毕业论文外文翻译审计办事处规模,审计质量与审计定价(适用于毕业_第1页
毕业论文外文翻译审计办事处规模,审计质量与审计定价(适用于毕业_第2页
毕业论文外文翻译审计办事处规模,审计质量与审计定价(适用于毕业_第3页
毕业论文外文翻译审计办事处规模,审计质量与审计定价(适用于毕业_第4页
毕业论文外文翻译审计办事处规模,审计质量与审计定价(适用于毕业_第5页
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AUDITOFFICESIZE,AUDITQUALITY,ANDAUDITPRICINGJONGHAGCHOI,CHANSOGFRANCISKIM,JEONGBONKIM,ANDYOONSEOKZANGSUMMARYUSINGALARGESAMPLEOFUSAUDITCLIENTFIRMSOVERTHEPERIOD20002005,THISPAPERINVESTIGATESWHETHERANDHOWTHESIZEOFALOCALPRACTICEOFFICEWITHINANAUDITFIRMHEREAFTER,OFFICESIZEISASIGNIFICANT,ENGAGEMENTSPECIFICFACTORDETERMININGAUDITQUALITYANDAUDITFEESOVERANDBEYONDAUDITFIRMSIZEATTHENATIONALLEVELANDAUDITORINDUSTRYLEADERSHIPATTHECITYOROFFICELEVELFOROUREMPIRICALTESTS,AUDITQUALITYISMEASUREDBYUNSIGNEDABNORMALACCRUALS,ANDTHEOFFICESIZEISMEASUREDINTWODIFFERENTWAYSONEBASEDONTHENUMBEROFAUDITCLIENTSINEACHOFFICEANDTHEOTHERBASEDONATOTALOFAUDITFEESEARNEDBYEACHOFFICEOURRESULTSSHOWTHATTHEOFFICESIZEHASSIGNIFICANTLYPOSITIVERELATIONSWITHBOTHAUDITQUALITYANDAUDITFEES,EVENAFTERCONTROLLINGFORNATIONALLEVELAUDITFIRMSIZEANDOFFICELEVELINDUSTRYEXPERTISETHESEPOSITIVERELATIONSSUPPORTTHEVIEWTHATLARGELOCALOFFICESPROVIDEHIGHERQUALITYAUDITSCOMPAREDWITHSMALLLOCALOFFICES,ANDTHATSUCHQUALITYDIFFERENCESAREPRICEDINTHEMARKETFORAUDITSERVICESKEYWORDSAUDITOFFICEOFFICESIZEAUDITQUALITYAUDITPRICINGDATAAVAILABILITYDATAAREPUBLICLYAVAILABLEFROMSOURCESIDENTIFIEDINTHEPAPERTHEWAYWETHINKABOUTANACCOUNTINGFIRMCHANGESDRAMATICALLYWHENWESHIFTTHEUNITOFANALYSISAWAYFROMTHEFIRMASAWHOLE,TOTHEANALYSISOFSPECIFICCITYBASEDOFFICESWITHINAFIRMINTERMSOFDEANGELOS1981BARGUMENT,ABIG4ACCOUNTINGFIRMISNOTSOBIGWHENWESHIFTTOTHEOFFICELEVELOFANALYSISFOREXAMPLE,WHILEENRONREPRESENTEDLESSTHAN2PERCENTOFARTHURANDERSENSNATIONALREVENUESFROMPUBLICLYLISTEDCLIENTS,ITWASMORETHAN35PERCENTOFSUCHREVENUESINTHEHOUSTONOFFICEINTRODUCTIONASALLUDEDTOINTHEABOVEQUOTE,THESIZEOFACITYBASEDAUDITENGAGEMENTOFFICECOULDBEAMORECRUCIALDETERMINANTOFAUDITQUALITYANDTHUSAUDITFEESTHANTHESIZEOFANATIONALLEVELAUDITFIRMBECAUSETHECITYBASEDOFFICEISASEMIAUTONOMOUSUNITWITHINANAUDITFIRMWITHITSOWNCLIENTBASEITISANOFFICEBASEDENGAGEMENTPARTNERORAUDITTEAM,NOTNATIONALHEADQUARTERS,WHOACTUALLYADMINISTERSANDIMPLEMENTSINDIVIDUALAUDITENGAGEMENTCONTRACTS,INCLUDINGTHEDELIVERYOFAUDITSERVICESANDTHEISSUANCEOFANAUDITOPINIONINTHISREGARD,WALLMAN1996ANDFRANCIS2004ARGUETHATTHEASSESSMENTOFAUDITORINDEPENDENCENEEDSTOFOCUSMOREONTHEINDIVIDUALOFFICELEVELRATHERTHANTHEENTIREFIRMLEVELBECAUSEMOSTOFTHEAUDITDECISIONSWITHRESPECTTOAPARTICULARCLIENTAREMADEWITHINEACHINDIVIDUALOFFICETHEANECDOTALEVIDENCEONTHECOLLAPSEOFENRON,WHICHWASAUDITEDBYTHEHOUSTONOFFICEOFARTHURANDERSEN,ISAGOODEXAMPLETHATDEMONSTRATESTHEIMPORTANCEOFOFFICELEVELAUDITQUALITYHOWEVER,MUCHOFEXTANTAUDITRESEARCHHASFOCUSEDITSATTENTIONONTWONATIONALLEVELAUDITFIRMCHARACTERISTICSASFUNDAMENTALDETERMINANTSOFAUDITQUALITY,NAMELYAUDITFIRMSIZEEG,SIMUNICANDSTEIN1987BECKERETAL1998FRANCISANDKRISHNAN1999KIMETAL2003CHOIANDDOOGAR2005,ANDAUDITORINDUSTRYLEADERSHIPEG,DEFONDETAL2000BALSAMETAL2003KRISHNAN2005THESESTUDIESFIND,INGENERAL,THATLARGEAUDITFIRMSWITHINTERNATIONALBRANDNAMESIE,BIG4AUDITORSORINDUSTRYEXPERTISEPROVIDEHIGHERQUALITYAUDITSERVICESTHANSMALLAUDITFIRMSWHICHLACKSUCHBRANDNAMESORINDUSTRYEXPERTISEIMPLICITINTHISLINEOFRESEARCHISTHEASSUMPTIONTHATAUDITQUALITYISHOMOGENEOUSACROSSOFFICESOFVARIOUSSIZESLOCATEDINDIFFERENTCITIESWITHINTHESAMEAUDITFIRMASARESULT,WEHAVELITTLEEVIDENCEONCROSSOFFICEDIFFERENCESINAUDITQUALITY,ANDINPARTICULAR,WHETHERANDHOWTHESIZEOFALOCALENGAGEMENTOFFICEHASANIMPACTONAUDITQUALITYAND/ORAUDITPRICINGANATURALQUESTIONTOASKISISTHEOFFICESIZEANADDITIONALENGAGEMENTSPECIFICFACTORDETERMININGAUDITQUALITYANDTHUSAUDITPRICINGOVERANDBEYONDAUDITFIRMSIZEANDINDUSTRYLEADERSHIPWEAIMTOPROVIDEDIRECTEVIDENCEONTHISUNEXPLOREDQUESTIONSEVERALRECENTSTUDIESPROVIDEINDIRECTEVIDENCESUGGESTINGTHATAUDITQUALITYMAYDIFFERACROSSDIFFERENTENGAGEMENTOFFICESWITHINANAUDITFIRMFOREXAMPLE,INTHEFIRSTUSSTUDYTHATUSESEACHENGAGEMENTOFFICEASTHEUNITOFANALYSIS,REYNOLDSANDFRANCIS2000,375FINDTHATWHENCLIENTSIZEISMEASUREDATTHEOFFICELEVELUSINGOFFICESPECIFICCLIENTELES,“BIG5AUDITORSREPORTMORECONSERVATIVELYFORLARGERCLIENTS”FURTHER,FERGUSONETAL2003ANDFRANCISETAL2005FINDTHATCITYSPECIFIC,OFFICELEVELINDUSTRYLEADERSHIP,WHENCOMBINEDWITHTHENATIONALLEVELLEADERSHIP,GENERATESTHEHIGHESTAUDITFEEPREMIUMSANDTHUS,BYINFERENCE,HIGHERAUDITQUALITYINTHEAUSTRALIANANDUSAUDITMARKETS,RESPECTIVELY,WHILENATIONALLEVELINDUSTRYLEADERSHIPALONEHASNOEFFECTSUBSEQUENTLY,FRANCISETAL2006DOCUMENTTHATCLIENTEARNINGSQUALITYPROXIEDBYABNORMALACCRUALSISHIGHERWHENAUDITORSARECITYLEVELINDUSTRYLEADERSALONE,ORTHEYAREBOTHCITYLEVELANDNATIONALLEVELINDUSTRYLEADERSPUTDIFFERENTLY,THEIRRESULTSINDICATETHATNATIONALLEVELINDUSTRYLEADERSHIPALONEHASNOSIGNIFICANTIMPACTONAUDITQUALITYMORERECENTLY,CHOIETAL2007SHOWTHATTHEGEOGRAPHICALPROXIMITYOFTHECITYBASEDENGAGEMENTOFFICETOCLIENTSHEADQUARTERSISPOSITIVELYASSOCIATEDWITHTHEACCRUALQUALITYOFCLIENTS,SUGGESTINGTHATTHEGEOGRAPHICALLOCATIONOFTHEAUDITORSOFFICEISANIMPORTANTENGAGEMENTSPECIFICDETERMINANTOFAUDITQUALITYTHEABOVEFINDINGS,TAKENTOGETHER,SUGGESTTHATCITYBASED,OFFICELEVELCHARACTERISTICSMAYPLAYANIMPORTANTROLEINDETERMININGAUDITQUALITYANDTHUSAUDITPRICINGITSHOULDBEPOINTEDOUT,HOWEVER,THATNONEOFTHESESTUDIESHASPAIDATTENTIONTOTHEQUESTIONOFWHETHERTHESIZEOFALOCALENGAGEMENTOFFICEISSYSTEMATICALLYASSOCIATEDWITHAUDITQUALITYANDFEESPAIDTOAUDITORSTOBRIDGETHISGAPINOURKNOWLEDGE,WEINVESTIGATEAHITHERTOUNDERRESEARCHEDQUESTIONOFWHETHER,ANDHOW,THESIZEOFALOCALENGAGEMENTOFFICEHEREAFTER,OFFICESIZEISASSOCIATEDWITHAUDITQUALITYANDAUDITPRICINGWEFIRSTHYPOTHESIZETHATOFFICESIZEISSYSTEMATICALLYASSOCIATEDWITHAUDITQUALITYEVENAFTERCONTROLLINGFORAUDITFIRMSIZEATTHENATIONALLEVELANDAUDITORINDUSTRYEXPERTISEATTHEOFFICELEVELASWILLBEFURTHERELABORATEDINTHENEXTSECTION,ONEWOULDOBSERVEAPOSITIVEASSOCIATIONIFTHEAUDITSBYLARGEOFFICESAREOFHIGHERQUALITYTHANTHEAUDITSBYSMALLOFFICESSECOND,WEALSOEXAMINETHEASSOCIATIONBETWEENTHEOFFICESIZEANDAUDITFEESPREVIOUSRESEARCHSHOWSTHATAUDITQUALITYISPRICEDINTHEMARKETCHOIETAL2008CRASWELLETAL1995FERGUSONETAL2003FRANCISETAL2005TOTHEEXTENTTHATTHEOFFICESIZEISPOSITIVELYASSOCIATEDWITHAUDITQUALITY,ONECANPREDICTTHATTHELARGERISTHEOFFICESIZE,THEHIGHERISTHEAUDITQUALITY,ANDTHUSTHEGREATERISTHEAUDITFEETHEREFORE,APOSITIVEASSOCIATIONBETWEENTHEOFFICESIZEANDAUDITFEESCOULDBEVIEWEDASEVIDENCECORROBORATINGTHEPOSITIVEASSOCIATIONBETWEENTHEOFFICESIZEANDAUDITQUALITYINTESTINGOURHYPOTHESES,WEASSERTTHATBIASEDEARNINGSREPORTINGCANBEUSEDTODRAWINFERENCESABOUTAUDITQUALITY,ANDWEUSETHEMAGNITUDEOFABNORMALACCRUALSASAPROXYFORAUDITQUALITYTOMEASUREABNORMALACCRUALS,WERELYONTWOALTERNATIVEMODELSDEVELOPEDBYBALLANDSHIVAKUMAR2006ANDKOTHARIETAL2005INADDITION,WEESTIMATETHESIZEOFALOCALENGAGEMENTOFFICEUSINGTHEAUDITANALYTICSDATABASE,WHICHPROVIDESTHEIDENTITYOFAUDITENGAGEMENTOFFICESFORALLSECREGISTRANTCLIENTSWEMEASUREOFFICESIZEINTWODIFFERENTWAYSONEBASEDONTHENUMBEROFAUDITCLIENTSINEACHOFFICE,ANDTHEOTHERBASEDONATOTALOFAUDITFEESEARNEDBYEACHOFFICEBRIEFLY,OURRESULTSREVEALTHATINTHEUSAUDITMARKET,BOTHAUDITQUALITYANDAUDITFEESAREPOSITIVELYASSOCIATEDWITHOFFICESIZEAFTERCONTROLLINGFORAUDITFIRMSIZEATTHENATIONALLEVELPROXIEDBYABIG4DUMMYVARIABLE,INDUSTRYLEADERSHIPATTHELOCALOFFICELEVELPROXIEDBYANINDUSTRYSPECIALISTDUMMYVARIABLE,ANDOTHERRELEVANTFACTORSTHESERESULTSAREROBUSTTOABATTERYOFSENSITIVITYCHECKSWEPERFORMOURSTUDYCONTRIBUTESTOTHEEXISTINGLITERATUREINSEVERALWAYSFIRST,OURPAPERISONEOFFEWSTUDIESWHICHDOCUMENTTHATAUDITQUALITYISNOTHOMOGENEOUSACROSSLOCALOFFICESWITHINANAUDITFIRMTOOURKNOWLEDGE,OURPAPERISONEOFTHEFIRSTSTUDIESTHATPROVIDEDIRECTEVIDENCETHATTHESIZEOFANAUDITENGAGEMENTOFFICEISANIMPORTANTENGAGEMENTSPECIFICDETERMINANTOFAUDITQUALITYINTHEUSTHERESULTSOFOURSTUDYSUGGESTTHATFUTURERESEARCHONAUDITQUALITYDIFFERENTIATIONNEEDSTOPAYMOREATTENTIONTOOFFICELEVELAUDITORBEHAVIORASTHEUNITOFANALYSISANDTOTHESIZEOFALOCALENGAGEMENTOFFICESECOND,THISPAPERISTHEFIRSTTOCONSIDEROFFICESIZEASACRITICALFACTORINAUDITPRICINGGIVENTHATNOPREVIOUSRESEARCHHASEXAMINEDWHETHERAUDITFEESAREINFLUENCEDBYTHESIZEOFALOCALOFFICE,OUREVIDENCEHELPSUSBETTERUNDERSTANDTHENATUREOFAUDITORCLIENTRELATIONSHIPSINTHECONTEXTOFAUDITPRICINGFINALLY,THEFINDINGSINTHISSTUDYPROVIDEBOTHREGULATORSANDPRACTITIONERSWITHUSEFULINSIGHTSINTOWHATDETERMINESAUDITQUALITYANDTHUSAUDITFEESOURRESULTSSUGGESTTHATREGULATORSWOULDHAVEABETTERASSESSMENTOFAUDITQUALITYIFTHEYSHIFTTHELEVELOFQUALITYCOMPARISONTOSMALLVERSUSLARGEAUDITORSATTHEOFFICELEVEL,ANDAWAYFROMBIG4VERSUSNONBIG4AUDITORSATTHENATIONALLEVELECONOMICTHEORYONQUALITYPREMIUMSCLAIMSTHATPRODUCINGGOODSANDSERVICESOFAUNIFORMQUALITYFORVARIOUSMARKETSANDCONSUMERSOVERTIMEISCRUCIALFORMAINTAININGQUALITYPREMIUMSEG,KLEINANDLEFFLER1981KREPSANDWILSON1982SHAPIRO1983SIMILARLY,OUREVIDENCESUGGESTSTHATLARGE,BIG4AUDITORSSHOULDTAKECARETOMAINTAINASIMILARLEVELOFAUDITQUALITYACROSSOFFICESOFDIFFERENTSIZESBECAUSEASYSTEMATICALLYPOORQUALITYAUDITSERVICEPERFORMEDBYALOCALOFFICECOULDPOTENTIALLYCAUSEDAMAGETOTHEREPUTATIONFORTHEENTIREAUDITFIRMHYPOTHESISDEVELOPMENTOFFICESIZEANDAUDITQUALITYAGROWINGBODYOFAUDITRESEARCHEMPHASIZESTHEIMPORTANCEOFANALYZINGTHEBEHAVIOROFAUDITORSINCITYBASED,LOCALENGAGEMENTOFFICESHOWEVER,NONEOFTHESESTUDIESHASPAIDATTENTIONTOTHESIZEOFALOCALOFFICEINTHECONTEXTOFAUDITQUALITYWHYDOESTHEOFFICESIZEMATTERINAUDITQUALITYOVERANDBEYONDTWOWELLKNOWNAUDITFIRMCHARACTERISTICS,IE,AUDITFIRMSIZEORBRANDNAMEBIG4VERSUSNONBIG4ANDINDUSTRYEXPERTISEINDEANGELOS1981BFRAMEWORK,ANAUDITORSINCENTIVETOCOMPROMISEAUDITQUALITYWITHRESPECTTOAPARTICULARCLIENTDEPENDSONTHEECONOMICIMPORTANCEOFTHECLIENTRELATIVETOTHEAUDITORSCLIENTPORTFOLIOHERANALYSISINDICATESTHATLARGEAUDITORSARELIKELYTOPROVIDEHIGHERQUALITYAUDITSERVICESTOAPARTICULARCLIENTTHANSMALLAUDITORSBECAUSEANAUDITORSECONOMICDEPENDENCEONTHATCLIENTISNEGLIGIBLEFORLARGEAUDITORS,ANDLARGEAUDITORSHAVEMORETOLOSEIE,BEARHIGHERREPUTATIONLOSSINCASEOFAUDITFAILURES,COMPAREDWITHSMALLAUDITORSDEANGELOS1981BTHEORYCANALSOBEAPPLIEDTOTHEANALYSISOFAUDITQUALITYDIFFERENTIATIONBETWEENLARGEVERSUSSMALLOFFICES,BECAUSEALOCALENGAGEMENTOFFICECANBEVIEWEDASASEMIAUTONOMOUSUNITINTERMSOFITSAUDITDECISIONS,CLIENTBASE,REVENUESOURCES,ANDOTHERFACTORSFRANCIS2004FRANCISETAL2006WALLMAN1996LARGELOCALOFFICESARELESSLIKELYTODEPENDONAPARTICULARCLIENTTHANSMALLLOCALOFFICESBECAUSETHEFORMERHAVEDEEPEROFFICELEVELCLIENTELESANDTHUSARELESSECONOMICALLYDEPENDENTONAPARTICULARCLIENTINOTHERWORDS,LARGEOFFICESARELESSLIKELYTOACQUIESCETOCLIENTPRESSUREFORSUBSTANDARDREPORTINGTHANSMALLOFFICESFURTHER,LOCALOFFICES,WHETHERSMALLORLARGE,MAYNOTBEARTHEFULLAMOUNTOFREPUTATIONLOSSESASSOCIATEDWITHANAUDITFAILUREBECAUSEASUBSTANTIALPORTIONOFTHEREPUTATIONLOSSESARELIKELYBORNEBYTHENATIONALLEVELAUDITFIRMITSELFWHILETHEREPUTATIONLOSSESINTHEEVENTOFAUDITFAILURESARELIKELYTOBEGREATERFORLARGEAUDITFIRMSDEANGELO1981B,THELOSSESARENOTNECESSARILYGREATERFORLARGELOCALOFFICESTHANFORSMALLLOCALOFFICES,BECAUSETHESECOSTSAREMOREFIRMWIDEINNATURERATHERTHANOFFICESPECIFICTHISMEANSTHATLOCALOFFICESMAYBEMORECONCERNEDWITHTHEECONOMICIMPORTANCEOFAPARTICULARCLIENTTHANAPOTENTIALLITIGATIONRISKFROMAUDITFAILURES,INPARTICULAR,WHENTHEOFFICESARESMALLINSIZETHEABOVEARGUMENTSLEADUSTOPREDICTTHATLARGELOCALOFFICESWITHRELATIVELYDEEPLOCALCLIENTELESARELESSLIKELYTOCOMPROMISEAUDITQUALITYWITHRESPECTTOAPARTICULARCLIENT,ANDTHUSTHATTHEYARELIKELYTOPROVIDEHIGHERQUALITYAUDITSERVICES,CETERISPARIBUS,COMPAREDWITHSMALLLOCALOFFICESWITHRELATIVELYTHINLOCALCLIENTELESINSUCHACASE,ONEWOULDOBSERVEAPOSITIVEASSOCIATIONBETWEENOFFICESIZEANDAUDITQUALITYWECALLTHISPREDICTIONTHEECONOMICDEPENDENCEPERSPECTIVESUMMARYANDCONCLUDINGREMARKSWHILEPREVIOUSAUDITINGRESEARCHHASEXAMINEDWHETHERANDHOWAUDITFEESANDAUDITQUALITYAREINFLUENCEDBYAUDITFIRMSIZEATTHENATIONALLEVELANDAUDITORINDUSTRYLEADERSHIPATBOTHTHENATIONALLEVELANDTHECITYLEVEL,THISLINEOFRESEARCHHASPAIDLITTLEATTENTIONTOTHEEFFECTOFTHESIZEOFALOCALENGAGEMENTOFFICEWITHINANAUDITFIRMIE,OFFICESIZEINTHECONTEXTOFAUDITQUALITYANDAUDITPRICINGUNLIKEPREVIOUSRESEARCH,THEFOCUSOFTHISPAPERISONWHETHERTHEOFFICESIZEISANADDITIONAL,ENGAGEMENTSPECIFICFACTORDETERMININGAUDITQUALITYANDAUDITPRICINGOVERANDBEYONDNATIONALLEVELAUDITFIRMSIZEANDOFFICELEVELINDUSTRYLEADERSHIPOURRESULTSCANBESUMMARIZEDASFOLLOWSFIRST,WEFINDTHATTHEOFFICESIZEISPOSITIVELYASSOCIATEDWITHAUDITQUALITYPROXIEDBYUNSIGNEDABNORMALACCRUALSOURFINDINGISCONSISTENTWITHWHATWECALLTHEECONOMICDEPENDENCEPERSPECTIVELARGESMALLLOCALOFFICESWITHDEEPOFFICELEVELCLIENTELESARELESSMORELIKELYTODEPENDONAPARTICULARCLIENT,ANDTHUSAREBETTERLESSABLETORESISTCLIENTPRESSUREONSUBSTANDARDORBIASEDREPORTINGSECOND,WEFINDTHATLARGELOCALOFFICESAREABLETOCHARGEHIGHERAUDITFEESTOTHEIRCLIENTSTHANSMALLONES,WHICHISCONSISTENTWITHTHEVIEWTHATLARGEOFFICESPROVIDEHIGHERQUALITYAUDITSTHANSMALLOFFICES,ANDTHISQUALITYDIFFERENTIALISPRICEDASAFEEPREMIUMINTHEMARKETFORAUDITSERVICESHOWEVER,THEABOVEFINDINGISATODDSWITHTHEVIEWTHATLARGEOFFICESHAVEACOSTADVANTAGEINPRODUCINGAUDITSERVICESOFSIMILARQUALITYANDTHUSAREABLETOCHARGELOWERBILLINGRATESCOMPAREDWITHSMALLOFFICESTAKENTOGETHER,OURRESULTSHIGHLIGHTTHATOFFICESIZEISONEOFTHEMOSTIMPORTANTENGAGEMENTSPECIFICDETERMINANTSOFAUDITQUALITYANDAUDITPRICINGLAST,WHILEWEUSETWOALTERNATIVE,ADVANCEDACCRUALMODELSTOALLEVIATEACONCERNOVERTHELIMITATIONSINHERENTINTHEJONES1991MODELESTIMATESOFABNORMALACCRUALS,OURMEASURESOFAUDITQUALITY,NAMELYUNSIGNEDABNORMALACCRUALS,MAYSUFFERFROMNONTRIVIALMEASUREMENTERRORSWETHEREFORECANNOTCOMPLETELYRULEOUTTHEPOSSIBILITYTHATTHEESTIMATEDCOEFFICIENTSONOURTESTVARIABLESAREBIASEDHOWEVER,GIVENTHATACONTEMPORANEOUSSTUDYOFFRANCISANDYU2009DOCUMENTSTHESAMEPOSITIVEASSOCIATIONBETWEENAUDITQUALITYANDAUDITOFFICESIZEUSINGTWOADDITIONALPROXIESFORAUDITQUALITY,IE,AUDITORSTENDENCYTOISSUEGOINGCONCERNOPINIONANDCLIENTFIRMSLIKELIHOODTOMEETEARNINGSBENCHMARKS,WEBELIEVETHATOURRESULTSAREUNLIKELYDRIVENBYPOSSIBLEMEASUREMENTERRORSOVERALL,OURRESULTSSUGGESTTHATBOTHREGULATORSANDAUDITFIRMSSHOULDPAYMOREATTENTIONTOTHEBEHAVIOROFSMALLOFFICESBECAUSETHEYAREMORELIKELYTOBEECONOMICALLYDEPENDENTONAPARTICULARCLIENT,ANDTHUSTOCOMPROMISEAUDITQUALITYINPARTICULAR,BIG4AUDITFIRMSMAYNEEDTOIMPLEMENTSTRATEGIESFORPROVIDINGAMOREHOMOGENOUSLEVELOFAUDITSERVICESACROSSOFFICESOFDIFFERENTSIZESBECAUSEAPOORQUALITYAUDITBYASMALLOFFICECOULDSIGNIFICANTLYDAMAGETHEREPUTATIONOFTHEENTIREFIRMINTODAYSGLOBALBUSINESSENVIRONMENT,THEISSUEOFMAINTAINING“UNIFORMQUALITY”SHOULDBEANEVENMOREIMPORTANTCONCERNTOREPUTABLEAUDITORSBECAUSETHEIRBUSINESSBECOMESINCREASINGLYINTERNATIONALIZEDINTERMSOFLOCATIONSANDCLIENTPROFILESFOREXAMPLE,ITMAYBEMOREDIFFICULTFORBIG4AUDITFIRMSTOMAINTAINUNIFORMQUALITYOFSERVICEATTHEOFFICELEVELACROSSDIFFERENTJURISDICTIONSAROUNDTHEWORLDFURTHER,LOCALOFFICESINDIFFERENTJURISDICTIONSEG,EUROPEANUNIONANDCHINAHAVETHEIROWNCLIENTBASESANDARELIKELYTOBEMOREAUTONOMOUSINMAKINGAUDITRELATEDDECISIONSTHANTHOSEWITHINTHEUSITISTHEREFOREPOSSIBLETHATTHESIZEOFALOCALPRACTICINGOFFICEPLAYSAMORESIGNIFICANTROLEINDETERMININGTHEQUALITYOFAUDITSERVICESINOTHERNONUSJURISDICTIONSTHANINTHEUSGIVENTHESCARCITYOFINTERNATIONALEVIDENCEREGARDINGTHEEFFECTOFAUDITOFFICESIZEONAUDITQUALITYANDAUDITPRICING,WERECOMMENDFURTHERRESEARCHONTHEISSUEUSINGINTERNATIONALSAMPLESFROMDIFFERENTJURISDICTIONS审计办事处规模,审计质量与审计定价JONGHAGCHOI,CHANSOGFRANCISKIM,JEONGBONKIM,ANDYOONSEOKZANG摘要此论文使用20002005年间对美国审计事务所大量取样的所得数据,以此调查审计事务所中当地办事处规模大小对审计质量和审计价格。实证检验中,审计质量是由异常应计来衡量的,办事处规模则有两种衡量方法一个是基于每个办事处的审计客户数量,另一个是基于每个办事处挣得的审计费用总额。调查结果显示,办事处规模大小对审计质量与审计费用都有着明显的正相关关系,即使控制了国家级审计公司的规模以及办公水平行业,结果也是如此。这正相关关系印证了规模大的本土办事处相对规模小的办事处来说,能过提供更高质量的审计。质量上的差异在审计市场中有价码的差别。关键字审计事务所,办事处规模,审计质量,审计定价数据可用性数据皆为公开可用,论文中有指明数据来源。当我们把对事务所整体的分析转变为对特定的城市中的办事处的分析时,我们对审计事务所的看法同时也有了剧烈的变化。根据迪安哥罗在1981年的论证,当分析办事处规模时,四大会计师事务时也就没有那么大了。举例来说,如果安然公司代表安达信会计事务所上市客户小于2的收入,那他代表的就是休斯敦办事处大于35的利润。简介正如前文所说,相对于国家级办事处来说,市级审计办事处的规模对审计质量有着更为重要的决定作用。因为市级办事处是半自治的单位,在审计公司中有他专属的客户群。真正管理和执行审计委托合同(包括审计服务的交付和审核意见的发表)的并不是全国总部,而是办事处合作伙伴。就这点而言,威廉与弗兰西斯提出观点,审计独立性的评估需要更多地关注办事处的程度而不是整体公司的程度。因为特定客户的大多数的审计决定都是由单独的办事处制定的。由安达信会计师事务所休斯敦办事处所审计的安然集团的倒闭便是一个很好的例子,证明办事处级别的审计质量的重要性之高。然而,现在许多审计研究都把焦点集中于国家级审计公司的特点,认为两个审计质量基本的决定性因素是审计公司规模和审计行业领导。研究发现,一般而言,拥有国际知名商标的大审计公司(比如四大)或是有行业专长的公司比非有名及缺乏行业专长的小公司拥有更高质量的审计服务。这个研究隐含的假设是同一公司在不同城市的不同规模的办事处的审计质量是平均的。因此,我们几乎没有收集到不同办事处的审计质量的差别,特别是本土办事处的规模是否影响到审计质量或是审计定价。所以有一个问题办事处规模是不是决定审计质量的另一个因素因此审计定价比审计公司规模和行业领先地位的高。我们只在为这个还没解决的问题提供直接的证据。最近有几项研究都提供直接证据证明同一公司的不同办事处的审计质量有所不同。例如,最初美国的雷诺和弗朗西斯使用单独的办事处作为研究的单位,他们发现当用具体办事处的客户来衡量客户规模时,“五大审计师对大客户更为谨慎。”此外,弗格森和弗朗西斯等发现,在澳大利亚和美国审计市场中,当市级行业领先水平与国家级领先水平联合时,审计收费是最高的。而单独国家级行业领先水平则没有这样的效果。随后,弗朗西斯等证实如果审计师是市级行业领导者或同时为国家级与市级领导水平时,非正常应计所代理的客户收益相对较高。换句话说,研究结果表明单独的国家级领先水平对审计质量没有特别显著的影响。最近,崔等人指出办事处与总部的地理集中程度和客户的应计质量成正相关,说明审计办事处的地理位置对审计质量是有决定性影响的。整合以上的发现,说明本地办事处规模对审计质量以及审计定价的决定起很重要的作用。这里需要指出的是,尽管如此,却没有研究者关注过本地办事处的规模是否与审计质量以及审计收费有系统性联系这个问题。为了填补这一知识空缺,我们决定调查这个迄今还未被研究过的问题,即办事处规模是否与审计质量和定价有关系以及如何联系。首先我们假设办事处规模与审计质量有系统性关联,即使控制了国家标准的审计公司规模和行业专长这两个变量。如果大公司的审计质量比小公司高,则说明是正相关关联,这我们在下文会做进一步阐述。接着,我们还检验了办事处规模与审计定价之间的关系。之前有研究指出审计质量在市场上被标价。办事处规模与审计质量正相关,以此来看,我们可以推测,办事处规模越大,审计质量越高,因此审计费用也会越多。所以,我们可以由办事处规模和审计定价的正相关关系推出办事处规模和审计质量的正相关关系。为了检验之前的假设,我们用有偏向性的收益报告来作关于审计质量的推论,另外我们用非正常应计的级数来代表审计质量。衡量非正常应计时,我们使用由保尔和库玛和科萨里等人开发的两个备择模型。此外,我们用审计分析数据库来估量本地办事处的规模,此数据库为美国证券交易委员会注册的客户提供审计办事处的身份认证。衡量办事处规模大小的方法有多种,一种是基于每个办事处的审计客户数量,另一种是基于每个办事处所挣得的审计费用。简单来说,研究结果指出在美国的审计市场,(控制审计公司规模为国家标准,行业领先水准为国家标准以及其他相关因素)审计质量和审计费用都与办事处规模呈正相关。这样的结果与我们所做的一连串灵敏度测试一致。我们的研究完善了现存的文献,体现在几方面。第一,该论文论证了同一审计公司的不同办事处的审计质量并不是相同的。就我们所知,在美国,我们的论文是最先有直接证据证明审计办事处的规模是决定审计质量的重要因素。研究结果指出,今后有关审计质量差异的研究应多关注办事处审计师行为以及本地办事处的规模。其次,本文最先提出办事处规模是影响审计定价的关键因素。先前从未有研究验证审计费用是否被本地办事处规模所影响,我们的证据可以让人们更好地了解在审计定价下审计师与客户的关系。最后,该研究结果为调查者和从业者提供了实用的关于审计质量和审计定价的见解。我们的研究结果建议调查者如果把质量等级比较改为大小公司审计员之分的比较,则该有一个更好的对于审计质量的评估。质量溢价的经济理论要求为不同的市场提供统一质量的产品和服务,消费者始终是维持质量溢价的关键。同样的,我们的证据显示,四大会计师行应该在不同规模的办事处维持相近水准的审计质量,因为一个当地办事处所犯的系统性低质量的服务错误能导致整个审计公司的名誉损失。假说发展越来越多的审计调查强调在本地公司或当地办事处工

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