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The U.S. government has endured several painful rounds of scrutiny as it tries to figure out what went wrong on Sept. 11, 2001. The intelligence community faces radical restructuring; the military has made a sharp pivot to face a new enemy; and a vast new federal agency has blossomed to coordinate homeland security. 试图为了找出2001年9月1号那天所犯的错误，美国政府已经经历了好几轮的精密调查。情报团体面临着激进的重组；军事方面已经将重点转向面对新的敌人；而且一个新的巨大的联邦机构已经成立，以协助配合国内安全。But did September 11 signal a failure of theory on par with the failures of intelligence and policy? 但911事件是否标志着一个理论的失败和标志着情报和决策的失败呢？Familiar theories about how the world works still dominate academic debate.关于世界如何运作类似的理论依然在学术争论中处于主导地位。 Instead of radical change, academia has adjusted existing theories to meet new realities.学术界已经调整了现存的理论去适应新的现实，而不是进行彻底的改革。 Has this approach succeeded? Does international relations theory still have something to tell policymakers?采取这样的途径能够成功吗？那些国际关系理论还依然能够为那些策略者提供某些提示吗？Six years ago, political scientist Stephen M. Walt published a much-cited survey of the field in these pages (“One World, Many Theories,” Spring1998). 六年前，政治科学家Stephen M. Walt发表了关于这个领域的一个调查。（该调查收录于1998春发表的一个世界，多种理论里） He sketched out three dominant approaches: realism, liberalism, and an updated form of idealism called “constructivism.” 他拟定了三个占有主导性的途径：现实主义，自由主义和一个现实主义适时的形式，并被称之为“构成主义”。Walt argued that these theories shape both public discourse and policy analysis. Walt坚持认为这些理论形成了公共论述和政策分析。Realism focuses on the shifting distribution of power among states. 现实主义将焦点放在国与国之间力量的转移分布的问题上。Liberalism highlights the rising number of democracies and the turbulence of democratic transitions. 自由主义强调的是日益俱增的民主国家和民主转变的动荡。Idealism illuminates the changing norms of sovereignty, human rights, and international justice, as well as the increased potency of religious ideas in politics. 理想主义阐明了主权变化的规范与标准，人权，和国际公正，还阐明了在政治中的宗教思想的不断增加的权力。The influence of these intellectual constructs extends far beyond university classrooms and tenure committees. 这些知识构图的影响延伸到了大学教室和决定教授职权委员会之外。Policy makers and public commentators invoke elements of all these theories when articulating solutions to global security dilemmas. 当涉及到关于全球安全困境解决问题的时候，政策制定者和大众评论员援引了所有这些理论的因素。President George W. Bush promises to fight terror by spreading liberal democracy to the Middle East and claims that skeptics “who call themselves realists. have lost contact with a fundamental reality” that “America is always more secure when freedom is on the march.” 乔治布什总统承诺通过向中东传播自由民主这种方式打击恐怖主义，并且宣称那些将自己称之为“现实主义者”的怀疑论者已经与那个基本的现实（当自由在进行中的时候，美国总是更加安全的）脱节了。Striking a more eclectic tone, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, a former Stanford University political science professor, explains that the new Bush doctrine is an amalgam of pragmatic realism and Wilsonian liberal theory.打出一个更加折中的语气，国际安全顾问，前斯坦福大学政治学教授，Condoleezza Rice解释到新的布什信条是实用现实主义和威尔逊自由理论的结合体。During the recent presidential campaign, Sen. John Kerry sounded remarkably similar: “Our foreign policy has achieved greatness,” he said, “only when it has combined realism and idealism.” 在最近的总统竞选活动期间，Sen. John Kerry的话听起来非常地相似：“我们的外交政策已经取得伟大成就，”他还说到：“只有当我们的外交政策和现实主义和理想主义相联系的时候，（才能取得这样的成就）”International relations theory also shapes and informs the thinking of the public intellectuals who translate and disseminate academic ideas.国际关系理论也在形成，并且将其思想告知那些解释和传播学术思想民众的知识分子。During the summer of 2004, for example, two influential framers of neoconservative thought, columnist Charles Krauthammer and political scientist Francis Fukuyama, collided over the implications of these conceptual paradigms for U.S. policy in Iraq.例如，在2004年的夏天期间，两个具有影响力的新保守主义思想的准则的策划者，专栏作家Charles Krauthammer 和政治学家Francis Fukuyama，与这些美国对伊概念模范的内涵所相抵触。 Backing the Bush administrations Middle East policy, Krauthammer argued for an assertive amalgam of liberalism and realism, which he called “democratic realism.” Krauthammer 支持布什政府中东政策，他还反对他称之为民主现实主义的自由主义和现实主义那自信的混合体。Fukuyama claimed that Krauthammers faith in the use of force and the feasibility of democratic change in Iraq blinds him to the wars lack of legitimacy, a failing that “hurts both the realist part of our agenda, by diminishing our actual power, and the idealist portion of it, by undercutting our appeal as the embodiment of certain ideas and values.” Fukuyama 宣称Krauthammers 对武力上的使用和对伊拉克民主变化的可行性上的信奉， 使得他无法解释战争缺乏合法性这个问题，而且让他也无法解释这样的一个失败：以通过减少我们实在的力量和减少现实主义的比重，并且通过削减我们作为某种思想和价值的具体形式的呼吁的这样一种方式，同时伤害了现实主义的作用和我们的议事日程。Indeed, when realism, liberalism, and idealism enter the policymaking arena and public debate, they can sometimes become intellectual window dressing for simplistic worldviews. 的确，当现实主义，自由主义和理想主义进入了决策制定的竞技场和公共的争论的时候，这些理论有时候能够成为为过于简单化的世界观增添了一丝活力的知识窗口。 Properly understood, however, their policy implications are subtle and multifaceted. 虽然能够被正常理解，然而，他们的政策的含义是微妙的，多层面的。Realism instills a pragmatic appreciation of the role of power but also warns that states will suffer if they overreach. 现实主义渐渐灌输一种国家作用实用主义的评价，但现实主义同时也警告国家，如果这些国家做得过火的话，他们也将会遭受痛苦。Liberalism highlights the cooperative potential of mature democracies, especially when working together through effective institutions, but it also notes democracies tendency to crusade against tyrannies and the propensity of emerging democracies to collapse into violent ethnic turmoil. 自由主义强调成熟民主国家间合作的潜力，特别当它一起完成有效的体系，不过自由主义也指出了这种与暴政做斗争，并且瓦解于暴力种族骚乱日益显现的民主国家的倾向的民主趋势。Idealism stresses that a consensus on values must underpin any stable political order, yet it also recognizes that forging such a consensus often requires an ideological struggle with the potential for conflict. 理想主义强调，在价值观方面上的共识必须支持任何一种稳定的政治秩序，然而它也应该意识到锻造这样的一个共识经常需要和潜在冲突做意识上的斗争。Each theory offers a filter for looking at a complicated picture.每一个理论都为了解复杂的情况提供了清晰的说法。 As such, they help explain the assumptions behind political rhetoric about foreign policy.就这点而论，他们有助于解释那些隐藏在关于外交政策政治的华丽修饰语背后的假设。 Even more important, the theories act as a powerful check on each other. 更加重要的是，这些理论在相互之间充当了强而有力的阻碍。Deployed effectively, they reveal the weaknesses in arguments that can lead to misguided policies.由于得到有效的部署，这些理论揭露在争论中的弱点，这些弱点可能会导致做出错误的决策。 IS REALISM STILL REALISTIC? At realisms core is the belief that international affairs are a struggle for power among self-interested states. 在以自我为本位的国家中，国际事务是一种权力的斗争，这样的一个信念是现实主义的核心。Although some of realisms leading lights, notably the late University of Chicago political scientist Hans J. Morgenthau, are deeply pessimistic about human nature, it is not a theory of despair. 虽然现实主义中一些重要的主导人物，特别是最近的芝加哥大学政治学家Hans J. Morgenthau，对人的本性的态度是非常悲观的，但是这并不是一个让人感到绝望的理论。Clear-sighted states can mitigate the causes of war by finding ways to reduce the danger they pose to each other. 那些精明的国家可以通过采取这种寻找途径从而降低那些国家相互之间构成的威胁的方式，来缓和战争的起因。Nor is realism necessarily amoral; its advocates emphasize that a ruthless pragmatism about power can actually yield a more peaceful world, if not an ideal one. 现实主义必然和道德是有关联的；其倡导者强调，如果不是一个理想化的实用主义的话，关于权力的无情的实用主义实际上能够获得一个更加和平的世界。In liberal democracies, realism is the theory that everyone loves to hate. 在自由的民主国家中，现实主义是这样一个理论：每一个人都爱憎恨。Developed largely by European migrs at the end of World War ii, realism claimed to be an antidote to the naive belief that international institutions and law alone can preserve peace, a misconception that this new generation of scholars believed had paved the way to war. 在二战末，很大程度上是由欧洲的migrs 发展着理想主义，对于这样幼稚的一个信念：单单是国际体系和法律就能够维护和平，新一代学者所相信的这样的一个信念是错误的概念已经为战争铺平了道路，理想主义自称为是一种对抗手段。In recent decades, the realist approach has been most fully articulated by U.S. theorists, but it still has broad appeal outside the United States as well. The influential writer and editor Josef Joffe articulately comments on Germanys strong realist traditions.颇有影响力的作家兼编辑Josef Joffe对德国激进的现实主义传统做出了明确的评论。 That states, not the United Nations or Human Rights Watch, have led the fight against terrorism. Even if realists acknowledge the importance of non-state actors as a challenge to their assumptions, the theory still has important things to say about the behavior and motivations of these groups. 虽然现实主义者承认非国家成员的重要性作为对这些现实主义者假设的一个质疑，但是那样的一个理论在涉及关于这些组织的行为和动机的时候，依然有很多重要的事情要说。The realist scholar Robert A. Pape, for example, has argued that suicide terrorism can be a rational, realistic strategy for the leadership of national liberation (Mindful of the overwhelming importance of U.S. power to Europes development, Joffe once called the United States “Europes pacifier.”) Chinas cur- rent foreign policy is grounded in realist ideas that date back millennia. 现实主义者Robert A. Pape坚持宣称：“例如，对于国家自由的领导来说，自杀式恐怖主义可能是一种合理的，现实 的范畴。”As China modernizes its economy and enters international institutions such as the World Trade Organization, it behaves in a way that realists understand well: developing its military slowly but surely as its economic power grows, and avoiding a confrontation with superior U.S. forces. Realism gets some things right about the post-9/11 world. The continued centrality of military strength and the persistence of conflict, even in this age of global economic interdependence, does not surprise realists. The theorys most obvious success is its ability to explain the United States forceful military response to the September 11 terrorist attacks. When a state grows vastly more powerful than any opponent, realists expect that it will eventually use that power to expand its sphere of domination, whether for security, wealth, or other motives. The United States employed its military power in what some deemed an imperial fashion in large part because it could. 美国在一些人认为很大部分是帝国的潮流 里使用了其军事力量，因为美国具备这样的实力。It is harder for the normally state-centric realists to explain why the worlds only superpower announced a war against al Qaeda, a non-state terrorist organization. 对于正规的以国家为中心现实主义者来说，去解释为什么世界上唯一超级大国对阿凯达，这样的一个非国家基地组织宣战，无疑是更加困难的。How can realist theory account for the importance of powerful and violent individuals in a world of states? 现实主义的理论怎样才能在多个国家并存的世界里解释强大而极端的个人的重要性呢？Realists point out that the central battles in the “war on terror” have been fought against two states (Afghanistan and Iraq), and movements seeking to expel democratic powers that occupy their homelands. Other scholars apply standard theories of conflict in anarchy to explain ethnic conflict in collapsed states. Insights from political realisma profound and wide-ranging intellectual tradition rooted in the enduring philosophy of Thucydides, Niccol Machiavelli, and Thomas Hobbesare hardly rendered obsolete because some non-state groups are now able to resort to violence.Post-9/11 developments seem to undercut one of realisms core concepts: the balance of power. Standard realist doctrine predicts that weaker states will ally to protect themselves from stronger ones and thereby form and reform a balance of power. So, when Germany unified in the late 19th century and became Europes leading military and industrial power, Russia and France (and later, Britain) soon aligned to counter its power. Yet no combination of states or other powers can challenge the United States militarily, and no balancing coalition is imminent. Realists are scrambling to find a way to fill this hole in the center of their theory. Some theorists speculate that the United States geographic distance and its relatively benign intentions have tempered the balancing instinct. Second-tier powers tend to worry more about their immediate neighbors and even see the United States as a helpful source of stability in regions such as East Asia. Other scholars insist that armed resistance by U.S. foes in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, and foot-dragging by its formal allies actually constitute the beginnings of balancing against U.S. hegemony. The United States strained relations with Europe offer ambiguous evidence: French and German opposition to recent U.S. policies could be seen as classic balancing, but they do not resist U.S. dominance militarily. Instead, these states have tried to undermine U.S. moral legitimacy and constrain the superpower in a web of multilateral institutions and treaty regimesnot what standard realist theory predicts. These conceptual difficulties notwithstanding, realism is alive, well, and creatively reassessing how its root principles relate to the post-9/11world. Despite changing configurations of power, realists remain steadfast in stressing that policy must be based on positions of real strength, not on either empty bravado or hopeful illusions about a world without conflict. In the run-up to the recent Iraq war, several prominent realists signed a public letter criticizing what they perceived as an exercise in American hubris. And in the continuing aftermath of that war, many prominent thinkers called for a return to realism. A group of scholars and public intellectuals (myself included) even approach. Its statement of princi- ples argues that “the move toward empire must be halted immediately.” The coalition, though politically diverse, is largely inspired by realist theory. Its membership of seemingly odd bedfellowsincluding for- mer Democratic Sen. Gary Hart and Scott McConnell, the executive editor of the American Conservative magazineillus- trates the power of international relations theory to cut through often ephemeral political labels and carry debate to the underlying assumptions. THE DIVIDED HOUSE OF LIBERALISM The liberal school of international relations theory, whose most famous proponents were German philosopher Immanuel Kant and U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, contends that realism has a stunted vision that cannot account for progress in relations between nations. Liberals foresee a slow but inexorable journey away from the anarchic world the realists envision, as trade and finance forge ties between nations, and democratic norms spread. Because elected leaders are accountable to the people (who bear the burdens of war), liberals expect that democracies will not attack each other and will regard each others regimes as legitimate and nonthreatening. 因为当选的领导者们对人们（那些肩负起战争的人们）负责，自由派期望民主国将不会相互攻击对方，并且将相互之间的政体看作是一种合法和对其不构成威胁的政体。Many liberals also believe that the rule of law and transparency of democratic processes make it easier to sustain international cooperation, especially when these practices are enshrined in multilateral institutions.很多自由主派也相信法律的统治和民主进程的透明使得维持国际间的合作变得更加容易，尤其是当这些实践庄严地载入了多边体系中，Liberalism has such a powerful presence that the entire U.S. political spectrum, from neoconservatives to human rights advocates, assumes it as largely self-evident. 自由主义拥有这样一个颇具影响力的范畴，以致整个美国政治范围内，从新保守主义者到人权倡导者，很大程度上都认为它是显而易见的。Outside the United States, as well, the liberal view that only elected governments are legitimate and politically reliable has taken hold. 同样地，除了美国之外，这样一个自由的观点：只有当选的政府才是合法的，并且在政治上才是可靠的，已经站稳了脚跟了。So it is no surprise that liberal themes are constantly invoked as a response to todays security dilemmas. 因此，自由的主题不断地被引用作为对于当今的安全困境的回应，这并不会让人感到惊讶。But the last several years have also produced a fierce tug-of- war between disparate strains of liberal thought. 但是在过去的几年里，在不同的自由思想的紧张之间也产生了一个激烈的竞争。Supporters and critics of the Bush administration, in particular, have emphasized very different elements of the liberal canon. 支持者们和布什政府的批评家们尤其强调自由准则的不同因素。For its part, the Bush administration highlights democracy promotion while largely turning its back on the international institutions that most liberal theorists champion. 对其来说，当很大程度上抛弃了绝大多数自由主义理论者拥护的国际机构的时候，布什政府强调民主提升了。The U.S. National Security Strategy of September 2002, famous for its support of preventive war, also dwells on the need to promote democracy as a means of fighting terrorism and promoting peace. 美国国家2002年九月份的安全策略，以其对预防战争的支持而闻名，也详述了促进民主作为促进和平和打击恐怖主义的一种方法的需要。The Millennium Challenge program allocates part of U.S. foreign aid according to how well countries improve their performance on several measures of democratization and the rule of law.千年挑战计划根据国家关于民主化和法规的几个措施改善其表现的程度，分派部分美国国外帮助。The White Houses steadfast support for promoting democracy in the Middle Easteven with turmoil in Iraq and rising anti-Americanism in the Arab worlddemonstrates liberalisms emotional and rhetorical power. 美国白宫对于中东地区提倡民主坚定的支持甚至在伊拉克地区还处于骚乱状态，并且在阿拉伯存在日益增长的反美主义 证明了自由主义令人动情的，用词华丽的力量。In many respects, liberalisms claim to be a wise policy guide has plenty of hard data behind it. 很多方面，自由主义宣称是一个明智的政策引导在其背后已经有很多确切的数据支持着这么一个理论了。During the last two decades, the proposition that democratic institutions and values help states cooperate with each other is among the most intensively studied in all of international relations, and it has held up reasonably well. 在过去的二十年期间，民主的机构和价值帮助国与国之间相互合作这样的一个提议在所有的国际关系中，是最值得集中研究的，而且这样的一个提议已经相当合理地被搁置。Indeed, the belief that democracies never fight wars against each other is the closest thing we have to an iron law in social science.的确，民主国家相互之间永远不会发动战争这样的一个信念是一件我们所拥有的，并且离我们最近的事情，这件事情是相对于一个在社会科学中的刚强的法律而言的。But the theory has some very important corollaries, which the Bush administration glosses over as it draws upon the democracy-promotion element of liberal thought.但是，那个理论有一些非常重要的推论，布什政府一直掩饰着这样的一个理论，因为布什政府利用了了自由思想促进民主的因素。Columbia University political scientist Michael W. Doyles articles on democratic peace warned that, though democracies never fight each other, they are prone to launch messianic struggles against warlike authoritarian regimes to “make the world safefor democracy.”哥伦比亚大学政治学家Michael W. Doyle在关于 民主和平的文章警告说：“虽然民主国家相互之间没有战争，但是这些民主国家倾向于 与 那些喜好战争的独裁主义政权做救世主般的斗争，从而让这个世界在对于民主这个范畴来讲的时候，是安全的。”It was precisely American democracys tendency to oscillate between self-righteous crusading and jaded isola