美国前最高法院大法官苏特尔在哈佛2010年毕业典礼上的演讲.doc

美国前最高法院大法官苏特尔在哈佛毕业典礼上的演讲哈佛大学法学院第359届毕业典礼，上午仪式开始之前，大法官戴维.H.苏特尔在马萨诸塞大厅内的来宾簿上签名。/哈佛 摄影师When I was younger, I used to hear Harvard stories from a member of the class of 1885. Back then, old graduates of the College who could get to Cambridge on Commencement Day didnt wait for reunion years to come back to the Yard. Theyd just turn up, see old friends, look over the new crop, and have a cup of Commencement punch under the elms. The old man remembered one of those summer days when he was heading for the Square after lunch and crossed paths with a newly graduated senior, who had enjoyed quite a few cups of that punch. As the two men approached each other the younger one thrust out his new diploma and shouted, “Educated, by God.”当我年轻时，我经常听1885班的一位校友讲述哈佛的往事。那时侯，法学院那些可以来剑桥参加毕业典礼的老毕业生们不会等到团聚年才重回学院。他们想回来时就回来，会会老友，看看新人，并在榆树下来一杯鸡尾酒。这位老人聊起旧日夏天的某天，当时他吃完午饭走向广场时，路遇一名新毕业的师弟，此人估计刚开怀畅饮了不少那种鸡尾酒。当二人渐渐走近，新毕业的哥们亮出刚拿到的文凭， 大喊一声“受过上帝的教育！”Even with an honorary Harvard doctorate in my hands, I know enough not to shout that across the Yard, but the Universitys generosity does make me bold enough to say that over the course of 19 years on the Supreme Court, I learned some lessons about the Constitution of the United States, and about what judges do when they apply it in deciding cases with constitutional issues. Im going to draw on that experience in the course of the next few minutes, for it is as a judge that I have been given the honor to speak before you.即使我手握哈佛大学荣誉博士学位，我也了解，没必要向全校的人高呼，但本校的宽容确使我有足够的勇气站在这里说 ，以我过去19年在最高法院的经历，我学到了一些关于美国宪法的知识，以及法官在裁定宪法案件时是如何运用这些宪法知识的。我很荣幸能以一名法官的身份，在接下来的几分钟里向你们讲述这些经历。The occasion for our coming together like this aligns with the approach of two separate events on the judicial side of the national public life: the end of the Supreme Courts term, with its quickened pace of decisions, and a confirmation proceeding for the latest nominee to fill a seat on the court. We will as a consequence be hearing and discussing a particular sort of criticism that is frequently aimed at the more controversial Supreme Court decisions: criticism that the court is making up the law, that the court is announcing constitutional rules that cannot be found in the Constitution, and that the court is engaging in activism to extend civil liberties. A good many of us, Im sure a good many of us here, intuitively react that this sort of commentary tends to miss the mark. But we dont often pause to consider in any detail the conceptions of the Constitution and of constitutional judging that underlie the critical rhetoric, or to compare them with the notions that lie behind our own intuitive responses. Im going to try to make some of those comparisons this afternoon.今天当大家在此欢聚一堂的时刻，也正是我们的国家公共生活中两件和司法有关的大事临近之时：去年的最高法院开庭期1即将结束，因此审理案件的步伐也加快了；为填补离职法官空缺而进行新的大法官提名的程序也接近尾声，正待确认。结果就是，我们将不断的听到或讨论到一种特别的批评，这种批评往往针对那些较具争议的最高法院的判决：这些批评说高院在立法，还说高院宣布的宪法条例在宪法中根本找不到，批评还说高院正在涉足扩大公民自由的司法能动主义（activism）。我们当中有许多人，我肯定今天在场的许多人的直觉反应就是，这些批评往往是文不对题的。但是，我们常常不会稍加思考这些批评言辞下隐藏的宪法概念以及涉宪审判的概念，或者把它们与我们自己的直觉反应背后的概念进行比较。今天下午，我要试着来做些这方面的比较。The charges of lawmaking and constitutional novelty seem to be based on an impression of the Constitution, and on a template for deciding constitutional claims, that go together something like this. A claim is made in court that the government is entitled to exercise a power, or an individual is entitled to claim the benefit of a right, that is set out in the terms of some particular provision of the Constitution. The claimant quotes the provision and provides evidence of facts that are said to prove the entitlement that is claimed. Once they have been determined, the facts on their face either do or do not support the claim. If they do, the court gives judgment for the claimant; if they dont, judgment goes to the party contesting the claim. On this view, deciding constitutional cases should be a straightforward exercise of reading fairly and viewing facts objectively.批评最高法院在立法、在更新宪法，似乎是基于对宪法的某种印象，基于审理涉宪案件的某种模式，这两者结合在一起产生了此类批评。涉宪案件有时候是政府提起诉讼说它有权行使某种权力，有时候是个人根据宪法的某一特定条文主张享有某种权益。原告援引这一条款，并提供事实证据，以证明他所主张的那种权利。一旦所主张的权利被确定，剩下的就是被提出事实是否支持这种主张。如果是，那么最高法院就判决给原告，如果不是，那么最高法院就判决给被告。从这个角度来看，判决涉宪案件应该是一项很直接了当的工作：忠实阅读宪法原文以及客观的认定事实。There are, of course, constitutional claims that would be decided just about the way this fair reading model would have it. If one of todays 21-year-old college graduates claimed a place on the ballot for one of the United States Senate seats open this year, the claim could be disposed of simply by showing the persons age, quoting the constitutional provision that a senator must be at least 30 years old, and interpreting that requirement to forbid access to the ballot to someone who could not qualify to serve if elected. No one would be apt to respond that lawmaking was going on, or object that the age requirement did not say anything about ballot access. The fair reading model would describe pretty much what would happen. But cases like this do not usually come to court, or at least the Supreme Court. And for the ones that do get there, for the cases that tend to raise the national blood pressure, the fair reading model has only a tenuous connection to reality.当然，确实有些涉宪案件是可以用这种忠实阅读宪法原文的模式来判决的。如果今天有位21岁的大学毕业生向法院提起诉讼要求参加今年美国参议员的竞选，对于这种诉求只需简单地展示该人的年龄就可以被驳回，根据宪法规定，参议员的最低年龄为30岁，并解释道这一要求是为了防止某些无法胜任的人获选。没有人会说这是高院在制定法律，或者提出反对说年龄限制的规定不是关于参选权的规定。运用忠实阅读宪法原文的模式可以得出这个案子的判决结果。但这种案子通常不会进入法院，至少很少会出现在最高法院。而那些在最高法院审理的案件往往会使整个国家绷紧神经，忠实阅读宪法原文的判决模式很难在现实中应用。Even a moments thought is enough to show why it is so unrealistic. The Constitution has a good share of deliberately open-ended guarantees, like rights to due process of law, equal protection of the law, and freedom from unreasonable searches. These provisions cannot be applied like the requirement for 30-year-old senators; they call for more elaborate reasoning to show why very general language applies in some specific cases but not in others, and over time the various examples turn into rules that the Constitution does not mention.只要稍假思索就可以明白为什么忠实阅读宪法原文的模式是不切实际的。宪法中有相当多是特意设置的开放式保证，例如“正当程序原则”，“受法律平等保护原则”，以及“免于不合理搜查的权力”等。这些宪法条文无法与“要求参议员必须在30岁以上”的条款以同样的方式执行，它们需要更加详细的探究，说明为什么同样的一句概括性的语句适用于某些案件，却不适用于另外一些案件；为什么随着时间积累，各种判例就形成了宪法原文中没有提及的规则。But this explanation hardly scratches the surface. The reasons that constitutional judging is not a mere combination of fair reading and simple facts extend way beyond the recognition that constitutions have to have a lot of general language in order to be useful over long stretches of time. Another reason is that the Constitution contains values that may well exist in tension with each other, not in harmony. Yet another reason is that the facts that determine whether a constitutional provision applies may be very different from facts like a persons age or the amount of the grocery bill; constitutional facts may require judges to understand the meaning that the facts may bear before the judges can figure out what to make of them. And this can be tricky. To show you what Im getting at, Ive picked two examples of what can really happen, two stories of two great cases. The two stories wont, of course, give anything like a complete description either of the Constitution or of judging, but I think they will show how unrealistic the fair reading model can be.不过这种解释还只是蜻蜓点水。宪法审判不仅仅是忠实阅读原文和简单的事实认定相结合，其原因也不仅仅是宪法必须用大量概括性的语言，以便在很长一段时间内都能适用。还有一个原因是，宪法包含的各种价值观互相不一定能和谐共处，可能互相对立。再一个原因是，某些用来判定是否适用宪法的事实与诸如一个人的年龄或收银条上的金额这些事实是迥然不同的；涉宪法案件中事实可能需要法官们在弄清楚他们想如何使用这些事实之前，先要理解这些事实所包含的意义。这点可能会比较令人费解。为了说明我的意思，我选了两个真实的案例，两个伟大判例的故事。当然，这两个故事绝不是对宪法或审判的全部描述，但我认为它们将展现出忠实阅读原文的判决模式是如何的不切实际。The first story is about what the Constitution is like. Its going to show that the Constitution is no simple contract, not because it uses a certain amount of open-ended language that a contract draftsman would try to avoid, but because its language grants and guarantees many good things, and good things that compete with each other and can never all be realized, all together, all at once.第一个故事是关于宪法是什么样的。它将表明，宪法不是简单的契约，并不是因为它使用了相当多开放式语句，而合同起草者会尽量避免这些开放式语句；而是由于它的文字赋予并许诺了太多美好的东西，而这些美好的东西又彼此冲突，不可能同时或者一次全部实现。The story is about a case that many of us here remember. It was argued before the Supreme Court of the United States on June 26, 1971, and is known as the Pentagon Papers. The New York Times and the Washington Post had each obtained copies of classified documents prepared and compiled by government officials responsible for conducting the Vietnam War. The newspapers intended to publish some of those documents, and the government sought a court order forbidding the publication.这个故事中的案例，我们这里许多人肯定还能回忆起来。这就是著名的“五角大楼文件案”。1971年6月26日，这一案件在美国最高法院开庭辩论。纽约时报和华盛顿邮报各获得了一份由负责指挥越战的政府官员准备并编制的机密文件副本。报纸打算发表其中一些文件，政府要求法院下令禁止刊载。The issue had arisen in great haste, and had traveled from trial courts to the Supreme Court, not over the course of months, but in a matter of days. The time was one of high passion, and the claim made by the United States was the most extreme claim known to the constitutional doctrines of freedom to speak and publish. The government said it was entitled to a prior restraint, an order forbidding publication in the first place, not merely one imposing a penalty for unlawful publication after the words are out. The argument included an exchange between a great lawyer appearing for the government and a great judge, and the colloquy between them was one of those instances of a grain of sand that reveals a universe.这一事件发生的很突然，而且一般案子从初审法院到最高法院都需要数月，这个案子却在短短的数天之内就从初审法院打到了最高法院。事情发生的时间点是一个公众情绪高涨的时侯，而由美国政府所提出的诉讼要求又是对言论和出版自由宪法原则的挑战最为极端的一例。政府表示，它有权预先禁止，即禁止发表，而不是对非法出版行为做出之后再进行处罚的命令。法庭辩论在一个为政府出庭辩护的伟大律师和一个伟大的法官之间展开了，而他们之间的辩论正是知微见著的实例。The great lawyer for the United States was a man who had spent many Commencement mornings in this Yard. He was Irwin Griswold, dean of the Law School for 21 years, who was serving a stint as solicitor general of the United States. The great judge who questioned the dean that day was Mr. Justice Black, the first of the New Deal justices, whom Justice Cardozo described as having one of the most brilliant legal minds he had ever met with. The constitutional provision on which their exchange centered was the First Amendment, which includes the familiar words that “Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” Although that language by its literal terms forbade Congress from legislating to abridge free expression, the guarantees were understood to bind the whole government, and to limit what the president could ask a court to do. As for the remainder of the provision, though, Justice Black professed to read it literally. When it said there shall be no law allowed, it left no room for any exception; the prohibition against abridging freedom of speech and press was absolute. And in fairness to him, one must say that on their face the First Amendment clauses seem as clear as the requirement for 30-year-old senators, and that no guarantee of the Bill of Rights is more absolute in form.那个为美国政府出庭辩护的伟大律师在这个校园里主持过许多届毕业典礼。他就是欧文格里斯沃尔德（Erwin Griswold），他担任哈佛法学院院达21年，中间还担任了一段时间的美国联邦总检察长。那天向格里斯沃尔德院长发问的那个伟大的法官就是布莱克大法官（Mr. Justice Black），他是罗斯福新政期任命的首位大法官，被卡多佐大法官（Justice Cardozo）誉为他所见过的最杰出的法律人才之一。两者关于宪法的交锋集中在第一修正案，包括大家耳熟能详的句子“国会不得制定任何法律剥夺言论或新闻自由。”虽然从字面而言，第一修正案禁止国会通过立法剥夺公民自由表达的权利，该项权利保证可以被理解为用来约束整个政府，并对总统可以要求法院做的事情加以限制。而至于其余的条文，布莱克法官宣称也要从原文的字面意思上解读。当宪法说不允许，就表明没有任何回旋的余地，禁止立法剥夺言论和出版自由是绝对的。为了体现对布莱克法官的公平，我们必须指出，第一修正案的条文从字面上看就和要求参议员必须年满30岁的要求一样明确，没有别的人权法案的权利保证形式比这一形式更加绝对的了。But that was not the end of the matter for Dean Griswold. Notwithstanding the language, he urged the court to say that a restraint would be constitutional when publication threatened irreparable harm to the security of the United States, and he contended there was enough in the record to show just that; he argued that the intended publications would threaten lives, and jeopardize the process of trying to end the war and recover prisoners, and erode the governments capacity to negotiate with foreign governments and through foreign governments in the future.但是，格里斯沃尔德院长并没有就此打住。尽管第一修正案的文字已经如此明确，他还是试图说服法院同意，当言论的发表会给美国的国家安全带来不可弥补的损害时，禁止发表是符合宪法的。他辩称历史上有足够的证据体现了这一点；他论述道，两个报社打算发表的内容会危及生命，损害政府试图结束战争，接回被俘将士的进程，并削弱政府未来与外国政府和通过外国政府进行谈判的能力。Justice Black responded that if a court could suppress publication when the risk to the national interest was great enough, the judges would be turned into censors. Dean Griswold said he did not know of any alternative. Justice Black shot back that respecting the First Amendment might be the alternative, and to that, Dean Griswold replied in words I cannot resist quoting:法官布莱克回应说，如果当国家利益遭受损害的风险很大时，由法院出面禁止发表，那么法官就会变成审查员。格里斯沃尔德院长说，他也想不出来还有任何其他选项。布莱克法官马上反击道，尊重宪法第一修正案就是其他选项，针对这句话，格里斯沃尔德院长的回应我实在忍不住要在这里引述：“The problem in this case,” he said, “is the construction of the First Amendment.他说道，“这个案子的问题就在于对宪法第一修正案的解释。”“Now Mr. Justice, your construction of that is well-known, and I certainly respect it. You say that no law means no law, and that should be obvious. I can only say, Mr. Justice, that to me it is equally obvious that “no law” does not mean “no law,” and I would seek to persuade the Court that that is true.“As Chief Justice Marshall said, so long ago, it is a Constitution we are interpreting.”“法官大人，你对第一修正案的解释是众所周知的，我当然尊重。你说，不得立法的意思就是不得立法，这应该是显而易见的。法官大人，我只能说，对我来说是同样显而易见的是“不得立法”并不等于“不得立法”，我将设法说服法庭，我的观点是正确的。“首席大法官马歇尔（Chief Justice Marshall）很久以前也曾说过，宪法由我们来解释”The government lost the case and the newspapers published, but Dean Griswold won his argument with Justice Black. To show, as he put it, that “no law” did not mean “no law,” Dean Griswold had pointed out that the First Amendment was not the whole Constitution. The Constitution also granted authority to the government to provide for the security of the nation, and authority to the president to manage foreign policy and command the military.这个案子最终是政府败诉，报道刊发了。但格里斯沃尔德院长却在与布莱克法官的辩论中胜出。为了表明他所说的“不得立法”并不意味着“不得立法” 格里斯沃尔德院长指出，宪法第一修正案不是宪法的全部。宪法还赋予政府权力，使其提供国家的安全，并授权总统处理外交政策和指挥军队。And although he failed to convince the court that the capacity to exercise these powers would be seriously affected by publication of the papers, the court did recognize that at some point the authority to govern that Dean Griswold invoked could limit the right to publish. The court did not decide the case on the ground that the words “no law” allowed of no exception and meant that the rights of expression were absolute. The courts majority decided only that the government had not met a high burden of showing facts that could justify a prior restraint, and particular members of the court spoke of examples that might have turned the case around, to go the other way. Threatened publication of something like the D-Day invasion plans could have been enjoined; Justice Brennan mentioned a publication that would risk a nuclear holocaust in peacetime.虽然他未能说服法庭，政府行使这些权力的能力将因为报纸文章的发表而受到严重影响，法院也承认，在某些时候，为了保证格里斯沃尔德院长所提出来的政府权力的行使法院可以限制出版权。法院对该案作出裁定的依据并不是基于“不得立法”的字面表达即表示不允许有任何例外，也就是说表达的权利是绝对的。持多数派意见的法官们的决定只是说，政府没有满足举证的重任，拿出事实证据来为自己要求的禁止发表作出辩解，个别法官还在设想一些可以让政府赢得案子的情形。像诺曼底登陆计划这样的事情如果报社要发表是会被禁止的；布伦南大法官（Justice Brennan）还提到如果文章的发表可能会引起和平时期的核战争也可以禁止。Even the First Amendment, then, expressing the value of speech and publication in the terms of a right as paramount as any fundamental right can be, does not quite get to the point of an absolute guarantee. It fails because the Constitution has to be read as a whole, and when it is, other values crop up in potential conflict with an unfettered right to publish, the value of security for the nation and the value of the presidents authority in matters foreign and military. The explicit terms of the Constitution, in other words, can create a conflict of approved values, and the explicit terms of the Constitution do not resolve that conflict when it arises. The guarantee of the right to publish is unconditional in its terms, and in its terms the power of the government to govern is plenary. A choice may have to be made, not because language is vague but because the Constitution embodies the desire of the American people, like most people, to have things both ways. We want order and security, and we want liberty. And we want not only liberty but equality as well. These paired desires of ours can clash, and when they do a court is forced to choose between them, between one constitutional good and another one. The court has to decide which of our approved desires has the better claim, right here, right now, and a court has to do more than read fairly when it makes this kind of choice. And choices like the ones that the justices envisioned in the Papers case make up much of what we call law.可见，即使是体现了言论和出版自由是和任何基本权利一样至高无上的宪法第一修正案，也不能达到绝对保证的程度。不能绝对保证是因为宪法必须作为一个整体来解读，当作为一个整体解读时，其他价值观就会出现，与不受约束的言论与出版自由发生潜在的冲突，比如保护国家安全的权利，和总统处理外交和军事事务的权力。换句话说，宪法的明文规定会造成各种被承认的价值观之间的冲突，而冲突出现时，宪法的明文规定又解决不了这一问题。出版自由是宪法明文规定的无条件保证，而政府行使宪法赋予的权力也是绝对的权利。选择往往是不可避免的，不是因为语言是模糊的， 而是因为宪法体现了美国人民的愿望，就像大多数国家的人民一样，我们总是希望鱼和熊掌兼得。我们想要秩序和安全，我们也要自由。此外，我们不仅希望得到自由，还希望得到平等。我们的这些想要兼得的愿望会发生冲突，而当这种冲突起时，法院就不得不在鱼和熊掌之间作出选择。法院在做这种选择的时候需要的不仅仅是对宪法原文的忠实阅读，必须决定哪一个价值在此时此地拥有更大的权利主张。而法官们在像“五角大楼文件案”中所做的选择形成的判例，也成了构成我们所说的法律的一部分。Let me ask a rhetorical question. Should the choice and its explanation be called illegitimate law making? Can it be an act beyond the judicial power when a choice must be made and the Constitution has not made it in advance in so many words? You know my answer. So much for the notion that all of constitutional law lies there in the Constitution waiting for a judge to read it fairly.让我来做个反问。这种选择和对这种选择的解释，能被称为非法的法律再制定吗？当法院必须做出一个选择，而宪法又没有预先予以明文规定的时候，这能称得上是超越司法权的行为吗？大家知道我的回答。这种认为所有涉及宪法的法律都在宪法原文中，只是等待一名法官来忠实的按字面解读的想法颇有局限。我们先谈到此为止。Now let me tell a second story, not one illustrating the tensions within constitutional law, but one showing the subtlety of constitutional facts. Again the story is about a famous case, and a good many of us here remember t