间接言语行为理论.ppt

,IntroductionAustinsSpeechActTheorySearlesIndirectSpeechActTheory-ClassificationofIndirectSpeechActsItsRelationswithOtherPragmaticTheories,IntroductionThetheoryofindirectspeechactswasputforwardbytheAmericanphilosopheroflanguageJohnSearle.ItoriginatedfromAustinstheory,butmadesomerevisions.OneofSearlescontributionsliesinhisunderstandingoftheimportanceofspeechacts.Heregardsaspeechactasabasicunitinsocialcommunication,yetnotawordorasentence.Thismeansthathistheorypaysmuchattentiontothefunctionsratherthantheformsoflanguages.,AustinsSpeechActTheoryItallbeginswithAustins)distinctionbetweentwokindsofsentences:performatives(施为句)andconstatives（叙事句）.Austinarguesthattheutteringofaperformativesentenceisactuallydoinganaction.InominateJohntobePresident,“Isentenceyoutotenyearsimprisionment,Ipromisetopayyouback.Inthesetypical,ratherexplicitcasesofperformativesentences,theactionthatthesentencedescribes(nominating,sentencing,promising)isperformedbytheutteranceofthesentenceitself.,Later,whenAustintriestoseparateperformativesfromconstatives,herealizesthedifficultyindistinguishingthemfromapart.Infact,allsentencescanbeusedtoperformspeechacts.Inordertoexplaininwhatsensetosaysomethingistodosomething,Austinclassifiesthreekindsofspeechacts:1)locutionaryact（言内行为）themovementofvocalorganstoproduceastretchofmeaningfulsounds,2)illocutionaryact（言外行为）-themakingofastatement,offer,promise,etc.tofulfillthepurposeofspeaking.(3)perlocutionaryact（言后行为）theeffectsleftontheaudiences.Thesecondspeechact,i.e.illocutionaryact,isthefocusofAustinsresearch,becausetheillocutionofanutteranceisthespeakerscommunicativeintentionorthefunctionitisintendedtoperform.Inthissense,Austinsspeechacttheoryisactuallyatheoryofillocutionaryacts.Hispreviousresearchfocusperformativestheninfactbelongstoaspecialgroupofillocutionaryactswhichareexpressedexplicitly.,SearlesIndirectSpeechActTheorySearlecontinueshisteachersresearchonillocutionaryacts,andfindsthatactuallyallthespeechactscanbeseenasillocutionaryacts.HemakessomerevisionstoAustinsfelicityconditionsandusenewtermstoclassifyfelicityconditionsintothree:preparatoryconditions,propositionalcontentconditionsandsincerityconditions.,1)Preparatoryconditionsconditionsthatidentifytheparticularcircumstancesandparticipantsappropriatetoperformingagivenillocutionaryact.2)Propositionalcontentconditionsconditionsthatdefinethecontentftheutterance.3)Sincerityconditionsconditionsthatinvolvethespeakersnecessarybelief,emotionandintention.,Accordingtotheseprinciples,wecananalyzethefelicityconditionsofaparticularspeechact.TakethespeechactrequestasanexampletoshowhowArequestBtodoC.1)PreparatoryconditionsAhasnotdoneC;AbelievesthatBcandoC;BwillnotdoCifheisnotaskedto.a.只有当听话人希望说话人去实施该行为，而且说话人也相信听话人希望他去实施该行为时，才能说出某一命题b.只有当说话人和听话人都明白，在正常情况下说话人不会趋势是某一行为时，才能说出某一命题,2)PropositionalcontentconditionsAStatestheactCthatBwillperform.命题内容规则：命题只能出现在话语（或比话语更大的语境）中，他讲述了说话人将实施的某一行为。3)SincerityconditionsAreallywantsBtodoC.只有当说话人希望实施某一行为时，才能说出某一命题。这一规则来自于真诚条件。,Inthestudyoffelicityconditions,Searlefindssomeutteranceswhichdeliberatelyfailtofulfilltheconditionsforthespeechact.However,theseutterancestendtoconductanotherspeechactwhosefelicityconditionshavebeensatisfied.Thismeansthatwiththesameutterancethespeakermeaningisdifferentfromtheliteralmeaning,andthatisthereasonwhytheutteranceperformsaspeechactwhichisdifferentfromtheoneusuallyrelatedtotheliteralmeaning.Basedontheaboveunderstanding,Searledefinesanindirectspeechactasanillocutionaryactwhichisperformedindirectlybywayofperforminganother.,塞尔认为间接言语现象实质上是“通过实施另一种言语行为来间接地实施某一种言语行为”。换言之，说话人想要通过句子的“字面用意”来表达间接的“言外之力”。Insummary,peopleoftenexpressideasinanindirectwaywhichleadstotwoillocutionaryactsintheindirectutterance.Thespeechactrelatedtothespeakermeaningiscalledprimaryillocutionaryact,whiletheactlinkedtotheliteralmeaningiscalledsecondaryillocutionaryact.,(1)SpeakerX:“Weshouldleavefortheshoworelsewellbelate.”(2)SpeakerY:Iamnotreadyyet.“HeretheprimaryillocutionaryactisYsrejectionofXssuggestion,andthesecondaryillocutionaryactisYsstatementthatsheisnotreadytoleave.Bydividingtheillocutionaryactintotwosubparts,Searleisabletoexplainthatwecanunderstandtwomeaningsfromthesameutteranceallthewhileknowingwhichisthecorrectmeaningtorespondto.,例如：Mydear，thebeefhereistooexpensive在这句话中，如果说话人只是抱怨这个地方出售的牛肉价格高而别无他意时，他的语言就是直接的；如果他的意图是想通过陈述而建议听话人换个地方再买的话，就实施了两个言外行为：一个是陈述，一个是建议。塞尔把说话人使用语言时所采用的两种言外行为称为首要言外行为和次要言外行为。首要言外行为体现的是说话人的真正意图，次要言外行为则是话语的字面意思。在例句中建议(首要言外行为)通过陈述(次要言外行为)来实现，说明语句的表层结构和深层结构、语句的字面意思和说话人的用意之间存在着不一致和不对应的现象，从而揭示出语言的形式和功能之间存在的多元关系。,ClassificationofIndirectSpeechActsSearleclassifiedindirectspeechactsintotwocategories:conventionalandunconventional.Conventionalindirectspeechacts(规约性间接言语行为）refertothoseutteranceswithfamiliarandfixedexpressions.Peopletaketheseindirectspeechactsforgrantedandevenfailtodetecttheillocutionaryforceintheliteralmeaningofutterances.Unconventionalindirectspeechacts（非规约性间接言语行为）aremuchmoredifficulttodetect,sothehearerneedtoanalyzethecontext,sharesomecommonknowledgewiththespeakerandhavesomebasicreasoningabilitiestofigureouttheindirectspeechact.,塞尔认为，间接言语行为可以分为规约性(convention)间接言语行为和非规约性(non-convention)间接言语行为。前者指按照习惯对句子的字面意思作出一般性推断的间接言语行为。这类行为已经形成一种人们普遍接受的习惯用法或语言形式，听话人很容易理解到语言的言外之意。规约性间接言语行为的应用主要是出于交际的礼貌原则，说话人为了表示对听话人的礼貌、客气或是尊重，或为了缓和语气而使用。在实际生活中，最常见的是请求策略，而这种策略与礼貌标记语成正相关关系，人们按语言使用习惯可以很快得出正确的推理。,例如：Idratheryouwontbelateanymore字面上是陈述，但它与请求这个言外之力相联系。,非规约性间接言语行为则情况复杂且具有不确定性，要依靠交际双方共知的语言信息、所处的语境以及会话原则来推断说话人的言外之意。也就是说，听话人在识别这一现象时往往通过语外因素进行推理。例如：以下是妻子和丈夫之间发生的一段对话。A：Whataterribletoday!(今天天气可真糟糕!)B：Yes，itis(是啊。)A：Sam，Imnotinthemoodtocook(山姆，我没心情做饭。)B：Whatsthematter?(怎么了?)A:NothingspecialJustfeelalittlebittired(没什么，就是觉得有点累。)B:Doyouwanttogoouttoeat?IknowagreatGreekplace(你想出去吃吗?我知道一个吃希腊菜的好地方。)A：Imreallytired(我实在是累了。)B：Ok，Whydontweorderoutforapizza?(好吧。那我们为什么不点比萨外卖呢?)A：Great!(好极了!),在这段对话中，妻子既不愿意做饭也不愿意出去吃，于是转弯抹角地表达自己的想法；而作为听话人的丈夫则依靠语境和双方共同生活的经历和背景理解了妻子的真正意图。根据言语行为理论，只有理解了使用者使用语言的意图时，才能理解语句的意义。这引导人们运用实践唯物主义的语言观，从多元化的视角去思考间接言语行为的真正含义。,WithhisdoctrineofindirectspeechactsSearleattemptstoexplainhowitispossiblethataspeakercansaysomethingandmeanit,butadditionallymeansomethingelse.Thiswouldbeimpossible,oratleastitwouldbeanimprobablecase,ifinsuchacasethehearerhadnochanceoffiguringoutwhatthespeakermeans(overandabovewhatshesaysandmeans).Searlessolutionisthatthehearercanfigureoutwhattheindirectspeechactismeanttobe,andhegivesseveralhintsastohowthismighthappen.Forthepreviousexampleacondensedprocessmightlooklikethis:,Step1:AproposalismadebyX,andYrespondedbymeansofanillocutionaryact(2).Step2:XassumesthatYiscooperatingintheconversation,beingsincere,andthatshehasmadeastatementthatisrelevant.Step3:Theliteralmeaningof(2)isnotrelevanttotheconversation.Step4:SinceXassumesthatYiscooperating;theremustbeanothermeaningto(2).Step5:Basedonmutuallysharedbackgroundinformation,XknowsthattheycannotleaveuntilYisready.Therefore,YhasrejectedXsproposition.Step6:XknowsthatYhassaidsomethinginsomethingotherthantheliteralmeaning,andtheprimaryillocutionaryactmusthavebeentherejectionofXsproposal