreadvanced
foundation
models
like
OpenAI’s
GPT-5.2,
Google’sGeminiDeepThink,andClaudeOpus4.6
that
explicitlyallocate
inferencetimeto
reason
through
complex
problems
before
producingananswer.Thiscapacityforpausingandreflection
affects
how
LLMshandle
mathematical
proofs,
scientific
questions,andsituations
where
nuance
matters.While
edge
AI
may
lack
the
breadth
and
flexibility
of
cloud-based
systems,it
benefits
from
deep
specialization
tailored
tothespecificdomains
inwhich
it
isdeployed,
including
healthcare,
finance,
defense,
and
transportation.
They
also
offerbenefits
that
are
criticalinmany
environments,particularlyincriticalinfrastructure,includingimprovedprivacy,low-latencyresponses,andofflineoperation.Inaddition
tobuildinglarger
general-purposemodels,
thereis
also
a
trend
ofimproving
small,
specializedmodels
designed
for
deploymentin
smartphones,
autonomous
vehicles,IoT
sensors,andotherembeddedsystems.Theseso-calledtinymodels,compactenoughto
runentirelyon-device,
have
becomeincreasingly
desirable
as
organizations
shift
from
centralizedcloudinfrastructure
towardlocal,
or
edge-based,
deployment.ExtendedReasoningMulti-DomainProblem-SolvingGPT-5.2,Gemini3,Opus
4.6DeepSeekR1&OpenAIO1EmergentReasoningStructured
InferenceEarlyReasoningModelsNextGenerationModels13TypeDeveloperNameDescriptionInitialReleaseDateMultipurposeuser
assistantGoogleProjectMarinerAnexperimentalChromeextensioncapableofbrowsing
websites
andreasoningacrossbrowsercontent.Prototypeintroduced
inlate2024Multipurposeuser
assistantOpenAIOperatorOneof
the
first
AIagentsbuilt
tonavigate
websitesandcomplete
tasksonbehalfofusers.Nowfullyintegratedintothe
ChatGPTagent.January2025Multipurposeuser
assistantOpenAIDeepResearchModelfocusedoninformationretrievalanddata
analysis,
capable
ofperformingmulti-stepresearch
formorecomplex
tasks.Now
unifiedintoaChatGPTagent.February2025Multipurposeuser
assistantGoogleGemini2.5Introducedagenticandreasoningcapabilities.March2025Multipurposeuser
assistantAnthropicClaude
4Sonnet
&OpusModels
withagenticcapabilitiesandextended
thinking.March2025Multipurposeuser
assistantAnthropicClaude
4.5SonnetFurtherevolutionofreasoningandagentic
features.September2025Multipurposeuser
assistantAnthropicClaude
4.5OpusFurtherevolutionofreasoningandagentic
features.November2025Multipurposeuser
assistantGoogleGemini
3
&Gemini3Deep
ThinkImprovedagenticandreasoningcapabilities.December2025AgenticbrowserMicrosoftEdgeCopilotAImodeforEdgebrowser.July
2025AgenticbrowserPerplexity
AICometAbrowserwithanintegrated
AIassistantandPerplexity’s
AIsearch
engine.March2025AgenticbrowserOpenAIChatGPTAtlasAbrowser
withabuilt-inChatGPTagent.October2025AgenticbrowserOperaNeonAbrowser
withagenticcapabilities.December2025CodingassistantCognitionWindsurfAgenticIDE.November2024;acquiredbyCognition
in
July2025CodingassistantAnthropicClaude
CodeTerminal-first
AIcodingassistant
thatdeeplyunderstands
full
codebasesusingagenticsearchto
scan
andinterpret
entire
projects
withoutmanual
fileselection.February2025The
conversation
around
autonomous
AI
agents
gained
momentum
in2024,
but
itwasn’t
until2025that
things
truly
began
to
take
shape.
The
shift
from
experimental
demonstrations
toproduction-grade
systems
occurredrapidly,asmajorvendorsexpandedAIcapabilitiesbeyondquestionanswering
into
autonomous
task
execution.AI
agents
vary
widely
in
form
and
function,
with
applicationsspanning
a
broad
range
of
use
cases.
Forthe
purpose
ofsimplicity,twoprimarycategoriesofAIagents
emerged
in
2025:general-purpose
agents,which
are
multifunctional,
desktop-integrated
assistants,
and
application-specificagents,
designed
to
operate
withinnarrowly
defined
softwareenvironments.Belowareafewhigh-profilepioneeringexamples,asseveralbusinessesacrosssectorsfollowedwiththereleaseoftheirown
solutions.
H
DD
N
AYE14TypeDeveloperNameDescriptionInitialRelease
DateCodingassistantOpen
AICodexagentCloud-basedsoftwareengineeringagent.May
2025CodingassistantAWSKiroAgenticIDE.July2025(preview),
November2025(GA)CodingassistantGoogleAntigravityEnablesdeveloperstodelegate
complex
coding
tasks
to
autonomous
AIagents.November2025AIautomationframeworkn8nGmbHn8nAnAI
workflowautomation
framework
thatevolvedintoan
agenticsolution.Late2024
-
early2025AIagentplatformServiceNowAI
AgentOrchestratorAcentralmanagementsystemfor
AI
agents
specializedinIT
servicemanagement,HR,CRM,andriskmanagement.January2025AIautomationframeworkMicrosoftAg
温馨提示
- 1. 本站所有资源如无特殊说明,都需要本地电脑安装OFFICE2007和PDF阅读器。图纸软件为CAD,CAXA,PROE,UG,SolidWorks等.压缩文件请下载最新的WinRAR软件解压。
- 2. 本站的文档不包含任何第三方提供的附件图纸等,如果需要附件,请联系上传者。文件的所有权益归上传用户所有。
- 3. 本站RAR压缩包中若带图纸,网页内容里面会有图纸预览,若没有图纸预览就没有图纸。
- 4. 未经权益所有人同意不得将文件中的内容挪作商业或盈利用途。
- 5. 人人文库网仅提供信息存储空间,仅对用户上传内容的表现方式做保护处理,对用户上传分享的文档内容本身不做任何修改或编辑,并不能对任何下载内容负责。
- 6. 下载文件中如有侵权或不适当内容,请与我们联系,我们立即纠正。
- 7. 本站不保证下载资源的准确性、安全性和完整性, 同时也不承担用户因使用这些下载资源对自己和他人造成任何形式的伤害或损失。
最新文档
- 苏教版小学二年级数学上册第一单元计算纠错教案
- 市场调研专员年度工作汇报
- 气瓶充装站任命书 范文(岗位兼职)
- 线上线下产品迭代市场合作协议
- 全面质量管理项目外包合作协议
- 民营企业设备租赁合同范本2026
- 内控合规知识竞赛题库及答案-内控合规管理
- 教师资格证小学《教育教学知识与能力》基础试题及答案3
- 部编版小学道德与法治四年级下册第四单元试题(含答案)
- 宁津县2027届四上数学期末经典试题含解析
- 2026年新教材八年级上册历史全册必背知识点考点提纲
- 2026年湖北专升本汉语言文学专业(现代汉语中国古代文学)题库附答案
- 2026年四川省拟任县处级领导干部理论(任职资格考试)全真模拟试题及答案
- SD22推土机使用说明书完整版
- 2026潍坊第二人民医院招聘(3人)建设笔试备考试题及答案解析
- 湖北省荆州市松滋市2025-2026学年上学期八年级物理期末试题(含答案)
- 社区食堂规范运营制度范本
- 2026年深圳市离婚协议书规范范本
- GB/T 21873-2025橡胶密封件给、排水管及污水管道用接口密封圈材料规范
- 神经内科疾病康复与治疗
- 公共资源交易数据的价值与应用分析
评论
0/150
提交评论