中部地区利用外资承接产业转移的博弈分析Thegameanalysisof.docxVIP

中部地区利用外资承接产业转移的博弈分析 The game analysis of Abstract:FDI is crucial to macroeconomic development of a regthe central regions in recent yeal governments regard preferential policies as the main means to attract te information to analyze preferential policy strategy of the central region, thus obtaining its pragmatic impacts on FDI attractiven to improve the means of FDI attraction to ensure that local governments achieve mutually beneficial resu下载 Keywords: Central regionFDI Game analysis 1. Introduction Since economic reform in 1978, China has formulated policies to open up the eastern coastal region, then develop the western region, and last revitalize northeastern old industrial regs overall economic growth, but led to a widening wealth gap between regi, almost every local government regards the introduction of FDI as a major is governments are proposing preferential policy strategy, which lowers the investment threshold and blindly disguises the performance of FDI introducte rapid development as a series of policies and measures to encourage FDI to transfer to the central regions were implemenntroduction of FDI as a top prioride range of preferential policies to compete with other regireferential policies on the attraction of FDI by using the Game Analysuggestions to improve the method to attract FDI in order to ensure the local government to achieve mutually beneficial resuost all the central region governments regard FDI introduction as a top prior affide range of preferential policies to compete with other regions. By building the game models, we will identify whether the competition game was rational and discover the various effects of it on economic development of the regithere are two local governments of A and B. Both are endowed with the same natural resources, industrial structure and investment environmments will receive 100 units of income if both of them choose cooperation, which means that both governments will implement unified preferential policies to undertake the t chooses non-cooperation, which means that the government will propose more preferential policies (such as land prices cut or taxes reduction, e the other chooses cooperation, the government chooses non-cooperation will attract 50% of the FDI of the other government by its more favorable te the two governments both choose non-cooperation, each side will lose 30 units of incooses non-cooperation, the government which chooses non-cooperate will receive 100 + (100 * 50%) -30 = 120 units of income, the income of the other government will be 100-100 * 50% = 50 une choices from a dynamic point of vion after the first round of the g policies to attract FDI and related industrl still consider to benefit most from the choice they mwill introduce new and more preferential policies in order to attract FDI to enB is not the case of the new policy, and A will introduce new policies to attract will gain 35 un Local governments are competing from the perspective of each income, rather than from the perspective of overall incthe final result of the game is “prisoners dilemma.The result of the game brings income to the government choosing cooperation, but brings more serious consequences as wnas central government implements the revenue-sharing policy at all levels of local governments, highlighting the dominant interest position of local governmehe main objectives of local governmepromote revenue growth, local governments need to attract new investment to increase employment rate, expand regional disposable income, and promote financial performagion compete to provide preferential policies for foreign investors, regardless of what policies other local governments implemnal funding and attract FDI and foreign indusoffer to foreign enterprises reduce operation costs of the business so that local enterprises can not compete with foreign enterpriinder local businesses and slow down local long-term economic developm of weakforeign business that rely on free land, returned taxes, and uncontrolled environment may ultimately beat those business depending on charged land, taxation, and environmental protection or even expel good local businesses with advanced management, technology, resources out of the martherefore resulting inefficient resource allocat All levels of local governments pursue FDI for the reason that FDI will bring GDP growth, taxation increase, employment enlargement and social welfare promotof several rounds of the game is that each local government will choose non-cooperation due to various reasain less after each round of the gincome, there should be some appropriate policies so that both sides have chosen to cooperate to achieve the mutual beneficial case with external forentral government established restricted or unified preferential policies for all levels of governmwith their own economic development, industrial base and natural resources characterist projects according to geographical environment, transportation conditions, human culture, history characteristics and other factors, rather than only the concessional policerests and long-term interests together into accotral governments choose to directly cooperate or give up beneficial policy strategy at the beginning of the game, turning to provide better public goods to outside invest Dileevels of government choose to coopernt is the strategy can be used alor and factor markets through the investment in public goods, even