亚洲发展模式破产了.doc

亚洲发展模式破产了作者：迈克尔佩蒂斯(Michael Pettis)为英国金融时报撰稿 2009-05-21亚洲经济近来的好转，正催生出一种危险的乐观情绪，几乎是在蓄意漠视今后的困难。未来的历史学家将把2008年作为亚洲发展模式破产的标志性年份。过去20年间，这种模式为亚洲经济的迅速增长提供了主要动力。而未来10年，将迎来通往新发展模式的艰难转型期。不幸的是，许多亚洲国家正在施行的危机应对政策，虽然可能暂时推动增长，却只会加大转型的难度。亚洲发展模式中国是一个强劲增长的典范的核心，是旨在调动高水平的国内储蓄、并把巨额投资输送到产能建设的各项政策。这些政策通过制约消费推高了储蓄水平，尽管与此同时，也迫使国内生产迅速增长。亚洲发展模式的后果之一，就是数十年来，生产一直超过消费。当一个国家的产出超过了消费，它就必须实现贸易顺差，出口过剩产能。因此，亚洲模式要求贸易顺差高高在上且不断扩大，使亚洲制造商能够生产远远超出亚洲消费者购买力的产品。但如果没有其它地区的贸易逆差，就不会有（亚洲的）贸易顺差。亚洲模式的一个根本条件是：外国人能够维持必要的贸易逆差。实际上，只有美国经济及金融体系的规模和灵活程度能够胜任这一角色。换言之，亚洲模式隐含着一场豪赌即押注于美国继续维持并扩大其巨额贸易逆差的意愿和能力。近20年来，美国家庭一直不计后果借贷，为消费狂欢埋单，也使亚洲出口商得以持续出口过剩产能。但随着美国家庭的资产负债状况表变得不堪重负，步入一段漫长的去杠杆化过程，只是时间早晚的问题。全球金融危机正是这一过程的组成部分。因此，未来很多年，美国消费增长都将落后于GDP增长。也就是说，美国的贸易逆差必将收窄，甚至变成贸易顺差。就规模而言，欧洲是足以取代美国的唯一经济体，而它显然也境况不佳，且负债累累，无力弥补上述需求缺口。因此，未来数年亚洲国家将无法继续通过巨额的贸易顺差来消化过剩的产能。那它们能做些什么呢？如果亚洲国家能够迅速推高国内消费净额，使其足以弥补美国消费净额的下滑，就不存在什么问题了。不幸的是如果说历史情况可以为鉴的话实现这一目标需要的时间，将比许多人希望的长得多。从出口驱动型经济向着国内消费驱动型模式的转型，涉及金融体系及家庭行为的漫长调整，还须对以往推动经济增长的政治结构和产业政策进行重大调整。然而，许多亚洲决策者仍对过时的发展观和僵化的产业及金融体系恋恋不舍，他们正把事情弄得更糟。他们试图通过加速推行已经破产的政策，来促进国内消费。这些投资导向型政策会通过扩大生产，间接地推动消费增长。因此，虽然它们暂时能拉动经济增长，但无法令国内消费净额上升到足以取代美国购买额的水平。更糟糕的是，某些情况下，这些政策将在未来最需要国内消费的时候，对其构成严重制约。举例而言，过去5个月，在中国政策制定者的鼓励下，出现了一轮规模空前的信贷扩张，它不仅以拉动投资为主要目标，也几乎肯定会导致未来的不良贷款大幅攀升。当不良贷款问题日益凸显、并威胁到银行体系的生存能力时，中国政府将不得不出台应对政策它以往就是这样做的，以进一步遏制消费，比如强制降低存款利率，以提高银行利润水平，或吸纳存款用于银行的资本重组。风险在于，如果政策的效果是令财政借贷、银行债务及企业存货出现短暂、且不可持续的增长，那么这些政策只会令中国的转型之路更加艰难。最终消化这些政策的影响，将令向内需驱动型经济转型的过程变得更加漫长和痛苦。事实证明，亚洲发展模式隐含的一个基本前提美国家庭有能力无限制地贷款和消费是错误的。这意味着，以这种模式作为增长引擎的时代已经结束。对于亚洲政策制定者来说，越早认识到这一点，越早坚定地推行经济与政治变革，转型经受的痛苦就会越轻。不幸的是，这种情况似乎并未出现。作者是卡内基国际和平基金会(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)高级研究员、北京大学金融学教授。译者/章晴Asias policymakers must enforce reformsBy Michael Pettis 2009-05-21The recent upturn in Asian economies is creating a dangerous optimism that almost willfully ignores the difficulties ahead. Future historians will mark 2008 as the year that the development model that has driven much of Asias rapid growth for the past two decades went bankrupt. While, the next decade will represent a difficult transition towards a new development model, unfortunately many Asian countries are responding to the economic crisis with policies that may temporarily boost growth but that are only likely to make the transition more difficult.At the centre of the Asian development model, with China providing a steroid-fueled example, were policies aimed at mobilising high levels of domestic savings and channeling massive investment into productive capacity. These policies boosted savings by constraining consumption even while they forced rapid growth in domestic production. One of the consequences of the Asian development model has been that production outgrew consumption for decades. When a country produces more than it consumes, it must run a trade surplus to export its excess capacity. The Asian model consequently required high and rising trade surpluses that allowed Asian producers to produce far in excess of what Asian consumers could afford to absorb.But there cannot be trade surpluses without trade deficits elsewhere. A fundamental requirement for the Asian model was that foreigners were able to run the requisite trade deficits. In practice only the US economy and financial system were large and flexible enough to play this role. The Asian model, in other words, implicitly involved a massive bet on the willingness and ability of the US to continue to run large and rising trade deficits.For nearly two decades US households borrowed recklessly to finance the consumption binge that allowed Asian exporters to continue exporting excess capacity but, as household balance sheets in the US became vastly overextended, it was just a question of time before a long deleveraging process would occur. The global financial crisis is part of this very process.As a consequence, US consumption will grow more slowly than US gross domestic product for many years. This is another way of saying that the US trade deficit must fall and may even become a trade surplus. Since it is clear that Europe, the only other economy large enough to replace the US, is too sickly and indebted to take up the slack, for the next several years Asians will not be able to continue running massive trade surpluses to absorb their excess capacity.So what can they do? If Asian countries could boost domestic net consumption as rapidly as US net consumption declines, none of this would matter. Unfortunately, and if history is any guide, this is going to take much longer than many hope. The transition from an export-led economy to a domestic consumption-led model involves a long restructuring of the financial system and household behaviour, and a major reversion away from political structures and industrial policies that powered growth in the past.But wedded as they are to an outmoded development ideology and rigid industrial and financial systems, many Asian policymakers are making things worse. They are attempting to raise domestic consumption by accelerating the policies that are bankrupt.These investment-oriented policies raise consumption indirectly, by boosting production, and so although they temporarily boost growth, they cannot result in a sufficiently large increase in domestic net consumption to replace American buying. What is worse, in some cases these policies will sharply constrain future domestic consumption, just when it is needed most.For example, the unprecedented loan expansion that Chinese policymakers have encouraged in the past five months is not only targeted primarily at boosting investment, but will almost certainly result in a massive expansion in future non-performing loans. As these become apparent and threaten the viability of the banking system, Beijing will be forced to respond, as it did in the past, with policies that further constrain consumption either by forcing lower deposit rates to increase bank profitability, or by capturing savings to recapitalise the banks.The risk is that Chinas trans