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1、1,25021335_06_2000_c2, 2000, Cisco Systems, Inc.,Deploying Secure Networks,Session 2502,What You Can Expect to Learn,“Network security is a system” Detailed network attack methodology Threat mitigation options Network security design components Specific optimizations to existing infrastructure,Deplo
2、ying Secure Networks,Security Threat Components Security Designan Example Design Under Fire Threat Mitigation Design Optimizations Security Designa Better Example Design Under Fire (2),Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS),Smurf Attack,ICMP REQ D=55 S= ,DDoS, How Does It Work?,Cl
3、ientSystem,1. Scan for Systems to Hack,Stacheldraht Attack,Legitimate Customer,Client,Handler,Agents (25),Handler,Agents (25),Handler,Agents (25),Internet,Stacheldraht Attack,Legitimate Customer,Client,Handler,Agent (25),Handler,Agent (25),Handler,Agent (25),Internet,Stacheldraht Transport Details,S
4、RC: Client,Client Communication,Agent to Handler Communication,Agent to Handler Communication (Spoof Check),DST: Handler,Port: 16660,Data: Encrypted Via blowfish,SRC: Agent,DST: Handler,ICMP Data: Skillz,SRC: Handler,DST Agent,ICMP Data:Ficken,ICMP ID: 666,ICMP ID: 667,SRC:,DST: Handler,ICMPT
5、ype: 0 (Echo Reply),ICMP Data:Agent IP,SRC: Handler,DST: Agent,ICMP Data: Spoofworks,ICMP ID: 666,ICMP ID: 1000,ICMPType: 0 (Echo Reply),ICMPType: 0 (Echo Reply),ICMPType: 0 (Echo Reply),Root Kits,Application Layer Attacks,Port Redirection Attack,Compromised Host A,Host B,Attacker,Source: Attacker D
6、estination: A Port: 25,Source: A Destination: B Port: 23,Source: Attacker Destination: B Port: 23,Deploying Secure Networks,Security Threat Components Security Designan Example Design Under Fire Threat Mitigation Design Optimizations Security Designa Better Example Design Under Fire (2),How Is Enter
7、prise Security Deployed Today?,Building Module,Mainframe Module,WAN Module,Core,Distribution,Distribution,Access,Access,Core,Distribution,Access,Server Module,Internet,Internet Module,Public Services (SMTP, DNS, WWW),Back-End Database,Access Router ACL (no State Inbound s0),Internet,Internet Module,
8、Source,Destination,Protocol,Action,Outside,Outside,Outside,Outside,Outside,Outside,DMZ,DMZ,DMZ,DMZ,Any,Any,SMTP,HTTP,DNS,SSL,Estab. TCP, UDP Replies,ICMP Echo/Reply,Permit,Permit,Permit,Permit,Permit,Permit,Firewall Rules,Internet,Internet Module,Source,Destination,Protocol,Action,Internal,Web Serve
9、r,Pub. SMTP,Any,DMZ,Any,Back-End Database,Int.SMTP,Any,Internal,Any,SQL,SMTP,ICMP Echo-Reply,SSH,Permit,Permit,Permit,Permit,Permit,Design Considerations,Dual “firewall” configuration Inbound traffic limited to relevant services on DMZ SSH allowed for encrypted remote administration Open internal ne
10、twork Full outbound access allowed (no traditional FTP),Deploying Secure Networks,Security Threat Components Security Designan Example Design Under Fire Threat Mitigation Design Optimizations Security Designa Better Example Design Under Fire (2),Bring on the Hackers!,Phase 1: Network Recon Phase 2:
11、“Own” a System Phase 3: Exploit Trust Phase 4: Get the Goods Phase 5: “Own” the Network,NETWORK COMPROMISE,Building Module,Mainframe Module,WAN Module,Internet,SMTP,DNS,HTTP/SSL,ServerModule,Network Recon,Attacker,Scorecard: Network Security Hacker,00,Ping sweep,Port scan,Others Whois DNS Web pages,
12、Internet,HTTP/SSL,“Own” a System,Attacker,SMTP,DNS,Vulnerability scan,CGI-BIN vulnerability Start xterm,Buffer overflow vulnerability Get “root”,Result ownership of one host,Internet,OWNED: HTTP/SSL,Scorecard: Network Security Hacker,00,01,Exploit Trust,Attacker,Scorecard: Network Security Hacker,In
13、ternet,SMTP,DNS,01,OWNED: HTTP/SSL,More recon Log files Processes Config files Password cracking Sniffing,Back-end databasediscovered,01,Get the Goods!,Attacker,Scorecard: Network Security Hacker,SMTP,DNS,OWNED: HTTP/SSL,Internet,Source: Attacker Destination: Web Server Port: 25 (SMTP),Source: Web S
14、erver Destination: Back-End Database Port: 22 (SSH),Source: Attacker Destination: Back-End Database Port: 22 (SSH),Back-End Database,Setup port redirection,Execute attack,Root via cracked passwords,“Own” the Network,Attacker,Scorecard: Network Security Hacker,SMTP,DNS,OWNED: HTTP/SSL,Internet,Back-E
15、nd Database,02,OWNED: Back-End Database,Past the firewall No more security More recon Vulnerability exploits,“Own” the Network,Past the firewall No more security More recon Vulnerability exploits Hacker has a new playground!,Attacker,Scorecard: Network Security Hacker,SMTP,DNS,0752,OWNED: HTTP/SSL,I
16、nternet,OWNED: Back-End Database,Crunchy on the OutsideSoft in the Middle,Distributed Denial of Service Attack,Phase 1: Setup Distribution Network Phase 2: Pick a Target and Attack,Now that He Has the Network, why not Have Fun?,Setup a Distribution Net,Handler,Client,Internet,Client infects handler,
17、Handler seeks out and infects agents,Attack!,Client coordinates attack Victim bandwidth is quickly eliminated,Agents,Agents,Handler,Client,Victim Network,Agent (25),Agent (25),Handler,Handler,Internet,ISP,Distribution Network B,Distribution Network A,ISP,Attack Review,Network compromise was complete
18、ly successful Firewall acted as configured Vulnerabilities started at the host level via an out of date system Network DDoS was completely successful All available Internet bandwidth was consumed Site under attack could have had DoS protection measures on their routers and firewalls and it wouldnt h
19、ave made a difference,Deploying Secure Networks,Security Threat Components Security Designan Example Design Under Fire Threat Mitigation Design Optimizations Security Designa Better Example Design Under Fire (2),Threat Mitigation,Application Layer Attacks,Root Kits,DDoS Source,DDoSVictim,Password Cr
20、acking,Good System Administration,Port Redirection,Proper Trust Model,Committed Access Rate,RFC 1918 Filtering,RFC 2827 Filtering,Intrusion Detection,Threat Mitigation (Cont.),Application Layer Attacks,Root Kits,DDoS Source,DDoSVictim,Password Cracking,Port Redirection,Private VLANs,Network Audit,Ve
21、rify Unicast RP forwarding,SP Filtering,Specific Filtering,VMPS VLANs,A new study by Cisco Secure Consulting Services offers some insight into where many common vulnerabilities exist in IT network systems. The study, which analyzed 33 midsize and large customer sites over a period of six months, fou
22、nd vulnerabilities in all the customer sites, but almost all the vulnerabilities could be traced to outdated software or lax system administration maintenance, not to inherent flaws in the systems. While the need for careful system administration and continual system security analysis has been well-
23、understood, Ciscos study indicates that most businesses, especially those that are conducting E-commerce activities over the Internet, arent being careful enough.,Good System Administration,Information Week February 21, 2000, Issue: 774,Good System Administration,Mailing lists Patches Logging Basics
24、 Strong or one-time passwords Encryption Switched infrastructure,Firewalls or sysadmins? After you log it, read or analyze it!,Fundamentals,Tips,Intrusion Detection Systems,Host and network both have their place False positives Placement Alarm or enforce?,Attacker,Public Services,Internal Services,I
25、nternal Users,Proper Trust Model,Public Host A,PublicHost B,Admin Host C,Database Server Host D,Committed Access Rate,Traffic Matching Specification,Traffic Measurement Instrumentation,Action Policy,Next Policy,Excess Traffic,Conforming Traffic,Burst Limit,Tokens,Rate limiting Several ways to filter
26、 “Token bucket” implementation,CAR Rate Limiting,Limit outbound ping to 256 Kbps Limit inbound TCP SYN packets to 8 Kbps,interface xy rate-limit output access-group 102 256000 8000 8000conform-action transmit exceed-action drop ! access-list 102 permit icmp any any echo access-list 102 permit icmp a
27、ny any echo-reply,interface xy rate-limit input access-group 103 8000 8000 8000conform-action transmit exceed-action drop ! access-list 103 deny tcp any host established access-list 103 permit tcp any host ,RFC 1918 Filtering,interface Serial n ip access-group 101 in ! acces
28、s-list 101 deny ip 55 any access-list 101 deny ip 55 any access-list 101 deny ip 55 any access-list 101 permit ip any any,ISPNetwork,CustomerNetwork,Ingress to Internet,RFC 2827 Filtering,interface Serial n ip access-group 101 in ! access
29、-list 101 permit 55 any access-list 101 deny ip any any,ISPNetwork,CustomerNetwork:,/16,Ingress to Internet,Ingress packets must be from customer addresses,Verify Unicast Reverse-Path,Mitigates source address spoofing by checking that a packets return path uses the sa
30、me interface it arrives on Best Implemented at your ISP Requires CEF Not appropriate where asymmetric paths exist,ip cef distributed ! interface Serial n ip verify unicast reverse-path,Service Provider Filtering,Best in e-commerce environments DDoS mitigation Bandwidth optimization,Attacker,Public S
31、ervices,Internal Services,Internal Users,Customer,DDoS Agent,Private VLANs,PromiscuousPort,PromiscuousPort,CommunityA,CommunityB,IsolatedPorts,Primary VLANCommunity VLANCommunity VLAN Isolated VLAN,Only One Subnet!,x,x,x,VMPS VLANs,Associates VLAN assignment with MAC address VMPS server simplifies m
32、anagement Consider User Registration Tool VLANs via NT and Novell usernames,Network Audit Fundamentals,Syslog Least common denominator for most network equipment Nearly all Cisco products support output to a syslog system IP accounting Adds additional visibility into ACL violations Network vulnerabi
33、lity analysis Allows an external perspective of your network,Optional Network Audit Tools,Dedicated log analysis tool Allows drill down into multiple systems for manual event correlation Homegrown scripts Great for specific logging applications Event correlation systems Just beginning to be seen in
34、the market Very promising idea,Specific Filtering,No outbound for web servers Be specific on other access Consider the risks of ICMP Add IDS if full ICMP is required,Customer,Public Services,Internal Services,Internal Users,Source: Public Services Destination: Internet Port: Any,Deploying Secure Net
35、works,Security Threat Components Security Designan Example Design Under Fire Threat Mitigation Design Optimizations Security Designa Better Example Design Under Fire (2),Design Optimizations,Optimizations Public host placement,Building Mod.,Mainframe Mod.,WAN Module,Server Module,Internet,SMTP,Back-
36、end Database,DNS,HTTP/SSL,Design Optimizations,Optimizations Public host placement,Intrusion detection placement,Internet,Back-end Database,HTTP/SSL,WAN Module,Building Mod.,Server Module,Mainframe Mod.,SMTP,DNS,WAN Module,Building Mod.,Server Module,Mainframe Mod.,Design Optimizations,Optimizations
37、 Public host placement,Intrusion detection placement,Catalyst features,Internet,Back-end Database,HTTP/SSL,SMTP,DNS,Design Optimizations,Optimizations Public host placement,Intrusion detection placement,Catalyst features,Router filtering/firewalling,Mainframe Mod.,Internet,Back-end Database,HTTP/SSL
38、,Building Mod.,WAN Module,Server Module,SMTP,DNS,Design Optimizations,Optimizations Public host placement,Intrusion detection placement,Catalyst features,Router filtering/firewalling,WAN Module,Building Mod.,Server Module,Mainframe Mod.,Internet,Back-end Database,HTTP/SSL,SMTP,DNS,Encryption,Design
39、Optimizations,Optimizations Public host placement,Intrusion detection placement,Catalyst features,Router filtering/firewalling,WAN Module,Building Mod.,Server Module,Mainframe Mod.,Internet,Back-end Database,HTTP/SSL,SMTP,DNS,Encryption,Network Audit,Internet Module,Problems: Public services are not
40、 protected Internet links are vulnerable to DDoS attacks No effective visibility into host attacks,Internet,Internet Module,Firewall the Access Routers,Pro: No topology impact Pro: session vs. packet tracking Pro: Multiple perimeters Con: Router performance impact,Internet,Internet Module,Add a Thir
41、d Firewall Interface,Pro: Third interface increases security Pro: Leaves routers routing Con: Increased load on firewalls Con: Topology impact,Internet Module,Internet,Internet Module,Internet,Do Both!,Pro: Maximum security Pro: Tiered filtering and audit model Con: Performance impact,Internet Modul
42、e,Internet,DDoS Vulnerability,Solution: CAR at ISP and local access router RFC 1918 and 2827 filtering Other optimizations as described earlier,CAR,Host Security Visibility,Solution: Intrusion detection deployment Network audit Private VLANs,Internet Module,Internet,CAR,Server Module,Problems No sec
43、urity (I think that covers it!),Server Module,Solutions Segment department specific servers to department VLANs Filter between VLANs based on network number Private VLANs for corporate-wide servers IDS Network audit,Server Module,Building Module,Problems Disparate points of access Hosts are hard to
44、protect and manage,Building Module,Solutions VMPS VLANs Private VLANs,Mainframe Module,Problems Mainframe security is often overlooked in security deployments No access control,Mainframe Module,Solutions AAA and access control at ingress router Consider encryption when existing Layer 7 access is in
45、the clear Network audit,WAN Module,Problems Trust issues with Internet connections also exist with traditional “private” WAN links Physical issues Packets in clear Auditing is seldom done,WAN Module,Solutions Network audit Encryption (Layer 3 or 7) For security enthusiasts only,Deploying Secure Netw
46、orks,Security Threat Components Security Designan Example Design Under Fire Threat Mitigation Design Optimizations Security Designa Better Example Design Under Fire (2),Security Design (a Better Example),Building Module,Mainframe Module,WAN Module,Core,Distribution,Distribution,Access,Access,Core,Di
47、stribution,Access,Server Module,CAR,Internet,Internet Module,Access Router ACL (Stateful Inbound s0),Internet,Source,Destination,Protocol,Action,Outside,Outside,Outside,Outside,Mail Server,Web Server,DNS Server,Web Server,SMTP,HTTP,DNS,SSL,Permit,Permit,Permit,Permit,Internet Module,CAR,Access Route
48、r ACL (Stateful Inbound e0),Internet,Source,Destination,Protocol,Action,Internal,Mail Server,DNS,Any,Outside,Outside,Any,SMTP,DNS,Permit,Permit,Permit,Internet Module,CAR,Firewall Rules,Internet,Source,Destination,Protocol,Action,Internal,Web Server,Pub. SMTP,DNS,Any,Back-End Database,Int. SMTP and
49、Outside,Outside,Any,SQL,SMTP,DNS,Permit,Permit,Permit,Permit,Internet Module,CAR,SMTP,Permit,Outside,Mail Server,Outside,Outside,Outside,Web Server,DNS Server,Web Server,HTTP,DNS,SSL,Permit,Permit,Permit,Deploying Secure Networks,Security Threat Components Security Designan Example Design Under Fire
50、 Threat Mitigation Design Optimizations Security Designa Better Example Design Under Fire (2),Bring on the Hackers (Again),Building Module,Mainframe Module,WAN Module,Server Module,CAR,Internet,Internet Module,Network Compromise Attack,Phase 1: Network recon Same level of success IDS alarmed on acti
51、vity Phase 2: “Own” a system Properly patched system would likely not be vulnerable, but lets assume it is. Xterm would fail, preventing the buffer overflow attack Phase 3: Exploit trust Assuming port redirection was successful (which it was not), no interactive sessions are possible from web server to inside Phase 4 and 5: Fail due to no inbound access
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