汇丰-工厂的工厂：关于中国产业升级的五个问题-Factory for factories Five questions about China's industrial upgrading-20261022

competitivenessofChina'sindigenoussemiconductorecosystem.4.WhicheconomiesarevulnerabletoChi2Semiconductors,onceabecomeaflashpointof‘geo-technological’competitiUS-China‘geo-technological’tensionsescalatedshaintroducedsweepingrulesemiconductormanufacturingequipment(SME)toChineseco(seeTable1foratimelineoftfacilities.Thesemeasuressoughttofrtheirownexportcontrolsin2023,furtherrestrictinTheserestrictionsinitiallycreatednolongereasilyaccesslequipmentneededtomanufacturecompaNetherlands,forexample,istheonlycompalithographymachines,whichareessentialforthefabrarguedthatthesemeasurescouterm.3AsChart1shows,China’sSMEimportsdippedsandSMEimportsfromupgrading.Infact,onecouldargcompetitivenessofChina’sdomesticsemiconductorecosy1“Yourphonesandcarsaren’tgoingtoworkthesameafternewU.S.rulesonsellingchipstoChina,”PaulTriolo,TheChinaProject,25October20222“Japan,NetherlandstojoinU.S.inrestrictingchipequipmentexportstoChina,”Reuters,27January20233“TheLimitsofChipExportControlsinMeetingtheChinaChallenge,”CenterforStrategicandInternationalStudies(CSIS),14April20253turbochargedindigenousChina’sSMEself-sufficBeforegeopoliticaltensionsdisruptedtheglobalsemicmanufacturerscouldpartnerwithleadingoverseasctypicallypurchasedthebestavailableeqcombinedwithgovernmentincentivestopromotelocalisation,cByworkingwithleadingChinesetechnologyfirms–high-endincreasinglycapableproducts–domesticsutechnologicalcapabilitiesthatwerepreultraviolet(DUV)lithographyequipmentintheabsenceofEUVtools.5MemorychipmanufacturerCXMThasmadeprogressinadvancedhigh-bandwidthmemoryBydevelopingopensource,computeefmatching–orcloselyapproachingHuawei’sAscendchips.8AlthoughtheseprocessorslagNdeliversufficientperformancereportedlypartneringwithHuaweitodevelopprogrpotentiallymarkinganothermilestoneinthevertiChineseSMEmanufacturershavebenefitedsubstatheirsharehadrisentoapproximabehindASMLatthetechnologicalfrontier,theyareimpTable1:Timelineofmajoreventsduringthe‘US-Chinachi4“InnovationunderPressure:China’sSemiconductorIndustryataCrossroads,”PaulTriolo,AmericanAffairsJournal,20February20265“China’sNo.2chipmakerreadies7nmproduction,”Reuters,16March20266“China’sCXMTmakesbreakthroughinadvancedmemorychips,”Reuters,31August20267“Nvidiasaysithas‘largelyconceded’China’sAIchipmarkettoHuawei,”CNBC,20May20268“USLeadintheAIRaceWithChinaIsRapidlyNarrowing,”Bloomberg,20August20269“DeepSeekpartnerswithHuaweitodevelopchipprogrammingtools,reducingrelianceonNvidia,”Reuters,30September20264upgradethemanufactucompetitiveness,andreducedependenceonforeiThesweepingMIC2025plans(IT)andsemiconductors,2)machinetoolsanIndependentevaluationshavereachedvaryingconclusionsthatChina’sindustrialcompetitivenesshasimChina’smajorsuccessesincludeurobotics,machinetools,andpharmaceutTable2:China’sris10Original:“国务院关于印发《中国制造2025》的通知,”国务院(8May2025).Englishtranslation:“NoticeoftheStateCouncilonthePublicationof“MadeinChina2025,”CenterforSecurityandEmergingTechnology(CSET),10March20225largelyimport-dependen50UnitedStates,Germadependentonimportsofcommercialaircraft(sForces”,aconceptthathroughadvancedtechnology.11Inotherwords,relentlessindustrialupgradingwillcontinue.nextphaseofdevelopmintellectualpropertyincome–thatis,generatingpatentedtecompaniesinothereconomiemanufacturerandtechnologyleader(seeChar011“Chinaissuesguidelinesondevelopingnewqualityproductiveforces,”Xinhua,9October20266supplierandexportcriticalmanufacturreinforcedChina’smanufacturingcomponents,ratherthansimplyusingandimportingthem(seeUStradetensions:SixlessonsfromJapTheescalationof‘geo-technology’tensionsandtheheightenedfocusoaftertheCOVID-19pandemicpromptedmanysupplychaindiversificationprovedharderelativelyeasilybetweenlow-costassesuppliersoftheinputsusedbythoForinstance,headlinesoftentoIndiaandVietnam.12YetthismovehasnotmateriallyreducedthedependenceonChina.AccordingtoNikkeiGeopoliticaltensionsandsimprovingitsproductioncapabilivalue-addedactivitiesthatareChina’sexpandedroleasanadvanChart7shows,China’slaChinahassteadilyincreaseditsshareoftechnology-intensmedium-skilled,high-techexportsnowaccouChart7:China’sshareofglobal5050 “ApplemovingtomakemostiPhonesforUSinIndiaratherthanChina,sourcessay,”Reuters,26April2025;“VietnamemergesasApple’snextdestinationinraceforAI-poweredhomedevices,”VietnamPlus,16October2025“WhatChinaholdsinstoreforApple’snewCEO,”NikkeiAsia,28April20267Fromtheworld’sfacttothefactoryforfactoriChina’scomponentsChart8:China’sshacapital,andintermediaChart9:Shareofprimportsembeddedwithin8642086420 (e.g.,manufacturingmachinery,iconsumergoods,whileintermediaincreasedsubstantially.Thedriveforgreaterself-sufficiency,discussehashelpedsupportthesetreembeddedwithinChina’sownexportshaltheWorldTradeOrganisation(WTO)in200WheredoChina’sexpandingmanufacturingcompIncreasingly,theygotoASEAN,whichnowagoodsexports,comparedwithjust10%two(seeChart11).Thistrendreflesupplychains.ItalsohighlightsVietnam’sdiversificationstrategies–straofChina’sintermedia508mostdisplacementwithinAsiadisplacingsomeincumbents.JapanandGeconomiesthathavefelttunlessitcontinuesChina’sindustrialdisplacementbcomponents.Between2015and2025,Choutstrippeddomesticdemand,promAsiaEconomicsComment:Chinaandthe‘tariffcascadeChina’sindustrialupgradimanufacturingsectors,inthosesurroundinginternalcombustionengiautomotiveindustryalmostleapfroggingestablishedtechnologiesthrough11%,whileGermany,Japnegotiations,asEuropeanChinesemodelsenteringtheEuropeanmarket(seeEU-Chinatradetensions:De-escalation,fornow,ShanellaRajanayWithinAsia,Japanhasexperiencedthegreatestdispmarketsacrossarangeofsectors–08642095050CXMTandYMTCintheDRAMandNANDsectors,respectigrowingchallengetoKoreaintensifyingcompetitionTheglobalAIboomcurrentlymaKoreanchipleaderswillneedtocprecision,thermalcontrolandyieldstability–capabilcollaborationwithleading-edgechipdesignersandcustomerstodevelop(seeKoreainfocus:5050China’soutboundinv5.WhicheconomiesstandtobenefitfromtWhileChina’sindustrieconomies,italsocreatesopportunitiesforASEANEconomistYunLiueconomieshavedeepflows(seeASEAN-Chinacorridor:Tradetotheleft,FDItoLastmonth,China’sgovernmentreleasedoffThisgrowthreflectsChina’sexparecordedbyJapanandKorea,forexample(seeSteadymarch,shiftinggroundfirmstobuildoperationsabroadratherthanacquiretheirwayintonewmarkets.14Meanwhile,furtherencouragingChinesecompaniestolocaliseproduction(seeChinaexportsandODI:marketswhilealsohelpingtomiASEANhascementeditselfasmanufacturers.ChineseODIflowstoASEconsiderations.ManyASEANeconomiesofferanabundaworkforce.Theseadvantageslessattractivetosomelocallabourforceparti5014“China’soverseasinvestmenthitsrecordUS$214billion.WhyareUS-boundflowsplunging?,”SouthChinaMorningPost,24September2026componentsareincreasVietnam,amajordestinationforChinesemanufacturingAsaresultofChina’smanufacturicontentembeddedintheexportsofmanySouthThailand,havenoticeablyrisenThesetrendscoincidewithasurgerapidlyexpandingdatacentrecapacityanddeveMalaysiaandThailandstandout.15Inourview,thishintsatbroaderintegrationacomplementarityalongsidecross-bordermanufacturingsupplManufacturingODIcangenerateshowsthataneconomycanstartwithlabour-ichainbycultivatingalargehumanlearningfrom,collaboratingwithandcompetingagainstforeignfirms.ChTeslatooperateawhollyownedfactoryinSASEANeconomiesshoulddrawasimilarlessonfroinvestmentcanacceleratethediffusionoftechnicalskilltangibleeconomicgainsarealreadyevidentinseveralotherASEANeconomies(seeChart23).“ChinesetechfirmsdriveAIdatacentreboominSoutheastAsia,”ThinkChina,28August2026;“China’sGalaxyDataCentertoinvest$2bnindatacentersinThailand,”DataCenterDynamics,8August2025;“HowMalaysia’sdatacentresbecametheenginepoweringChina’sAIambitions,”SouthChinaMorningPost,3April2025“HowChina’sEVmakersaimtobeatTesla,legacyautomakersinEurope,”Reuters,30May2024Chart22:ChangeinThailaEU-Chinatradetensions:De-escalaAsiaEconomicsComment:RegionalimplicationsofUS-Chinasummit,25SepteASEANPerspectives:ThedataceAsiaEconomicsComment:RegionalimplicationsofChina-EUtradetalksKoreainfocus:WhattAsiaEVsupplychains:ImplicationsoftheMiddleEastConflict,20March2Steadymarch,shiftiJapanelectronics:FivequestionsonthecAsiaEconomicsComment:ChinaandAsiaEVsupplychains:BatteriesandautochiSolarenergyinAsia:Shi