电力市场 文献翻译.doc

电力市场文献翻译 题 目 学生姓名 专业班级 学 号 院 （系） 指导教师 完成时间 2010年 06 月 05日 电力市场摘 要本文从引入能源市场概念的历史入手，对电力市场从总体到局部的作了介绍。分别讲述了批发电力市场和零售电力市场，电费问题，以及对电力市场适当作了批判。关键词 电力市场 批发电力市场 零售电力市场 电费 批判从经济角度来看，电力是一种商品能够被购买和出售。电力市场是一个影响电力购买和出售的系统，利用供应和需求来设定价格。批发交易的电力通常是清理和解决电网经营者或专用独立的实体，专门负责这一职能。市场的某些相关商品所规定的（和支付费用）各电网经营者，以确保其可靠性，如旋转备用，业务准备金，并安装能力，也通常由电网运营商来经营。此外，对大多数主要有电网电力市场的衍生产品，如电力期货和期权就是积极交易。这些市场的发展导致世界各地放松了对电力系统的管制。这个进程往往持续对天然气市场并行和放宽管制。1 早期历史最早引入能源市场的概念和私有化，是以电力系统产生于20世纪八十年代初期的智利，在并行和其它连带的面向市场改革与芝加哥男孩。智利模式普遍被视为成功地使电力价格具有合理性和透明度，但是考虑到随之而来的一些大型任职的继续主导和遭受结构性问题。阿根廷对智利的改进模型，实行严格的限制和加强了市场集中度，并举行改善付款单位储备金的结构，以保证系统的可靠性。在阿根廷引入市场的概念的主要宗旨之一的是私有化现有的发电资产（其中已落入下失修政府拥有的垄断，从而导致频繁的服务中断） ，并为需要恢复这些资产和系统的扩展吸引资本。世界银行在其他拉丁美洲国家积极引进各种混合市场，包括秘鲁，巴西和哥伦比亚，在20世纪九十年代，取得有限进展。电力市场的一个关键事件发生在1990年时，英国政府下面的玛格丽特撒切尔私有化英国供电业。英国当时所遵循的程序作为一个模式，或者至少对放宽其它一些英联邦国家是催化剂，特别是澳大利亚和新西兰，像阿尔伯塔省的区域市场。然而，在许多其他情况下发生的放松市场管制的广泛私有化的特点，就是英国的例子。放松管制的进程在不同的机构和市场的设计往往是非常不同的，但许多基本概念是相同的。这些国家是：职能分开，竞争的发电和零售从自然垄断职能的传输和分配，以及建立电力市场和批发零售电力市场。批发市场的作用是允许发电机之间的交易，零售商和其他金融中介机构为短期提供电力（见现货价格） ，并为未来的交付期提供（见远期价格）。2 自然市场电力是其特点是难以储存，必须发电量和用电量平衡。因此，与其他产品，它是不可能的，正常操作的情况下，是要保持它的存储、配给或有客户排队的。此外，需求不同和供应不断。因此物理要求控制机构，传输系统运营商，将协调派遣机组，来满足预期的跨越输电系统需求。如果有一个不匹配供应和需求之间的发电机加快或减慢造成系统频率（50或60HZ） 上升或下降。如果频率不在预定范围内，则系统运营商将采取行动，增加或切断任何机组或负荷。此外，物理定律确定电流如何流经一个电力网。因此，在多大程度上的电力在传输距离中的损失和任何特定的网络分支的挤塞程度将影响到经济调度的发电机组。每个电力市场的范围包括传输网络或电力网络，提供给在任何地理区域的批发商，零售商和最终消费者。市场可能超越国界。3 批发电力市场典型的电力日常消费在德国。批发电力市场存在竞争时发电机提供的电力输出到零售商。 对于一个经济高效的电力批发市场的蓬勃发展，至关重要的是一些标准得到满足。哈佛大学的霍根教授已确定这些标准。中央对他的标准是一个协调的现货市场已经有了“出价为基础，安全约束，经济调度与节点的价格” 。其他学者如加州大学伯克利分校的舒默勒奥伦教授和帕博勒斯皮勒教授提出的其他标准。聪明教授霍根的模式在很大程度上已经在美国，澳大利亚和新西兰通过。3.1 买入的，安全的限制，经济调度与节点价格理论电价在每一个节点上的网络是一个计算“影子价格” ，在这种假设的情况是要求在节点的问题上有一个额外千瓦时，并对系统假设增量成本，这样会导致重新派遣优化现有的单位建立了假设千瓦时的生产成本假设。这就是所谓的地点边缘价格（低熔点）或者是节点价格和在一些放松管制的市场使用，特别是在PJM互联，在美国纽约和新英格兰地区和新西兰的市场。然而，许多成熟的市场不配用节点定价，例如英国， Powernext和诺德普尔（斯堪的纳维亚和芬兰） 。虽然从理论上来说，低熔点的概念是有用的，而不是明显受到操纵，但在实践中系统的运营商已经大量酌情处理低熔点结果通过能力分类单位中运行“外出值得派遣” ，从而排除在低熔点中的计算。在大多数系统中，单位派遣提供无功功率，以支持传输网被宣布为“失去价值” （即使通常这些是相同的单位，设在限制区，并会导致丢失信号）。系统经营者，通常也使单位在线举行“纺纱储备” ，以防止突然停电或迅速坡道意外的需求，并宣布他们“失去价值” 。其结果往往是在结算价格时大大减少了，而日益增加的需求会导致价格上涨。霍根和其他人指出了各种因素，包括能源价格上限远远低于规定的推定的稀缺能源的价值所产生的影响“失去价值”派遣，使用技术，如减少在没有缺乏相应的价格信号的电压匮乏时期，等等。结果在“失踪的钱”的问题。结果是，供应商支付的价格“市场”是大大低于所需的水平，以刺激新项目。该市场是有益的，因此在实现短期系统业务和调度的高效率，但一直未能在什么是广告作为一个主要的好处：刺激适合新的投资需要的地方和时间。自推出市场，新西兰在2001年和2003年时经历了短缺，2005年经历了高油价，甚至在2006年遭遇更高的价格和严重短缺之风险的情况（截至2006年4月）。这些问题的原因是，新西兰正处于干旱危险之中，由于其高比例的电力来自水力发电。类似的短缺出现在20世纪70年代介入电力市场之前。如果在上世纪80年代没有短缺，似乎是由于在20世纪70年代开始大量增加的能力所造成的“高瞻远瞩”项目。市场上的差异，现在是自愿作出电力削减需求，而在20世纪70年代实行削减。如果电力用户了解的更多他们宁愿自行削减也不需政府，这样就提高了效率。在低熔点市场，制约因素存在于传输网络，有必要进行派遣更昂贵的一代在制约下游方面的因素。两边价格的约束单独引起拥挤收费和约束出租。当一个制约因素可造成某一分支网络达到其热限制或超载时，可能会出现由于排遣事件（例如，没有一台发电机、变压器或线路故障）是另一个网络的一部分。后者是指作为一个安全的制约因素。输电系统的运作，让其供应具有连续性，即使有故障，如缺少了路线，这就是所谓的安全制约系统。该系统在日前市场的价格，原则上是按提供的匹配发电机确定的，以出价消费者在每个节点开发一个典型的供需平衡的价格，通常以每小时为间隔，是分区域的单独计算，该系统运营商的潮流模型表明限制将绑定传输进口。在实践中，上述低熔点算法的运行，包括安全限制、成本最低的派遣计算（见下文）与在日前市场提供发电机和需求节点问题的基础上投标负载服务实体消耗用品。在大多数系统中使用的算法是一个“特区”的模式，而不是一个“交流”的模式，因此，制约和重新派遣造成热限制确定或预测，但制约和重新派遣造成无功功率不足并非如此。有些系统把边缘损失考虑在内。如上所述，价格在实时市场是由低熔点算法来确定、从提供单位平衡供应。这每个过程在输电网络每个节点上持续五分钟、半小时或一小时（取决于市场）的间隔。假设重新派遣计算确定低熔点必须尊重安全限制和重新派遣计算必须留出足够利润以维持系统在任何地方发生意外的中断的稳定性。这导致现货市场的“出价基础，安全约束，经济调度和节点价格”。3.2 风险管理 “卷风险”往往是用来表示这一现象，使电力市场参与者不确定大小、消费数量或产品。例如，零售商无法准确地预测消费者的任何特定时间的需求，为未来的几天和生产者是无法预测的确切时间，他们将停电或燃料供应不足。一个复杂的因素就是极端价格和数量活动的共同关系。举例来说，油价暴涨时或当一些消费者在消费的高峰期时经常发生一些生产者厂停电。引进大量的间歇性能源，如风力发电可能会缓解市场价格。电力零售商，谁购买批发市场的总额，以及谁销售批发市场发电机的总额，暴露在对这些价格和数量的影响上，就是保护自己免受危及，他们将和彼此进入“对冲合同”。这些区域市场的不同合同的结构，由于不同的公约和市场结构。但是，两个最简单和最常见的形式是很简单的，远期合约实物交割的固定价格和差价合同的当事方同意罢工价格规定的时间期限。在合同差异的情况下，如果造成批发价格指数（如合同中引用）在任何时间内高于“簸动”价格，发电机将退还“簸动”的价格与同期的实际价格之间的差额。同样，零售商将退还给发电机时低于“簸动价格”的实际价格。实际价格指数有时简称为“点”或“资源库”的价格，这取决于市场。在复杂的电力市场有许多其它的冲突安排，如摆动合同，虚拟竞标，金融输电权，看涨期权和看跌期权交易。一般来说，他们的目的是在参与者之间转移金融风险。3.3 批发电力市场澳大利亚- NEMMCO澳大利亚市场管理员，奥地利-见EXAA能源交易所，巴西-电力能源商业厅，加拿大-独立电力系统经营者（ IESO ）安大略省和阿尔伯塔省市场电力系统操作员（ AESO ），智利，斯堪的纳维亚-诺德普尔，法国， - Powernext，德国-欧洲能源交易所EEX，大不列颠- Elexon，爱尔兰- SEMO，日本-见日本电力交易所（ JEPX ），新西兰-见新西兰电力市场，菲律宾-见菲律宾电力批发现货市场，新加坡-见能源市场管理局，新加坡和能源市场公司（ EMC ）的，西班牙-见OMEL电力市场，美国，PJM，德克萨斯州电力可靠性协会市场，纽约市场，中西部市场，加州的ISO。4 零售电力市场电价总体上是政府在管制。然而，根据环境的放松管制和全球的私有化，有些人和其他人已经转变也将这样做。5 电力市场的经验有一些组织和社会运动代表提出在穷人中产生的对世界电力私有化作出了反应。5.1 南非在南非一些社会运动出现了抗议私有化，重新电力的家庭无法支付攀升的增加率，并争取免费的基本电费。其中包括西开普省反拆迁运动， Abahlali baseMjondolo ，南非国会工会联合会（南非工会大会）和索韦托电力危机委员会。参考文献1. 取自于2008年5月11号，新南威尔士州的维多利亚的电力成本的旗帜-悉尼先驱晨报。2. 新华社约翰内斯堡2008年4月17日（网）星期四，南非工会联合会（南非工会大会）数以千计的国会议员，走上约翰内斯堡街头抗议飞涨的食物和电力价格。 ELECTRICITY MARKETABSTRACTIn this paper, the concept of the energy market from the introduction of the history of start of the electricity market from general to partial introduction was made. Separately on the wholesale electricity market and retail electricity market, electricity problem, as well as the electricity market were critical appropriate.KEY WORDS: electricity market wholesale electricity market the retail electricity market electricity critical In economic terms, electricity is a commodity capable of being bought and sold. An electricity market is a system for effecting the purchase and sale of electricity, using supply and demand to set the price. Wholesale transactions in electricity are typically cleared and settled by the grid operator or a special-purpose independent entity charged exclusively with that function. Markets for certain related commodities required by (and paid for by) various grid operators to ensure reliability, such as spinning reserve, operating reserves, and installed capacity, are also typically managed by the grid operator. In addition, for most major grids there are markets for electricity derivatives, such as electricity futures and options, which are actively traded. These markets developed as a result of the deregulation of electric power systems around the world. This process has often gone on in parallel with the deregulation of natural gas markets.1 Early historyThe earliest introduction of energy market concepts and privatization to electric power systems took place in Chile in the early 1980s, in parallel with other market-oriented reforms associated with the Chicago Boys. The Chilean model was generally perceived as successful in bringing rationality and transparency to power pricing, but it contemplated the continuing dominance of several large incumbents and suffered from the attendant structural problems. Argentina improved on the Chilean model by imposing strict limits on market concentration and by improving the structure of payments to units held in reserve to assure system reliability. One of the principal purposes of the introduction of market concepts in Argentina was to privatize existing generation assets (which had fallen into disrepair under the government-owned monopoly, resulting in frequent service interruptions) and to attract capital needed for rehabilitation of those assets and for system expansion. The World Bank was active in introducing a variety of hybrid markets in other Latin American nations, including Peru, Brazil and Colombia, during the 1990s, with limited success.A key event for electricity markets occurred in 1990 when the UK Government under Margaret Thatcher privatised the UK Electricity Supply Industry. The process followed by the British was then used as a model or at least a catalyst for the deregulation of several other Commonwealth countries, notably Australia and New Zealand, and regional markets such as Alberta. However, in many of these other instances the market deregulation occurred without the widespread privatisation that characterised the UK example.In different deregulation processes the institutions and market designs were often very different but many of the underlying concepts were the same. These are: separate the contestable functions of generation and retail from the natural monopoly functions of transmission and distribution; and establish a wholesale electricity market and a retail electricity market. The role of the wholesale market is to allow trading between generators, retailers and other financial intermediaries both for short-term delivery of electricity (see spot price) and for future delivery periods (see forward price).2 Nature of the marketElectricity is by its nature difficult to store and has to be available on demand. Consequently, unlike other products, it is not possible, under normal operating conditions, to keep it in stock, ration it or have customers queue for it. Furthermore, demand and supply vary continuously.There is therefore a physical requirement for a controlling agency, the transmission system operator, to coordinate the dispatch of generating units to meet the expected demand of the system across the transmission grid. If there is a mismatch between supply and demand the generators speed up or slow down causing the system frequency (either 50 or 60 hertz) to increase or decrease. If the frequency falls outside a predetermined range the system operator will act to add or remove either generation or load.In addition, the laws of physics determine how electricity flows through an electricity network. Hence the extent of electricity lost in transmission and the level of congestion on any particular branch of the network will influence the economic dispatch of the generation units.The scope of each electricity market consists of the transmission grid or network that is available to the wholesalers, retailers and the ultimate consumers in any geographic area. Markets may extend beyond national boundaries.3 Wholesale electricity marketTypical daily consumption of electrical power in GermanyA wholesale electricity market exists when competing generators offer their electricity output to retailers.For an economically efficient electricity wholesale market to flourish it is essential that a number of criteria are met. Professor William Hogan of Harvard University has identified these criteria. Central to his criteria is a coordinated spot market that has bid-based, security-constrained, economic dispatch with nodal prices. Other academics such as Professors Shmuel Oren and Pablo Spiller of the University of California, Berkeley have proposed other criteria. Variants of Professor Hogans model have largely been adopted in the US, Australia and New Zealand.3.1 Bid-based, security-constrained, economic dispatch with nodal pricesThe theoretical price of electricity at each node on the network is a calculated shadow price, in which it is assumed that one additional kilowatt-hour is demanded at the node in question, and the hypothetical incremental cost to the system that would result from the optimized redispatch of available units establishes the hypothetical production cost of the hypothetical kilowatt-hour. This is known as locational marginal pricing (LMP) or nodal pricing and is used in some deregulated markets, most notably in the PJM Interconnection, New York, and New England markets in the USA and in New Zealand. However, many established markets do not employ nodal pricing, examples being the UK, Powernext and Nord Pool (Scandinavia and Finland). While in theory the LMP concepts are useful and not evidently subject to manipulation, in practice system operators have substantial discretion over LMP results through the ability to classify units as running in out-of-merit dispatch, which are thereby excluded from the LMP calculation. In most systems, units that are dispatched to provide reactive power to support transmission grids are declared to be out-of-merit (even though these are typically the same units that are located in constrained areas and would otherwise result in scarcity signals). System operators also normally bring units online to hold as spinning-reserve to protect against sudden outages or unexpectedly rapid ramps in demand, and declare them out-of-merit. The result is often a substantial reduction in clearing price at a time when increasing demand would otherwise result in escalating prices. Hogan and others have noted that a variety of factors, including energy price caps set well below the putative scarcity value of energy, the impact of out-of-merit dispatch, the use of techniques such as voltage reductions during scarcity periods with no corresponding scarcity price signal, etc., results in a missing money problem. The consequence is that prices paid to suppliers in the market are substantially below the levels required to stimulate new entry. The markets have therefore been useful in bringing efficiencies to short-term system operations and dispatch, but have been a failure in what was advertised as a principal benefit: stimulating suitable new investment where it is needed, when it is needed.Since the introduction of the market, New Zealand has experienced shortages in 2001 and 2003, high prices all through 2005 and even higher prices and the risk of a severe shortage in 2006 (as of April 2006). These problems arose because NZ is at risk from drought due to its high proportion of electricity generated from hydro. Similar shortages arose during the 1970s before the electricity market was introduced. The absence of shortages during the 1980s appears to be due to the large increase in capacity as a result of the Think Big projects started during the 1970s. The difference the market has made is that now cuts in electricity demand are made voluntarily while in the 1970s cuts were imposed. If the users of electricity know more about what they prefer to cut than the government, this has led to an increase in efficiency. In LMP markets, where constraints exist on a transmission network, there is a need for more expensive generation to be dispatched on the downstream side of the constraint. Prices on either side of the constraint separate giving rise to congestion pricing and constraint rentals.A constraint can be caused when a particular branch of a network reaches its thermal limit or when a potential overload will occur due to a contingent event (e.g., failure of a generator or transformer or a line outage) on another part of the network. The latter is referred to as a security constraint. Transmission systems are operated to allow for continuity of supply even if a contingent event, like the loss of a line, were to occur. This is known as a security constrained system.The system price in the day-ahead market is, in principle, determined by matching offers from generators to bids from consumers at each node to develop a classic supply and demand equilibrium price, usually on an hourly interval, and is calculated separately for subregions in which the system operators load flow model indicates that constraints will bind transmission imports. In practice, the LMP algorithm described above is run, incorporating a security-constrained, least-cost dispatch calculation (see below) with supply based on the generators that submitted offers in the day-ahead market, and demand based on bids from load-serving entities draining supplies at the nodes in question. In most systems the algorithm used is a DC model rather than an AC model, so constraints and redispatch resulting from thermal limits are identified/predicted, but constraints and redispatch resulting from reactive power deficiencies are not. Some systems take marginal losses into account. The prices in the real-time market are determined by the LMP algorithm described above, balancing supply from available units. This process is carried out for each 5-minute, half-hour or hour (depending on the market) interval at each node on the transmission grid. The hypothetical redispatch calculation that determines LMP must respect security constraints and the redispatch calculation must leave sufficient margin to maintain system stability in the event of an unplanned outage anywhere on the system. This results in a spot market with bid-based, security-constrained, economic dispatch with nodal prices.3.2 Risk managementVolume risk is often used to denote the phenomenon whereby electricity market participants have uncertain volumes or quantities of consumption or production. For example, a retailer is unable to accurately predict consumer demand for any particular hour more than a few days into the future and a producer is unable to predict the precise time that they will have plant outage or shortages of fuel. A compounding factor is also the common correlation between extreme price and volume events. For example, price spikes frequently occur when some producers have plant outages or when some consumers are in a period of peak consumption. The introduction of substantial amounts of intermittent power sources such as wind energy may have an impact on market prices.Electricity retailers, who in aggregate buy from the wholesale market, and generators who in aggregate sell to the wholesale market, are exposed to these price and volume effects and to protect themselves from volatility, they will enter into hedge contracts with each other. The structure of these contracts varies by regional market due to different conventions and market structures. However, the two simplest and most common forms are simple fixed price forward contracts for physical delivery and contracts for differences where the parties agree a strike price for defined time periods. In the case of a contract for difference, if a resulting wholesale price index (as referenced in the contract) in any time period is higher than the strike price, the generator will refund the difference between the strike price and the actual price for that period. Similarly a retailer will refund the difference to the generator when the actual price is less than the strike price. The actual price index is sometimes referred to as the spot or pool price, depending on the market.Many other hedging arrangements, such as swing contracts, Virtual Bidding, Financial Tran