外文翻译---服务业FDI的开放性：一个国际比较分析.doc

本科毕业论文外文翻译原文Openness to Foreign Direct Investment in Services: An International Comparative AnalysisStephen S. GolubNational policies towards FDI typically feature measures aimed at both attracting and discouraging in ows. Policies to attract FDI such as tax breaks, favourable regulatory treatment and subsidies of various sorts are usually focused on manufacturing. Policies towards services are far more ambivalent. Laws and regulatory practices frequently discriminate against foreign investors in services such as public utilities (electricity distribution and telecommunications in particular), transport (notably air and maritime transport), nancial services, and even construction and wholesale/retail distribution.The ambiguous attitudes towards FDI in services are amply illustrated in recent policy actions and debates. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), an inter-agency group that screens foreign direct investment for national security concerns, has recently been in the limelight with several high-profile cases, notably one involving the acquisition of a US port by investors in Dubai. A recent open skies aviation agreement between the United States and the European Union was scuttled in part because the United States refused to ease its restriction that all US airlines must be at least 75 per cent owned by US citizens. Japan rejected a takeover offer from the UK-based Childrens Investment Fund in the energy company J-Power. China has been moving, under pressure from the United States, to open its nancial services industry to foreign investors. Likewise, India is also gradually opening wholesale and distribution services to large foreign rms such as Wal-Mart despite strong local opposition. Venezuela and other Latin American countries with left-wing governments, on the other hand, have recently increased restrictions on foreign investment in telecommunications. Thailand has also recently moved to reduce control by foreign investors in its telecommunications industry.As in the case of manufacturing, countries benet from FDI in services through employment creation, capital accumulation, transfer of technology, improved service and increased competition. Moreover, liberalisation of FDI in services can contribute to manufacturing productivity by increasing availability of quality of production-related services (Arnold et al., 2006, 2007; Golub et al.,2007). Critics argue that FDI can also impose economic costs such as displacement of local rms and reduced competition. Infant entrepreneurship arguments can be adduced in favour of discrimination against foreign investors. Service sectors are also typically subject to economic or prudential regulation, because of tendencies towards natural monopoly or other market failures, although such market failures do not in themselves provide a clear-cut rationale for discrimination between local and foreign investors. The main reasons for limiting foreign ownership in services are non-economic, relating to national security or economic nationalism. Industries such as telecommunications, banking, transportation and electricity provision are often viewed by host countries as strategic or sensitive. Services are therefore generally subject to far more stringent restrictions than manufacturing and even natural resources (Hoekman, 1995).The cross-border provision of services, unlike goods, often can only be delivered through commercial presence, i.e. setting up of foreign operations, rather than international trade in the item itself. It is therefore to be expected that FDI plays a prominent role in the globalisation of the service sector, fostered in part by partial opening of service industries to FDI.Formal international agreements on FDI and on trade in services have been far less extensive than on international trade in goods, although various global negotiations and regional free-trade agreements often cover some aspects of international investment in services, notably the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) provisions on commercial presence. To the extent that it has occurred, opening to FDI in services has primarily been unilateral.FDI in services has been increasing rapidly, raising the stakes in the debates about policies. In 2005, services constituted the majority of inward FDI stocks, at almost two-thirds for developed countries, and about 50 per cent for developing countries, up considerably from 1990 (Table 1). Within services, nance, trade and business services are the three largest categories, but transport, communications and electricity have also been increasing rapidly. It should be noted, however, that the share of services in total FDI remains smaller than the share of services in world GDP, reecting in part the fact that FDI in services remain relatively restricted. Evidence that restrictions reduce FDI is provided below.Despite the increasing prominence and controversies surrounding FDI in services, very little systematic information is available on policies towards FDI in services. Unlike international trade where international comparisons of tariff and non-tariff barriers are widely available, there have been few previous efforts to quantify and systematically compare national policies towards FDI. Yet, indicators of the policy stance towards FDI are just as important as measures of trade barriers, given the prominence of FDI in the world economy and the policy debates surrounding FDI. Both policy-makers and researchers stand to benet from the use of the indicators presented here. The rst step in any international negotiations related to FDI involves improved information on policies towards FDI. The inuential knowledge-capital model of FDI suggests that restrictions on FDI are an important variable for inclusion in empirical analysis. In econometric tests of FDI, researchers have sometimes resorted to measures based on surveys of investor opinion, rather than objective measures of openness to FDI, but the reliability of these subjective measures is open to question.Case studies of the environment for FDI in various economies have been conducted through investors surveys and country reports (e.g. Economist IntelligenceUnit reports and Country Commercial Guides), but these cover a wide variety of issues and are not easily compared.Given the difculties in classifying and ranking the various restrictions, some studies (e.g. Hoekman, 1995) are limited to counting the number of restrictions. Kobrin (2005) used an annual UNCTAD report on national policy changes to show that liberalisation measures greatly outnumber increased restrictions in the 19922001 period. However, UNCTADs database provides no information about the level of restrictions, only the number and nature of changes that are observed in different years.A number of studies of restrictions on FDI (Hoekman, 1995; Pacic EconomicCooperation Council, 1995) use the WTOs GATS commitments related to mode 3 (commercial presence) as their primary data source. GATS commitments are made in the form of positive lists, i.e. they represent ofcial commitments to open markets. This is in contrast to negative lists of exceptions to liberalisation. A problem with the GATS positive lists is that the absence of a positive commitment in some sector does not necessarily imply a restriction. A country may simply have chosen not to list this sector in its schedule to retain policy exibility. Or, if the sector is restricted, GATS may be silent on the nature of the restriction. Also, the current GATS schedules date from around 2000 and may not adequately capture recent changes at the national level.The Australian Productivity Commission and afliated researchers carried out a number of sectoral studies of impediments to trade in services: telecommunications (Warren, 2001), banking (McGuire and Schuele, 2001), maritime transport (McGuire et al., 2001), distribution (Kalirajan, 2000) and professional services (Nguyen-Hong, 2000). These studies focus on all modes of service delivery rather than FDI per se, however, and many of them rely primarily on the GATS, with the related limitations noted above.The Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom (IEF) rates the opennessof countries to FDI on a scale of 1 to 5. The IEF methodology is not clearly articulated on their website and covers broader aspects of the climate for FDI, such as foreign exchange convertibility and access to arbitration that differ from the narrower focus here on discrimination between foreign and domestic investors. The World Competitiveness Report also ranks countries on their openness to FDI. These reports, however, are not based on a transparent and veriable method and openness to FDI is not precisely dened.Hardin and Holmes (1997, 2002) provide a comprehensive approach to barriersto inward FDI but cover only a limited number of countries. Golub (2003), Koyama and Golub (2006) and UNCTAD (2006) adopt a variant of Hardin and Holmess approach in a study of restrictions on inward FDI for various samples of developed and developing countries. This article extends and synthesises the results from these three studies.There are a number of limitations of the present study. First, policies towardsFDI are diverse and complex, and therefore not easily quantied even when they are known. Second, descriptions of these policies are not readily available and must be sought in a variety of sources, which sometimes provide conicting or incomplete information. Third, policies are not static; on the contrary, governments have frequently altered policies. Fourth, the focus here is on policies that discriminate between foreign and domestic investors, i.e. deviations fromnational treatment. Regulations of labour and product markets and other policies that apply equally to foreign and domestic investors are not considered here,with the exception of government monopolies. For example, domestic content requirements, price ceilings, prudential regulations and other barriers to entry are not addressed. Fifth, this study is limited to overt restrictions on FDI, mostly ignoring any informal private or ofcial efforts to tilt the playing eld in favour of domestic over foreign rms. Sixth, the breadth and degree of enforcement may not always be easily inferred from the descriptions of the statutes. Seventh, this study does not consider positive discrimination towards foreign investors such as tax breaks.The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 explains the method of computing FDI restrictions, Section 3 presents the results for all countries, Section 4 examines the correlations of FDI restrictions with FDI patterns, and Section 5 concludes.This section explains how measures of policies discriminating between foreign and domestic investors are computed. There are several issues involved in computing the restriction scores. A classication of various types of restrictions, a choice of industries and a system of weighting are needed.外文题目： Openness to Foreign Direct Investment in Services: An International Comparative Analysis 出 处： The World Economy (2009) doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9701.2009.01201.x 作 者： Stephen S. Golub 译 文：服务业FDI的开放性：一个国际比较分析国家政策对于外商直接投资的典型特征措施旨在吸引和阻止资本流入。吸引外国直接投资的政策，如税收减免，有利的监督管理和各类补贴通常是以制造业为重点。对于服务的政策，更是矛盾。法律和监管措施对服务的外国投资者的经常歧视，如公用事业（尤其是电力分配和电信），运输（尤其是空中和海上运输），金融服务，甚至是建筑和批发/零售分销行业。最近的政策行动和辩论充分说明了对外国直接在服务业投资的不明确态度。美国对外国投资委员会（CFIUS），一个的机构间小组筛查的最近引起人们注意的几个典型外国直接在国家安全问题上投资的案例，特别是其中的涉及美国港口被迪拜投资者收购的案例。最近的一个美国和欧盟的“开放天空”的航空协议在某种程度上失败是因为美国拒绝放宽所有美国的航空公司必须至少拥有75%的美国公民的限制。日本拒绝了位于英国的以儿童投资基金为基础的能源公司J-Powerd的收购要约。中国在受到来自美国的压力下逐渐对外国投资者开放金融服务业。同样，印度也逐渐对国外大公司如沃尔玛开放批发及分销服务，尽管本地的反对意见很强烈。委内瑞拉和其他拉美国家的左翼政府，另一方面，最近增加了对外资在电信投资的限制。泰国最近也提出，以减少外国投资者在电信行业的控制。由于在制造的情况下，国家通过外国在服务业直接投资中创造的就业机会，资本积累，技术转移，改进服务和增加竞争受益。此外，外国直接在服务投资的开放能够促进生产效率的提高，通过增加与生产相关的服务的可用性(Arnold et al., 2006, 2007; Golub et al., 2007)。批评者认为外国直接投资也可以征收经济损失比如当地企业的置换和减少竞争。婴儿企业家精神论点可以被引证为对外国投资者的歧视的支持。服务部门通常也受到经济或审慎监管，因为对自然垄断或其他市场失灵的倾向，虽然这种市场失灵本身并不能为本地和外国投资者直接的歧视提供明确的理由。限制在非经济领域的外资服务所有权的主要原因在于国家安全和经济民主主义。行业如电信，银行，交通和电力供应往往是被东道国国家视为“战略”或“敏感”。因此，服务业普遍受到比制造业甚至自然资源更为严格的限制（Hoekman，1995）。该服务的跨境提供，不像商品，往往只能通过“商业存在”交付，即设立海外业务，而不是项目本身的国际贸易。因此，可以预期，外国直接投资在全球化的服务部门中有着很重要的地位，在某种程度上推动了服务业的外国直接投资的部分开放。利用外商直接投资的正式的国际协议和服务贸易范围比在国际贸易的货物少得多，虽然不同的全球贸易谈判和区域自由贸易协定经常会涉及国际投资服务的一些方面，特别是在服务贸易总协定（GATS）对商业存在的规定。在某种程度上外国直接投资在服务业的开放已单向的初步发生。服务业外国直接投资迅速增加，提高有关政策的辩论中的利害关系。2005年，服务构成了大部分的外来直接投资股票，与1990年比较发达国家几乎有三分之二的大幅度上升，发展国家大约有百分之五十(表 1)。在服务业，金融，贸易和商业服务构成三大类别，但交通，通讯和电力也迅速增加。应当指出，在外国直接投资总额中服务所占的份额仍然低于世界GDP的服务份额，部分反映了外国直接投资在服务业仍然相对有限的事实。如下证据表明限制条件减少了外国直接投资。尽管围绕服务业外商直接投资的争论日益突出，很少有系统的资料可用于服务业外国直接投资政策。不像国际贸易的关税和非关税贸易壁垒在国际上比较广泛的使用，很少有过量化和比较系统地研究对外国直接投资的国家政策。然而，对外国直接投资的政策指标的立场是与贸易壁垒措施一样重要的，考虑到围绕外国直接投资在世界经济和外国直接投资政策的突出辩论。政策制定者和研究者都从这里展示的指标受益。有关外国直接投资在任何国际谈判的第一步是改进对外国直接投资的政策信息。颇具影响力的外国直接投资的知识资本的模型表明，外国直接投资的限制条件是经验性分析中需列入的一个重要变量。外商直接投资的计量测试中，研究人员有时会采取对投资者的民意调查，而不是客观的测量对外国直接投资的开放性，但是这些主观测试的可靠性值得商榷。通过投资者和国家报告（如经济学家情报组的报告和我国商业指南），对各经济体的外国直接投资环境案例研究进行了调查，但这些涵盖了各种各样的问题，不容易比较。鉴于分类和排序各种限制的困难，一些研究（如Hoekman，1995）受限于计数数量的限制。Kobrin (2005) 使用年度的联合国贸易和发展会议报告的国家政策变化显示，自由化措施，极大地超过在1992-2001年期间增加的限制。但是，贸发会议的数据库没有提供有关的限制级别的信息，只有不同年份的数量和性质的变化。对外国直接投资的限制（Hoekman，1995;太平洋经济合作理事会，1995年）的研究报告,利用世贸组织的服务贸易总协定的承诺，将源模式3（商业存在）作为其原始数据，服务贸易总协定作出的承诺是“积极的”清单的形式，也就是说，它们代表官方承诺开放市场。这是相对于“负面的”例外的自由化清单。服务贸易总协定列出积极的清单的问题是一些部门的积极承诺，并不一定意味着没有限制。一个国家可能干脆选择不列出时间表，保留本部门政策的灵活性。或者，如果该部门限制，服务贸易总协定可能会对该限制的性质保持沉默。此外，目前2000年左右的服务贸易总协定的时间表，可能无法充分反映国家最近的变化。此外，澳大利亚生产力委员会及其所属的研究人员开展了一系列阻碍服务贸易的部门研究，电信业(Warren, 2001)，银行业(McGuire and Schuele, 2001)，海运(McGuire et al., 2001)，配送(Kalirajan, 2000)和专业服务(Nguyen-Hong, 2000)。这些研究侧重于所有提供服务的模式，而不是外国直接投资本身，然而，其中许多主要依赖于服务贸易总协定与上面提到的有关限制。美国传统基金会经济自由度指数（国际盛事基金）将国家的外国直接投资的开放性的规模评为1至5。国际盛事基金的方法在他们的网站没有明确阐述，涵盖了外国直接投资更广的面，如外汇兑换和存取的仲裁的不同较窄的集中在国内外投资者之间的歧视这里。世界竞争力报告还对他们国家的外国直接投资的开放性排名。但是这些报告并非基于一个透明和可核查的方法，对外国直接投资开放性没有明确的界定。Hardin和Holmes (1997, 2002) 提供全面的方法来解除外国直接投资流入的障碍，但只涉及有限的几个国家。Golub (2003)，Koyama 和Golub (2006)采用Hardin和Holmes对外商直接投资流入发达国家和发展中国家的各种样品的限制的研究的一种做法。本文从这三个研究结果进行扩展和综合处理。当前的研究有许多限制。首先，对外国直接投资的政策是多样和复杂的，因此不容易量化，即使它们是已知的。其次，这些政策信息是不容易获得，必须寻求各种各样的来源，有时提供相互矛盾的或不完全的信息。第三，政策不是一成不变的，相反，政府经常改变政策。第四，这里的重点是在外国和国内投资者的政策，即偏离“国民待遇”。劳动力和产品市场和其他政策条例同样适用于外国和国内投资者在这里不予考虑，除了政府垄断者以外。例如，国内含量要求，价格上限，审慎监管和其他进入障碍得不到解决。第五，本研究仅限于公开限制的外国直接投资，几乎忽略任何非正式的私人或政府努力倾斜外国公司竞争环境使有利于国内市场。第六，执法的广度和程度可能并不总是很容易从法律的说明推断出来。第七，这个研究并没有考虑对外国投资者正面的歧视，诸如减税。本文的其余部分组织如下。第2节说明了外国直接投资的限制的计算方法，第3节显示了所有国家的结果，第4节审查了外国直接投资的限制与外国直接投资模式的相关性，第5节总结。本节解释说明了国外和国内投资者之间如何区分政策措施进行了计算。计算限制分数涉及到几个问题。对不同类型的限制进行分类，行业选择和权重体系是必要的。10/30 17:12 C620轴拨杆的工艺规程及钻2-16孔的钻床夹具设计09/21 13:39 CA6140车床拨叉零件的机械加工工艺规程及夹具设计83100308/30 15:37 CPU风扇后盖的注塑模具设计09/20 16:19 GDC956160工业对辊成型机设计08/30 15:45 LS型螺旋输送机的设计10/07 23:43 LS型螺旋输送机设计09/20 16:23 P-90B型耙斗式装载机设计09/08 20:17 PE10自行车无级变速器设计10/07 09:23 话机机座下壳模具的设计与制造09/08 20:20 T108吨自卸车拐轴的断裂原因分析及优化设计09/21 13:39 X-Y型数控铣床工作台的设计09/08 20:25 YD5141SYZ后压缩式垃圾车的上装箱体设计10/07 09:20 ZH1115W柴油机气缸体三面粗镗组合机床总体及左主轴箱设计09/21 15:34 ZXT-06型多臂机凸轮轴加工工艺及工装设计10/30 16:04 三孔连杆零件的工艺规程及钻35H6孔的夹具设计08/30 17:57 三层货运电梯曳引机及传动系统设计10/29 14:08 上盖的工工艺规程及钻6-4.5孔的夹具设计10/04 13:45 五吨单头液压放料机的设计10/04 13:44 五吨单头液压放料机设计09/09 23:40 仪表外壳塑料模设计09/08 20:57 传动盖冲压工艺制定及冲孔模具设计09/08 21:00 传动系统测绘与分析设计10/07 23:46 保护罩模具结构设计09/20 1