IISD2026电池时代产业政策报告来自中国印尼与摩洛哥的经验

TheInternationalInstitutgloballyrecognizedthinktankwith3solvetheworld'smostpressingsustainabledevelopmentchallenges.Wethesesolutionsarebroughttolife.HeadquarteManitoba,weareadiverseteamoIISD'sheadquartersinancestrallandsoftheAnishinaabe(Ojibwe),Ininiw(Cree),Anisininew(OjibweCree),Dene,andDakotaNations,andthehomelandofthIISDisaregisteredcharitableorganizatstatusintheUnitedStates.IISDreceivescotheProvinceofManitobaandprojectfundingfromgovernmentsinsideandoutsideCanada,UnitedNationsagencies,foundatiWrittenbyAaronCosbey,SeniorAssociate,InternaSustainableDevelopment(IISD);WilliamDavis,EconomicAdvisor,IntergovernmentalForumDevelopment(IGF);BertramLang,SeniorPolicyAdvisor,IGF;PoppyS.Winanti,ProfessorofInternationalRelatioAcademicandStudentAffairs,FacultyofSocialandPoliticalSciUniversitasGadjahMada,Indonesia;andPoorvaKarkare,SeniorPolicyAnalyst,EuropeanCentreforDevelopmentPolicyManagement.Tipping,RashidSKaukab,SatishTriplicane,andIsabelleRamfortheircontributionsthroughoutthedevelopmenTheauthorsalsowishtnegotiatorsandexpertswhoreviewedearlie 1 4 4 5 7 1 2 26 34 37 43 43 50 Figure3.China'sestimatedmarket 9 DRCDemocraticRepublicMIITMinistryofIndustryandInTDKNdomesticcomponent-levelrequirementsWTOWorldTradeOrganizationByAaronCosbeyIndustrialpolicyisnowafactoflifefornationalpolicy-makersworldwide.ArecentWorldBankreportcharacterizedindustrialpolicyas“backwithavengeance”(Fernandes&2026).Indeed,itcanbearguedthatitmosteconomies,evenduringtheyearswhenitwasofficiallyoutoffashion.inaworldwherefreetradeisnolongerassumedshareinthegrowingsectorsofthefuture,manyofthemcleantechnologybased,anmaintainmarketshareinevolvinglegacyseconomiesinlinewiththeimperativeofsustainabilityinthefaceclimatechange,pollution,andbiodiversityloss.Thepresentreportisbornoftheneedtobetterunderstandtheimplicationsoftheriseintheuseofindustrialpolicy,intermsofgeopoliticalimplications,effectivenessinacdomesticobjectives,impactsontradingpartners—inparticular,developed—andsysteBecauseeveryexerciseinindustrialpolicyisunique,shapedbyanationalcontextofpolitics,economics,andindustrialstartingpoints,amongothers,thequestunderstandingiswellservedbyacofthreecasesofindustrialpolicysupportformodernbatteryvalueextractionandprocessingofrawmaterialsthroughbatteryproductionand,ultimately,themanufactureofelectricvehicles(EVs)andbatteryenergystoragesystems(BESSs).Thebatteryvaluechainisasignificantfocusofindustrialpolicyworldwide,BatteriesarethecostliestcomponentofEVs.HisthalfofEVs'costs(Ritchie,2022),butinrecentyears,theyhavefallentobetween30%and40%(Cepnik&Linder,2026).Intandem,demandforE(IEA,2026b).Fromaclimatepersthedecarbonizationoftransport—theworld'sthird-biggestsectoralsourceofemissionssourcesofrenewableelectricitysuchaswindandsolar,andrisingthattechnologyhasdrivencostdecreasesontheorderof20%peryearover(Ember,2025).Asaresult,in2025,theworldadded108type(enoughtopoweralmost100millionhouses),upfromadditionsofjin2020(IEA,2026a).ServingthosetwodynamicmainbetweenUSD500billionand800billion—anincreaseover2023ofbetween250%and400%(IEA,2023).IndustrialpolicyinmanycoThecasecountriesconsideredinthisreportareChina,Indonesia,startswithChina,asanexampleofacoordinatedsuiteofpoliciesthathasmanagedtocaptureglobalmarketsharealongtheintothedifficultiesofsuchanapproach—Indonesia'spolicieshavebeenhighlysucinfosteringinvestmentinthedownstreamprocessingofsimilarambitionsofverticallyintegrEachcaseoffersaverydifferentperspectiveoalongthevaluechaininwhichthosetoolsareemployedthelessonsthattheyoffer,intermsofeffectiveuseofindustrialpolicy;thenuancesthecaseshighlightforspillovereffectsofindustrialpolicy,bothpositiveandnegativcasesfromwhichtheyaredrawn,buttheystihowtomoveforwardinanareaofinternationaleconomicgovernancethatwouldThisreportispartofasuiteofworkfromtheInternationalInstituteforSustaDevelopmentonthetradeaspectsofindustrialpolicy.Thatworkhas,overthepast2years,drawnonexpertinputinawofthechallengesandopportunitiesof“green”industrialpolicy(Altenburgetal.,2025).ThisreportwillbefollowedbyfurthercasestudAltenburg,T.,Behboodi,R.,&Cosbey,A.(2025).Anandopportunitiesofgoinggreen.InternationalInstituteforSus/publications/report/industrial-policy-renCepnik,C.,&Linder,M.(2026,January2).ThefutureofaffordableEVs:Breakthroughsinbatterypackcosts.McKinsey&Company.https://www.mccenter-for-future-mobility/our-insights/the-future-of-affordable-evs-br21stcentury-Overview.WorldBank.hten/099111503312622762/pdf/IDU-457b42e3-1cea-4052-a8fb-569df0c5f419.pdfInternationalEnergyAgency.(2024,Ap/reports/batteries-and-secure-energy-tranInternationalEnergyAgency.(2026a).GlobalenergyreviewInternationalEnergyAgency.(2026b).GlobalEVoutlook/latest-insights/how-cheap-is-badollarsinthe1990s.BytheChina'sdominanceinglobalbatteryvaluechainstodayappearstobeingthemainrefinerofmostmetallicmaterialsusedinbatteries,thecountryalsoaccountsforthevastmajorityofcomponentproduction(e.g.,camaterials,andbatterycells),ofbatteriesthemselves,andkeydownEVs(InternationalEnergyAgency[IEA],2025b;Lombardoetal.,2026).1studyexploreshowChina'sindustrialpolicieshavelaidfotheirimplicationsforthecountryitselfandtherestoftheworld.ThisincluofthepoliticaldriversandmacroeconomicmechanismsbehindChina'srise,aswellasrecentadaptationstomountinggThedevelopmentofChina'sbatteryindustryisbestunderstoodwithinthelargerindustrialpolicyframeworkthathassoughttobalanceinnovationpromotionandlong-termegrowthwithpoliticalcontrsecurityhasbeenfurtherheightenedbyexacerbatedgeopolitperceivedvulnerabilityintermsofaccesstosconcernsarereflectedintheDualCirculationstrategy,firstpresentedbyPrein2020andinte(2021-2025)asaparty-ledpoliticaandtechnologicalself-relianceratherthanmerelyaimingforamstimulus.Dualcirculationreconfirmsthenecessityof“internationalcircupartiallyopeneconomyrelyingontransnationalsupplychainsunambiguouslyaimsfor“anewdevelopmentpatternwithdomesticmainstay”(NationalDevelopmentandReformCommission,2021).InthisPremierLiuHefurtherstressedtheneedfgooduseofthestrategicadvantageofthelargedomesticmarket”(SinaFinance,2020).Indeed,China'shugedomesticmarketandtheparty-state'sabilitytosteerittmacroeconomicandpoliticalendshavebeencriticalfactorsforChinesthatarehardtoemulateforanyAcorerationaleofChina'sindustrialstrategy,embodiedintheNationalMedium-andLong-termScienceandTechnologyDevelcountry'smanufacturingindustryfromlow-costtohigher-valueproductswhileaimtechnologicalleadershipinselectedstrforeigntechnologyandknow-howacrossaChina'sstrategicindustrialpoltechnologiesascorecomponentsofnationaleconstrategicguidance,spanningthe10thFive-YearPtheAutomobileIndustryMid-andLong-TermDevelopmentPlan(2017),andrecentnewenergyvehicle(NEV)developmentandknowledgeecosystemtoamassknow-howandtechnologicalabatteriesthatothercountriestodaycanhardlymatch—eventhoughthetechnologywasdeveloped,invented,andcommercializedinEuropeal.,2020).ThispolicyfocusontheEVsupplychainresrealizationthatforeignautomakershadanunassailableleadininmarketsandtechnology.Politicalconcernsabouteneincreasinglymotorizedmega-citiesalsoplayedarole(HeggelThecompetitivenessoflocalfirmsstrengthenedovertime,notonlythrosubsidiesbutalsothroughnumerouscompetinglocalgovernmentincefinancingfromstate-linkedbanks.Localandregionalclusterssupportedverticallyintegratednatdifferentsegmentsofthelithium-ionbatterysupplych2025;IEA,2022;Kennedy,2024;Whitfield&Wuttke,2026).EarliersubsidyregimesforEVsandbatterieswereoftenconditibenchmarking,withstandardstightenedovertimetopushfirmstowardimprovedproductqualityandadvancedtechnologies(Chu,2021,p.5;Hove,2024,pp.6-7).Theuseofsuchincentivesforsubsidytherecommendationsfromtheindus(Garyetal.,2024).Ratherthanrelyingondirectpurchasesubsidiesalone,thesystem,formallyimplementedin2018,establishedtradableperformancestandarautomobilemanufacturers,withNEVcreatingamarket-orientedandtechbeneficiariestoengageintechnologicalupgradingwithmassiveresearchanddevelopment(R&D)investment(Yangetal.,2022).Notably,thisdual-creditsystemwasalsoappliedtoforeiencouragingdomesticmanufacturerstoupgradetheirprodufirms(Allan&Nahm,2025,p.427).Atthesametime,locrequirementsforcedforeignautomakerstoestablishjointventuresandinvestinsupplychaindevelopment,domesticfirms(Ezell,2024;Kennedy,2018).Thegradualrelaxationofjoint-ventureafter2018reflectsChina'sincreasedtechnologicalconfidencacomprehensivevalue-chainstrategy,combiningupstreamrawmaterialarefiningcapacityexpansion,andcellmanufacturingsupport(BoniDeNobili&BintaMaiinvestmentsinkeycriticalmineralsacrosstheworld(incluandequitystakesinnumerouslocalminingincludingthroughoverseasrefiningandprecursormaterialinvestments(Deberdt,2024;Sanchez-Lopez,2023).Beyondcentral-levelstateguidanceandsuppobelow:shutoutoflucrativejointventuresbycentralregulationsandentrenchedstate-ownedenterprises(SOEs),localgovernmentsalliedwmanufacturingclusters(Lu&Ma,2026).Thisreflectsawell-documentedfeatureofChina'sreform-erapoliticaleconomydecentralizedauthoritarian”system(Xthebulkoftheeconomyandexperimentlocalobjectives.Morerecently,faworld-leading,verticallyintegratedlithium-ionbatteryeclocalclustersandindustrialparks(Zhao&Luethje,2025).LeadingbatteryfirmnotablyContemporaryAmperexTechnologyCo.,Ltd.(CATL)—pursintegration,movingintoprecursorchainloops.Thisinterplayoftop-downindustrialpolicyandbottom-upfirmexpansionfundamentallyreshapedgmarketpositionacrossmultiplesegments(Craig-ScheWuttke,2026;Zhao&Luethje,2025).governmenthasalsopursueddemand-sidepoliciestoprovideast·massivesupportforthedeployment·subsidiesforEVpurchaseuntil2022;theseappeartohChinese-manufacturedEVsanddiscouragedthoseofforahighersubsidywasoffer·vehicletrade-insubsidiesandtaxpurchase·taxexemptions,freeparking,acce·publicprocurementofandecomparedtothose·useoftargetsfordeploymentofBESSs,leadingtoeffortsfroencouragetheiruse(Osezua&Tomomewo,2025).ValueChainwithinChina,whichonlymadeup1%ofnewpassengervehiclesalesin2016,quadruaround4%by2020(InternationalCouncilonCleanTransportatsurgedfurthertosurpass53%in2025(Reuters,plug-inhybridmarketin2023asare02040NB:Miningfiguresforcobalt,manganese,nickel,andlithium,andremarketsharesforChinesecompanies,regardlessoflocatiodominanceofChineseindustry;therefore,thisfigureuseswhichevervariant(geographownership)ishigher.Redataformanganeserelatetoproductionproduction.Miningdatadataforgraphiterelatetobattery-grSource:Authors'calculationsbasedonGreiResearch,2023;M,2023;NationalMineralsInformationCenter,20Thesharpaccelerationin2021factors.Thefirstkeyfactorforacharginginfrastructure,whistockofpublicchargingpointsmorethantripledfrom2019(0.52million)to2022(1.8million),accountingforabouttwothirdsofglobalgrowthofChina'sdual-creditpolicyduringitssecondphatowardastrongerregulatorysupply-pushmodelthatcompelledmanufactproduction(MinistryofIndustryandInformationTecdeclinesinlithium-ionbatterycostssubstantiallyimprovenabledmass-marketdiffusion(Barwicketal.,2025).Finally,post-COVincludingextendedpurchasesubsidies,taxexemptiinvestment,reinforcedbothconsumerdemandandindustrialperiod.Together,thesefactorscreatedaself-rescaling,andconsumeruptake,furthersandincentives,suchastherestrictioninFebruary2021andBeijing'sincreas2022(XinhuaNewsAgency,2021).China'sEVsurgehasrestructureddomesticindustriesbypushingincumbeelectrificationwhilelow-costmodels(e.g.,suacceleratedmassdomesticupheavilyinthemining,beneficiation,andrefiningLithium-iron-Nickel-based■CathodeactivemaNB:Datarelatelithium-iron-phosphatebatterotherdatarelatetoproductionSource:Greitemeieretal.,2025;IEA,2025a;LombarChina'sdominanceoverbatterysupplychainsfurtherextparticularlyinrefiningmineralssuchasgraphiteatgloballycompetitivedownstream,Chinesepredominan(Figure3);overall,over80%oflithium-ionbatteriesareproducedinChina.CompetitionamongChinesebatteryandEVprpricesdown²andimprovingperformancetolevelsthathaveallowedthelarge-scalerolloutoflithium-ionbatteriesandEVsworldwideandencouragedgreateruptakebyimprformoneyofferedbyEVs.ChinesecompaemergingmarketsthatarerapidlyincreasingtheirEVuptakeEVsalesinBrazil)(MazzonLFPbatteriesmanufacturedinChinaarealsobeingrolledoutral.,2026).ChinesecompanieshavealaddressconcernsaboutEVrangeandcriticalmineralavailabiliappliedresearchandthedevelopmentofbatterychemistriessuchaslithium-iron-phosph(IEA,2025a)and,morerecently,sodium-ionthatallmineralsthataremorereadilyavailableandlessgeographicallyconcentrateuseofcobaltandnickelinbatteries)(CATL,2024;Hove,2025).InChina'sfirst-tiercities,batteryEVsubstitutionhascontrairquality,particularlycomparedtoothermegacitielevels(Lyuetal.,2024).UptakeofEVsisalsoanimportantpartoftacklingcinChinaandaroundtheworld(Hausfather,2019;Myllyvirta,2024).Forgrengine(ICE)sales,withEVexpansioncentraltotransportd2030(IEA,2024b,2025b;Lyuetal.EveniftheemissionsintensityofChina'senergyproductioniinvestmentsinrenewableenergyproduction,theconcentrationofthebatteryindustryinChinaatpresentmayincreaseemissionsalonguseofcoal-basedelectricitygeneration,includingbyleadingproducersofthemineralsusedinbatteryproduction(Davis,2025).National-scaleempiricalreseintensiveminingactivitiestoseriousenvironmentalharmsandhdeforestationtodamagetocropsandwatercontamination:arecentsfromminingareasfoundacicarcinogenicriskinroughlyhalfoftheminingareasassessed(Yinetal.,2025).Whilemininghasemergedasaleadingsourceoffarmlandcontaminationthroughaccumulationofcadmium,mercury,lead,andarsenicoversincethemid-2010sappearstohavecontributedtoaplateauingof2023).Furthermore,labourconcernscontinuetoarise,includingbothoccupationalhealth2Forexample,averagebatterypricesfellby8%in2025(Lombardoetal.,2factories(Ewe&McDonell,2026;Murphy,2023;OfficeofHumanRights,2026).AnotherpotentialnegativesystemiceffectofChina'sprocessingdominancewithinmineralvaluechainsisthatitrisksunderminingtheproductionoterm.Alackoflocalprocessingwheremineralsareextractedcanreducetheeconobenefitsandundercutthe"sociallicencetooperate,"therebyraisingtheriskofdisruptionsandconflictinminingregionsthhealthtollfortheproductionofcriticalenergytransitionmineral2023;Dieneetal.,2022;UNSG,2025).Relocatingbatteryprocessingclosertowherebatterymineralsareminedand/orsoldinfinalconsumerproductscouldreducetgreenhousegasemissionsalongbeunclear.Ontheonehand,consumersubsidieshavesignificantlyraisedoverallbattdemand.Asaresult,countthem,arelikelytohavebenefitedfromthistrend;thisincludes,notably,producminerals(sinceChina'spolicieshavenotfocusedonincreasingdomesticproductionoftheseindustrialdevelopmentbasedwith—orwouldhavecompetedwith—Chinafurtherdownthebatteryvaluechain,itisunclearwhetherthemarketsharelefttotheircompaniesinanbatteryvaluechainislargerthanwhat2.4EconomicChallenges:Overcapacityand“invoWhileChina'sindustrialpolicieshavehelpedthecountryachieveglobaldominationoftbatteryvaluechain,thegovernmentnowofficiallyhighlightsovercapacityrisksinthebatteindustry,aswellasseveralothersectors(Reuters,2026a).I(Reid,2025).Asaresult,inthelastfewyeaundesirabletrendframedas“involution”(pricecuttingandvolumesratherthaninnovationandquunsustainableforfirmsinfurtherwidenitspriceadvantageontheglobalbatterymarket,EVmakersworldwide(Gunteretal.,2facingsimilarissues,leadingmanytofacelosses(SaUltimately,China'sindustrialpolmanufacturersfromlocalgovernmentsinChinaintheformoflandgrants,subsitaxincentiveshaslikelycausedinvestmentinproductionca3ChinahaschallengedsuchmeasuresattheWorldTradeOrganizatiefficientlevels,leadingmanufacturerstoproducevehiclesevenwhenthemarketpriceendsupbeingbelowthecostofproduction(M&GAsiaPacificEquitiesandSustainabilityteams,2025;Reuters,2025a).Poorenforcementofbankruptcylawsalsoaltocontinueoperating,eveniftheydefaultontheirdebts,whichcanworsenproblemsofoversupply(DeutscheBankResearchInstitute,2025;Woo,2019).Subnationalgovernments'continuedpolicysupport,includingforunpreconomicallyunsustainablebusinessmodelsfromlocalgovernmentfurtherencouragedbyPresidentXi's2023calltopromote"newqualityproductiveforces”NEVtechnologies.Notably,theofficialcentralMarxistnotionof"advancedproductiveforces,"focusesonbuildingprothroughbreakthroughsinfrontiertechnologieswithoutmentioningtheneedtokeepindustrialcapacityinlinewiththelevelofdemand(Pomfretetal.,2024).ThistrendinChineseindustrialpolicywherethedevelopmentofproductivecapacityinfavouredindustriesispursuedwithoutadequateattentiontodemandsignsofovercapacity(Gunteretal.,2025).Inaddition,whereaslocalgovernmforsupportinglocalindustrialdevelopmentdidpmanyfutureindustrychampions,excessiveindustrialpolicyincentivesinreAlthoughothereconomiesexperienceoverinvestment(e.g.,throughassetpricebubbles),Tran,2024).Thecentralgovernmentiscertainlytryingtoenandcompetitionbasedonquality,ratherthanpriceandvolumes(Taylor,2026).However,thismaynotresolveissueswithovercapacityifhigherpricesreducedemand.Thus,thegovernmentisalsoreducingcentraltaxincentivesfstricterregulationstoreduceproductioncapacity,includingoutlawiproductioncost(M&GAsiaPacificEquitiesandSustainabilityteams,2025).Neverthelestheirpolicytargetsmayencouragethemtocontinuetosupportfthatarenotcommerciallyviablebythemselves.Recentempiricalresearchconfirmsthatbypreventingthemarket'seliminationmechanismfromfunctioning,thiskindofindustrialpolicyisitselfanunderlyingcaonlyofinternationalcompetitorsbutalsoinnovationcapa2024).Historically,otherjurisdictionsoutsideChinahavefinanunprofitablecarindusHeightenedgeopoliticaltensions,aswellasthedanglingthreatofChinesecompetitiontotheirestablishedautomotiveindustries,haveledregulatorsinseveralkeynotablytheEuropeanUnionandtheUnitedStates,toraisetradebarrtheirdependenceonChinaforbatteryindustrietheEuropeanUnionandtheUnitedStateshavedevelopedprbatteryindustries(Nhan,2022).Thesepolicieshaveincludedlocalsubsidies,localsourcingtargetsandhighChina(Davis,2025,pp.33-42;Songetal.,2024).Atthesametime,manywiththeirownambitionstolocalizemineralprocessinganddownstreammineralthatpotentiallylucrativeprocessingactivitiesarebeinglosttooutsidecomfromChina(Davis,2024;SThereactionstothismountingbacklashagainstEVsandcompontotheadaptivenessofChinesecompaniesandpolicy-makersalike:mostnotably,ChineseoutwardinvestmentintocountriessuchasMemanufacturingandautomotiveelectrificationsectorsincreasingrisingsignificantlytoleverageMexico'saccesstotheU.S.marketundertMexico-CanadaAgreement(USMCA)(Interesse,2025).InMorocco,Chinesefirmshaveequallybeenscalingupbatterysectorinprojectsandupstreamprecursorandcathodefacilities—toleveragethepositionclosetoEuropeanautomotivemarketsalongwithitsnaturalresophosphateandcobalt(Bortok,2024;Umar&YSimilarly,theoutsourcingofChinese-ownedrefiningoperationstothirdcountrieshasbeendrivensimultaneouslybyproducingcountryrequestsandmaterials—ChineseinvestmentsinIndonesiannickelprocessingbepoint—andbythetighteningofenvironmentalstandardswithin2021).Combinedwiththenowworld-leadingroleofChinesecompaniesincommerciallymatureprocessingtechnologiesforkeybatterymineralslithium—thisintegratedupstream-toinglobalbatterysupplychains,renderingChina'srisealongbatteryvaluechains