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天津大学模板课件目录1.Introduction2.LiteratureReview3.Model3.1RepairProcessandInventoryPolicy3.2CostStructure3.3InformationStructure3.4ContractTypesandPayoffs3.5SignalingGame4.Benchmark:First-BestUnderCompleteInformation5.SignalingwithVerifiableInventory5.1Resource-BasedContract5.2Performance-BasedContract6.SignalingwithUnverifiableInventory6.1Resource-BasedContract6.2Performance-BasedContract7.Extensions:EfficiencyEnhancementStrategies7.1EndogenizingInventoryVerifiability7.2PoolingInventoryAcrossMultipleBuyers8.Conclusions目录1.Introduction1.Introduction供货商买方产品PBCRBC可靠性私有信息使用备用库存维护背景介绍1.Introduction供货商买方产品PBCRBC可靠文献回顾2.LiteratureReviewPBCforoutsourcedservicesasymmetricinformationinoperationsmanagementtheuseofwarrantiesasasignalingmechanism文献回顾2.LiteratureReviewPBCfo建模3.Model3.1RepairProcessandInventoryPolicyN:identicalcopies;B:inventorybackorder;s:inventory;TheexpectedbackordersinsteadystateisAvailabilityisequalto建模3.Model3.1RepairProcessa建模3.2CostStructureEachtimeaproductfailureoccurs,thebuyerincursafixedcostr≥0.Thebuyer’sexpectedcostisequaltoThevendor’sexpectedcostisequalto建模3.2CostStructure建模3.3InformationStructureWeassumethattheproductofferedbythevendorisoneoftwopossibletypes,LorH,whereLdenoteslowreliabilityandHdenoteshighreliability.Hazardrateordering(危险率序):Excesswealthordering(剩余财富序):建模3.3InformationStructure建模3.4ContractTypesandPayoffsWecanwritethebuyer’sexpectedpayoffasThevendor’sexpectedpayoffisgivenbyRBC:PBC:建模3.4ContractTypesandPayof建模3.5SignalingGameWeassumethatthevendor,whopossessesprivateinformationaboutthereliabilityofanewlydevelopedproduct,choosescontracttermsandproposesthemtothebuyer.Thebuyerthenacceptsthecontracttermsifhisexpectedpayoffexceedsanoutsideoptionvaluedatθ.WeseekaperfectBayesianequilibrium(PBE)thatisalsorenegotiation-proof.建模3.5SignalingGame建模4.Benchmark:First-BestUnderCompleteInformationGiventhevendortypeτ,thefirst-bestoutcomeisobtainedbysolvingtheoptimizationproblem.建模4.Benchmark:First-BestUnd建模5.SignalingwithVerifiableInventoryWenowconsiderthesettinginwhichthevendorpossessesprivateinformationaboutproductreliability.5.1Resource-BasedContractThevalueofαsetbythevendorinhercontractmayrelayinformationaboutwhetherornottheproductisreliable.建模5.SignalingwithVerifiable建模5.1Resource-BasedContractInsummary,successfulsignalingbythereliablevendorispossibleunderRBCwhenherinventorychoiceisverifiable,butitcomesatacostsincethevendorhastoleavepositivesurplustothebuyer.建模5.1Resource-BasedContractI建模5.2Performance-BasedContractTherefore,successfulsignalingbythereliablevendorcanbedoneunderbothRBCandPBCwhentheinventoryisverifiable.However,PBCpresentsanadvantagebecauseitsrisksharingmechanismismoreamenabletosignalingthanthatofRBC.建模5.2Performance-BasedContra建模6.SignalingwithUnverifiableInventory6.1Resource-BasedContractWithinventorynolongerverifiable,thepayofffunctionsforthevendorandthebuyerunderRBCremainthesameasthoseoftheverifiableinventorycase.Anunderinvestmentininventorycauseseconomicinefficiency.建模6.SignalingwithUnverifiab建模6.2Performance-BasedContractThereliablevendoroverinvestsininventoryinequilibrium.Overall,wefindthattheinteractionbetweenthevendor’sdiscretionaryinventorychoiceandhersignalingincentivecreatessubtledynamicsthatimpacttherelativeefficiencyofafter-salesservicecontractsinnontrivialways.建模6.2Performance-BasedContra建模Whichcontracttypewillthereliablevendorprefer?Thus,thereliablevendorfindsthattheabilitytosignalhertypewithPBCmorethancompensatesforthecostassociatedwithoverinvestmentininventoryandanybenefitpresentedbyRBC,whichdoesnotimproveuponapoolingoutcome.建模Whichcontracttypewillthe扩展7.Extensions:EfficiencyEnhancementStrategiesEndogenizingInventoryVerifiabilityPoolingInventoryAcrossMultipleBuyers扩展7.Extensions:EfficiencyEn结论8.ConclusionsSuggestions:Thekeytobringefficiencytothesupplychainisinventorytransparency.Analternativewaytobringefficiencyistoutilizeinventorypooling,incasethevendormanagesinventoriesacrossmultiplebuyers.结论8.ConclusionsSuggestions:谢谢!谢谢!天津大学模板课件目录1.Introduction2.LiteratureReview3.Model3.1RepairProcessandInventoryPolicy3.2CostStructure3.3InformationStructure3.4ContractTypesandPayoffs3.5SignalingGame4.Benchmark:First-BestUnderCompleteInformation5.SignalingwithVerifiableInventory5.1Resource-BasedContract5.2Performance-BasedContract6.SignalingwithUnverifiableInventory6.1Resource-BasedContract6.2Performance-BasedContract7.Extensions:EfficiencyEnhancementStrategies7.1EndogenizingInventoryVerifiability7.2PoolingInventoryAcrossMultipleBuyers8.Conclusions目录1.Introduction1.Introduction供货商买方产品PBCRBC可靠性私有信息使用备用库存维护背景介绍1.Introduction供货商买方产品PBCRBC可靠文献回顾2.LiteratureReviewPBCforoutsourcedservicesasymmetricinformationinoperationsmanagementtheuseofwarrantiesasasignalingmechanism文献回顾2.LiteratureReviewPBCfo建模3.Model3.1RepairProcessandInventoryPolicyN:identicalcopies;B:inventorybackorder;s:inventory;TheexpectedbackordersinsteadystateisAvailabilityisequalto建模3.Model3.1RepairProcessa建模3.2CostStructureEachtimeaproductfailureoccurs,thebuyerincursafixedcostr≥0.Thebuyer’sexpectedcostisequaltoThevendor’sexpectedcostisequalto建模3.2CostStructure建模3.3InformationStructureWeassumethattheproductofferedbythevendorisoneoftwopossibletypes,LorH,whereLdenoteslowreliabilityandHdenoteshighreliability.Hazardrateordering(危险率序):Excesswealthordering(剩余财富序):建模3.3InformationStructure建模3.4ContractTypesandPayoffsWecanwritethebuyer’sexpectedpayoffasThevendor’sexpectedpayoffisgivenbyRBC:PBC:建模3.4ContractTypesandPayof建模3.5SignalingGameWeassumethatthevendor,whopossessesprivateinformationaboutthereliabilityofanewlydevelopedproduct,choosescontracttermsandproposesthemtothebuyer.Thebuyerthenacceptsthecontracttermsifhisexpectedpayoffexceedsanoutsideoptionvaluedatθ.WeseekaperfectBayesianequilibrium(PBE)thatisalsorenegotiation-proof.建模3.5SignalingGame建模4.Benchmark:First-BestUnderCompleteInformationGiventhevendortypeτ,thefirst-bestoutcomeisobtainedbysolvingtheoptimizationproblem.建模4.Benchmark:First-BestUnd建模5.SignalingwithVerifiableInventoryWenowconsiderthesettinginwhichthevendorpossessesprivateinformationaboutproductreliability.5.1Resource-BasedContractThevalueofαsetbythevendorinhercontractmayrelayinformationaboutwhetherornottheproductisreliable.建模5.SignalingwithVerifiable建模5.1Resource-BasedContractInsummary,successfulsignalingbythereliablevendorispossibleunderRBCwhenherinventorychoiceisverifiable,butitcomesatacostsincethevendorhastoleavepositivesurplustothebuyer.建模5.1Resource-BasedContractI建模5.2Performance-BasedContractTherefore,successfulsignalingbythereliablevendorcanbedoneunderbothRBCandPBCwhentheinventoryisverifiable.However,PBCpresentsanadvantagebecauseitsrisksharingmechanismismoreamenabletosignalingthanthatofRBC.建模5.2Performance-BasedContra建模6.SignalingwithUnverifiableInventory6.1Resource-BasedContractWithinventorynolongerverifiable,thepayofffunctionsforthevendorandthebuyerunderRBCremainthesameasthoseoftheverifiableinventorycase.Anunderinvestmentininventorycauseseconomicinefficiency.建模6.SignalingwithUnverifiab建模6.2Performance-BasedContractThereliablevendoroverinvestsininventoryinequilibrium.Overall,wefindthattheinteractionbetweenthevendor’sdiscretionaryinventorychoicea
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