国际贸易外文翻译---美国欧洲农产品贸易的技术性贸易壁垒.docx

外文文献译文资料来源：silvia weyerbrock.technical trade barriers in us/europe agricultural traded.newark：university of delaware，2000作者：silvia weyerbrock美国/欧洲农产品贸易的技术性贸易壁垒摘要技术性贸易壁垒严重影响了美国/欧洲的农产品贸易。一项1996年美国农业部的调查显示，有57个欧洲的贸易壁垒影响了美国的农产品出口，产生了估计有89955万美元的贸易影响。本文阐述了欧洲和美国的技术法规妨碍双边贸易。本文为个案研究提供了一个背景，并对技术性贸易壁垒的未来作用下了定论。由于贸易规则的变更，更高的食品安全和食品质量的需求以及欧盟的东欧国家，我们希望美国/欧洲的技术性贸易壁垒能够在将来得到发展。什么是技术性贸易壁垒？美国/欧洲的农产品贸易受到技术性贸易的强烈影响。如上所述，对于技术性贸易壁垒没有统一的定义。研究人员建议把定义建立在意图，经济影响，工具使用的基础之上。在本次调查中，我们遵循了由thornsbury等人（1997年）、罗伯茨和deremer（1997年）提出的定义。他们把技术性贸易壁垒定义为“能够管制外国产品在国内市场上销售的法规和标准,并且这些法规和标准的表面目的是为了纠正与这些产品的产、分配和消费相联系的外部作用产生的市场无效。”这一定义包括身份，措施，质量的标准，动植物卫生检疫措施，全球共同展区及包装要求。不过，该定义并不包括诸如补贴和税收（罗伯茨和deremer，1997）的奖励措施。除了技术法规，罗伯茨和deremer强调，表明符合外国法规可能成为一个技术性贸易壁垒。技术性贸易壁垒有别于其他贸易壁垒的原因在于它可以产生经济效率。而且，动植物卫生检疫措施协议不是最惠国待遇，换言之，不同的贸易方为了获得进入一个进口国市场可能需要符合不同的条件。因此，为这些措施设计有效的规则是有难度的（罗伯茨和deremer，1997）。为了遏制近年来盛行的技术性贸易壁垒，关贸总协定的成员国组织了关于动植物卫生检疫措施协议（sps）和技术性贸易壁垒协议（tbt）的谈判，作为乌拉圭回合谈判的一部分（世界贸易组织，1994年a，1994年b）。这些协议大大加强了对技术性贸易壁垒使用的国际规则。所有世贸组织的成员国都受到了这些协议的制约。该协议规定，动植物卫生检疫措施和技术措施，不应成为变相的贸易壁垒或以武断或歧视性的方式被使用。他们应该只被适用于必要的范围之内，并且必须以科学的原则和风险评估（世界贸易组织，1994年a，1994年b）为基础。各国被鼓励使用由国际科学组织制定的国际标准，诸如食品规范委员会，国际兽疫局（oie）和国际植物保护公约（ippc）。但是，如果各国的理由是科学或一个非歧视性的更低水平的风险的话，他们可能保持比国际标准更为严格的标准。在协调统一的情况下，世贸组织的成员国被鼓励运用等效和谈判的原则，例如，兽医等效协议。等效意味着相同的健康保障水平可以由（世界贸易组织，1994年b）不同的方法实现。如果一个国家可以证明它的措施，尽管有些不同，仍能满足其他国家合法目标的要求，法规和标准应被等同看待。等效协议允许的产品能与最小海关检查交易。如果每一方都承认对方的工厂检查程序，那么检查人员前往国外生产和加工设施变得无关紧要。另一个动植物卫生检疫措施协议的新特点，区域化原则，建议病虫害的地位应被区域化考虑，而不是在国家层面上。如果一个国家能够证明它的一块区域所遭受的病虫害比进口国的多并很可能继续保持，那么就不应该对这个区域的商品加以管束。最后，各国再不能轻易拒绝一个基于新成立的争端解决机制做出的小组决定。美国/欧洲的贸易壁垒概览在一项美国科学家联合会，美国农业部监管机构和美国贸易组织的调查中，罗伯茨和deremer（1997年）指出了在欧盟，东欧和前苏联的影响1996年6月美国农产品出口的贸易壁垒。这些壁垒包括市场准入壁垒，市场拓展壁垒和市场保留壁垒。市场准入壁垒，包括进口禁令；市场扩大壁垒有限，但并不排除美国的出口；市场保留壁垒是目前正在考虑的措施，一旦获得通过则很可能影响美国的出口。罗伯茨和deremer要求大使专员和贸易组织从当前美国出口收入的价值这个层面来估计受到此类壁垒的贸易影响，可能存在威胁和潜在的损失。请注意，这项调查只涵盖影响美国出口到的那些包括在美国科学家联合会海外办事处项下的国家的贸易壁垒。它既不包括欧盟的贸易壁垒对其他国家特别是美国的影响，也不包括美国的壁垒对欧盟进口的影响。该调查发现了欧洲的57个贸易壁垒并对美国的农产品出口产生了估计有价值89955万美元的贸易影响。其中的6个贸易壁垒产生了一个估计有超过5000万美元/人的个人贸易影响（见表2）。这些壁垒共计占所有估计贸易影响的61.8。调查发现在世界范围内只有12个其他的壁垒有如此大的影响。罗伯茨和deremer（1997）找到了23条美国/欧洲的贸易法规，它们产生了一个估计有超过500万的贸易影响。考虑到产品包含贸易壁垒，调查显示，许多壁垒影响美国出口至欧洲的动物产品贸易（见表2）。关于动物产品的所有壁垒的贸易影响达到估计有47730万美元，占所有欧洲壁垒估计贸易影响的53。相比之下，在世界上的所有其他国家动物产品出口遭受贸易壁垒的只占10730万美元。此外，出口加工食品和粮食超过1亿美元也分别受到了贸易壁垒的影响（罗伯茨和deremer，1997）。美国农业部调查报告是关于技术贸易壁垒影响美国农产品出口的最全面的调查。它通过详细说明这些壁垒是如何遍布的来为技术性贸易壁垒找到光明。但是，其结果应被仔细解释为几个原因：1专家咨询很可能有偏见：美国科学家联合会和贸易组织的目标是促进美国农产品出口。监管机构曾经以美国的立场来看待诸如科学依据和符合新的贸易协定的各项措施的问题来审核他们的估计。2一些专家可能已经知道，美国可能会考虑启动以他们的报告为基础的世贸组织争端解决程序。3这项调查涵盖市场保留壁垒（即正在审议的壁垒），其通过和实施是不确定的。4最后，出于保密的原因，罗伯茨和deremer（1997）没有明确指出具体的问题。由于缺乏信息，因此很难评估各种估计的可靠性。表2 在1996年美国农业部调查报告中发现的欧洲的技术性贸易壁垒贸易壁垒数量(百万美元) 估计的贸易影响(eti)按估计的贸易影响：eti大于5000万美元 6 555.81eti在5万美元和4999万美元之间 23 307.73eti小于5万美元 38 36.01共计 57 899.55续表按产品种类*：所以产品 0 0.00水果和蔬菜 0 0.00谷类和饲料谷类 7 108.81动物产品牛肉 7 157.80猪肉 5 68.50牛肉和猪肉 1 50.00所有动物产品 2 201.00其他产品待加工产品 13 112.91种子 2 25.00林木类 4 76.00鱼类 2 1.00共计* 43* 801.12*注意事项：只有当（1）提供超过10个贸易壁垒，或者（2）估计的贸易影响超过5000万美元时，产品种类的信息可供提供。资料来源：thornsbury等人（1997年）；罗伯茨和deremer（1997年）。具体措施本节会提出近期具体的美国/欧洲农业贸易的技术性贸易壁垒。除了研究欧洲壁垒对美国进口的影响，我们也会探讨美国壁垒对欧洲进口的影响。我们明确普遍存在这种壁垒的领域，并试图概略估计它们的贸易影响。我们的调查没有提供关于美国/欧洲贸易的技术壁垒的系统证据。这需要一个详细的评估，它关于许多标准和法规以及一个关于许多国家出口的全面的调查。相反，我们的研究是基于研究论文，报纸，工业和机构的出版物诸如“阿格拉欧洲”（报刊名）上找到的信息，美国对外农业服务产业的文件以及一份关于美国贸易和投资的壁垒的欧盟委员会报告。我们省略了这些出版物没有提及的贸易壁垒，可能有许多技术性贸易壁垒与合格评定和执行方面相关。在本文中，我们试图概略地估计各种技术性贸易壁垒的影响。不幸的是，除了彼得森，帕吉和亨利（1998年美国）在论文上引发的欧盟荷尔蒙争端以外，关于美国/欧洲的技术性贸易壁垒对价格和社会福利的影响的定量的经济研究仍处于莫衷一是的状态。有时，新闻和其他来源确定存在威胁或存在壁垒的贸易影响。如果没有数据，我们近似估计最大可能的影响，例如，一个进口禁令，在实施该项禁令以前给予贸易量的信息。但是请注意，这种估计可能言过其实。进口禁令往往与具体的生产和加工技术有关。如果一家美国的加工企业遵循欧盟的法规，它就仍有可能与欧盟达成生意上的往来。表3 节选的美国/欧洲技术性贸易壁垒的近似的贸易影响贸易壁垒 近似的贸易影响（百万美元)美国的技术性贸易壁垒针对欧盟牛肉和羊肉的壁垒 2针对各种农药的壁垒(德萊尼修正案)(威胁)欧盟出口酒到美国(1995年) 1,015欧盟出口橄榄油到美国(1994/95年)a 70,000吨针对西班牙猪肉制品的壁垒西班牙出口红肉到美国(1995年)b 0.4欧盟的技术性贸易壁垒针对美国标准参考样品的欧盟壁垒 14,000(最大威胁但是有可能有许多例外)针对美国激素处理牛肉的欧盟壁垒 100针对美国新鲜肉类和禽类的欧盟壁垒(威胁) 100针对美国禽类的欧盟壁垒 54针对转基因生物的欧盟壁垒美国谷物出口到欧盟(1995年) 433针对波兰乳制品的欧盟壁垒 ec60东欧的技术性贸易壁垒针对美国禽肉的东欧可能壁垒c 160针对美国激素处理牛肉的保加利亚壁垒 2.5俄罗斯的技术性贸易壁垒针对美国禽肉的俄罗斯壁垒(威胁但并没有被实施) 840a. 在1994到1995年间，酒和橄榄油的出口与所有出口类似。并不是所有的酒和橄榄油的出口都受到了贸易壁垒的影响。b. 数据适用于所有红肉但猪肉除外。c. 东欧禽肉1997年的出口总额达到16000万美元。最后，请注意，我们并不仅仅试图精确地指出罗伯茨和deremer的关于欧洲技术性贸易壁垒影响美国农产品出口的清单。美国农业部的调查构成了1996年6月美国农产品出口所面临的国外技术性贸易壁垒的缩影。美国农业部调查所定义的第二猜测措施会使我们忽略诸如欧盟针对特定危险材料的威胁禁令等的重大现实问题。其他问题可能会被同时解决。41外文文献原文material source: silvia weyerbrock.technical trade barriers in us/europe agricultural traded.newark：university of delaware，2000author: silvia weyerbrocktechnical trade barriers in us/europe agricultural tradeabstracttechnical barriers strongly affect us/european agricultural and food trade. a 1996 usda survey identifies 57 questionable european regulations affecting us agricultural exports with an estimated trade impact of $899.55 million. this article identifies european and us technical regulations that impede bilateral trade. the article provides a background for case studies and draws conclusions regarding the future role of technical barriers. we expect that technical barriers in us/europe trade will proliferate in the future because of changes in trade rules, higher demand for food safety and various food quality attributes, and eu membership of eastern european countries.what is a technical barrier to trade?us/europe agricultural trade is strongly affected by technical barriers to trade. as mentioned above there is no commonly agreed upon definition of technical barriers to trade. researchers have proposed definitions based on intent, economic impact, and instruments used.in this survey we follow a definition proposed by thornsbury et al. (1997) and roberts and deremer (1997). they define technical barriers as “internationally divergent regulations and standards governing the sale of products in national markets which have as their prima facie objective the correction of market inefficiencies stemming from externalities associated with the production, distribution, and consumption of these products.” this definition includes standards of identity, measure, and quality, and sps, global commons, and packaging measures. it, however, excludes incentive measures such as subsidies and taxes (roberts & deremer, 1997). in addition to the technical regulations, roberts and deremer stress that demonstrating conformity to a foreign regulation can be a technical barrier. technical trade barriers differ from many other trade barriers because they can be economically efficient. moreover, sps regulations are not “most favored nation,” i.e., different trading partners may need to comply with different conditions for gaining access to, an importing countrys market. consequently, designing effective rules for such measures is difficult (roberts & deremer, 1997).to stem the proliferation of technical barriers in recent years, gatt members negotiated agreements on sanitary and phytosanitary measures (sps) and technical barriers to trade (tbt) as part of the uruguay round agreement (world trade organization, 1994a, 1994b). these agreements considerably strengthen international rules on the use of technical barriers. all wto members are now subject to these agreements. the agreements specify that sps and technical measures should not be used as disguised trade barriers or in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner. they should only be applied to the extent necessary and must be based on scientific principles and on risk assessment (world trade organization, 1994a, 1994b). countries are encouraged to use international standards developed by international scientific organizations such as the codex alimentarius commission, the international office of epizootics (oie), and the international plant protection convention (ippc). countries, however, may maintain standards that are stricter than international standards, if they are justified by science or by a nondiscriminatory lower level of risk. in the absence of harmonization, wto members are encouraged to apply the principle of equivalency and negotiate, for example, veterinary equivalence agreements. equivalency implies that the same level of health protection can be achieved by different methods (world trade organization, 1994b). regulations and standards should be considered equivalent if one country can show that its measuresalbeit differentmeet the other countrys legitimate objectives. equivalence agreements allow products to be traded with minimal customs checks. if each side recognizes the other partys plant inspection procedures, visits of inspectors to foreign production and processing facilities become unnecessary. another novel feature of the sps agreement, the principle of regionalization, suggests that disease or pest-free status should be considered on the regional rather than the country level. if a country can demonstrate that an area of its country is, and is likely to remain, disease or pest-free than importing countries should not place restrictions on goods from this area. finally, countries cannot easily reject a panel decision based on the newly established dispute settlement mechanism any longer.technical regulations in us/europe tradeoverviewin a survey of fas attaches, usda regulatory agencies, and us trade organizations, roberts and deremer (1997) identify questionable regulations in the eu, eastern europe, and the fsu that affected us agricultural exports in june 1996. such barriers include market access, market expansion, and market retention barriers. market access barriers include import bans; market expansion barriers limit but do not preclude us exports; and market retention barriers are measures under consideration, which may adversely affect us exports, if enacted. roberts and deremer asked the attaches and trade organizations to estimate the trade impact of such barriers in terms of the value of current us export revenue that is threatened and could be potentially lost. please note that the survey only covers questionable measures affecting us exports to countries covered by overseas fas offices. it does neither cover questionable european measures affecting countries other than the us nor us measures affecting european imports.the survey finds 57 questionable measures in europe with an estimated trade impact on us agricultural and food exports of $899.55 million. six of these questionable measures have an estimated individual trade impact of more than $50 million each (table 2). together these barriers account for 61.8% of the total estimated trade impact. survey respondents identified only 12 other measures worldwide with such a large impact. roberts and deremer (1997) find 23 regulations in us/europe trade with an estimated trade impact of more than $5 million. considering the product coverage of questionable measures, the survey shows that many barriers affecting us exports to europe affect trade in animal products (table 2). the estimated trade impact of all barriers on animal products is $477.3 million and accounts for 53% of estimated total trade impacts of all european barriers. by comparison, in all other countries of the world only $107.3 million exports of animal products are subjected to questionable barriers. moreover, exports of processed foods and grains exceeding $100 million respectively are affected by questionable barriers (roberts & deremer, 1997).the usda survey is the first comprehensive survey of technical trade barriers affecting us agricultural exports. it has shed the light on tbts by detailing how pervasive such barriers are. however, its results should be interpreted carefully for several reasons.1. the experts consulted are likely to be biased: the goal of fas attaches and trade organizations is to promote us agricultural exports. the regulatory agencies used to vet their estimates are likely to take the us stance on issues such as the scientific justification and conformity of various measures with the new trade agreements.2. some experts may have been aware that the us may consider initiating wto dispute settlement procedures based on their reports.3. the survey covers market retention barriers (i.e., barriers under consideration) whose adoption and implementation are uncertain.4. finally, for confidentiality reasons, roberts and deremer (1997) could not identify specific issues. lacking this information, it is difficult to assess the reliability of various estimates.table 2 european technical trade barriers identified in 1996 usda surveynumber of barriers (million $) estimated trade impact(eti)by estimated trade impact:eti larger than $50 million 6 555.81eti between $5 million and $49.99 million 23 307.73eti smaller than $5 million 38 36.01total 57 899.55by product category*:all products 0 0.00fruits and vegetables 0 0.00grains and feedgrains 7 108.81animal productscontinuedbeef 7 157.80pork 5 68.50beef and pork 1 50.00all animal products 2 201.00other productsfurther processed products 13 112.91seeds 2 25.00forestry 4 76.00fish 2 1.00total* 43* 801.12*note: information for product categories only given if (1) more than 10 barriers apply, or (2) if the eti exceeds $50 million.source: thornsbury et al. (1997); roberts and deremer (1997).specific measuresthis section identifies recent and current specific technical barriers in us/europe agricultural trade. in addition to studying european barriers on us imports, we also explore us barriers on european imports. we identify sectors in which such barriers are prevalent and attempt to approximate their trade impact.our survey does not provide systematic evidence on technical barriers in us/europe trade. this requires a detailed assessment of many standards and regulations and a comprehensive survey of exporters in many countries. instead, our study is based on information found in research papers, newspapers, and industry and agency publications such as agra-europe, documents of the us foreign agricultural service, and a european commission report on us barriers to trade and investment. we omit questionable measures not mentioned in such publications and, possibly, many tbts related to conformity assessment and enforcement.in this article, we attempt to approximate the trade impact of various tbts. unfortunately, with the exception of peterson, paggi, and henrys paper (1998) on the us/eu hormone dispute, quantitative economic studies on the price and welfare effects of tbts in us/europe trade are unavailable at this point. occasionally, news and other sources identify the trade impact of threatened or existing barriers. if no data are available, we approximate the maximum possible impact of, for example, an import ban, by giving information on the trade volume before the ban. note, however, that this estimate is likely to be an overstatement. import bans are frequently linked to specific production and processing techniques. if a us processing firm follows eu guidelines, it may still be able to do business with the eu. table 3. the approx