会计外文翻译 2.doc

游说中走向国际会计准则委员会对公允价值选择修订受访者的影响摘要：本文中我们研究的重点是分析IASB（国际会计准则委员会）行为的环境，探讨利用制度上的理论框架来制定标准制度过程中的影响。在阐述2002年国际会计准则第39条修订标准制定工作的过程的同时以 “公允价值期权修正案”为重点，对其进行个案研究。该研究是根据提交的意见信，最后的标准及其依据结论基础，以当事方身份、他们的意见、奖励、利益和他们所使用的论据来支持自己的立场。对国际会计准则理事会反对意见的反应是备受争议的来源，同样也是选择的理由。关键词：会计标准制定，国际会计准则委员会，游说，公允价值的选择1 介绍人们普遍认为，会计准则是为了提高会计信息质量，减少市场参与者之间的信息不对称。由于会计标准确定了公司所披露的信息，在利润分配过程中发挥着重要作用，一个各方都能接受的会计标准是很少存在的。受影响的各方将设法说服标准制定者按对他们有利的方向去编写规则，稍后再解决那些无法避免的内在冲突。换句话说，会计标准设置不只是在找一个“合适的解决方案”，也是在为有利益冲突的相关个人和团体做出选择。私人监管机构通过一个适当的公众咨询的过程制定其标准，包含提供给有兴趣的人士以机会，即在最终标准被通过前发表一个讨论问题的机会。标准设置被认为是一个有关游说决策机构的政治活动。研究游说过程是必要的，因为给出了理解设置标准的见解。如果以前的研究主要是以来自不同国家的标准制定者的工作为重点，我们认为，国际会计准则委员会制度上的特性并不能证明这个一般化的结果。2 文献回顾政治文献的一个重要组成部分是在制定标准中确定有关各方的奖励和胜利。有些研究提出上诉的经济模式，个人利益和理性的参与者解释标准的制定过程和行动者的行为。其他研究试图将参与者分类，研究他们的职务与会计准则结果的相关性。尽管在会计准则的制定中有广泛的文献，但很少有研究聚焦于国际会计准则委员会及其前身机构间常设委员会的工作。他们中的一部分在没有集中注意特别游说者的情况下对意见函进行分析。肯尼和拉尔森（1993年）审查了财务报告征求意见稿的意见函在合资企业的利益，并得出结论，少数个别企业游说机构间常设委员会和专业人士和商业组织代表其委托人对议员进行疏通。 肯尼和拉尔森（1995）分析了机构间常设委员会在1989年至1992年之间公布的建议意见函，发现约40个组织的贡献，60的组织予以回应。拉森（1997）的实证检验了美国游说文学的起源思想在国际范围内的适用性。麦克阿瑟（1996）分析了公司发出关于教育部32（财务报表的可比性），测试灰色的假设在会计价值与霍夫斯泰德确定的文化价值的联系。后来，麦克阿瑟（1999）重点分析机构间常设委员会对外债务的32个机构的成员进行游说行为中文化因素的影响。合并后的结果表明，文化，会计学文化和经济因素影响会计机构的成员和企业管理者的喜好。通过探索特色的游说对国家的影响，霍里森等人（2006年）表明，在执行水平高的国家，司法效率高并具有依法纳税的积极态度，从而更多的公司参与游说，并经常涉及国内盈余管理的办法和对企业没有显著影响的国内企业信息化的环境。3 研究方法为了评估国际会计准则委员会在其标准制定过程中的环境影响，我们将研究2002年以后，国际会计准则第39条修订后公允价值的发展。4 研究的理论框架在社会理论为基础，制度理论声称，他们的组织结构调整，政策和程序符合规范，价值观念和信仰被视为合法，以保持信誉和生存。由于里特和银（1986）建议，一个组织的制度化，其合法性和是否获得成功决于它能否设计自身的能力。此后，合法性是仪式进行的执法体制，依据这些执法程序以符合理性的预期和沟通。在国际会计准则委员会，参与者在不同的国家，专业背景和不同利益的斗争中尽力影响规则制定工作。鉴于各种参与者涉及利益、传统和语言的多样化，制定有些奇怪的进程标准仍然是可能的。据认为，话语优势的专业知识和专业，制度化的正当过程，提供了一个相互矛盾的利益协调机制，参与者进行合作，以便各地制定国际标准的竞赛组织的转变，从而意味着国际会计准则委员会是一个合法的国际性组织（霍里森答等，2006）。妥协对保持信誉致力于保持可信和生存是必须的。5 案例选择考虑到案件必须代表调查的现象，我们决定研究一个在发展产生中备受争议的标准，它更有可能为制定过程提供一个深入了解的标准。这种做法是可以理解为选择了一个极端的例子（瑞恩等人，2002年）。在1998年发表的国际会计准则第39条，旨在确定和建立金融工具确认和计量的指导，是一个长期进程的高潮。谈判过程远未结束，自首次发行于1998年这个标准已经了修改七次。2002年国际会计准则第39条的修改是引进一个选择权，允许实体指定任何不可撤销的金融资产或金融负债以公允价值衡量收益及亏损，并于损益账内确认损失（“公允价值选择”）。虽然公允价值受许多欧洲银行和保险公司青睐，如欧洲中央银行（ECB）对公允价值选择，以及银行监管机构强烈反对并游说欧盟委员会，其中包括瓜分选择权。这引起了欧盟以外首次可以使用完整方案的情况，但欧盟的上市公司可以在理论上应用公允价值的资产，因为欧盟排除负债。面对同一个意想不到的问题，在2004年4月国际会计准则委员会发出决定，提出了征求意见稿对公允价值选择进行限制（教育部建议修订国际会计准则第39号金融工具：确认和计量：公平值期权）。6 数据分析为了研究而进行的游说行为，必须知道哪些机会是得到了由国际会计准则委员会的成员参与游说的过程。一个可能的入侵源可能来自欧盟的筛选机制。选民也可以利用非正式渠道进行游说。获得非正式的游说活动的迹象是困难的，因为它不是直接遵循的。基于这个原因，我们的调查将以意见函，决定摘要，新闻稿及其他公共信息作为根据。Georgioiu（2004）表明，在使用意见函游说和使用游说机制之间有种强大的联系，因此我们将主要侧重于通过可得到的公众意见函来研究游说行为。人口研究由写在2002年和2005年，回应修正后的国际会计准则第39条征求意见草案的意见函组成。四百七十八封评论信党首次分为不同的类别，每个类别代表了不同的成分编制人员，会计人员，使用者，国家标准制定机构，证券交易所，政府，个人，学者及其他有关方面。我们的分析支持沙顿（1984年）的编制大厅常常比使用者更发达的假说，因为他们有更大的接触法规的影响，他们能够承受的游说费用。第二大组是参加会计专业。侯赛因和凯兹（1991）解释其对法律责任的参与和积极关注。此外，普罗（1984）经验表明， 会计师游说是作为他们委托人的辩护人。 Lindalh（1987）先进的思想表明他们使用一种政治资源，以提交意见函来创建专业形象或作为广告形式。该集团的财务报表的用户似乎对这个影响的过程心不在焉。编制人员，专业人士和标准制定者也是代表了国资委的大多数。我们研究了不同各方的游说，通过相关的国际会计准则委员会对国际会计准则第39条的修订和被舍弃的有重要意义的假设（克鲁斯卡尔-沃利斯，渐近意义是0.0001。）许多与会者不同意董事会修改公允价值期权的理由。会计专业人士和编制人员（银行和保险公司）以勉强的态度限制公允价值的选择。大多数意见函来自英国（22封），德国（11封），澳大利亚（9封），瑞士（7封），新西兰（6封），法国（6封），日本，丹麦和比利时（各4封）。为了观察外部势力是否通过他们的意见函来影响国际会计准则委员为，我们确定了选民信中提出的主要问题并且进行了验证。他们最后的标准是否集成（方法由威特曼提议于2001年）和 国际会计准则委员会是否改变了它最终标准的立场由教育部予以表示。大部分在最后一个标准中收到答案。如果最终标准反映了不同选民的不同看法，那么这个结论的理由就为标准制定者提供了更详细的基础。为了评估受访者的影响每一封意见函都将基于其与最终标准结果的一致性而被编码。具体来说，如果意见信对标准的结果是持赞成意见的，则会被编码为正的数字1。若是持反对意见的意见信，这是问题的结果编码为负的数字1。然后，我们实现了与国际会计准则委员会的立场偏好的二项测试。结果见表7：验证问题没有提到（国际会计准则委员会最终解决方案）同意教育署合计合计655 70预期比例0.5比例0.92995信赖区间0.841to 0.976（精确）2尾p0.0001（精确）这一分析初步表明，国际会计准则委员会受访者在他们的信件表示的偏好而影响。为了统计预测，变量测试协会、团体和选民对会计问题的影响之间的关系，卡方测试被应用。据透露，银行从测试的最终标准中核查消除影响。此外，大多数银行在没有分离对自身价值影响的情况下同意公允价值债务。以与公允价值选择有关的特殊问题的态度为调查目的，我们实现对具体的评论信件的内容进行分析。许多论点和支撑的论据提出了一个经过深思熟虑的问题，被认为是一种力量的显示，其用意就是，用更多的观点和为其支撑的论据提供一种强烈的意见。公司还可以使用不同类型的论据和支持的论据，比如经济后果和概念上论据，试图说服标准制定者的观点（图特西茨等， 1992）。我们也理解为一种优势指标，就对词的数量和以网页为基础的措施而论是有问题的，因为不同的写作风格和不同的页面设置、窗口、图形。我们确定，最长的理由来自于选民收到的编制和会计专业基于争论的最常用的概念。7 结论的局限性和未来研究的建议这一行动，是为了寻找在标准制定中短路的解决方案。它的基础部署策略，是在压力体制之间的距离由来已久的情况下保持标准制定者的合法性。我们的结论也支持国际会计准则委员会审查其章程，正当程序，提高透明度的最新行动，我们理解为试图获得更多合法性。本研究实证部分证明，部分外部行动者通过他们的意见函影响国际会计准则委员会的决定。内容分析表明，大多数选民当他们与标准的制定者不同意的意见不和时，往往使用的概念上的论点以加强他们的立场。这还说明，选民更喜欢使用社会接受的理由隐藏其真正游说的原因，加深标准制定者的神话。本案例研究说明了国际会计准则委员会如何利用其自身价值标准，通过认知的合理操作来开发适当的程序仪式。该项研究的最重要的限制是以意见函和其他可得到的公开材料为基础的重要事实。此外，内容分析的结论可能会因研究者在分类参数上的主观性和游说立场的选择指标而受到影响。参考文献1福格蒂，狄莫西.J（1992）,“会计标准制定作为一个制度化的行动领域：约束，机遇和难题”，会计和公共政策，第11卷331-3552侯赛因，M.凯特兹，J.E（1991）会计准则在美国：权力与社会交换的分析，对会计学和公共政策，第10卷，第1期.59-813肯尼，萨拉纽约和拉尔森，罗伯特K.（1993），“游说行为与国际会计准则”的发展，欧洲会计评论，第3卷，531-5544肯尼，萨拉纽约和拉尔森，罗伯特K.（1995）“国际会计准则的发展：在标准制定制宪参与分析”，国际会计杂志，第30卷.第4期.283-3015拉森，罗伯特K.（1997）公司对国际会计准则委员会的游说，国际财务管理和会计，第8卷.第3期.175-203Lobbying towards IASB: respondents influence On the fair value option amendmentABSTRACT：The focus of our research is to analyze the environment in which IASB acts and to investigate its influence on the standard setting process using the theoretical framework of the institutional theory. We perform a case study illustrating the standard setting process for the amendments to IAS 39 after 2002 concentrating on the “Fair Value Option- amendment”. The examination is based on comments letters submitted, final standards and their basis for conclusion and pursues the dentification of the main parties involved, their opinions, incentives, interests and the arguments they use to support their position, the sources of controversies and also the reaction of the IASB to opposing arguments and the justification of its choices.Keywords: accounting standard setting, IASB, lobbying, fair value option1 IntroductionThere is a general presumption that accounting standards are intended to enhance the quality of accounting information and to reduce the asymmetry among market participants. Because the standards determine the information disclosed by companies and play an important role in the wealth distribution process, an accounting standard acceptable to all rarely exists. The affected parties will try to convince the standard setter to write rules to their advantage and the later will have to solve the inherent conflicts. In other words, accounting standard setting is not just about finding the “right solution” but is also about making choices among the views of different individuals and groups having conflicting interests. Private regulators develop their standards according to a due process which incorporates a formal public consultation by providing interested parties opportunities to express their views on debated issues before the adoption of the final standards. The standard setting is considered a political activity in which interested parties will seek to lobby the rule-making body.The study of the lobbying process is necessary because it gives insights into understanding the institutional features of standard setting. If prior research concentrated mainly on the work of standards setters from different countries, we considered that institutional particularities of IASB dont justify the generalization of results.2 Literature ReviewAn important part of the literature on politics in standard setting identified interested parties their incentives and victories. Some research appealed economic models, the individual interest and the rationality of the actors to explain the standard setting process and the behavior of the actors. Other research studies classified participants and correlated their positions to accounting standard outcomes.In spite of the extensive literature on accounting standard-setting, few studies focused on the work of the IASB and its forerunner, IASC. A part of them analyzed the comment letters without focusing on characteristics of lobbyers. Kenny and Larson (1993) examined the comment letters on the Exposure Draft Financial Reporting of Interests in Joint Ventures and concluded that few individual firms lobby the IASC and that professional and trade organizations lobby on behalf of their constituents. Kenny and Larson (1995) analyzed also the comment letters on IASC proposals published between 1989 and 1992 and found that 40 organizations contributed about 60 % of all submitted responses. Larson (1997) tested empirically the applicability of ideas originating in the U.S.-based lobbying literature in an international context. Mac Arthur (1996) analyzed the content of the comment letters sent by companies to the IASC on ED 32 (comparability of financial statements) to test Grays hypothesized linkages between accounting values and the cultural values identified by Hofstede. Later, MacArthur (1999) focused on the impact of cultural factors on the lobbying behavior of accounting bodies members on the IASCs ED 32. The combined results suggested that cultural, accounting sub cultural and economic factors influence the preferences of accounting bodies members and corporate management. By exploring the effect of national characteristics on lobbying, Jorissen et al (2006) demonstrated that in countries with high levels of enforcement, with high judicial efficiency, and with a positive attitude towards tax compliance, companies engage more often in lobbying and that variables relating to domestic earnings management practices and the domestic information environment of the firm have no significant influence.3 Research methodologyIn order to assess the influence of IASBs institutional environment on its standard setting process we will examine the development of amendments to IAS 39 after 2002 concentrating on the “Fair Value Option-amendment”.4 The theoretical framework of the researchGrounded in social theory, institutional theory asserts that organizations adjust their structure, policies, and procedures to conform to norms, values, beliefs deemed legitimate in order to maintain credibility and survive. As Ritti and Silver (1986) suggest, the institutionalization of an organization and its success in gaining legitimacy depends on its ability to project myth about itself. Afterwards, the legitimacy is maintained by engaging in ritualistic enforcement to comply with institutional expectations and communicating the rational basis of these enforcement processes. In the case of IASB, actors with different national, professional background and diverging interests struggle to influence the process of rule setting. Given the variety of actors involved the diversity of their interests, traditions and languages it is somewhat surprising that the process of standard setting is still possible. It has been argued that the dominance of the expertise and professional discourse, the institutionalization of a due process which provided a coordination mechanism for actors with conflicting interests to collaborate in order to elaborate international standards transformed IASB in a legitimate mean of organizing contest all over the world ( Jorissen A. et al ,2006). Compromise is essential to maintain credibility in order to remain credible and survive.5 Case selectionConsidering that the case must be representative for the investigated phenomenon we decided that the study of the development of a standard which gave rise to much controversy is more likely to provide an insight into the standard setting process. This approach can be understood in terms of selecting an extreme case (Ryan et al, 2002). Issued in 1998, IAS 39 was the culmination of a long process aimed at defining and establishing recognition and measurement guidance for financial instruments. The negotiation process is far from the end having that, from its initial issuance in 1998, the standard has been amended seven times. Among the revisions to IAS 39 in 2002 was the introduction of an option that permitted entities to designate irrevocably on initial recognition any financial asset or financial liability to be measured at fair value with gains and losses recognized in profit or loss (the “fair value option”). Although many EU banks and insurers favored the fair-value option, banking regulators such as the European Central Bank (ECB) strongly opposed it and lobbied the European Commission which included the option in the carve-out. This generated a situation where first time adopters outside the EU could use the full option, but EU listed companies could in theory only fair value assets, because the EU carve out excluded liabilities. Confronted with an unexpected problem, IASB decided to propose the limitation of the fair value option in an Exposure Draft issued in April 2004 (ED Proposed Amendments to IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement: The Fair Value Option ).6 Data analysisIn order to study the lobbying behavior it is essential to know which opportunities are given by IASB to its constituents to participate in the lobbying process. A possible source of intrusion might come from EU screening mechanism. The constituents may also use informal channels for lobbying. Obtaining evidence of informal lobbying activity is difficult because it is not directly observable. For this reason, our examination will be based on comment letters, decision summaries, press releases and other public information. Georgioiu (2004) shown that there is a strong link between the use of comment letters and the use of other lobbying mechanisms, so we will focus mainly on the study of lobbying behavior using publicly available comment letters. The research population consisted of comment letters that were written between 2002 and 2005 in response to exposure drafts that amended IAS 39.The 478 comment letters were first classified in different categories, whereby each category represented a different constituent party: preparers, the accounting profession, users, national standard setters, stock exchanges, governments, individuals, academics and other interested parties. Our analysis supports the hypothesis developed by Sutton (1984) that preparers lobby more often than users, because they have greater exposure to the effects of regulations and they are able to bear the costs of lobbying. The second largest participating group is the accounting profession. Hussein and Ketz (1991) explain their participation as a proactive concern over legal liability. Also, Puro (1984) demonstrated empirically that accountants lobby as advocates of their clients. Lindalh (1987) advanced the idea that they use comment letters submission as a political resource to create the image of professionalism or as a form of advertising. The group of users of financial statements seems to be almost absent in this influencing process. The preparers, professionals and standard setters represent also the majority of SAC. We tested if the different constituent parties lobby to the same extent towards all documents issued by the IASB related to amendments to IAS 39 and the hypothesis was rejected with a high significance (KruskalWallis, asymptotic significance being 0.0001). Many participants disagreed with the boards reasons to amend the fair value option. Accounting professionals and preparers (banks and insurance companies) had the most reluctant position related to the limitation of the fair value option. Most comment letters were received from UK (22), Germany (11), Australia (9) Switzerland (7), New Zeeland (6), France (6) Japan (4) Denmark (4) Belgium (4).In order to observe if external actors influenced IASB via their comment letters we identified the main issues raised by constituents in their letters and verified if they were integrated in the final standard (the methodology was proposed by Weetman, 2001) and we analyzed situations for which IASB changed in the final standard its position expressed in the ED. Most comments received an answer in the final standard. The justification of standard setter in the basis for conclusion is more detailed if the final standard reflects a different view from the view of constituents. In order to assess the respondents influence each comment letter was coded based on its concordance with the outcome in the final standard. Specifically if the comment letter favored the outcome in the standard it was coded +1 for that issue; if the comment letter opposed the outcome it was coded -1 for the issue. Then we realized a binomial test of the preference with the IASBs position.This analysis tentatively indicated that the IASB is influenced by respondents preferences as expressed in their letters. To statistically test for the association between the predictor variable, constituents groups and the influence on accounting issues, a chi-square test was used. It revealed that banks influenced the elimination of the verifiability test from the final standard. Also, most banks agreed with fair valuing debts without separating the effect of own creditworthiness. With the purpose of examination of the positions taken in relation to the specific issues related to the use of fair value option we realized a content analysis of comment letters. The number of arguments and supporting arguments presented on an issue was considered as an indication of strength, the idea being that the more arguments and supporting arguments provided in a submission the stronger the position of the submission. Companies may also use different types of arguments and supporting arguments, such as economic consequences or conceptually based arguments, in an attempt to convince standard setters of their view (Tutticci et al., 1992). We also interpreted as a strength indicator the number of phrases considering that measures based on word counts and pages are problematic because of different writing styles and different page set-ups, graphics and font size. We determined that the longest justifications were received from preparers and the accounting profession and most constituents used conceptual based arguments.7 Conclusions, limitations and suggestions for future researchActions to find a solution for this short circuit in standard setting. It underlies the necessity of deploying strategies to