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1、Introduction to Game Theory,Yale BraunsteinJune 2003,General approach,Brief History of Game Theory Payoff Matrix Types of Games Basic Strategies Evolutionary Concepts Limitations and Problems,Brief History of Game Theory,1913 - E. Zermelo provides the first theorem of game theory; asserts that chess

2、 is strictly determined 1928 - John von Neumann proves the minimax theorem 1944 - John von Neumann & Oskar Morgenstern write Theory of Games and Economic Behavior” 1950-1953 - John Nash describes Nash equilibrium,Rationality,Assumptions: humans are rational beings humans always seek the best alterna

3、tive in a set of possible choices Why assume rationality? narrow down the range of possibilities predictability,Utility Theory,Utility Theory based on: rationality maximization of utility may not be a linear function of income or wealth It is a quantification of a persons preferences with respect to

4、 certain objects.,What is Game Theory?,Game theory is a study of how to mathematically determine the best strategy for given conditions in order to optimize the outcome,Game Theory,Finding acceptable, if not optimal, strategies in conflict situations. Abstraction of real complex situation Game theor

5、y is highly mathematical Game theory assumes all human interactions can be understood and navigated by presumptions.,Why is game theory important?,All intelligent beings make decisions all the time. AI needs to perform these tasks as a result. Helps us to analyze situations more rationally and formu

6、late an acceptable alternative with respect to circumstance. Useful in modeling strategic decision-making Games against opponents Games against nature,Types of Games,Sequential vs. Simultaneous moves Single Play vs. Iterated Zero vs. non-zero sum Perfect vs. Imperfect information Cooperative vs. con

7、flict,Zero-Sum Games,The sum of the payoffs remains constant during the course of the game. Two sides in conflict Being well informed always helps a player,Non-zero Sum Game,The sum of payoffs is not constant during the course of game play. Players may co-operate or compete Being well informed may h

8、arm a player.,Games of Perfect Information,The information concerning an opponents move is well known in advance. All sequential move games are of this type.,Imperfect Information,Partial or no information concerning the opponent is given in advance to the players decision. Imperfect information may

9、 be diminished over time if the same game with the same opponent is to be repeated.,Key Area of Interest,chance strategy,Non-zero Sum,Imperfect Information,Matrix Notation,Notes:Player Is strategy A may be different from Player IIs. P2 can be omitted if zero-sum game,Prisoners Dilemma & Other famous

10、 games,A sample of other games: Marriage Disarmament (my generals are more irrational than yours),Prisoners Dilemma,10 , 10,Blame,Dont,Blame,Dont,20 , 0,0 , 20,1 , 1,Prisoner 1,Prisoner 2,Notes: Higher payoffs (longer sentences) are bad. Non-cooperative equilibrium Joint maximum,NCE,Jt. max.,Games o

11、f Conflict,Two sides competing against each other Usually caused by complete lack of information about the opponent or the game Characteristic of zero-sum games,Games of Co-operation,Players may improve payoff through communicating forming binding coalitions & agreements do not apply to zero-sum gam

12、es Prisoners Dilemma with Cooperation,Prisoners Dilemma with Iteration,Infinite number of iterations Fear of retaliation Fixed number of iteration Domino effect,Basic Strategies,1. Plan ahead and look back 2. Use a dominating strategy if possible 3. Eliminate any dominated strategies 4. Look for any

13、 equilibrium 5. Mix up the strategies,Plan ahead and look back,Strategy 2,Strategy 1,150,1000,25,Strategy 1,Strategy 2,- 10,You,Opponent,If you have a dominating strategy, use it,Strategy 2,Strategy 1,150,1000,25,Strategy 1,Strategy 2,- 10,You,Opponent,Eliminate any dominated strategy,Strategy 2,Str

14、ategy 1,150,1000,25,Strategy 1,Strategy 2,- 10,You,Opponent,Strategy 3,-15,160,Look for any equilibrium,Dominating Equilibrium Minimax Equilibrium Nash Equilibrium,Maximin & Minimax Equilibrium,Minimax - to minimize the maximum loss (defensive) Maximin - to maximize the minimum gain (offensive) Mini

15、max = Maximin,Maximin & Minimax Equilibrium Strategies,Strategy 2,Strategy 1,150,1000,25,Strategy 1,Strategy 2,- 10,You,Opponent,Strategy 3,-15,160,Min,1000,150,- 10,-15,160,Max,Definition: Nash Equilibrium,“If there is a set of strategies with the property that no player can benefit by changing her

16、 strategy while the other players keep their strategies unchanged, then that set of strategies and the corresponding payoffs constitute the Nash Equilibrium. “ Source: /economics/mccain/game/game.html,Is this a Nash Equilibrium?,Strategy 2,Strategy 1,150,1000,25,Strategy 1,

17、Strategy 2,- 10,You,Opponent,Strategy 3,-15,160,Min,1000,150,- 10,-15,160,Max,Cost to press button = 2 units,When button is pressed, food given = 10 units,Boxed Pigs Example,5 , 1,Press,Wait,Press,Wait,9 , -1,4 , 4,0 , 0,Little Pig,Big Pig,Decisions, decisions.,Time for real-life decision making,Hol

18、mes & Moriarity in The Final Problem What would you do If you were Holmes? If you were Moriarity? Possibly interesting digressions? Why was Moriarity so evil? What really happened? What do we mean by reality? What changed the reality?,Mixed Strategy,Safe 2,Safe 1,$ 0,$10,000,$100,000,Safe 1,Safe 2,$

19、 0,Mixed Strategy Solution,The Payoff Matrix for Holmes & Moriarity,Evolutionary Game Theory,Natural selection replaces rational behavior Survival of the fittest Why use evolution to determine a strategy?,Hawk / Dove Game,Evolutionary Stable Strategy,Introduced by Maynard Smith and Price (1973) Strategy becomes stable throughout the population Mu

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