外文翻译--外商直接投资模式的解释：基于土耳其汽车产业的分析

中文 3265 字 本科毕业论文外文翻译 外文题目： Understanding patterns of FDI: the case of Turkey and its auto industry 出 处： European Business Journal, 15 (2), 2003, pages 61-69 作 者： M. John Foster Ipek Alkan. Ipek 原 文： Patterns of FDI for Turkey: actuality and expectation The starting point arguably for any aspirant developing economy in its search for inward foreign investment FDI from the perspective of the investors is the general upswing in aggregate global FDI trends from source economies, which occurs for a variety of well-rehearsed reasons, see e.g. Porter (1990), Buckley (1992) and Dunning (1993). These reasons include: market extension (perhaps because the home market is near saturation); accessing scarce primary products (primarily oil and minerals); production efficiency strategies benefiting from location-specific cost advantages in sink economies; and more or less complex mixtures of these and other factors. For developing economies, the question they may reasonably ask is: Can we get a share of this inflow of capital? Table 1 summarises global patterns of FDI in recent years. It shows a 238% increase in aggregate FDI over the period 1994 to 1999. This comprised a 338% increase in FDI into developed countries and a 98% rise in the inflows to developing economies. In short, while there has been significant growth in developing economies, for the developed economies the growth has been much more dramatic. Even China, the much vaunted star of foreign investment, has only performed steadily when benchmarked against global aggregates. The table shows, using Vietnam as a benchmark, that Turkey has not done very well in aggregate terms when compared with newer emerging economies over the past decade. This simple aggregate pattern is further elaborated by considering the FDI per capita figures shown in Table 2. This clearly suggests that Turkey is missing out in that its per capita performance over the decade shown has been flat while the picture has been one of sharp growth within the other developing economies. The comparison with Vietnam is very stark; Vietnam is a country which had to re-launch its economy from a very low base after the US removed its block on US companies investment, instituted immediately after its withdrawal from the Vietnam War in 1975. Indeed the flat performance of the 1990s at a time of aggregate global increase is even more notable when compared with the 1980s. Data for that period show that the liberalisation-oriented change in regime of the period did indeed produce a positive increase albeit from a low base. Hence the fairly modest average performance around the change of decade (see Table 1) nevertheless marked a five-fold increase on the first couple of years. A corner was turned, so to speak, but was not followed by the expected acceleration. At an aggregate level, the ratio FDIt/GDPt,， where t is the year or period chosen, is sometimes used as an indicator of how well a country is doing in attracting FDI. Is a country getting its share? The unreliability of source data can be a problem but the ratio is likely to be fairly robust certainly to an order of magnitude. Based on data from the UN Statistical Yearbook (UN, 2001) and the data in Table 1, in 1999, Turkeys ratio was 0.4, compared with Thailand 5.5, Vietnam 5.8, China 3.8, UK 5.7, and US 3.1. These data suggest that Turkey failed to perform it clearly did not get a relative share, whether compared with developed or comparable developing countries. Until recently, manufacturing was very important within the pattern of FDI into Turkey, and the biggest subsector therein was the auto and transport parts industry. Hence the auto industry might be expected to be a particular target for FDI. But actual realised FDI in that sector has been muted in absolute if not internal, comparative terms, as we explain in more detail in the next section: why? We have already stated that Turkeys aggregate FDI performance has been weaker than might be expected based on simple benchmarking around the size of the countrys population and GDP. An examination of some of the key elements of the countrys business environment would tend to suggest that the expectation might well be for a stronger performance than that found. First of all there is its favourable geographical position. Turkey sits at the northeast corner of the Mediterranean. As such, it: abuts the EU via its current most easterly element, Greece (and has its customs union with the EU), has borders with oil rich Iran and Iraq and moregenerally can be seen as well placed to serve the growing Middle East market, and has immediate access to a number of ex-Comecon economies either via direct land borders or by sea via Black Sea ports it controls the Bosphorus, which is the gateway to the Black Sea. Three more positive factors can be readily identified, all of which might be thought to be sources of comparative advantage: 1. competitive labour rates, certainly compared with EU rates, if not with those of other developing economies in other regions (e.g. the benchmark used before, Vietnam); 2. a well-developed infrastructure, in the west of the country at least, which is also the industrialized area; and 3. a large privatisation programme, over the past decade. We conclude this section by noting the major sources of FDI into Turkey. Recently the main sources have been: France, Germany, US, Netherlands, Switzerland, UK, Italy and Japan, see e.g. Loewendahl and Ertugal-Loewendahl (2000, Table 1). In other words the EU and the US lead such inward investment as is occurring, not for example its oil-rich Arab neighbours. The auto sector within the Turkish economy At the time of the research in 2001, there were 15 auto-makers in Turkey (TAMs), of which 10 have at least some element of FDI. The pattern of production and imports is shown in Table 3. It shows a growing share of the Turkish market for auto units being taken by imports even as the market itself grew. The industry is the third largest industrial segment in the economy and employs 500 000 people. Vehicle ownership rates currently are around 62 per thousand persons, compared with a global average of 82 per thousand, indicating high potential demand if the economy can grow generally. However, there are major perceived impediments to auto sales, as we discuss in the next section. These include low income per capita and high levels of final sales tax. The 15 producer companies have a capacity to build 667 000 passenger cars per annum (in five companies) and a further 223 000 vehicles of other types, making 890 000 in total. Table 4 shows the recent export performance of the TAMs. While they show an upward trend they are still not sufficient to enable the TAMs to achieve acceptable levels of plant utilisation, no more than the order of 50% over a number of years. Survey of foreign-invested TAMs Given the twin facts of Turkeys general underperformance in the FDI stakes, including the auto sector, and, apparently, the potentially favourable conditions for FDI in Turkey, the question of its relatively poor level of FDI remained. In order to explore this issue, a survey was conducted of the 10 auto-makers in Turkey which have at least some element of foreign investment (the FITAMs see Appendix 1 for a list). Five of the ten responded and supplied some considerable detail, including answers to follow-up queries by telephone, where answers to questions were not wholly clear. The questionnaire was structured in the form of a combination of closed (fact gathering) and open (opinion offering) questions. Perceived barriers to FDI in the auto industry It was found that the main factors believed to impede the development of the auto industry and hence act as barriers to further FDI into it were as follows: political instability, including corruption; recurring economic crises, with attendant high inflation, interest rates and stagnation; low income levels these are believed to be holding back latent domestic demand; heavy reliance on imported components (inputs) this can also be seen as the industry not achieving sufficient mass to allow local vertical integration; and high taxes on final vehicle sales, from 37 to 64%. One consequence of these factors, in combination, was low utilisation rates within Turkish auto plants (of the order of 50%, as already noted). A consequence of this in turn is that unit costs are higher than would be the case were something close to full capacity use to be achieved. This in turn has made Turkish exports less competitive, in the EU for example, than might have been expected. In the case of the EU market this lack of competitiveness occurs in spite of markedly higher EU labour rates. This highlights an important point, made elsewhere in a Southeast Asian context, see Foster (1997), that simply having low wage rates available is an inadequate basis for an FDI decision. The point seems obvious once made but is often glossed over because the low wage rationale for FDI is the one most frequently discussed. The sense of Turkey being in an apparently strong competitive position vis-vis inward FDI but failing to realise its potential because of concerns regarding political and economic stability is supported by the conclusions of a recent paper by Loewandahl and Ertugal-Loewendahl (2000). Prognosis for the future of FITAMs The responding auto companies were also asked for their prognosis for the future. Those foreign manufacturers already committed to Turkey, as were our respondents, are cautiously bullish. Conclusions, in brief, were: none of the responding FITAMs had plans to withdraw nor expected competitors to do so; indeed three of the five respondents had further immediate investment plans in hand and a fourth had recently completed a significant investment; the consensus was nevertheless that moves into Turkey by Volkswagen and Nissan were not expected; political stability was seen as the key to significant expansion of the FITAMs; Turkey is perceived to possess country-specific advantages (CSAs): these CSAs could underpin future FDI if the question of political stability could be resolved. CSAs commonly included: quality of labour; managerial ability; an industrial mentality a mindset able to cope with an industrial environment; an already well-constructed industry base in autos. The issue of managerial ability is of particular interest for Turkeys future. In a study of UK firms engaged in FDI, it was notable that companies were more worried by lack of competent local management than lack of trained shop-floor labour (Foster, 2002). As for the threat of other emerging economies being alternative destinations for auto inward FDI, the responses showed that Turkeys own CSAs would enable it to compete. In addition, the EU customs union agreement gives Turkey a direct advantage, even if all other factors are equal. However, perhaps the major competitor destination in simple aggregate investment terms is China and its auto industry is currently inwardly focused, i.e. seeking to develop and meet growing domestic demand as its economy continues to grow quickly (of the order of 7 to 8% until 2002). The major change in Turkish life in late 2002 was the election in November of a new government. The two important factors concerning the new government are its Islamic roots and the fact that it has an overall majority in the parliament. The latter certainly offers the potential to deliver stable government and initiate necessary economic reforms which may have been infeasible for preceding coalitions because of the inherent fragility of those coalitions. The fact that the party has, as stated, Islamic roots raises different questions in a country whose government was secularised by Ataturk some eighty years ago. So far the new government has shown no extreme tendencies which might worry would-be investors and rather has presided over the agreement with the EU of a timetable for Turkeys potential accession. A complementary assessment approach Having looked at the actual situation and the industrys own perceptions of future prospects, we apply an evaluative framework for FDIs (Foster, 2002) to the Turkish auto industry context. The results were found to be highly compatible with those from the questionnaire data. This is both further evidence for the validity of the framework and interesting in that its outcomes are consonant with the preceding discussion. The Foster FDI-Evaluation framework (2002) comprises six factors which are seen to be important, contextual aspects of the overall FDI decision as a complement to the usual financial appraisals. Each factor has an attached (subjective), Likertbased scoring scale. Four of the six factors have positive or affirmative scales, while the other two, F4 and F6, have negatively inclined scales (i.e. a high score denotes potential hazard). For this application we have adopted two conventions. First, we have used a seven-point scale for each factor. Secondly, we have presented the complements of the two negatively oriented factors, i.e. if the score for factor F4 were 5, then the score of the complement F4c would be (7 5) = 2. By doing this we generate a picture that is visually easy to interpret. A pattern to the right will be favourable and to the left will be unfavourable. Finally, note that here we apply the framework to the Turkish auto industry (TAI) as an entity rather than using it as a complement to the financial assessment of an individual investment proposal. The factors and their scores or the scores of the complements are shown in Figure 1. (Brief details of the nature of the factors in the Foster model can be found in Appendix 2.) 译 文： 外商直接投资模式的解释：基于土耳其汽车产业的分析 土耳其的 FDI模式：现状和展望 从投资者的角度研究对内外商投资时，可以认为 FDI 是个正普遍上升的经济来源。 FDI的产生原因包括很多，如波特（ 1990）、巴克利（ 1992）、邓宁（ 1993）的研究理论。这些原因包括：市场扩展（可能国内市场几近饱和）；获得稀缺的初级产品（主要为石油和煤矿）；在下沉经济过程中从某个特定的成本优势中获得生产效率战略；其他原因或者以上原因的组合。处于发展中的经济体理所当然会疑问：“我们能从这种资金的流动中受益吗？” 表 1概况了近几年 FDI在全球的分布规模。该表显示从 1994-1999年总 FDI流量增长了 238%。发达国家相应的增长了 338%，而发展中国家增长了 98%。简单的说，当发展中国家经济发生了较大的增长，发达国家的经济增长就要巨大的多。即使对外商投资的赞美很多，但跟全球的总量比，中国只是表现的很稳定。图表显示，拿越南作为参照，过去 10 年与一些新兴经济体比，土耳其在总体上看表现的并不好。 在考虑了人均 FDI 后，简单的综合模式在表 2 中体现。从表中可以明显看出，土耳其在过去的 10年里，其人均 FDI落后而其他发展中经济体是 快速增长的，表现为土耳其的曲线平缓。土耳其与越南的之间比较是非常明显的；自从美国取消了他对美国公司投资的股份后，越南在经济基础极低的情况下开始重新开发经济，即从 1975年越南战争的撤退后直接开始建立。 确实， 19 世纪 90 年代在与 80 年代的全球总增长表现比较中，其平坦表现更为显著。那段时间的数据显示即使基数小，但政权自由化的改变确实产生了积极的增长。因此， 10年来这种相当平均的表现仍然在最初几年有了 5倍的增长。可以说原先的表现不好的观点被否定了，只是这还不及预期。 在总和的水平上，选定的单位年或特定期间的 FDI/GDP 比例，有时可以很好地表示一个国家在吸引 FDI上做的有多少出色。一个国家能“得到份额”吗？数据资料或许存在不可靠的问题，但对于一个数量集，比率是相当合理的。基于联合国统计数据（ 2001）和表 1的数据，土耳其的比率为 0.4，台湾为 5.5，中国3.8，英国 5.7，美国 3.1。这些数据显示无论是与发达国家还是发展中国家比较，土耳其未能得到相应的市场份额。 到现在为止，制造业是非常重要的 FDI 进入土耳其的模式，其中占绝大部分的是汽车和运输零部件产业。因此，汽车产业可能是研究 FDI最理想的对象。但是我们观察到 FDI 对汽车产业并非如此，我们将在下一部分详细解释：为什么？ 以国家的人口和 GDP为尺标，我们已经证明土耳其的 FDI总额比预期的要差很多。一个针对该国商业环境中的关键因素开展的检验，将提出预期的表现可能要比以发现的要更好。 首先，是它有利的地理位置。土耳其坐落在地中海的东北角。照这样说来： 土耳其紧靠着欧盟，经过他最东边的邻国 -希腊（并与欧盟建立了海关联盟）； 与石油国家伊朗、伊拉克和被普遍看好且日益增长的中东市场有市场交涉； 土耳其通过直接的土地边界和黑海的港口与许多的经济互助经济体取得联系，他控制了 博斯 普鲁斯海峡 ，即黑海的入口。 三个积极因素应该确定，这三个都可能成为竞争优势： 1有竞争力的劳动价格，这自然是指与欧盟的价格对比，而不是与其他地区的发展中经济体（如之前用过的越南的标准）； 2良好的基础设施，起码在该国的西部 -同样也是个工业区拥有这优势； 3过去几十年以来的巨大的私有化体系。 我们以对土耳其的 FDI 来源的关注来结束该节。近年来主要的来源有：法国、美国、荷兰、瑞士、英国、意大利和日本，如见 Loewendahl和 Ertugal-Loewendahl（ 2000，表 1）。换句话说，当下发生的外来投资都是受制于 欧盟和美国 ， 而不是如它的石油储量丰富的阿拉伯邻国 。 外商投资土耳其汽车制造商的研究 土耳其在 FDI 股份中表现不佳的两个原因之一是在于汽车产业部分。汽车产业作为土耳其有潜力吸引 FDI的有利条件，存在着 FDI水平相对较低的问题。为了开展本项研究，我们对 10 家具有外商投资因素的土耳其汽车制造商开展了调查（即 FITAMs，外商投资的土耳其汽车制造商，见附录 1）， 10 家中的 5 家已经给予了回复并提供了足够的信息，包括通过后续的电话回访答的不是很清楚的问题。问题的 设置为结合封闭式和开放式的问题。 FDI在汽车产业中的壁垒的假设 被认为阻碍了汽车产业发展而因此成为后续的 FDI 进入该产业的主要因素包括以下几点： 政局不稳定，包括腐败； 经常性的经济危机，伴随高通胀，高利率和经济停