AGENCY-PROBLEMS-AND-RESIDUAL-CLAIMS.doc

代理问题和剩余请求权Abstract Social and economic activities, like religion, entertainment, education, research, and the production of other goods and services, are carried on by different types of organizations, for example, corporations, proprietorships, partnerships, mutual and nonprofits. There is competition among organizational forms for survival. The form of organization that survives in an activity is the one that delivers the product demanded by customers at the lowest price while covering costs. The characteristics of residual claims are important both in distinguishing organizations from one another and in explaining the survival of organizational forms in specific activities. This paper develops a set of propositions that explain the special features of the residual claims of different organizational forms as efficient approaches to controlling agency problems. 社会和经济活动，如宗教、娱乐、教育、研究及商品和服务的生产和提供活动，是通过不同种类的组织进行的。如公司、业主制企业、互助（基金）和非赢利组织等。为了生存，各种组织形式间存在竞争关系。在一项活动中，能够生存的组织形式应该能够以最低的价格，提供消费者需要的产品。剩余索取权的特征是重要的，它既能够把一个组织和另外一个组织区别开来，又能够解释专门活动中组织形式的生存状况。本文提出了 用一套理论把不同组织形式的剩余索取权的专门特征解释为控制代理问题的有效的方法。I. 介绍A. Organizational Survival Social and economic activities, such as religion, entertainment, education, research, and the production of other goods and services, are carried on by different types of organizations, for example, corporations, proprietorships, partnerships, mutual, and nonprofits. Most goods and services can be produced by any form of organization, and there is competition among organizational forms for survival in any activity. In the absence of fiat, the form of organization that survives in an activity is the one that delivers the product demanded by customers at the lowest price while covering costs. This is the telling dimension on which the economic environment chooses among organizational forms. A. 组织生存 社会和经济的活动, 例如宗教、娱乐、教育、研究、商品和服务的生产和提供，是通过不同种类的组织进行的。如公司、业主制企业、互助（基金）和非赢利组织等。大多数的商品与服务是通过某一组织形式生产的，而且，为了生存，组织形式之间存在竞争。在任何活动中，能够生存的组织形式应该能以最低的价格提供消费者需要的产品。这就告诉我们在组织形式中，经济环境选择的方向。An important factor in the survival of organizational forms is control of agency problems. These problems arise because contracts are not costlessly written and enforced. Agency costs include the costs of structuring, monitoring, and bonding a set of contracts among agents with conflicting interests, plus the residual loss incurred because the cost of full enforcement of contracts exceeds the benefits. In this paper we explain the special features of the residual claims of different organizational forms as efficient approaches to controlling special agency problems. We analyze only private organizations. In related papers we have examined other features of the contract structures of different organizational forms that contribute to their survival: in particular, (1) the control of agency problems in the class of organizations characterized by separation of“ownership” and “control,” and (2) the effects of special characteristics of residual claims on decision rules for resource allocation.组织生存中一个重要的因素是代理问题的控制。之所以产生这些问题是因为合同不能无代价的去签订和执行。代理成本包括设计、监督和约束利益冲突的代理人之间的一组契约所必须付出的成本，加上执行契约时，成本超过利益所造成的剩余损失。在这篇文章中，我们把不同组织形式的剩余索取权的专门特征描述为控制专门代理问题的有效的方法。我们只分析私人组织。在有关的论文中我们已经考察了有助于不同组织形式生存的合同结构的其它特征。特别是，(1)、在所有权和控制权分离的组织中存在的代理问题的控制。（2）、剩余索取权专门特征对资源分配决策规则的影响。B. Residual Claims: General Discussion The contract structures of organizations limit the risks undertaken by most agents by specifying either fixed payoffs or incentive payoffs tied to specific measures of performance. The residual riskthe risk of the difference between stochastic inflows of resources and promised payments to agentsis borne by those who contract for the rights to net cash flows. We call these agents the residual claimants or residual risk bearers. B. 剩余索取权：一般讨论 通过规定固定的支付或制定与专门业绩考核相联系的刺激性支付的方式，组织的契约结构减少了由大多数代理人承担的风险。剩余风险指的是资源的随机流入和对代理人的承诺支付之间的差别风险。剩余风险由那些为得到净现金流而签订合同的人承担。我们称这些代理人为剩余索取人或剩余风险的承担者。The characteristics of residual claims distinguish organizations from one another and help explain the survival of organizational forms in specific activities. We first analyze and contrast the relatively unrestricted residual claims of open corporations with the restricted residual claims of proprietorships, partnerships, and closed corporations. We then turn to the more specialized residual claims of professional partnerships, financial mutuals, and nonprofits. 剩余索取权的特征（使我们）能够把一个组织和另一个组织区别开来，并且有助于我们解释在特定活动中，组织形式的生存情况。我们首先分析和对比股份有限公司的相对非限制性的剩余索取权和业主制、合伙、有限公司的有限制性的剩余索取权，然后，我们再分析专业合伙制、非盈利组织等更特殊的剩余索取权。II. Open CorporationsMost large non nonfinancial organizations are open corporations. The common stock residual claims of such organizations are unrestricted in the sense that (1) stockholders are not required to have any other role in the organization, (2) their residual claims are freely alienable, and (3) the residual claims are rights in net cash flows for the life of the organization. Because of the unrestricted nature of the residual claims of open corporations, there is generally almost complete separation and specialization of decision functions and residual risk bearing.II.股份有限公司 大多数的非金融组织采用股份有限公司的形式。这种组织的普通股票的剩余索取权，从下面意义上来说是没有限制的。（1）股东不需要在组织中起任何作用。（2）他们的剩余索取权可以自由的转让。（3）剩余索取权就是对组织净现金流的权利。 由于股份有限公司剩余索取权具有不受限制的性质，因此，一般来说，它的决策（功能）和剩余风险的承担基本上是完全分开和专业化的。A. Common Stock versus State Contingent ClaimsOne can imagine claims that are even less restricted than the common stocks of open corporations. There could be “state contingent claims”that is, claims of the sort discussed by Arrow (1964) and Debreu (1959) specifying payoffs for each possible future state of the world. Such state contingent claims allow any (hence generally “less restricted”) allocation of risk. They are, nonetheless, fixed payoff promises. To specify the total payoffs to be obtained in all future states, one would need to identify all current and future decisions of an organization through state contingent claim contracts. Given the costs and information requirements this implies, it is not surprising that state contingent claims are not the dominant system for allocating risk. B. 普通股票和状态依存索取权我们可以想象这样一种要求权，它比股份有限公司普通股票的限制还少，这就是“状态依存索取权”即Arrow (1964) and Debreu (1959)讨论过的那种请求权，“状态依存索取权”详细规定了未来每一种可能状态下的支付情况。这种状态依存索取权允许对任何风险进行分配（由于是任何风险，因此一般说来，它有很较少的限制），它们仍然是固定的支付承诺。为了详细说明在将来一切状态下得到的总的支付，人们需要通过状态依存索取权合同来确定一切现在的和将来的组织决策。在给定的成本和信息要求下，这意味着，状态依存索取权不是主要的分配风险的制度。We can also imagine state contingent claims that are true residual claims. The claim would cover a fraction of the organizations net cash flows in a given state rather than a specified payoff in that state. However, this type of claim generates conflicts among the claim holders of different states because alternative decisions shift payoffs across states and benefit some claim holders at the expense of others. Common stock（ that represents proportionate claims on the payoffs of all future states） eliminates these agency problems, but at the sacrifice of some efficiency in the allocation of risk. Common stock and other common forms of residual claims also avoid most of the costs of defining and verifying states of the world.我们也能够想象出，状态依存索取权是真的剩余索取权。该权利在给定的未来状态下，能够得到组织的一部分净现金流，而不是在那种状态下的某种指定的支付。然而，这种请求权会在不同状态的权利人之间产生冲突，因为，在某状态下，可选择的决策改变了支付，并在一些权利人受损的情况下，使一些权利人受益。普通股票代表了与一切未来状态的支付相称的请求权，（普通股票）在风险的分配中以牺牲部分效率为代价消除了这些代理问题。普通股票和别的剩余要求权的普通形式也避免了确定和核对未来状态的大部分成本。B. The Advantages of Common Stock Residual Claims 1. Unrestricted Risk Sharing among Residual Claimants. The common stock of open corporations allows more efficient risk sharing than residual claims that are not separable from decision roles, as, for example, in proprietorships and partnerships where the proprietors and partners are the decision makers and the primary residual claimants. Common stock allows residual risk to be spread across many residual claimants who individually choose the extent to which they bear risk and who can diversify across organizations offering such claims. Other things equal, portfolio theory implies that such unrestricted risk sharing lowers the cost of risk-bearing services.3 B. 普通股票剩余索取权的优势1.在剩余索取者之间，无限制的风险承担。股份有限公司的普通股比那些（没有与决策角色分离的）剩余索取权能更有效承担风险。例如，在业主制和合伙制中，所有者和合伙人是决策制订者和最初的剩余索取人。普通股允许剩余风险分散到许多剩余索取者。剩余索取者个人选择他们所承担的风险程度，同时，剩余索取者能够通过组织提供的这种请求权实现多样化。其他条件等同时，资产组合理论 告诉我们这些非限定的风险承担降低了风险承担的成本。2. Specialized Risk Bearing by Residual Claimants. The activities of large open nonfinancial corporations are typically complicated, involving contracts with many factors of production, for example, different types of labor, raw materials, and managers. When there is significant variation through time in the probability of default on these contracts, contracting costs increase. In addition, because the human capital of agents is generally employed in a single organization, risk aversion tends to cause them to charge more for any risk they bear than security holders who can diversify risk across many organizations.2、剩余索取者的专门的风险承担。大的非金融性股份有限公司的活动非常复杂，其活动需要与许多生产要素签订合同。例如，不同种类的劳动力、原材料和经理人。随着时间推移，当这些契约有大量的违约变化时，契约成本增加了。另外，代理者的人力资本一般受雇于一个组织，人们对风险的厌恶态度，使得他们（人力资本）与公债持有者相比，对所承担的任何风险收取更多的费用，因为公债持有者能够通过许多组织使风险多样化。（从而使风险变小）Efficient accommodation of large-scale specialized risk bearing by residual claimants is an advantage of corporate common stock. To bond contractual payments to other agents, the common stockholders put up wealth, which is used to purchase assets. If the wealth required to bond promised payments goes beyond the value of inputs optimally purchased rather than rented, common stock proceeds can be used to purchase liquid assets, for example, the securities of other organizations, that have no function except to bond specialization of risk bearing by residual claimants. 剩余索取人对大规模专门风险承担的有效地适应是普通股票的优势。为了保证给其他代理人的合同的支付，普通股东提供财富，这些财富被用来购买资产。如果需要保证承诺支付的财富超过了所购买的（不是租来的）最佳投入的价值，普通股票的收益可以用来购买流动的资产，例如，别的组织的债券，流动资产没有别的作用，除了保证剩余索取人的风险承担的专业化。3. Purchase of Organization-specific Assets. Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that because of conflicts of interest with outside owners of organization-specific assetsassets that have lower value to other organizationsrental contracts for such assets generate higher agency costs than outright purchase.7 Common stock, with its capacity for raising wealth from residual claimants, is an efficient vehicle for financing such purchases in activities where using large amounts of organization-specific risky assets is efficient.3、对组织的具体资产的购买 克来因、阿尔钦、詹森、和麦克林认为，由于与组织的专门财产的外部的所有者存在利益冲突，降低了其他组织价值的价值 针对这些财产的租用（合同）与完全的购买产生了较高的代理成本。普通股票具有增加剩余索取者财富的能力。在使用大量的组织专门风险的资产才有效率的活动中，普通股票是一种为购买这种财产所筹措资金的有效方式。 4. Specialization of Management. In the complicated production and distribution activities of large open corporations, coordinating the activities of agents, recontracting among them, and initiating and implementing resource allocation decisions are specialized tasks that are important to the survival of the organization and largely fall on its managers. However, managerial skills are not necessarily tied to wealth or willingness to bear risk, and incompetent managers who are important residual claimants can be difficult to remove. Thus, ignoring agency problems in the decision process, the survival of a complex organization is enhanced by common stock residual claims that allow specialization of managementin effect, the absence of a classical entrepreneur who is both decision maker and residual risk bearer. 4.经营的专业化。 在大的股份公司的复杂的生产和分配活动中，协调代理人的活动、再签定代理人间的合同、开始和完成资源分配决策是专门的工作任务，对于组织的生存十分重要，主要靠它的经营者来完成。然而，经营技巧却不必与财富或承担风险的意愿相联系，没有能力的经营者，他们是重要剩余索取人的话，很难被清除。于是，在决策过程中忽视代理问题，普通股剩余索取权允许经营的专业化，通过它，复杂组织的生存能力增强了。实际上，既是决策制定者又是剩余风险的承担者的古典的企业家没有了。5. The Market Value Rule for Investment Decisions. When common stocks are traded without transactions costs in a perfectly competitive capital market, the stockholders agree that resource allocation decisions should be evaluated according to their contribution to the current market value of their residual claims.5 The market value rule weighs current against future resources according to the opportunity costs at which resources can be traded across time in the capital market. For example, the market value rule favors expenditures to reduce the current and future costs of delivering products whenever the current market value of the future cost savings is greater than the current expenditure. Product prices can then be lowered while still covering costs. 5、投资决策的市场价值规则， 当普通股在完全竞争的资本市场上以没有交易成本的方式进行交易时，股东同意资源的分配决策应该根据它们对目前剩余索取权的市场价值的贡献进行估价。市场价值规则根据机会成本（以机会成本，资源就可以在资本市场交换）衡量目前的，而不是将来的资源。例如，市场价值规则喜欢支出去减少目前和将来送交产品的成本，当将来节省的成本的目前市场价值大于目前的支出时。生产价格能降到产品的成本。 In contrast, when the horizon of the residual claims is less than the life of the organization, residual claimants assign zero value to cash flows that occur beyond the horizon. Similarly, when residual claims are not freely alienable or separable from other roles in the organization, it is rational for risk bearers to attribute lower current value to uncertain cash flows than is implied by capital market prices for the future resources. As a consequence, ignoring agency problems in the decision process, organizations with common stock residual claims, investing according to the market value rule which is optimal for their residual claimants, will be able to deliver products at lower prices than organizations with restricted residual claims. 相比之下，当剩余索取权的期限少于组织的存活时间，当超过剩余索取权的期限后，剩余索取权人从现金流中分配到的价值变成0。同样，当剩余索取权不能自由地转让或从组织的别的作用中分离时，对风险承担者来说，it is rational for risk bearers to attribute lower current value to uncertain cash flows than is implied by capital market prices for the future resources.因此，在决策过程中忽视代理问题，拥有普通股剩余索取权的组织，（根据市场价值规则投资，这对于他们的剩余索取权人来说是最佳的），与那些有限制性剩余索取权的组织相比，将能以更低的价格提供产品。C. The Agency Problems of Common Stock Residual Claims The unrestricted nature of the common stock residual claims of open corporations leads to an important agency problem. The decision process is in the hands of professional managers whose interests are not identical to those of residual claimants. This problem of separation of “ownership” and “control”more precisely, the separation of residual risk bearing from decision functionshas troubled students of open corporations from Adam Smith (1937) to Berle and Means (1932) and Jensen and Meckling (1976). In “Separation of Ownership and Control” (Fama and Jensen, 1983), we argue that this agency problem is controlled by decision systems that separate the management (initiation and implementation) and control (ratification and monitoring) of important decisions at all levels of the organization. C.普通股剩余索取权的代理问题 股份有限公司普通股剩余索取权的非限制性产生了一个重要的代理问题。职业经理人掌握决策（过程），他们的利益与剩余索取人的利益是不一致的。所有权和控制权的的分离问题，更精确地说，剩余风险承担与决策的分离是 。在所有权和控制权的分离(Fama and Jensen, 1983)一文中，我们认为这个代理问题是由决策系统决定的。这种决策体系把管理和（组织内部任何层次上的重要决策的）控制分开了。Devices for separating decision management and decision control include (1) decision hierarchies in which the decision initiatives of lower level agents are passed on to higher level agents, first for ratification and then for monitoring, (2) boards of directors that ratify and monitor the organizations most important decisions and hire, fire, and compensate top-level decision managers, and (3) incentive structures that encourage mutual monitoring among decision agents. The costs of such mechanisms for separating decision management from decision control are part of the price that open corporations pay for the benefits of unrestricted common stock residual claims.决策管理和决策控制相分离的策略包括：（1）决策等级制度。在该制度里，低层次代理人的决策首创传到高层次代理人那里，起初是为了签署，后来是为了监督。（2）董事会批准、监督组织中最重要的决定，并决定和雇佣、解雇、决定高管的补偿。（3）鼓励决策代理人之间相互监督的激励体系。这种把决策管理和决策控制相分离的机制的成本是（股份有限公司为了非限制性股票剩余索取权的利益而支付的）价格的一部分。III. Restricted versus Unrestricted Residual ClaimsThe proprietorships, partnerships, and closed corporations observed in small-scale production activities differ in many ways both from one another and from open corporations. For example, proprietorships have a single residual claimant, whereas partnerships and closed corporations have multiple residual claimants. As a consequence, the residual claim contracts in partnerships and closed corporations must specify rights in net cash flows and procedures for transferring residual claims to new agents more explicitly than the residual claims in proprietorships. III.限制的和非限制的剩余索取权从事小规模生产活动的业主制企业、合伙企业和有限公司彼此之间有很多不同，也有别于股份有限公司。例如，业主制企业有单一的剩余索取人，而合伙企业和有限公司有多个剩余索取人。因此，与业主制企业相比，合伙企业和有限公司的剩余索取权合同必须详细列出净现金流权利和把剩余索取权转给新的代理人的程序。However, for control of the agency problems in the decision process, the common characteristic of the residual claims of proprietorships, partnerships, and closed corporations that distinguishes them from open corporations is that the residual claims are largely restricted to important decision agents. This restriction avoids the agency problems between residual claimants and decision agents that arise because of separation of risk bearing and decision functions in open corporations. Thus, costly mechanisms for separating the management and control of decisions are avoided.8 然而，为了控制决策中的代理问题，和股份有限公司不同，业主制企业、合伙企业和有限公司的剩余索取权的一般特征是剩余索取权大部分只限于重要的决策代理者。这种限制避免了剩余索取权人和决策代理人之间的由于股份公司风险承担和决策分离而产生的代理问题。因此，高昂的决策的控制和管理的分离机制避免了。Restricting residual claims to decision makers controls agency problems between residual claimants and decision agents, but at the expense of the benefits of unrestricted common stock. The decision process suffers efficiency losses because decision agents must be chosen on the basis of wealth and willingness to bear risk as well as for decision skills. Residual claimants forgo optimal diversification so that residual claims and decision making can be combined in a small number of agents. Foregone diversification and limited alienability lower the value of the residual claims, raise the cost of risk-bearing services, and lead to less investment in projects with uncertain payoffs than when residual claims are unrestricted. Finally, because dec