古吉拉特的农业合作社【外文翻译】.doc

本科毕业设计（论文）外 文 翻 译原文：Agricultural cooperatives in Gujarat, India: agents of equity or differentiationBy Ebrahim.Alnoor Agricultural cooperatives have been promoted in India s economic development programme as a means of encouraging large-scale agricultural production while enhancing community cooperation and equity. Focusing on sugar cooperatives in Gujarat state of western India,the author shows that these cooperatives have been successful in promoting large-scale agricultural production and in improving the economic and social standing of their members.IntroductionAgricultural cooperatives have been idealised as egalitarian organisations that engender（造成） the development of solidary communities while simultaneously increasing agricultural productivity.According to Attwood and Baviskar (1988:2): Cooperatives have been expected to achieve a number of economic and social goals. In addition to increasing production and mobilising underutilised resources, they have also been expected to increase social justice and equality of opportunity, to reinforce social solidarity, and to rebuild communities supposedly fragmented by the impact（影响，效果）of colonialregimes, market expansion, and new technologies.In Gujarat state of western India, cooperatives have led to increased productivity but their role as agents of equity intended to raise the standard of living of the poor is questionable.This paper attempts to assess the role that agricultural cooperatives have played in Gujarat: whether they have improved the economic and social conditions of the poor or, conversely, whether they have led to an increased differentiation of the peasantry.I open with a brief background on agricultural cooperatives in India, and then focus on sugar cooperatives in western India. Sugar cooperatives in the states of Gujarat and Maharashtra have often been upheld as models of cooperative success. Using secondary literature, I outline some of the reasons for this success. I then probe into relations of exchange between members of the cooperatives and those excluded from membership. This part of my analysis depends heavily on the extensive anthropological work conducted by JanBreman in south Gujarat over the past three decades. Bremans work on sugar cooperatives in Surat district is particularly insightful on peasant differentiation in the region.Background to cooperatives in IndiaCooperative farming has been a component of India s programme for agricultural development since the First Five-year Plan in 1951. Cooperatives were promoted as part of India s economic development programme for it was believed that they could lead to a larger scale and more productive agricultural system that could be organised and executed by existing local panchayats (local councils and political institutions). The original concept, as perceived by Indian planners, envisioned a cooperative society as a body that could encompass an entire village, thereby forming its centre of economic activity. This vision was based on a notion that all members of a village would be willing to work within the cooperative structure. The result would be large-scale agricultural production through the pooling and more efficient use of resources.During the 1950s, cooperative farming had not been precisely defined by the Indian government, but four forms of cooperative farming were outlined:better farming societies, in which the members use land individually; tenant farming societies, in which land belongs to the society but is leased out to the members for individual use; joint farming societies, in which land is used jointly by the members who retain their individual property rights on land; collective farming societies, in which land is owned and used collectively.This outline was narrowed in the Second Five-year Plan by specifying that cooperative farming necessarily involves joint use of land. Government subsidies were consequently limited to cooperatives that fell into the third and fourth categories above (i.e. joint and cooperative farming societies). Indian planners and policy makers initially aimed systematically to promote cooperatives in villages through strong administrative enforcement, thereby hoping to establish a vast network of essentially large-scale cooperative agriculture.As a result of resistance to and problems with administrative enforcement, however, Indian planners altered their aims in the 1960s to emphasise the voluntary formation of cooperative farming societies. It was hoped by the government that financial incentives would encourage the joint use of land and resources, thereby increasing agricultural productivity as well as improving equity through collective ownership. Incentives for newly established cooperative societies included medium- and long-term credits for land reclamation, storehouse construction,capital fund contribution, and a salary contribution for a paid manager over a three to five year period.Most of the cooperatives formed at this time were joint farming societies which maintained private ownership of land rights. Of those that were collective, the cultivated） land area in most was relatively small and thus did not take advantage of economies of scale. Moreover, to take advantage of government incentives（动机）, many fictitious cooperative societies were formed. In such cooperatives, the actual agricultural work was performed by labourers, while the founders of the cooperatives supervised. In contrast, a non-fictitious or working cooperative was to have more equitable labour and profit distribution. By law, the cooperatives were required to have a minimum of ten members, so labourers or dependants were provided with nominal or dummy membership in fictitious societies. Profit distribution within these societies usually emphasised land contribution over labour contribution. The development of fictitious societies is noteworthy for they were actually capitalist production units established under the guise of cooperatives.Recognising that poorer segments of society, especially labourers and artisans, were often effectively excluded from cooperative membership, the Government of India (in its Sixth Five-year Plan) suggested the creation of cooperatives specifically for the poor (Government of India 1980:179). Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, federal and state governments in India have continued to promote the formation of various kinds of cooperative societies, including those in areas of agricultural production and processing, marketing of agricultural inputs and products, dairying, housing, labour, rural credit and banking, with some credit schemes and labour cooperatives directed specifically towards poorer classes and castes. Cooperative growth has been particularly notable in western India, and especially in the states of Gujarat and Maharashtra. According to Attwood and Baviskar, there are more cooperatives per capita in western India than in any other major region of the country , with about 92,507 societies registered in Maharashtra in 1989 and 29,175 in Gujarat (1995a:43, 142-143).3 Of the agricultural cooperatives established, many have focused on the provision of credit to farmers, and on facilitating the collective processing and marketing of agricultural products, rather than on collective farming. As a result, membership in agricultural cooperatives has tended to favour landowners while limiting the entry of landless agricultural labourers.The success of cooperatives in western IndiaAttwood and Baviskar (1995b:11) identify four quantifiable criteria useful for measuring thesuccess of cooperative efforts at a regional scale: 1the quantity of cooperatives existing in the region; 2the variety of cooperatives in that region and the extent to which they meet a broad range of economic and social needs; 3the durability or long-term survival of cooperatives; and 4the financial viability of cooperatives, i.e. efficient operation and the delivery of goods and services to members.Using the four criteria above, Attwood and Baviskar observe that cooperative formation has been especially successful in Gujarat and Maharashtra. There are not only a very large number of cooperatives per capita in this region (i.e. high quantity), but these co-ops also span almost all spheres of economic activity (i.e. high variety), their organizational mortality rate is relatively low (i.e. high durability), and many sugar and dairy cooperatives in western India have been extremely productive and have paid increasingly higher prices for farm products supplied by their members (i.e. high viability) (1995a:4346). While some kinds of cooperatives have not proven viable in western India (e.g. cotton ginning), Attwood and Baviskar note with approval that such cooperatives have not been artificially propped up by government subsidies and have therefore eventually been replaced by more viable enterprises.Several hypotheses are provided by Attwood and Baviskar (1995a) and Shah (1995, 1996) to explain the success of cooperatives in western India. While all of their hypotheses are insightful (e.g. hypotheses concerning governance, competition, patronage, and autonomy from state control), I limit my discussion only to those which are directly relevant to the broader theme of this paper- that is, to the role of cooperatives as agents of equity or differentiation. In particular, three of the hypotheses developed by Attwood and Baviskar are directly concerned with social stratification and relationships of exchange between groups involved in cooperatives (1995b:13):1 Regions with a broad middle stratum of peasant proprietors are more likely to nurture successful cooperatives.2 Regions with numerically large, middle-status castes are more likely to nurture successful cooperatives.3 Heavy investments in equipment encourage leaders to be concerned with capacityutilisation and thus with participation by small producers.The first hypothesis above is concerned with relationships of class. The authors argue that the middle-class peasantry (i.e. medium and small landowners) is more likely to invest in cooperation than are members of wealthier or poorer classes. Middle-class peasants, they contend, stand to gain considerably from cooperative ventures (in economic and political terms), are willing to work hard for low returns, own productive assets such as land, can sometimes employ and supervise labour, and have the skills to make managerial decisions under conditions of uncertainty. Moreover, Attwood and Baviskar suggest that cooperatives are more likely to succeed in regions with moderate stratification than they are to succeed in highly stratified communities (where elites may see cooperatives as a threat to their dominance) or in egalitarian societies (where lower incentives to seek improvement, as well as a lack of diversity in skills and occupations, may inhibit cooperative entrepreneurism). In western India, they explain, the large middle stratum provides the skills and motivations required of innovative cooperative organisers (1995a:57).The second hypothesis is concerned with caste, but is related to the first hypothesis, since it matters a great deal whether economic differences are reinforced by caste divisions, or whether caste membership cuts across class lines (1995b:16). In the state of Maharashtra, the Maratha caste dominates rural society (comprising about 40 per cent of the state s overall population) and spans many classes, including large and small farmers as well as agricultural labourers. Attwood and Baviskar argue that, despite significant competition and conflict between various Maratha factions, their linked caste status enables the formation of effective alliances between large and small farmers (1995a,b:17, 58). Like the Marathas, the Patidars of Gujarat also occupy a middle caste position that includes large, medium, and some small landholders. While the Patidars make up only about 12 per cent of Gujarat s population, theyAre concentrated in certain regions of south Gujarat. Both the Patidars and Marathas wield considerable economic and political power in the regions where they are dominant, and have played a central role in the establishment of agricultural cooperatives. The Patidars, however,are losing power to a more populous and poorer grouping of castes known as the Kshatriyas,which comprise about 40 per cent of Gujarat s population and include a large number of small and middle farmers, as well as some landless labourers. Cooperatives established by the Patidars are now being used by Kshatriya landowners to improve their own economic and social standing (1995a:59).The third hypothesis above refers to the participation of small farmers in high-investment ventures such as sugarcane and dairy processing cooperatives. Attwood and Baviskar explain that sugar factories often require large investments in heavy machinery (sometimes exceeding US$10 million) which, in order to make profit, require 1,500-2,500 tonnes of sugarcane daily during the crushing season. Since a large portion of the sugarcane crushed by a cooperative factory is supplied by small farmers (often 50 per cent in Maharashtra), cooperation between large and small growers is essential in order for the factories to operate at high capacity and to maximise profits. Similarly, the Patidar leaders of dairy cooperatives in Gujarat (such as the famous Amul dairy), which are supplied by a large numbers of small milk producers, have needed to encourage these small producers to join in order to be able to modernise and expand their operations, and to run their new equipment at full capacity so as to make profits.These small producers, many of whom are of the Kshatriya caste, have thus been able to gainentry to the cooperatives (1995a:68).All three of the hypotheses outlined above are concerned with relationships of exchange between different social and economic groupings within the membership of cooperatives. The successful cooperatives of western India, as Attwood and Baviskar have shown, tend to comprise a broad middle stratum of landowners and castes, but are also able to develop alliances across class and caste boundaries. Where these conditions are met (as well as a series of other conditions outlined by the authors), it appears that agricultural cooperatives are capable of bringing higher returns to their members and thus making small as well as large landholders better off. Although agricultural cooperation in India was initially viewed as a means of increasing production, it was not intended by India s planners to expand the socio-economic gulfs between peasant groups. Cooperatives were intended to promote equity and social solidarity between class and caste lines while simultaneously increasing productivity. Planners believed that cooperatives could promote equity and efficiency simultaneously, and under varying political and economic conditions nationwide (Attwood and Baviskar 1988:2). Like the fictitious agricultural cooperatives of the 1950s and 1960s, south Gujarat s sugar cooperatives have certainly succeeded in promoting large-scale agriculture, but this success has resulted in an increased differentiation of the peasantry.In sum, sugar cooperatives in south Gujarat have been successful as engines of large-scale agricultural and capitalist production, but have failed as agents of equity. Their promotion as agents of equity, then, might be better suited to relatively homogeneous communities where the betterment of one group is not likely to depend on the oppression of another, or under conditions where landless labourers can also gain access to membership and decision making Development in Practice; May2000, Vol. 10 Issue 2, p178-188, 11p译文： 古吉拉特的农业合作社阿诺尔 易卜拉欣印度：股权或代理人分化作为重要的鼓励农业生产的资料，农业合作社已经促进了印度的经济发展项目，同时加强社区合作和公平。重点放在印度西部的古吉拉特州糖合作社，笔者表明，这些合作社已经在促进大规模农业生产和提高其成员的经济和社会地位等方面取得了成功。简介农业合作社已被理想化为造成连带社区发展的平等的组织，同时提高农业生产率。据阿特伍德和Baviskar（1988:2）：合作社已经实现了预期的经济和社会目标数。除了增加生产，使资源得到充分利用和调动，他们还预期会通过市场拓展和新技术等方法来增加社会机会的公正和平等，加强社会团结，重建被认为是由分散的殖民影响的社区制度。在印度西部的古吉拉特州，合作社已使生产率得以提高，但其作为旨在提高穷人生活水平权益代理商的角色值得怀疑。本文试图评估，农业合作社在古吉拉特的运行，是否改善了穷人的经济和社会条件，或反之，他们是否已经导致了农民分化的增加。我公开了关于印度的农业合作社的简要背景，然后重点关注印度西部的糖合作社。在古吉拉特州和马哈拉施特拉，作为合作成功的典范，糖合作社经常得到维护。用二级文学，我概述了这一成功的部分原因。然后我探讨了合作社成员和那些被排除在成员关系之外的人之间的交流关系。我分析的这一部分，在很大程度上是依靠JanBreman在过去三十年在古吉拉特南部进行的广泛的人类学的工作。布雷曼在苏拉特地区的关于糖合作社的工作见证了该地区农民的分化。合作社在印度的背景自1951年的第一个五年计划起，合作农场一直是印度农业发展的计划组成部分。合作社晋升为印度经济发展计划的一部分，相信他们能够带来更大规模、更高效的农业系统，可以由现有的地方行政区（地方议会和政治机关）组织和执行。印度规划者最初认识到的概念，是设想建立一个包括所有村庄的社会合作社，从而形成经济活动的中心。这一设想是基于这样一个想法：一个村庄的所有成员将愿意在合作社结构中进行劳作。该结果将是通过汇集和充分利用各种资源形成大规模的农业生产。在20世纪50年代，“合作农场”并没有被印度政府给出明确定义，但是四个农业合作形式被勾勒出来：1，较好的农业社：成员个体使用土地。2，出租式的农业社：土地属于社会，但可作为个人使用租给成员。 3，联合农业社：土地可由拥有个人土地财产权利的成员使用。4，集体农业社：土地属于集体并由集体使用。这个纲要在第二个五年计划中受到限制，规定合作农业必然涉及土地联合使用。因此，政府补贴也因此仅限于上述的第三种和第四种合作社（即联合农业社和集体农业会）。印度的规划者和决策者最初旨在通过强有力的管理执行来系统地推进农村的合作社，从而希望能够建立一个实质的大规模合作农业的巨大网络。但是由于管理执行的阻力和问题，印度的规划人员改变了他们在20世纪60年代的目的，改成强调自愿合作的农业合作社。这是政府希望财政动机能鼓励资源和土地的共同使用，从而提高农业生产力以及通过集体所有权权益来提高资产净值。新成立的合作社的动机包括土地开垦的中长期信用，仓库建设，投资基金贡献，以及超过三至五年的雇佣经理的薪金贡献。在这一时期形成的合作社，大多是联合农业社，主张私人拥有土地权。至于那些集体农业社，大部分耕地面积都相对较小，因此没有形成规模经济的优势。此外，由于政府采取奖励措施的优势，形成了很多虚拟合作社。在这样的合作社里，当所谓的合作社“创始人”在在管理的时候，实际上农业工作是由劳动者来完成的。相比之下，非虚拟或工作合作社有更多公平的劳动和利润分配。根据法律规定，合作社必须拥有最少十名成员，因此劳动者或家属都会被提供给名义上的或虚假的社员关系。在这些群体中，利润分配通常强调劳动贡献对土地的贡献。虚拟社会的发展是值得注意的，因为他们实际上是在合作社的幌子下建立资本主义生产单位。 位于印度西部“成功的合作社”阿特伍德和Baviskar（1995年：11）确定了在区域规模合作四个量化的衡量标准：1.他的数量在该地区现有的合作社2.在该地区的合作社和各种程度满足他们广泛经济和社会的需要;3.他的耐用性或长期生存合作社4.他对合作社的财务可行性，即有效运作和交付货物和服务会员使用以上，阿特伍德和Baviskar四项标准观察，合作的形成，特别是在古吉拉特邦和被马哈拉施特拉成功。不仅有一个非常大的按每本地区（即高量），人均合作社，但这些合作社还“跨度经济活动”（即高品种）几乎所有的领域，他们的组织“死亡率相对低”（即高耐久性），以及许多糖和奶制品合作社印度西部已经非常富有成效和“已支付的价格越来越高农产品其成员提供的.”（即高活性）（1995年：43 46）。于此同时，有些种类的合作社没有在印度西部被证实可行性。（例如棉花）阿特伍德和Baviskar记录并同意这样的没有人工收入的提高而靠着政府补贴维持的合作社，最终被一些可行的企业取代。阿特伍德和巴维斯卡（1995年