哈佛分析框架-外文文献及翻译

经营分析与估值克雷沙·G.帕利普保罗·M.希利摘自书籍“BusinessAnalysisandValuation”第五版第一章节1.简介

本章的目的是勾勒出一个全面的财务报表分析框架。因为财务报表提供给公共企业经济活动最广泛使用的数据，投资者和其他利益相关者依靠财务报告评估计划企业和管理绩效率。各种各样的问题可以通过财务状况及经营分析解决，如下面的示例所示：一位证券分析师可能会对问：“我的公司有多好？这家公司是否符合我的期望？如果没有，为什么不呢？鉴于我对公司当前和未来业绩的评估，该公司的股票价值是多少？”一位信贷员可能需要问：“这家公司贷款给这家公司有什么贷款？公司管理其流动性如何？公司的经营风险是什么？公司的融资和股利政策所产生的附加风险是什么？“一位管理顾问可能会问：“公司经营的行业结构是什么？该策略通过在工业各个企业追求的是什么？不同企业在行业中的相对表现是什么？”公司经理可能会问：“我的公司是正确的估值的投资者吗？是我们在通信程序中有足够的投资者来促进这一过程？”财务报表分析是一项有价值的活动，当管理者在一个公司的战略和各种体制因素完成后，他们不可能完全披露这些信息。在这一设置中，外部分析师试图通过分析财务报表数据来创建“中端信息”，从而获得有价值的关于该公司目前业绩和未来前景的展望。了解财务报表分析所做的贡献，这是很重要的理解在资本市场的运作，财务报告的作用，形成财务报表制度的力量。因此，我们首先简要说明这些力量，然后我们讨论的步骤，分析师必须执行，以提取信息的财务报表，并提供有价值的预测。2.从经营活动到财务报表企业管理者负责从公司的环境中获取物理和财务资源，并利用它们为公司的投资者创造价值。当公司在资本成本的超额投资时，就创造了价值。管理者制定经营战略，实现这一目标，并通过业务活动实施。企业的经营活动受其经济环境和经营战略的影响。经济环境包括企业的产业、投入和产出的市场，以及公司经营的规章制度。公司的业务战略决定企业如何定位自己的环境中获得竞争优势。2.1会计制度特点1：权责发生制会计企业财务报告的基本特征之一是权责发生制，它们是以权责发生制而不是现金会计制备的。不像现金会计，权责发生制会计与经济交流活动和实际收付现金相关的成本和效益的记录之间的区别。净收益是应计制会计下的主要周期性业绩指标。计算净收入，生态影响的经济交易记录的基础上的预期，并不一定是实际的现金支付。预期的现金收入交付的产品或服务被确认为收入，和预期的现金流出与这些收入被确认为费用。会计的必要性来自于投资者对定期财务报告的需求。因为企业进行经济交易，在持续的基础上，在报告期导致了一个有趣的基本测量问题，结束时的会计帐簿任意闭合。因为现金会计报告的不完整性，在生态经济带来的后果所进行的交易。在一定时期内，权责发生制会计的目的是提供一个公司的周期性表现更完整的信息。2.2会计制度特点2：会计准则和审计采用权责发生制会计是在许多重要的复杂性企业财务报告的中心。由于权责发生制会计处理当前事件的预期未来现金的后果，它是主观的，依赖于各种假设条件。谁应该负责制定这些假设条件负主要责任？一个公司的管理者被赋予作出适当的估计和假设编制财务报表的任务，因为他们有亲密的了解他们公司的业务优势。经理授予的会计自由裁量权可能是有价值的，因为它反映了财务报表中的内部信息。然而，由于投资者认为利润作为衡量管理者的绩效，管理者有动机利用他们的会计自由裁量权歪曲报道利润的假设、偏见。另外，在公司内部和外部之间的合同中使用的会计数字提供了另一种管理操作的会计数字的动机。在来管理扭曲了财务会计资料，使他们对前内部财务报表的使用者不值钱。因此，财务报告的决定，企业管理者的代表团有成本和收益。许多会计惯例已经形成，以确保管理者使用他们的会计灵活性来概括他们对公司经营活动的知识，而不是为了自我服务的目的而伪装现实。例如，可测性和稳健性惯例和会计反应担心扭曲人学生可能偏向乐观。这两个公约都试图限制管理者对悲观偏见的乐观偏见。会计准则（公认会计原则），由财务会计标准委员会（FASB）发布和类似的标准设定在其他国家机构，也限制了潜在的扭曲，管理者可以将报告数字。统一会计准则的尝试，以降低管理者的能力，以不同的方式记录类似的经济交易，无论是随着时间的推移或跨公司。提高均匀性的会计准则，然而，是减少管理者反映他们公司的财务报表差异真正的业务灵活性。严格的会计准则对经济交易的最佳效果，其会计处理不依赖于管理者的专有信息。然而，当有重大的商业判断参与评估交易的经济后果，严格的标准，防止经理利用自己的业务知识上会不正常。此外，如果会计准则过于僵化，他们可能会促使管理者花费经济资源来调整业务交易，以达到预期的会计结果。审计，广义地定义为一个对上报的财务报表的人比其他人的完整性验证，确保管理人员利用会计规则和惯例一致，随着时间的推移，和他们的会计估计是合理的。因此，审计提高会计数据的质量。第三方审计也可能会降低财务报告的质量，因为它限制了会计规则和惯例的发展随着时间的推移。FASB认为审计意见在标准制定过程中，核数师很可能会反对会计准则的生产数据，这是很难进行审计的，即使拟议的规则为投资者提供相关信息。其中会计纠纷经理、审计师的法律环境，投资者也可以在裁决报告数据质量有显著的影响。诉讼的威胁和惩罚的有益效果，证明了信息披露的准确性。然而，一个重要的法律责任的潜力还有可能阻碍管理人员和审计人员从支持会计建议重新进行风险预测，如前瞻性信息披露。附：BusinessAnalysisandValuationKGPalepu，PMHealyFromtheliteratureofthefirstchapteroftheFifthEdition“BusinessAnalysisandValuation”1.IntroductionThepurposeofthischapteristooutlineacomprehensiveframeworkforfinancialstatementanalysis.Becausefinancialstatementsprovidethemostwidelyavailabledataonpubliccorporations’economicactivities,investorsandotherstake-holdersrelyonfinancialreportstoassesstheplansandperformanceoffirmsandcorpo-ratemanagers.Avarietyofquestionscanbeaddressedbybusinessanalysisusingfinancialstate-ments,asshowninthefollowingexamples:• Asecurityanalystmaybeinterestedinasking:“HowwellisthefirmIamfollow-ingperforming?Didthefirmmeetmyperformanceexpectations?Ifnot,whynot?Whatisthevalueofthefirm’sstockgivenmyassessmentofthefirm’scurrentandfutureperformance?”• Aloanofficermayneedtoask:“Whatisthecreditriskinvolvedinlendingacertainamountofmoneytothisfirm?Howwellisthefirmmanagingitsliquidityandsol-vency?Whatisthefirm’sbusinessrisk?Whatistheadditionalriskcreatedbythefirm’sfinancinganddividendpolicies?”• Amanagementconsultantmightask:“Whatisthestructureoftheindustryinwhichthefirmisoperating?Whatarethestrategiespursuedbyvariousplayersinthein-dustry?Whatistherelativeperformanceofdifferentfirmsintheindustry?”• Acorporatemanagermayask:“Ismyfirmproperlyvaluedbyinvestors?Isourin-vestorcommunicationprogramadequatetofacilitatethisprocess?”Financialstatementanalysisisavaluableactivitywhenmanagershavecompletein-formationonafirm’sstrategiesandavarietyofinstitutionalfactorsmakeitunlikelythattheyfullydisclosethisinformation.Inthissetting,outsideanalystsattempttocreate“in-sideinformation”fromanalyzingfinancialstatementdata,therebygainingvaluablein-sightsaboutthefirm’scurrentperformanceandfutureprospects.Tounderstandthecontributionthatfinancialstatementanalysiscanmake,itisim-portanttounderstandtheroleoffinancialreportinginthefunctioningofcapitalmarketsandtheinstitutionalforcesthatshapefinancialstatements.Therefore,wepresentfirstabriefdescriptionoftheseforces;thenwediscussthestepsthatananalystmustperformtoextractinformationfromfinancialstatementsandprovidevaluableforecasts.2.FrombusinessactivitiestofinancialstatementsCorporatemanagersareresponsibleforacquiringphysicalandfinancialresourcesfromthefirm’senvironmentandusingthemtocreatevalueforthefirm’sinvestors.Valueiscreatedwhenthefirmearnsareturnonitsinvestmentinexcessofthecostofcapital.Managersformulatebusinessstrategiestoachievethisgoal,andtheyimplementthemthroughbusinessactivities.Afirm’sbusinessactivitiesareinfluencedbyitseconomicenvironmentanditsownbusinessstrategy.Theeconomicenvironmentincludesthefirm’sindustry,itsinputandoutputmarkets,andtheregulationsunderwhichthefirmoperates.Thefirm’sbusinessstrategydetermineshowthefirmpositionsitselfinitsen-vironmenttoachieveacompetitiveadvantage.2.1AccountingSystemFeature1:AccrualAccountingOneofthefundamentalfeaturesofcorporatefinancialreportsisthattheyarepreparedusingaccrualratherthancashaccounting.Unlikecashaccounting,accrualaccountingdistinguishesbetweentherecordingofcostsandbenefitsassociatedwitheconomicac-tivitiesandtheactualpaymentandreceiptofcash.Netincomeistheprimaryperiodicperformanceindexunderaccrualaccounting.Tocomputenetincome,theeffectsofeco-nomictransactionsarerecordedonthebasisofexpected,notnecessarilyactual,cashre-ceiptsandpayments.Expectedcashreceiptsfromthedeliveryofproductsorservicesarerecognizedasrevenues,andexpectedcashoutflowsassociatedwiththeserevenuesarerecognizedasexpenses.Theneedforaccrualaccountingarisesfrominvestors’demandforfinancialreportsonaperiodicbasis.Becausefirmsundertakeeconomictransactionsonacontinualbasis,thearbitraryclosingofaccountingbooksattheendofareportingperiodleadstoafun-damentalmeasurementproblem.Sincecashaccountingdoesnotreportthefulleco-nomicconsequenceofthetransactionsundertakeninagivenperiod,accrualaccountingisdesignedtoprovidemorecompleteinformationonafirm’speriodicperformance.2.2AccountingSystemFeature2:AccountingStandardsandAuditingTheuseofaccrualaccountingliesatthecenterofmanyimportantcomplexitiesincor-poratefinancialreporting.Becauseaccrualaccountingdealswithexpectationsoffuturecashconsequencesofcurrentevents,itissubjectiveandreliesonavarietyofassump-tions.Whoshouldbechargedwiththeprimaryresponsibilityofmakingtheseassump-tions?Afirm’smanagersareentrustedwiththetaskofmakingtheappropriateestimatesandassumptionstopreparethefinancialstatementsbecausetheyhaveintimateknowl-edgeoftheirfirm’sbusiness.Theaccountingdiscretiongrantedtomanagersispotentiallyvaluablebecauseital-lowsthemtoreflectinsideinformationinreportedfinancialstatements.However,sinceinvestorsviewprofitsasameasureofmanagers’performance,managershaveincentivestousetheiraccountingdiscretiontodistortreportedprofitsbymakingbiasedassump-tions.Further,theuseofaccountingnumbersincontractsbetweenthefirmandoutsidersprovidesanothermotivationformanagementmanipulationofaccountingnumbers.In-comemanagementdistortsfinancialaccountingdata,makingthemlessvaluabletoex-ternalusersoffinancialstatements.Therefore,thedelegationoffinancialreportingdecisionstocorporatemanagershasbothcostsandbenefits.Anumberofaccountingconventionshaveevolvedtoensurethatmanagersusetheiraccountingflexibilitytosummarizetheirknowledgeofthefirm’sbusinessactivities,andnottodisguiserealityforself-servingpurposes.Forexample,themeasurabilityandcon-servatismconventionsareaccountingresponsestoconcernsaboutdistortionsfromman-agers’potentiallyoptimisticbias.Boththeseconventionsattempttolimitmanagers’optimisticbiasbyimposingtheirownpessimisticbias.Accountingstandards(GenerallyAcceptedAccountingPrinciples),promulgatedbytheFinancialAccountingStandardsBoard(FASB)andsimilarstandard-settingbodiesinothercountries,alsolimitpotentialdistortionsthatmanagerscanintroduceintoreportednumbers.Uniformaccountingstandardsattempttoreducemanagers’abilitytorecordsimilareconomictransactionsindissimilarways,eitherovertimeoracrossfirms.Increaseduniformityfromaccountingstandards,however,comesattheexpenseofreducedflexibilityformanagerstoreflectgenuinebusinessdifferencesintheirfirm’sfi-nancialstatements.Rigidaccountingstandardsworkbestforeconomictransactionswhoseaccountingtreatmentisnotpredicatedonmanagers’proprietaryinformation.However,whenthereissignificantbusinessjudgmentinvolvedinassessingatransac-tion’seconomicconsequences,rigidstandardswhichpreventmanagersfromusingtheirsuperiorbusinessknowledgewouldbedysfunctional.Further,ifaccountingstandardsaretoorigid,theymayinducemanagerstoexpendeconomicresourcestorestructurebusinesstransactionstoachieveadesiredaccountingresult.Auditing,broadlydefinedasaverificationoftheintegrityofthereportedfinancialstatementsbysomeoneotherthanthepreparer,ensuresthatmanagersuseaccountingrulesandconventionsconsistentlyovertime,andthattheiraccountingestimatesarerea-sonable.Therefore,auditingimprovesthequalityofaccountingdata.Third-partyauditingmayalsoreducethequalityoffinancialreportingbecauseitconstrainsthekindofaccountingrulesandconventionsthatevolveovertime.Forex-ample,theFASBconsiderstheviewsofauditorsinthestandard-settingprocess.Auditorsarelikelytoargueagainstaccountingstandardsproducingnumbersthataredifficulttoaudit,eveniftheproposedrulesproducerelevantinformationforinvestors.Thelegalenvironmentinwhichaccountingdisputesbetweenmanagers,auditors,andinvestorsareadjudicatedcanalsohaveasignificanteffectonthequalityofreportednumbers.Thethreatoflawsuitsandresultingpenaltieshavethebeneficialeffectofim-provingtheaccuracyofdisclosure.However,thepotentialforasignificantlegalliabilitymightalsodiscouragemanagersandauditorsfromsupportingaccountingproposalsre-quiringriskyforecasts,suchasforward-lookingdisclosures.2.3AccountingSystemFeature3:Managers’ReportingStrategyBecausethemechanismsthatlimitmanagers’abilitytodistortaccountingdataaddnoise,itisnotoptimaltouseaccountingregulationtoeliminatemanagerialflexibilitycompletely.Therefore,real-worldaccountingsystemsleaveconsiderableroomformanagerstoinfluencefinancialstatementdata.Afirm’sreportingstrategy,thatis,themannerinwhichmanagersusetheiraccountingdiscretion,hasanimportantinfluenceonthefirm’sfinancialstatements.Corporatemanagerscanchooseaccountinganddisclosurepoliciesthatmakeitmoreorlessdifficultforexternalusersoffinancialreportstounderstandthetrueeconomicpictureoftheirbusinesses.Accountingrulesoftenprovideabroadsetofalternativesfromwhichmanagerscanchoose.Further,managersareentrustedwithmakingarangeofestimatesinimplementingtheseaccountingpolicies.Accountingregulationsusuallyprescribeminimumdisclosurerequirements,buttheydonotrestrictmanagersfromvol-untarilyprovidingadditionaldisclosures.Asuperiordisclosurestrategywillenablemanagerstocommunicatetheunderlyingbusinessrealitytooutsideinvestors.Oneimportantconstraintonafirm’sdisclosurestrategyisthecompetitivedynamicsinproductmarkets.Disclosureofproprietaryinfor-mationaboutbusinessstrategiesandtheirexpectedeconomicconsequencesmayhurtthefirm’scompetitiveposition.Subjecttothisconstraint,managerscanusefinancialstatementstoprovideinformationusefultoinvestorsinassessingtheirfirm’strueeco-nomicperformance.Managerscanalsousefinancialreportingstrategiestomanipulateinvestors’percep-tions.Usingthediscretiongrantedtothem,managerscanmakeitdifficultforinvestorstoidentifypoorperformanceonatimelybasis.Forexample,managerscanchooseac-countingpoliciesandestimatestoprovideanoptimisticassessmentofthefirm’strueperformance.Theycanalsomakeitcostlyforinvestorstounderstandthetrueperfor-mancebycontrollingtheextentofinformationthatisdisclosedvoluntarily.Theextenttowhichfinancialstatementsareinformativeabouttheunderlyingbusi-nessrealityvariesacrossfirms—andacrosstimeforagivenfirm.Thisvariationinac-countingqualityprovidesbothanimportantopportunityandachallengeindoingbusinessanalysis.Theprocessthroughwhichanalystscanseparatenoisefrominforma-tioninfinancialstatements,andgainvaluablebusinessinsightsfromfinancialstatementanalysis,isdiscussednext.3.FromfinancialstatementstobussinessanalysisBecausemanagers’insiderknowledgeisasourcebothofvalueanddistortioninaccount-ingdata,itisdifficultforoutsideusersoffinancialstatementstoseparatetrueinformationfromdistortionandnoise.Notbeingabletoundoaccountingdistortionscompletely,in-vestors“discount”afirm’sreportedaccountingperformance.Indoingso,theymakeaprobabilisticassessmentoftheextenttowhichafirm’sreportednumbersreflecteconomicreality.Asaresult,investorscanhaveonlyanimpreciseassessmentofanindividualfirm’sperformance.Financialandinformationintermediariescanaddvaluebyimprovinginves-tors’understandingofafirm’scurrentperformanceanditsfutureprospects.Effectivefinancialstatementanalysisisvaluablebecauseitattemptstogetatmanagers’insideinformationfrompublicfinancialstatementdata.Becauseintermediariesdonothavedirectorcompleteaccesstothisinformation,theyrelyontheirknowledgeofthefirm’sindustryanditscompetitivestrategiestointerpretfinancialstatements.Successfulintermediarieshaveatleastasgoodanunderstandingoftheindustryeconomicsasdothefirm’smanagers,andareasonablygoodunderstandingofthefirm’scompetitivestrategy.Althoughoutsideanalystshaveaninformationdisadvantagerelativetothefirm’smanag-ers,theyaremoreobjectiveinevaluatingtheeconomicconsequencesofthefirm’sinvest-mentandoperatingdecisions.Figure1-3providesaschematicoverviewofhowbusinessintermediariesusefinancialstatementstoaccomplishfourkeysteps:(1)businessstrategyanalysis,(2)accountinganalysis,(3)financialanalysis,and(4)prospectiveanalysis.3.1AnalysisStep1:BusinessStrategyAnalysisThepurposeofbusinessstrategyanalysisistoidentifykeyprofitdriversandbusinessrisks,andtoassessthecompany’sprofitpotentialataqualitativelevel.Businessstrategyanalysisinvolvesanalyzingafirm’sindustryanditsstrategytocreateasustainablecom-petitiveadvantage.Thisqualitativeanalysisisanessentialfirststepbecauseitenablestheanalysttoframethesubsequentaccountingandfinancialanalysisbetter.Forexam-ple,identifyingthekeysuccessfactorsandkeybusinessrisksallowstheidentificationofkeyaccountingpolicies.Assessmentofafirm’scompetitivestrategyfacilitateseval-uatingwhethercurrentprofitabilityissustainable.Finally,businessanalysisenablestheanalysttomakesoundassumptionsinforecastingafirm’sfutureperformance.3.2AnalysisStep2:AccountingAnalysisThepurposeofaccountinganalysisistoevaluatethedegreetowhichafirm’saccountingcapturestheunderlyingbusinessreality.Byidentifyingplaceswherethereisaccount-ingflexibility,andbyevaluatingtheappropriatenessofthefirm’saccountingpoliciesandestimates,analystscanassessthedegreeofdistortioninafirm’saccountingnumbers.Anotherimportantstepinaccountinganalysisisto“undo”anyaccountingdis-tortionsbyrecastingafirm’saccountingnumberstocreateunbiasedaccountingdata.Soundaccountinganalysisimprovesthereliabilityofconclusionsfromfinancialanaly-sis,thenextstepinfinancialstatementanalysis.3.3AnalysisStep3:FinancialAnalysisThegoaloffinancialanalysisistousefinancialdatatoevaluatethecurrentandpastper-formanceofafirmandtoassessitssustainability.Therearetwoimportantskillsrelatedtofinancialanalysis.First,theanalysisshouldbesystematicandefficient.Second,theanalysisshouldallowtheanalysttousefinancialdatatoexplorebusinessissues.Ratioanalysisandcashflowanalysisarethetwomostcommonlyusedfinancialtools.Ratioanalysisfocusesonevaluatingafirm’sproductmarketperformanceandfinancialpoli-cies;cashflowanalysisfocusesonafirm’sliquidityandfinancialflexibility.3.4AnalysisStep4:ProspectiveAnalysisProspectiveanalysis,whichfocusesonforecastingafirm’sfuture,isthefinalstepinbusinessanalysis.Twocommonlyusedtechniquesinprospectiveanalysisarefinancialstatementforecastingandvaluation.Boththesetoolsallowthesynthesisoftheinsightsfrombusinessanalysis,accountinganalysis,andfinancialanalysisinordertomakepre-dictionsaboutafirm’sfuture.Whilethevalueofafirmisafunctionofitsfuturecashflowperformance,itisalsopossibletoassessafirm’svaluebasedonthefirm’scurrentbookvalueofequity,anditsfuturereturnonequity(ROE)andgrowth.Strategyanalysis,accountinganalysis,andfinancialanalysis,thefirstthreestepsintheframeworkdiscussedhere,provideanex