CHRISTIAN HUCK 翻译.doc

CHRISTIAN HUCK(London)Coming to Our Senses: Narratology and the Visual 1 IntroductionMarco Polo is believed to have traveled about 14.000 miles during his lifetime; Ibn Battuta, the great Arab explorer of the middle ages, managed about 75.000. But both were dwarfed by the Englishman James Holman, a retired naval officer, who traveled roughly 250.000 miles in the first half of the 19th centurybefore the arrival of trains, steam boats and planes. He trekked deep into Siberia, sailed to Brazil, rode through southern Africa, explored unmapped parts of Australia and survived the bandit-infested Balkans. However, the most remarkable thing about all this is that Holman had been blind since th e age of twenty-fourhe made all his travels without seeing where he was going: he heard, smelled and felt his way cautiously through the world. “While vision gulps, tactility sips,” his biographer notes, “an object yields up its qualities not all at once, at the speed of light, but successively over time, and in sequence of necessity.” (Roberts 2006: 69) However, despite his obvious achievements, Holman was never taken seriously by his contemporaries, and was soon forgotten. His experiences were deemed invalid for the simple reason that he could not use his visual sense: “ His sightlessness makes genuine insight impos-sible ” (Roberts 2006: xii). The Enlightenments epistemological paradigm of the eyewitness did not allow for other sense data to become the basis for new knowledge. 基督教哈克（伦敦）唤醒你的知觉：叙事和视觉1引言据说在马可波罗的一生中，他走过约14000里；中世纪伟大的阿拉伯探险家伊本白图泰，走过约75000里。但他们与一位退休的海军军官英国人詹姆斯霍尔曼相比，都相形见绌，詹姆斯在19世纪上半页走过的路程达到250000里，在那个时候火车，蒸汽船和飞机都还未出现。他长途跋涉，深入到西伯利亚，航行到巴西，骑马穿过非洲南部，探索了澳大利亚未描绘在地图上的部分，并在土匪横行的巴尔干存活下来。然而，这一切事情中最了不起的是，霍尔曼24岁就失明了，他在他看不见的情况下进行了他所有的旅行：他以他自己的方式谨慎地听着、闻着、感受着这个世界。 “虽然通过视觉收获的信息量大，通过触觉收获的信息量较少，”他的传记作者指出，“一个物体并不是一次快速的就展现了它的品质，而是随着时间的推移依次呈现”（Roberts 2006：69）.然而，尽管他的成就有目共睹，但他从来没有被他的同代人认真对待，并且很快就被遗忘了。他的经验被视为无效，仅仅因为他不能使用他的视觉：“他的看不见埋没了深刻的洞察力”（ Roberts 2006：XII）。启蒙运动时期见证者的认识论范式并没有让其他的检测数据成为新知识的基础。In this article, I want to compare two travelogues that mark the sub-mission of the travel report to the paradigm of the eyewitness. The two texts in question are Daniel Defoes Tour through the Whole Island of Great Britain (172426) and Edward Wards account of his ramblings through London in The London Spy , originally published as a periodical between 1698 and 1699. While the two texts deal with roughly the same subject matter, London around the year 1700, they present two very different accounts of it. In line with the centurys empiricist imperative to observe, both emphasize that they will only report those things they have personally witnessed. However, the resulting reports could not be more unlike. Defoes calm, plain, and objective description of the streets and buildings of the city is contrasted by Wards rushed, exuberant and ex-cited account of its inhabitants. How can the two descriptions be so different, when the perceived object is basically the same?在这篇文章中，我想比较两个标志着从顺从旅行报告到目击者的范式的两个游记。我们所讨论的两个文本是丹尼尔笛福的 贯穿整个大不列颠岛（17241726）和爱德华沃德在伦敦间谍中记录的关于伦敦的随笔，它最初以期刊的方式于1698至1699年间发表。尽管这两个文本大致有着相同的主题1700年左右的伦敦，但他们采用了完全不一样的叙述方式。为了符合本世纪对于观察的经验主义，他们都强调将只报告那些他们亲眼目睹的事情。然而，由此产生的报告完全不一样。迪福对城市的街道和建筑物的平静，平淡，客观的描述和沃德对当地居民鲁莽，精力旺盛和兴奋的描述相冲突。为何两个描述是如此不同，何时感知的对象时才基本上是相同的？A literary historian might credit this difference in description to different political aims: the Whig Defoe is trying to present an economically progressive Britain, while the Tory satirist Ward attempts to ridicule the human follies of his fellow citizens suffering the consequences of (early) modernity. Narratologically speaking, they consequently show very dif-ferent points of view, they reveal a markedly different “perspective” on things, they “focalize” different aspect s of the city. However, instead of explaining the differing accounts with reference to the ideological backgrounds of the authors and thus making “only” metaphorical use of the terminology, I want to analyze a difference manifested in the creation of two specific narratorfigures, the employment of their senses, and the re-lation between perception and repor ting which these narrators reveal.一个文史学家可能会将这种描述差异归因于不同的政治目的：辉格党的迪福想要呈现一个经济进步英国，而保守党讽刺作家沃德则想要嘲笑他那些正遭受现代化后果的同胞们的愚蠢从叙述方面来说，他们因此展现了不同的观点，他们揭示了看待事情的完全不同的“视角”，他们“聚焦”了城市的不同方面。然而，比起参照作者不同的思想背景来分析描述的不同，从而只能利用术语的隐喻使用，我更想分析出现在两种特定叙述特点和他们的感官运用以及叙述者的观念和他们所做报告之间的关系的差异。It becomes obvious, when analyzing the two texts more closely, that while perception in Defoes text is rest ricted to the visual, the narrator in Wards text employs all kinds of sensory perceptions. The attempt to de-scribe and theorize the different narrators, then, leads to the question, whether there is an aural, olfactory or even a haptic equivalent to a point of view : a point of smell, maybe, or a point of taste? What would be the difference between these? And could a specific mode of perceiving (a story) influence the mode of reporting (in discourse)? As there are few predecessors which to build on, and as st udies of the impact of perceptual regimes on modes of writing are still rare, all I will be able to offer here is a tentative investigation of what is at stake in the relation between “perspective” and the senses, and a few suggestions concerning how and why this relation could and should be further explored.在将两个文本更加紧密地进行分析时，笛福的文本里的观念停留在视觉感知，而在沃德文本的叙述中他运用了所有的感官这个事实就越来越明显。试图分析并理论化不同的叙述方法将会引出一个问题，是否存在一种听觉，嗅觉甚至触觉相当于这个观点：一个点的气味，也许，或者是一个点的味道？它们之间的差异是什么？感知的具体模式（一个故事）会影响报告（话语）模式么？由于没有什么前辈的意见可以作为参考，由于知觉机制对写作模式的影响的研究数量依然十分稀少，我会在这里能够提供的是一个关于在感知和感觉的关系中什么是最关键的初步调查和关于为何这种关系应该进一步被探讨以及如何探讨的一些建议。2 The Rise of the VisualHowever persistent and/or ambivalent the classical “Greek privileging of vision” (Jay 1993: 33) and however “ocularphobic” (36) the Middle Ages might have been, the “ocularcentrism” of post-Renaissance culture would be difficult to deny: “vision, aided by new technologies, became the dominant sense in the modern world” (45). The importance of the visual soon became pervasive:From the curious, observant scientist to the exhibitionist, self-displaying courtier, from the private reader of printed books to the painter of perspectival landscapes, from the map-making colonizer of foreign lands to the quantifying businessman guided by instrumental rationality, modern men and women opened their eyes and beheld a world unveiled to their eager gazes. (69)2视觉的兴起无论经典的“希腊视觉优先”多么稳固和矛盾（Jay 1993：33）,（36）无论 中世纪有多么的“视觉恐惧”，后文艺复兴时期的 “视觉中心论”是难以否认的：“视觉，新技术的辅助下，在现代世界成为了主要感官”（45）。视觉的重要性，很快便广为人知。从好奇，敏锐的科学家到爱出风头的人和自吹自擂的高官，从纸质书籍的私人读者到透视风景的画家，从外国的土地上的地图制作殖民者到由工具理性知道的量化商人，现代的男人和女人们睁开了眼睛，用他们热切的目光观察着这个世界。 （69）Although by no means a homogeneous field, the visual sense came to be dominated by the particularly influential scopic regime of linear perspective, embodied by the technical device of the camera obscura (cf. Crary 1990: 2729). Ldemann outlines how this scopic regime establishes a specific observer position: It gives the observer the illusion he could see without being involved, that he could see, with-out being seen, without changing the observed through observing and without himself being changed by the act of observing: The subject that sees by means of linear per-spective installs itself behind the window of the “peep show” in the position of a secret, for himself and others invisible voyeur. Consequently, he is an empirical subject only in a very limited sense. While he is in the world in the emphatic sense that the things of the world organize themselves according to his perspective , he is at the same time distanced from the world by this very act. Like the Cartesian cogito the observer is bereft of his body. (Ldemann 1999: 66)1虽然没有一个均匀场，视觉感由线性角度的特别有影响力的视界政体所主导，由投像器技术设备所体现。吕德曼概述了这个视界政体如何建立一个特定的观察员地位：它给观察者一个不参与就能看到的错觉，这个错觉就是，他可以在不被看到的情况下，在观察过程中不改变观察对象的情况下，在不被观察这一行为改变自己的情况下看到他想看到的东西。从线性视角看到的国民将装置安装在“西洋镜”窗户背后的隐秘位置，以便于他自己和其他隐形偷窥者在使用。因此，他只有在非常有限的意义上才是一个经验主体。即使他觉得世界上的东西是以他的观点组合起来的 .，然而就因恰恰因为这一行为，他是在同一时间，远离了这个世界。就像笛卡尔的“我思”观察者是失去了他的身体。 （Ldemann 1999：66）As I want to argue in the following, it is such an observer position that a text like Defoes ascribes to its narrator, a narrator curiously situated at the same time in and out of the world he describes. But it is also the observer position that forms the basis for the concept of the perceptive/re-flective figure in (classical) narratology正如我想在下面证明的，正是这样一个观察者的位置，就像迪福对其解说员描述的文本，解说员在同一时间既在他所描述的世界里也在这个世界外。但也正是这个观察员的位置形成了（经典的）叙事学的感知/反射图的基础概念。Throughout the nineteenth century, a new mode of observing evolved: the “mirror” was replaced by the “lamp” as the paradigm for (artistic) vision (cf. Abrams 1953). This new scopic regime was one of “subjective vision, a vision that had been taken out of the incorporal relations of the camera obscura and relocated in the human body” (Crary 1990: 16). Two aspects of this new development appear crucial. On the one hand, the replacement of the mirror by the lamp, or of the camera obscura by the laterna magica , is a replacement of one scopic regime for another; the dominance of the visual remains unaffected. On the other hand, the new scopic regime has to be interpreted in a specific way so that it can be inte-grated into the narratological framework. As Klepper (2004) has recently argued, the central shift from the old to the new scopic regime is based on the deconstruction of transparency: while older texts assumed the possibility of an impartial observer, later ones reveal the partiality of every (subjective) observation. It seems to me that narratological theory takes this later, adaptive, “Jamesian” stance as its starting point and reinterprets earlier narratives accordingly, i. e. that they, also, were biased. However, this theory inherits or adopts both the visual bias and the epistemological model of the older scopic regime, because it interprets a constructive mode of observation within the wider framework of perspectivism, of which the (Cartesian) linear perspective is understood to be only one particular instance. In the framework of narratology, the observer is, as I will argue, still watching from inside a camera obscura , albeit one which has a distorting prism in its hole.经过整个十九世纪，一个新的观察模式逐步形成了：由于（艺术）视觉的范式，“镜子”被 “灯”一词替换（cf. Abrams 1953）。这个新的视界政体是 “主观视觉，是一种已从投像器的非物质关系中被剔除之后又重新安置在人体上的一种视觉”（Crary 1990：16）。这一新的发展的两个方面都显得至关重要。一方面，镜与灯的替换，或投像器与魔法时刻的替换，是一种视界政体与另一种的替换; 视觉的霸主地位不受影响。另一方面，一个新的视界政体必须以一个特定的方式加以诠释，以便于它可以被集成到叙事框架。 Klepper（2004）最近指出，从旧的到新的视界政体的中央转变是基于其透明度的解构，然而年代久远的书籍很可能是公正的观察者，之后的一些书籍揭示了每个（主观）观察的偏爱。在我看来，叙事学理论之后才领悟这一点，适应的，以“詹姆斯的研究者”的立场为出发点，并相应地重新诠释早期叙事，例如，他们也是有偏见的。然而，此理论继承或采用的视觉偏差和旧的视界政体的认识论模型，因为它诠释了在更广泛的视觉主义框架之内的观察建设方式，其中（笛卡尔）线性视角被理解为只是一个特定的实例。在叙事学的框架中，我认为观察者一直都在观察看暗箱内部，虽然其中有一个棱镜在其孔中。3 Ut pictura poesis: Narratology and the VisualClassical narratological theory, from Henry James to Franz Stanzel and Grard Genette, was developed in response to the novel of the 18th and 19th centuries. Given that these centuries mark the heyday of the primacy of visual observation, it comes as no surprise that the classical texts of this era and subsequently the theories concerned with these should also show a strong visual bias (cf. Klepper 2004). The narratoror character whose perceptions the narrator reportsis ge nerally conceived as a subject that perceives its (fictional) world almost exclusively visually. 3诗如画：叙事和视觉亨利詹姆斯，弗朗茨丹泽和热拉尔热奈特的经典叙事学理论是为了回应 18世纪和19世纪的小说而发展起来的。鉴于这些百年标志着视觉观察的鼎盛时期，那么这个时代的经典读本和随后与这些有关的理论表现出强烈的视觉偏差也不足为奇了（cf. Klepper 2004）。叙述者或那些由叙述者描述其观念的人物，都通常被认为是完全通过视觉来感知这个世界的公民。The question whether such visual bias poses a problem for narratology did not seem important to most theoreticians, who touch on it only slightlyif at all. Bals definition of “focalization”, for example, could not be more visual: “Whenever events are presented, they are always presented from within a certain vision. A point of view is chosen, a certain way of seeing things, a certain angle”. “Focalization is,” she continues, “the re-lation between the vision and that which is seen, perceived” (Bal 1985: 100). Without further ado, she makes “seeing” stand in for all forms of perception. Bal seems to follow Genette, who thinks it enough to “take up the slightly more abstract term focalization ,” to “avoid the too spe-cifically visual connotations of the terms vision, field , and point of view” (Genette 1980: 189). However, when revisiting his theory, Genette claims that his “only regret is that he used a purely visual, and hence overly narrow, formulation”. Consequently, he wants to “replace who sees? with the broader question of who perceives?” (Genette 1988: 64). Similarly, in their chapter on “Focalization” Martinez and Scheffel appear to realize the reductive pairing of “who sees” and “who speaks”, but think it enough to add in brackets: “(seeing should be understood here in the more general sense of perceiving)” (Martinez & Scheffel 1999: 64). Finally, Rimmon-Kenan also hopes with Genette and Bal that the more abstract term of “focalization” can avoid “the specifically visual connotations of point of view,” but admits that even this new terminology “is not free of optical-photographic connotations” and proclaims that “its purely visual sense has to be broadened to include cognitive, emotive and ideological orientation” (Rimmon-Kenan 1983: 71). But although she declares her intention to transgress the limits of the “purely visual sense of focalization” and acknowledges that perception also includes “hearing, smell, etc.,” all her examples remain within the realm of the visual (77). 这样的视觉偏差是否会对叙事学带来一个问题对于大多数只对其有轻微触及的理论家来说似乎并不重要。比如，Bal对“聚焦”的定义，已经非常直观了：“每当事件发生，他们总以一种特定的 “愿景”被呈现。一种观点，即看待事物特定的方式，特定的角度，已经被选择。“聚焦就是”她接着说，“视觉与被看到的，感知到的东西之间的联系（BAL 1985：100）。事不宜迟，她让“看”代替了所有形式的感知。Bal似乎赞同Genette的观点，谁认为它足以占用稍抽象术语的聚焦”，“避免术语视觉，领域和观点的太特异的视觉内涵”（Genette 1988：189）。然而，当重新审视他的理论时，Genette声称，他的“唯一的遗憾是，他运用了纯粹的视觉，因此过于狭隘和公式化”。因此，他要用更广泛的“谁感知到了？”取代“谁看到了”这个问题 “（Genette 1988：64）。同样，在“聚焦”这一章里，Martinez和 Scheffe，似乎意识到了“谁看”和“谁说”这一组的还原，但实际认为足够在括号内添加：“（看在这里应该以更一般的“感知”意义被理解）“（Martinez & Scheffel 1999：64）。最后Rimmon-Kenan也希望Genette和Bal让更抽象的术语“聚焦”能够避免“观点的特殊视觉内涵”，并且也承认，即使这个新的术语“也是有光学照相内涵的“，同时宣布，“正式纯粹的视觉感受才应该被扩大到包括认知的，感情的和思想的方向“（Rimmon-Kenan 1983：71）。但是，尽管她宣称她超越 “纯粹的视觉意义上的”聚焦“的限制，并承认这种看法也包括”听觉，嗅觉等，但她所有的例子都基本以视觉为主（77）。Quite obviously, this visual bias of narratological terminology and the failure to amend it have not gone unnoticed. In what might be called post-classical narratology, I found at least two possibilities to interpret these findings. The first follows the line set out already by Rimmon-Kenan and claims, in the words of Niederhoff, that “the metaphorical character of a scientific term does not diminish its suitability” (Niederhoff 2001: 45).很明显，这种叙事学术语的视觉偏差和未能修改它的这个事实并没有被忽视。在可以被称为后经典叙事学中，我发现至少有两种可能可以解释这些发现。第一个可能与Rimmon-Kenan已经列出的一样，并且它主张，用Niederhoff的话来说，“科学术语的隐喻特征并不会减弱它的适用性”（ Niederhoff 2001：4-5）。The conceptual model, this suggests, remains unhampered by the terminology. Chatman, for example, claims: “Genette has always seemed to mean more by focalization than the mere power of sight. He obviously re-fers to the whole spectrum of perception: hearing, tasting, smelling, and so on” (Chatman 1986: 192). Prince takes the substitution of “seeing” for “perceiving” even further:Note that the verb “perceive” is to be taken in a broad rather than narrow acceptation: to apprehend with the senses (to see, hear, touch, etc.) or with the mind, or with something like their equivalent. In other words, what is perceived may be abstract or concrete, tangible or intangiblesights, s ounds, smells, or thoughts, feelings, dreams, and so on. (Prince 2001: 44)这表明，概念模型仍然不受术语的限制。例如，Chatman称：“Genette似乎想要通过聚焦来表达初达除了视力以外更多的东西。显然他指的是整个感知范围：听，品，闻等等“（Chatman1986：192）。Prince甚至更进一步地用“感知”来取代“看”：请注意.动词“感知”应该以一种广泛的而不是狭隘的意义被理解：用感官（看，听，摸，等）或用思想，或与用他们功能类似的的去领悟它的意思。也就是说，被感知的可能是抽象的也可能是具体的，可能是有形的也可能是无形的景象，声音，气味，思想，感情，梦想等等。 （Prince 2001：44）According to this line of thinking, one can amend the terminology and leave the underlying model untouched. Consequently, Nelles, following Jost, distinguishes between “ocularization”, the visual element of focalization, “auricularization”, the “aural point of view”(cf. Jost 1983),gustativization, olfactivization, and tactivilization (cf.Nelles 1997: 95-96).The problem I have with such supplementation lies in the subordination of different senses under a model that was quite obviously developed with the visual in mind. When Prince defines point of view as “yielding that which might be perceived from a certain perspective” (Prince 2005: 442), he is simply substituting the wider term perceiving for the old “seeing”, but consequently must suggest that we smell or taste “from a certain perspective”which, I think, already stretches the metaphor, and the model, a bit too far, as does the idea of an “aural point of view”. I will return to the problem of “perspective” in regard to other senses later. 根据这一思路，人们可以修改术语并保持底层模型不变。因此，Nelles跟Jost一样，区分“视觉化”，聚焦的视觉元素，“听觉化”，“听觉的角度”（ cf. Jost 1983），味觉化，嗅觉化和触觉化（cf.Nelles 1997： 95-96）。我所这样补充的问题是从属于一个模式下的不同感官的，而这个模式明显是通过视觉影像发展的。当Prince把观点定义为 “屈服于从某个角度感受到的东西”（ Prince 2005：442）时，他就是在用含义更广泛的术语感知来代替“看”，但结果必须表明我们是从“某个角度”去嗅去品味的我想这句话已经包含暗喻了，而这个模式，对于 “听觉的角度”这个概念是有点过头了。考虑到其他感官，之后我会回到 “视角”的问题上来。A second line of response to the visual bias of the terminology seems to accept that the terminology is not just arbitrary , but a metaphor we live by, not a surface problem, but one that conceptually frames our thinking. Consequently, Lanser affirms the visuality of the concept of “point of view” by conceding, with John Berger and others, the primacy of the visual over all other senses: “perception is always structured upon a rela-tionship of perceiver and perceivedupon a point of view” (Lanser 1981: 4). In a similar way, Nnning and Nnning affirm the visual bias of their term “perspectiv