2026数字十年现状：缩小结构性差距动员2030年及以后的投资

ENEN

Brussels,17.6.2026

COM(2026)288final

COMMUNICATIONFROMTHECOMMISSIONTOTHEEUROPEAN

PARLIAMENT,THECOUNCIL,THEEUROPEANECONOMICANDSOCIAL

COMMITTEEANDTHECOMMITTEEOFTHEREGIONS

StateoftheDigitalDecade2026:Closingstructuralgapsandmobilisinginvestmentsfor

2030andbeyond

StateoftheDigitalDecade2026:

Closingstructuralgapsandmobilisinginvestmentsfor2030andbeyond

1

1.Introduction

In2026,theEUisfacingacombinationoflongstandingandemergingchallengestoitseconomicandsocietalprosperity,competitivenessandstrategicindependence.Rapidtechnologicalchange,intensifyingglobalcompetition,geopoliticaltensionsandrisingsecurityrisksareincreasingthestrategicimportanceofdigitalpolicy.Digitaltransformationisnolongeronlyamatterofinnovationandproductivity;itisalsoincreasinglytiedtoresilience,securityanddemocraticstabilityinlinewithEUvalues.Meetingthesechallengeswilllargelydependonthesuccessofawhole-of-societydigitaltransformation,underpinningcompetitiveness,resilienceandsecuritywhilereducingexcessivedependenciesandstrengtheningtheEU’stechnologicalsovereignty.Thisrequiresactionacrossthefulldigitalchain:fromeducation,foundationalresearchandinnovationtoindustrialscale-up,infrastructuredeployment,adoptionacrosstheeconomy,effectivepublicsectordigitalisationanddevelopmentoftheskillsandsafeguardsneededtoensurethatdigitaltransformationworksforpeople.

The2026StateoftheDigitalDecadeCommunicationgoesbeyondstocktakingandidentifiesstructuralfactorsattherootofEU’sdigitalperformance,priorityreformsandinvestments.Itconcludesthat,whiletangibleprogresshasbeenachievedsince2022,itremainsinsufficienttomeettheEU’sobjectivesandaddresstheabove-mentionedchallenges.TheEUhasadvancedinanumberofareas,includingbasicconnectivity,businessdigitalisationandthedeploymentofcommondigitalinfrastructures.However,significantgapspersistinfoundationaltechnologies,computingcapacity,cybersecurity,advanceddigitaluptake,digitalskillsandscale-upcapacity,aswellasinclusivenessandaccessibilityofdigitaltechnologies.ThesegapspointtofourmainaspectsnecessarytoincreasetheEU’sdigitalleadership:consolidatingthestrategictechnologybase;strengtheningthesecurityandresilienceofdigitalecosystems;acceleratingthediffusionandadoptionofdigitaltechnologiesacrosssocietyandtheeconomy;andensuringthatdigitaltransformationworksforpeoplebyincreasingdemocraticresilience,digitalskillslevelsandsocialinclusion.

Acentralmessageofthisreportisthatdeliverydependsasmuchoninvestmentandimplementationasonstrategy.Closingexistingstructuralgapswillrequireachangeinboththescaleandcoordinationofinvestmentandreforms.Thecomingperiodwillthereforerequireamorecoherentframeworklinkingreforms,nationaldelivery,EUfundinginstrumentsandprivateinvestment.This,inturn,willrequire,theEU,industry,MemberStates,industryandinvestorstojoinforces.

Sinceitsadoptionin2022,theDigitalDecadePolicyProgramme(DDPP)1hasemergedasastrategicanchorforidentifyinggapsandprioritiesandasanoperationalframeworkfordeliveringonEurope’sdigitalambitionsthrougharobustgovernancemechanismthatdrivesrecommendations,initiativesandcoordinatedactionacrossthedigitalpolicylandscape(Figure1).TheDDPPcombinescommonobjectivesandtargetswithacontinuousmonitoringcycle,MemberStates’involvement,notablythroughNational

1EuropeanParliamentandCounciloftheEuropeanUnion,

Decision(EU)2022/2481of14December2022Establishingthe2030Policy

Programme"PathtotheDigitalDecade"

9,OJL323,19December2022.

2

DigitalDecadeStrategicRoadmaps(nationalroadmaps)andEU-levelcoordinationwithMemberStatesthroughtheDigitalDecadeBoard.TheproposedframeworkforthenextMultiannualFinancialFramework(MFF)2hasfurtherrecognisedtheroleoftheDigitalDecadeinsupportingEurope’ssustainableprosperity,competitivenessandtechnologicalsovereigntybyprovidingthatmeasuresfinancedthroughtheNationalandRegionalPartnershipPlans(NRPPs)shouldcontributetotheimplementationofrecommendationsissuedundertheDigitalDecadePolicyProgramme,whiledigitalinvestmentssupportedbytheforthcomingEuropeanCompetitivenessFund(ECF)shouldaddressthegapsandprioritiesidentifiedintheStateoftheDigitalDecadereports.

Figure1:TheDigitalDecadeobjectivesandtargetsandhowtheytranslateintoEUpoliciesandactions

FurtherdetailedanalysesarepresentedintheannexesandinthesupportingdocumentsofthisCommunication,whichtogetherconstitutethe2026StateoftheDigitalDecadeReport.ThisCommunicationisaccompaniedbyAnnex1withhorizontalrecommendationsandAnnex2includingthecountry-specificrecommendations,whichpresentafocusedandevidence-basedsetofsubstantiatedprioritiesforactionforthenextprogrammingperiod3.Together,theyareintendedtosupportamore

2EuropeanCommission,AEuropeanbudgetfitforEurope’sambitions:MultiannualFinancialFramework2028–2034,legislativepackageadoptedon16July2025.

3TheDigitalDecadeReportissuesrecommendationsunderDecision(EU)2022/2481.Article3definesitsgeneralobjectives,includingresilience,reducingthedigitaldivide,technologicalsovereignty,digitalcapabilitydeployment,digitalempowerment,cybersecurity,andsustainability.

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coordinated,sustainedandoperationaldigitalpolicyresponsecapableofstrengtheningEurope’scompetitiveness,technologicalsovereignty,resilienceandcapacitytoact.

Finally,thisreportalsolaysthegroundworkforthereviewoftheDDPPlaterin2026,withpossibleproposalsforchangestotargets,objectivesandgovernanceinlightofrecenttechnologicalandEUpolicydevelopments.

2.TrackingtheoverallprogressoftheEU’sDigitalDecade

2.1.Thestrategiccontext:technologyrivalry,AIaccelerationandthecompetitivenessimperative

In2025,threedevelopmentsraisedthestrategicstakesoftheEU’sdigitaltransformation.

First,intensifyingtechnologicalrivalry4,thecontinuedconsequencesofRussia’swarofaggressionagainstUkraine,thede-riskingofrelationswithChina,andrenewedtransatlantictensionsexposedacorevulnerability:Europe’sdependenceonexternalactorsforcriticaldigitalinfrastructure,technologies,andservices.Semiconductorsupplychains,cloudcapacity,AIecosystems,andconnectivityhavebecomemattersofeconomicandnationalsecurityforMemberStates.Atthesametime,thecybersecuritythreatlandscapehasworsenedinbothscaleandsophistication,withAIamplifyingadversarialcapabilitiesandincreasingsystemicvulnerabilities.Digitaltechnologieshavealsobecomekeyforcemultipliersindefence,withcivilianinnovation,notablyAI,advancedconnectivity,cloud,andautonomoussystemsincreasinglyenablingsecurityanddefencecapabilities.

Second,2025markedafurtherstep-changeinAI,bothindeploymentandimpact,andtheEUisnowbetterequippedthanatanypointsince2022toplayaleadingroleinthistransformation.AIisshiftingfromexperimentationtowidespreadadoptionacrosstheeconomyandsociety,withinvestmentsurgingtounprecedentedlevelsandAIcapturingaverylargeshareofglobalventurecapitalin20255.TherehasbeenanhistoricincreaseinITglobalinvestments,up13.5%from2025andreachingsomeUSD6.31trillionin20266,notablyrelatedtoAIwithfocusondatacentresandsoftware(modeldevelopment).Thishasledtounprecedentedpressureonprimaryresources,notablychips,storageandhigh-bandwidthmemory.Disruptiveadvances,includinghighlyautonomousagenticsystemscapableoftaskssuchasvulnerabilitydiscoveryandcyberoperations,carrysystemiceconomic,securityandstrategicimplications.Againstthisbackdrop,theEUhassubstantiallystrengtheneditsreadinesstocompete:theAIContinentactionplan,theApplyAIStrategy,therolloutofAIfactoriesandtheplannedAIGigafactories,theCloudandAIDevelopmentAct,andthetrustframeworksetbytheAIActtogetherprovideacoherentfoundationthat

Article4setsspecifictargetsforMemberStatesinareassuchasskills,infrastructure,andthedigitalisationofbusinessesandpublicservices.Article6mandatestheCommissiontoassessannualprogresstowardtheseobjectivesandtargets,andtorecommendactionsforMemberStates.Article7laysdownnationalDigitalDecadestrategicroadmapsasthemaintoolforimplementingtheserecommendations.

4OECD,

Science,TechnologyandInnovationOutlook2025,

28October2025.

5OECD,

VentureCapitalInvestmentsinArtificialIntelligencethrough2025,

OECDPolicyBriefsNo50,February2026.

6Gartner,

GartnerForecastsWorldwideITSpendingtoGrow13.5%in2026,Totalling$6.31Trillion,

22April2026.

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fewotherjurisdictionscanmatchinscope.Thisreadinessismatchedbysocietaldemand:morethanhalfofEUcitizensalreadyuseAItools(59%intheirpersonallives;morethanonethirdintheirwork7),whilearoundfouroutoffiveEuropeanssupportthedevelopmentofEU-ownedAItoolsandbelievethatAIshouldbecarefullyregulatedforsafety,evenifthisslowsdowndevelopers8.

Third,thecompetitivenessandresilienceimperativehasacquirednewurgency.TheEU’slabourproductivitygaprelativetotheUnitedStatesremainscloseto20%,drivenprimarilybygapsintheproductionandadoptionofdigitaltechnologies9,whilestructuralpressuresonenergysystems,capitalmarketsandindustrialsupplychainsarereshapingtheconditionsinwhichEuropeanfirmscompeteglobally.RecentassessmentsbytheEuropeanInvestmentBank(EIB),theCentreforEconomicPolicyResearch(CEPR)andtheAnnualSingleMarketandCompetitivenessReportconvergeontheneedforatransformativeshiftinthescaleandcoordinationofinvestmentindigitalandcomplementarytechnologies.Withoutsuchashift,theEUrisksmissingtheproductivitydividendthatdigitaltransformationcouldunlockanddeepeningitsstructuraldependenciesincriticalinputsandinfrastructures.

TheabovedevelopmentsarereflectedintheresultsoftheDigitalDecadeEurobarometer202610:

-82%ofEuropeancitizensthinkthattheEUshouldreduceitsdependenciesondigitaltechnologiesfromnon-EUcountries;85%ofrespondentsthinktheEUshouldprioritiseinvestmentsindigitalservicesthataredevelopedandcontrolledinEurope.58%ofEuropeanswouldbewillingtoswitchtoanEU-baseddigitalserviceproviderevenifitmeansslightlyhighercosts.

-79%ofEuropeansconsiderthatdigitalpolicyshouldbeapriorityfortheEU’sfutureand80%thinkitisimportanttomaketheEUagloballeaderintechnologicalinfrastructures.

-87%ofcitizensagreethatonlinemanipulation,includingdisinformation,foreigninterference,AI-generatedcontentanddeepfakesposeathreattodemocraticprocesses.

-92%ofEuropeansthinkthatstrengtheningtheprotectionofchildrenandyoungpeopleonlineshouldbeapriorityfortheEU.

2.2.Whatthe2025metricsrevealabouttheEU’sdigitaltrajectory

Againstthisbackground,the2025metricsshowamixedpicture.TheEUhasperformedstronglyin2025inbusinessdigitalisationandthedeploymentofbasicconnectivityinfrastructures.Overalltechnologyadoption(cloud/AI/data)accelerated,withAIrecordinga48%increasebetween2024and2025.ThedigitalintensityofSMEsalsocontinuedtoimprove.Basic5Gcoveragehasnearlybeenachievedandfibretothehome(FTTH)deploymenthasmaintainedasteady,albeitinsufficient,expansion.Moreover,Europecontinuestolagbehindintermsoftake-upofgigabitconnectivity,mid-bandand5Gstandalone

7GONZALEZVAZQUEZ,I.,FERNANDEZMACIAS,E.,WRIGHT,S.andVILLANI,D.,DigitalMonitoring,AlgorithmicManagementandthePlatformisationofWorkinEurope,PublicationsOfficeoftheEuropeanUnion,Luxembourg,2025

8SpecialEurobarometer572]

https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2759/3200731

9EuropeanCommission,

AnnualSingleMarketandCompetitivenessReport2026,

COM(2026)46final,30January2026.

10

https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2759/3200731

.

5

(SA).Indigitalpublicservices,servicesforbothcitizensandbusinessesareprojectedtoreachonlyaround90%ofthetargetby2030.Progressinbasicdigitalskillshasbeenstrong,bringingthe80%targetwithin

closereachby2037.However,theICTspecialiststargethasstagnated.Figure2:TakingstockofKPIs'progresstowards20301112

Atthesametime,significantstructuralgapspersist,notablyinhumancapital,advancedtechnologies,andscale-upcapacity.TheshortageofICTspecialistsremainssevere,aspolicyeffortsmadeatEUand

11ThecurrentKPIforthe5Gtargetdoesnotreflecttheactualqualityofserviceexperiencedbyusers.Itmonitorsareaswherea5Gsignalisavailable,regardlessofthenetworkperformance.Therefore,thecurrentstageof5Gdeploymentcanbeconsideredonlyas‘basic5G,.

Regardingquantum,dataisbasedon:StrategicAdvisoryBoardoftheEuropeanQuantumFlagship

,KeyPerformanceIndicatorsforQuantum

TechnologiesinEurope,

March2025.Bytheendof2025,theEuroHPCJointUndertakinghadprocuredsixquantumcomputers,twoofwhichwereinauguratedin2025,andtwoadditionalanaloguequantumsimulatorswereinauguratedundertheHPCQSproject.

12FulldetailsontheKPIsareintheDESI2026Methodologicalnoteat

https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news-redirect/938549

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Member-Statelevelhavenotyetmaterialised,andiscompoundedbypersistentgenderimbalances.Severalweaknessesalsopersistinthedeploymentofsovereigncriticalinfrastructures,notablyin

TheEUholdsonly9%oftheglobalsemiconductormarket,farfromthe20%target,anditcontinuestounderperformgloballywhenitcomestounicorn-sizedcompanies,bothinabsolutetermsandrelativetothesizeofitseconomy.

Figure3showshowthekeyDigitalDecadeindicatorsatEUlevelhavedevelopedbetween2021and2025,puttingthecurrent

semiconductors,cloudandAI.

Figure3:Progressover4yearsbyKPIatEUlevel

KPI

DESI2022

(year2021)

DESI2026

(year2025)

4-yearprogress

(%)

VHCN

69.7%

85.5%

22.7

Fibretothepremises(FTTP)

49.7%

74.1%

49.3

Basic5G

65.8%

96.8%

47.1

Semiconductors

8.6%

8.8%

2.3

SMEsbasicdigitalisation

54.8%

71.4%

30.2

Cloudtake-up

34.0%

46.7%

37.3

AItake-up

7.7%

20.0%

160.8

Unicorns

223

324

45.3

Basicdigitalskills

53.9%

60.4%

12.0

ICTspecialists

4.5%

5.0%

11.1

Digitalpublicservicescitizens

74.6

84.6

13.4

Digitalpublicservicesbusinesses

81.7

88.6

8.4

situationintoafour-yearperspective.Toseecurrentprogresstowardsthe2030targets,Figure4belowtrackstheprogressofKPIstowardthecorrespondingEUtargets,benchmarkingachievementlevelsagainstprojectedtimelines.

Figure4:TrackingKPIsprogressandexpectedtimelinebasedontrajectoryprojections(EuropeanCommission’scalculation)

2.3.Fromdatatoimplementation

Overthepastyear,cooperationbetweenMemberStateshastranslatedintomoretangibleprogress,

withconcretejointinvestmentsandoperationalinitiativesacceleratingthedeploymentofshareddigitalinfrastructuresandcapabilitiesacrosstheEU.Throughmulti-countryprojects,MemberStatesandtheCommissionarescalingjointinvestmentinshareddigitalinfrastructures.TwonewEuropeanDigital

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InfrastructureConsortia(EDICs)havebeensetupthisyear,afurtherpipelineofnewEDICsisadvancing,andtheImportantProjectsofCommonEuropeanInterest(IPCEI)programmeisbeingimplementedinmicroelectronics,cloudandhealthcare(includingAI-enabledsolutions).Byoperationalisingarobustpublic-privatepartnership,theAIGigafactoriesinitiativedevelopedundertheEuroHPCJointUndertakingdemonstrateshowcoordinatedactionofEU,industry,andMemberStateeffortscanhelptheEUbridgethegapbetweendigitaltargetsandthenecessaryscaleofimplementation.Together,thesemechanismsarehelpingtobuildstrategiccapacitiesthatnosingleMemberStatecoulddeployalone.

Snapshotofthetangiblebenefitsofdigitalisation:

Inhealthcareforexample,AIcansupportfasterandmoreaccuratediagnosisbyhelpingcliniciansdetectearlysignsofdiseaseinmedicalimages.Itcanalsoautomateroutineadministrativetasks,freeingupmedicalstafftimetofocusmoredirectlyonpatientcare.

However,thedevelopmentoftrustworthyAIsolutionsdependsonaccesstohigh-qualityandrepresentativedatasets.Inthisrespect,EUCAIM(theEuropeanFederationforCancerImages)fundedundertheDigitalEuropeProgramme(DIGITAL)illustratesthevalueofbuildingapan-Europeaninfrastructureforcancerimagingandassociatedclinicaldata.AsofSeptember2025,EUCAIMconnects83imagingdatasetsacrossninecancertypes(around107000subjects)andprovides50AItoolstousers(researchers,innovatorsandhealthcareprofessionals)in16countries.Bytheendof2026,itisexpectedtoexceed60millionimagesandtobringtogetheratleast30distributeddataholdersfrom15countries,enablingsecureandprivacy-preservingcollaborationforthedevelopmentofinnovativeimaging-basedAIsolutions.

ProgresshasalsobeensupportedbystrongeractionandclosercollaborationwithandbetweenMemberStates.TheDigitalDecadeBoard(DDB)hasplayedakeyroleincatalysingaction.TheBoardadvancedthealignmentoftheDDPPwiththefutureMFF,preparedthegroundfortheDDPPreview,coordinatedupdatestonationalroadmaps,andfolloweduponthe2025recommendations.Morebroadly,theDDBisincreasinglyfunctioningasthemainnationalexperts’forumforstructuredexchangeonimplementationchallenges,coordinationneedsandsimplification.

Nationalroadmapsremainthemainvehiclethroughwhichthiscollectiveeffortistranslatedintonationalcommitments.Throughthem,MemberStatesarecollectivelycommittingtoatotalof1934measures,representinganoverallinvestmentofEUR289.3billion,includingEUR205.9billionfrompublicbudgets(equivalentto1.09%ofEUGDP).MemberStatesarealsodemonstratingtheircommitmenttocollectiveactionthroughtheimplementationofannualDigitalDecaderecommendations.In2025,MemberStatesaddressed64%ofthe186country-specificrecommendationsissuedbytheCommission,eitherthroughsignificantpolicychanges(11%)ormakingsomechanges(53%)throughnewmeasures.19MemberStatesaddressedatleasthalfoftheirrecommendations.AtEUlevel,approximately55%ofrecommendationsshownotable(52.2%)orsignificantprogress(2.4%),withparticularlystrongadvancesinareassuchasuptakeofadvancedtechnologiesandICTspecialists.However,45%ofrecommendationshaveseenonlylimitedprogress.

Whilemomentumisbuildinginseveralareas,furtherstructuredandmoreambitiouspolicyeffortsremainnecessarytoaccelerateprogress.AsAnnex1shows,thegapsinachievingthe2030targetsdonotstemfromisolatedpolicyshortcomingsorshort-termcyclicalfactors.Rather,theypointtodeeperstructural

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challengesthatarecloselylinkedtotheEU’scapacitytostrengthenitsdigitalleadership.Inmanycases,thesechallengesariseinareaswherethescale,complexityorcross-bordernatureoftheissueshasexceededthecapacityofexistinginstrumentstodeliverthenecessarycoordinationandanadequatelevelofinvestment.Thefollowingsectionsummarisesthesechallengesandtheirunderlyingcauses.TheyarealsoanalysedinlightoftheEU’sstrategicpriorityofestablishingEuropeasatrueAIcontinent,requiringacomprehensivesetofassets,capabilities,andinfrastructures,fromadvancedskillstorobustethicalframeworks.

3.ShapingEU’sDigitalleadershipandtechnologicalsovereigntyintheAIcontinentera

Inthisreport,‘digitalleadership’referstoEurope’scapacitytoremainatthetechnologicalfrontier,shapethedevelopmentanduptakeofdigitaltechnologiesandinfrastructures,andinfluencethedirectionoftheglobaldigitaltransformation.ItreflectstheEU’sabilitytoleveragetheSingleMarket,innovation,investmentandregulationtofosterthedevelopment,deploymentandgovernanceofcriticaldigitalcapabilities,whilepromotinginternationalstandardsandapproachesthatarealignedwithEuropeanvaluesandinterests.

Achievingthisrequirescoordinatedactionacrossseveralfronts:

•boostinghomegrownindustrialcapacityandautonomyatkeystepsofthesupplychainofdigitaltechnologies,progressingtowardsafullEuropeantechnologystackwhileincreasingthechoiceforconsumersintheDigitalSingleMarket;

•securingthesupplyofdigitaltechnologiesunderpinningEurope’scompetitivenessbymitigatingdependenciesonasingleoralimitednumberofnon-EUsuppliers;

•gainingcontroloverdatainfrastructuresandcriticaldatawhiledevelopingthecapacitytoleveragethemeffectively;

•settingthestandardsforkeystrategictechnologies,addressingjurisdictionalrisksfordataanddigitalserviceprovision,andsafeguardingtheEU’scapacitytoregulateinlinewithitsvaluesandstandards;and

•strengtheningthetalentpipeline.Thestructuralgapsidentifiedinthissectionconcernpreciselythosedomainswherethiscapacityismostatrisk.

3.1Technologicalsovereignty:closingtheR&Iandinfrastructuregap

TheEUstillfacesthecriticalchallengeofsecuringcontroloverthefulldigitalinnovationchain,fromfoundationalresearchtolarge-scaleindustrialdeployment.AspartoftheTechSovereigntyPackage,theCommunicationonEuropeanTechSovereignty13outlinestheEU’sapproachanddefinestechnologicalsovereigntyasEurope’sabilitytodevelop,controlandscalethecriticaltechnologies,infrastructure,

13COM(2026)503

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servicesanddata,includingdigitalecosystems,thatunderpinitseconomy,securityandsociety,whilede-riskinganddiversifyingsupplychainsandtechnologicalexposuretoreducestrategicdependenciesandresistforeigninterference.14

3.1.1.Acceleratinginnovationindigitaltechnologies

EuropeancompaniescontinuetolagindigitalR&D,particularlyinAI.Thisgapisclearlyvisibleinresearchandinvestmenttrends15.EUcorporateR&Dgrewbyonly2.9%in2024,thelowestratesincethepandemic16.Apersistentsectoralimbalancefurtherdisadvantagesdigitaltechnologies:recentR&Dinvestmentincreaseshavebeenconcentratedinenergy(+19.8%oneyeargrowthrate)andhealth(+13%),whileICT-relatedsectorsremaincomparativelyunderdeveloped.ThissituationisexacerbatedbythelimitednumberoflargeICTfirmsinEurope,whichconstrainsprivateR&D,weakensinnovationecosystemsandslowsthecommercialisationofdigitaltechnologies.

GlobalR&DinvestmentisbecomingincreasinglyconcentratedamongasmallnumberofUStechnologygiants17-Amazon,Alphabet,Meta,MicrosoftandApple-particularlyinAI,cloudandadvancedcomputing.Overthepastdecade,thesefivecompanieshavenearlydoubledtheirshareofglobalR&Dspendingamongtheworld’stop2000firms,nowaccountingforaround15%ofthetotal.Withoutadecisivestep-changeininvestment,coordinationandsupportforscalingEuropeanfirms,theEUrisksfurtherdeepeningitsdependenceonexternaltechnologyproviders,withsevereconsequencesforEuropeancompetitiveness,sovereignty,andsecurityandfallingevenfurtherbehindintheglobaldigitalrace.

Addressingthescale-upgaprequiresnotonlyfinancinginstrumentsbutastructuralreformofthelegalenvironmentinwhichEuropeandigitalcompaniesoperate.Thefragmentationofcompanylawacrosstwenty-sevennationaljurisdictionscreatescompliancecosts,investorfrictionandgovernancecomplexitythatmaydisadvantageEU-incorporatedcompaniesrelativetotheirthirdcountrycounterparts.

TheproposalforaRegulationestablishingthe28thregimecorporatelegalframework(‘EUInc.’)18,adoptedbytheCommissionon18March2026,directlyaddressesthisstructuralbarrierbyintroducingaharmonised,digital-firstandcost-effectivesetofcorporaterulesandprocedurestofacilitatethecreationandscaling-upofcompaniesacrossthesinglemarket.AnewEUcentralinterfacewillenablefoundersandcompaniestocompleteincorporationandfilingprocedureswithouthavingtonavigate27differentnationalsystems.TheframeworkwillbuildonexistingnationalbusinessregistersandtheirEU-levelinterconnectionthroughtheBusinessRegistersInterconnectionSystem(BRIS).Realisingthesebenefitswilldependnotonlyontheformaladoptionofthe28thregime,butalsoonitsconsistent

14

JRCPublicationsRepository-OpenbutNotPowerless:TowardsaCommonUnderstandingofEUDigitalSovereignty.

15TheEUleadsinhigh-impactresearchinonlythreeofthe74criticaltechnologies;AustralianStrategicPolicyInstitute(ASPI),

CriticalTechnology

Tracker,

2025.

16EuropeanCommissionJointResearchCentre,

The2025EUIndustrialR&DInvestmentScoreboard,

December2025.

17Ibid.

18Regulation(EU)2026/74oftheEuropeanParliamentandoftheCouncilonthe28thregimecorporatelegalframework,'EUINC.'

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operationalimplementationacrossMemberStates,includingthroughclearcompanyformationrules,well-functioningnationalregistriesandpredictablecross-borderenforcement,sothatitprovidesgenuine

simplificationandpracticalusabilityforthescale-upsitisintendedtoserve.

Open-sourcesoftwareconstitutesafurtherunder-exploitedsovereigntyinstrument.Estimatedtocontributeb