证券法论文范文.doc

证券法论文范文 序号（学号）： 长春光华学院 证券投资学课程学期论文 近年来我国证券市场的回顾与展望 姓 名 教 学 院 专 业 班 级 指导教师 商学院 财务管理 马淑华 xx 年 6 月 27 日 近年来我国证券市场的回顾与展望 摘要 改革开放以来，我国经济持续快速增长，为证券业的发展提供了良好的环境。从中国证券市场建立至今，风雨飘荡的走过近30余年，在这期间，我国证券市场获得极大的进步，逐步建立起包括骨片，债券，外汇及多种金融衍生品等较为完善的金融市场结构。但是由于起步较晚，与发达国家相比，金融市场现存的缺陷也比较显著，市场体制不完善，股权结构特殊，投资者以散户为主，承受风险的能力相对较弱，证券市场监管不力等尚不成熟的问题亟待解决。本文立足于中国证券市场发展现状，结合证券市场发展历程，对其原因尽享了研究，并总结了中国证券市场现状的解决方案并推动我国证券市场未来发展的相应策略。 装 订 线 关键词 证券市场 资本 产业结构 市场监管 创新 目 录 装 订 线 摘要.1 目录.2 引言.3 一、我国证券市场现状3 （一）我国证券市场的发展状况.4 （二）我国证券机构发展概况4 二、我国证券市场存在的问题.4 （一）证券规模小.5 （二）资本品种种类不足.5 （三）我国证券市场制度不健全.5 （四）上市公司财务造假和信息披露不透明.6 三、推进资本市场发展的措施.6 （一）市场导向.6 （二）加快立法进度，规范证券市场.6 四、我国证券市场发展趋势.7 （一）制度创新全新推进.7 （二）产品创新将系列化.8 （三）市场创新发展.8 （四）证券市场国际化.8 五、结论.9 六、参考文献.9 七、致谢.10 引言 装 订 线 在改革开放和建设社会主义市场经济的历史进程中，我国的证券市场作为社会主义市场经济体制的一个组成部分也得到了史无前例的的快速发展，证券市场的发展不但有力地促进了国有企业的改革，而且史无前例的推动了我国国民经济持续、高速、健康增长的强大动力。目前，我国的证券市场不仅有了1200多家上市公司，而且还有大量的机构投资者跟个体投资者，证券跟证券市场已经成为国民经济发展和人民日常生活紧密相关的重要经济领域，以后此普及证券经济学的知识对于提高国民常有市场经济的能力具有重要的意义。 从改革开放至今，中国市场经济虽然走过了30余年的历程。伴随着中国经济的崛起，资本市场也不断地发展壮大但是西方国家的证券市场比中国早了近200年，经历了各种各样的挫折，中国证券市场在探索中不断的成长、成熟。然而最近一段时期，很多证券公司频频被曝光存在违法违规行为，涉嫌欺诈等行为，我国这个全市场发展存在严重的问题，当前我国证券市场正处于一个改革的关键阶段。因此，本文首先阐述了我国证券市场的发展历程及现状，并揭露目前阶段存在的问题，找到存在问题的原因及影响因素，最后通过对我国证券市场现阶段的现状全方面认识并为其未来发展提供可行性建议，进一步促进证券市场的发展，从而促进我国国民经济的发展。 一、我国证券市场现状 中共十一届三中全会以后，中国进入了改革开放的新时代，随着经济体制改革不断深入的情况下，证券和证券市场也得到了恢复和发展。1990年12月19日，中国改革开放以来第一家证券交易所上海真股权按交易所正式开业，1991年7月3日第二家证券交易所深圳证券交易所也正式开张营业，这也标志着改革开放以后，中国证券市场正式形成。1981年至1987年年均国债发行规模仅为59.5亿，90年代则达到数千亿，而1997年有余各方面的原因，国债发行规模达到了2412亿元人民币。实践是证明真理的唯一标准，改革开放的路子是一条正确的选择，我国国民经济的快速发展，为证券市场的发挥在那创造了良好的条件，而证券市场的建立跟发展则反馈投资行业体制改革，推动了我国经济结构的完善，从而推动了我国国民经济持续稳定的快速发展，为我国持续创造世界GDP增速第一的奇迹提供了强有力地支持。 （一）我国证券市场的发展状况 证券市场是我国现阶段社会主义市场经济的重要组成部分，为我国国民经济的发展做出重要的贡献，主要体现在以下几个方面：一是起步较晚，但是发展速度快， 装 订 线 规模逐渐扩大，金融衍生品的种类也逐渐变得多样化。证券市场的监管制度，交易体系步上正轨。二是市场逐渐正规化、法制化证券证券期货监督管理信息公开办法正在试行中，证监会就证券投资基金服务机构业务管理办法公开征求意见,拟将核心应用软件开发、信息系统运营维护、信息安全保障和基金交易电子商务平台等信息技术系统服务业务纳入监管。随着证券市场的发展，证券市场在我国国民经济中起着越来越重要的作用。证券法的相关规定，按照真实、准确、完整、及时的要求，切实履行信息披露义务，不得有虚假记载、误导性陈述或重大遗漏。相关中介机构应当保持职业操守，勤勉尽责，独立出具各类文件，对所依据的文件资料内容的真实性、准确性、完整性进行核查、验证，切实负起责任。 （二）我国证券机构发展概况 1981年，中国国库券开始发行，我国最早的证券市场式国债市场，国库券的发行标志着证券市场的发展这一历史性突破。 1987年9月27日,第一家证券公司深圳经济特区证券公司成立。 1990年11月26日，上海证券交易所正式成立。 1990年12月19日，上海证券交易所成立。 1991年5月,深圳市股票发行与交易管理暂行办法颁布。 1993年7月7日：国务院证券委员会发布证券交易所管理暂行办法。 2000年10月18日，创业板市场规则（修订意见稿）上网披露。 xx年5月，经过国务院批准，中国证监会批复同意深圳证券交易所内的主板市场设立中小企业板。 二、我国证券市场存在的问题 我国证券市场经过短短30年的时间就达到了许多国家几十年甚至上百年才能达到的规模，汲取了西方国家发展的成功经验，才使得我国证券市场快速发展，但是由于过于注重速度的发展，我国证券市场存在很多问题，制约了证券市场自身功 美国是世界上公司法、证券法研究最为发达的国家之一，在美国法学期刊（Law Review & Journals）上每年发表400多篇以公司法和证券法为主题的论文。自1994年开始，美国的公司法学者每年会投票从中遴选出10篇左右重要的论文，重印于Corporate Practice Commentator，至xx年，已经评选了15年，计177篇论文入选。 以下是每年入选的论文列表： xx年（以第一作者姓名音序为序）： 1.Anabtawi, Iman and Lynn Stout. Fiduciary duties for activist shareholders. 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1255-1308 (xx). 2.Brummer, Chris. Corporate law preemption in an age of global capital markets. 81 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1067-1114 (xx). 3.Choi, Stephen and Marcel Kahan. The market penalty for mutual fund scandals. 87 B.U. L. Rev. 1021-1057 (xx). 4.Choi, Stephen J. and Jill E. Fisch. On beyond CalPERS: Survey evidence on the developing role of public pension funds in corporate governance. 61 Vand. L. Rev. 315-354 (xx). 5.Cox, James D., Randall S. Thomas and Lynn Bai. There are plaintiffs andthere are plaintiffs: An empirical analysis of securities class action settlements. 61 Vand. L. Rev. 355-386 (xx). 6.Henderson, M. Todd. Paying CEOs in bankruptcy: Executive pensation when agency costs are low. 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1543-1618 (xx). 7.Hu, Hey T.C. and Bernard Black. Equity and debt decoupling and empty voting II: Importance and extensions. 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 625-739 (xx). 8.Kahan, Marcel and Edward Rock. The hanging chads of corporate voting. 96 Geo. L.J. 1227-1281 (xx). 9.Strine, Leo E., Jr. Toward mon sense and mon ground? Reflections on the shared interests of managers and labor in a more rational system of corporate governance. 33 J. Corp. L. 1-20 (xx). 10.Subramanian, Guhan. Go-shops vs. no-shops in private equity deals: Evidence and implications. 63 Bus. Law. 729-760 (xx). xx年： 1.Baker, Tom and Sean J. Griffith. The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance: The Directors & Officers Liability Insurer. 95 Geo. L.J. 1795-1842 (xx). 2.Bebchuk, Lucian A. The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise. 93 Va. L. Rev. 675-732 (xx). 3.Choi, Stephen J. and Robert B. Thompson. Securities Litigation and Its Lawyers: Changes During the First Decade After the PSLRA. 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1489-1533 (xx). 4.Coffee, John C., Jr. Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation. 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1534-1586 (xx). 5.Cox, James D. and Randall S. Thomas. Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions. 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1587-1640 (xx). 6.Eisenberg, Theodore and Geoffrey Miller. Ex Ante Choice of Law and Forum: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Merger Agreements. 59 Vand. L. Rev. 1975-xx (xx). 7.Gordon, Jeffrey N. The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-xx: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices. 59 Stan. L. Rev. 1465-1568 (xx). 8.Kahan, Marcel and Edward B. Rock. Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control. 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1021-1093 (xx). 9.Langevoort, Donald C. The Social Construction of Sarbanes-Oxley. 105 Mich. L. Rev. 1817-1855 (xx). 10.Roe, Mark J. Legal Origins, Politics, and Modern Stock Markets. 120 Harv. L. Rev. 460-527 (xx). 11.Subramanian, Guhan. Post-Siliconix Freeze-outs: Theory and Evidence. 36 J. Legal Stud. 1-26 (xx). (NOTE: This is an earlier working draft. The published article is not freely available, and at SLW we generally respect the intellectual property rights of others.) xx年： 1.Bainbridge, Stephen M. Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment. 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1735-1758 (xx). 2.Bebchuk, Lucian A. Letting Shareholders Set the Rules. 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1784-1813 (xx). 3.Black, Bernard, Brian Cheffins and Michael Klausner. Outside Director Liability. 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1055-1159 (xx). 4.Choi, Stephen J., Jill E. Fisch and A.C. Pritchard. Do Institutions Matter? The Impact of the Lead Plaintiff Provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. 83 5.Cox, James D. and Randall S. Thomas. Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers: Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions to Participate in Securities Class Action Settlements. 58 Stan. L. Rev. 411-454 (xx). 6.Gilson, Ronald J. Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy. 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1641-1679 (xx). 7.Goshen , Zohar and Gideon Parchomovsky. The Essential Role of Securities Regulation. 55 Duke L.J. 711-782 (xx). 8.Hansmann, Hey, Reinier Kraakman and Richard Squire. Law and the Rise of the Firm. 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1333-1403 (xx). 9.Hu, Hey T. C. and Bernard Black. Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership: Taxonomy, Implications, and Reforms. 61 Bus. Law. 1011-1070 (xx). 10.Kahan, Marcel. The Demand for Corporate Law: Statutory Flexibility, Judicial Quality, or Takeover Protection? 22 J. L. Econ. & Org. 340-365 (xx). 11.Kahan, Marcel and Edward Rock. Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law. 58 Vand. L. Rev. 1573-1622 (xx). 12.Smith, D. Gordon. The Exit Structure of Venture Capital. 53 UCLA L. Rev. 315-356 (xx). xx年： 1.Bebchuk, Lucian Arye. The case for increasing shareholder power. 118 Harv. L. Rev. 833-914 (xx). 2.Bratton, William W. The new dividend puzzle. 93 Geo. L.J. 845-895 (xx). 3.Elhauge, Einer. Sacrificing corporate profits in the public interest. 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 733-869 (xx). 4.Johnson, . Corporate officers and the business judgment rule. 60 Bus. Law. 439-469 (xx). 5.Milhaupt, Curtis J. In the shadow of Delaware? The rise of hostile takeovers in Japan. 105 Colum. L. Rev. 2171-2216 (xx). 6.Ribstein, Larry E. Are partners fiduciaries? xx U. Ill. L. Rev. 209-251. 7.Roe, Mark J. Delaware?s politics. 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2491-2543 (xx). 8.Romano, Roberta. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the making of quack corporate governance. 114 Yale L.J. 1521-1611 (xx). 9.Subramanian, Guhan. Fixing freezeouts. 115 Yale L.J. 2-70 (xx). 10.Thompson, Robert B. and Randall S. Thomas. The public and private faces of derivative lawsuits. 57 Vand. L. Rev. 1747-1793 (xx). 11.Weiss, Elliott J. and J. White. File early, then free ride: How Delaware law (mis)shapes shareholder class actions. 57 Vand. L. Rev. 1797-1881 (xx). xx年： 1Arlen, Jennifer and Eric Talley. Uegulable defenses and the perils of shareholder choice. 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 577-666 (xx). 2.Bainbridge, Stephen M. The business judgment rule as abstention doctrine. 57 Vand. L. Rev. 83-130 (xx). 3.Bebchuk, Lucian Arye and Alma Cohen. Firms decisions where to incorporate. 46 J.L. & Econ. 383-425 (xx). 4.Blair, Margaret M. Locking in capital: what corporate law achieved for business organizers in the nieenth century. 51 UCLA L. Rev. 387-455 (xx). 5.Gilson, Ronald J. and Jeffrey N. Gordon. Controlling shareholders. 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 785-843 (xx). 6.Roe, Mark J. Delaware s petition. 117 Harv. L. Rev. 588-646 (xx). 7.Sale, Hillary A. Delaware s good faith. 89 Cornell L. Rev. 456-495 (xx). 8.Stout, Lynn A. The mechanisms of market inefficiency: an introduction to the new finance. 28 J. Corp. L. 635-669 (xx). 9.Subramanian, Guhan. Bargaining in the shadow of takeover defenses. 113 Yale L.J. 621-686 (xx). 10.Subramanian, Guhan. The disappearing Delaware effect. 20 J.L. Econ. & Org. 32-59 (xx) 11.Thompson, Robert B. and Randall S. Thomas. The new look of shareholder litigation: acquisition-oriented class actions. 57 Vand. L. Rev. 133-209 (xx). xx年： 1.Ayres, Ian and Stephen Choi. Internalizing outsider trading. 101 Mich. L. Rev. 313-408 (xx). 2.Bainbridge, Stephen M. Director primacy: The means and ends of corporate governance. 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 547-606 (xx). 3.Bebchuk, Lucian, Alma Cohen and Allen Ferrell. Does the evidence favor state petition in corporate law? 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1775-1821 (xx). 4.Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, John C. Coates IV and Guhan Subramanian. The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Further findings and a reply to symposium participants. 55 Stan. L. Rev. 885-917 (xx). 5.Choi, Stephen J. and Jill E. Fisch. How to fix Wall Street: A voucher financing proposal for securities intermediaries. 113 Yale L.J. 269-346 (xx). 6.Daines, Robert. The incorporation choices of IPO firms. 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev.1559-1611 (xx). 7.Gilson, Ronald J. and David M. Schizer. Understanding venture capital structure: A tax explanation for convertible preferred stock. 116 Harv. L. Rev. 874-916 (xx). 8.Kahan, Marcel and Ehud Kamar. The myth of state petition in corporate law. 55 Stan. L. Rev. 679-749 (xx). 9.Langevoort, Donald C. Taming the animal spirits of the stock markets: A behavioral approach to securities regulation. 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 135-188 (xx). 10.Pritchard, A.C. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and the counterrevolution in the federal securities laws. 52 Duke L.J. 841-949 (xx). 11.Thompson, Robert B. and Hillary A. Sale. Securities fraud as corporate governance: Reflections upon federalism. 56 Vand. L. Rev. 859-910 (xx). xx年： 1.Allen, William T., Jack B. Jacobs and Leo E. Strine, Jr. Function over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law. 26 Del. J. Corp. L. 859-895 (xx) and 56 Bus. Law. 1287 (xx). 2.Ayres, Ian and Joe Bankman. Substitutes for Insider Trading. 54 Stan. L. Rev. 235-254 (xx). 3.Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, Jesse M. Fried and David I. Walker. Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation. 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 751-846 (xx). 4.Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, John C. Coates IV and Guhan Subramanian. The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy. 54 Stan. L. Rev. 887-951 (xx). 5.Black, Bernard and Reinier Kraakman. Delawares Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search for Hidden Value. 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 521-566 (xx). 6.Bratton, William M. Eon and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value. 76 Tul. L. Rev. 1275-1361 (xx). 7.Coates, John C. IV. Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers. 89 Cal. L. Rev. 1301-1421 (xx). 8.Kahan, Marcel and Edward B. Rock. How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law. 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 871-915 (xx). 9.Kahan, Marcel. Rethinking Corporate Bonds: The Trade-off Between Individual and Collective Rights. 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1040-1089 (xx). 10.Roe, Mark J. Corporate Laws Limits. 31 J. Legal Stud. 233-271 (xx). 11.Thompson, Robert B. and D. Gordon Smith. Toward a New Theory of the Shareholder Role: Sacred Space in Corporate Takeovers. 80 Tex. L. Rev. 261-326 (xx). xx年： 1.Black, Bernard S. The legal and institutional preconditions for strong securities markets. 48 UCLA L. Rev. 781-855 (xx). 2.Coates, John C. IV. Takeover defenses in the shadow of the pill: a critique of the scientific evidence. 79 Tex. L. Rev. 271-382 (2000). 3.Coates, John C. IV and Guhan Subramanian. A buy-side model of M&A lockups: theory and evidence. 53 Stan. L. Rev. 307-396 (2000). 4.Coffee, John C., Jr. The rise of dispersed ownership: the roles of law and the state in the separation of ownership and control. 111 Yale L.J. 1-82 (xx). 5.Choi, Stephen J. The unfounded fear of Regulation S: empirical evidence on offshore securities offerings. 50 Duke L.J. 663-751 (2000). 6.Daines, Robert and Michael Klausner. Do IPO charters maximize firm value? Antitakeover protection in IPOs. 17 J.L. Econ. & Org. 83-120 (xx). 7.Hansmann, Hey and Reinier Kraakman. The essential role of organizational law. 110 Yale L.J. 387-440 (2000). 8.Langevoort, Donald C. The human nature of corporate boards: law, norms, and the unintended consequences of independence and aountability. 89 Geo. L.J. 797-832 (xx). 9.Mahoney, Paul G. The political economy of the Securities Act of 1933. 30 J. Legal Stud. 1-31 (xx). 10.Roe, Mark J. Political preconditions to separating ownership from corporate control. 53 Stan. L. Rev. 539-606 (2000). 11.Romano, Roberta. Less is more: making institutional investor activism a valuable mechanism of corporate governance. 18 Yale J. on Reg. 174-251 (xx). 2000年： 1.Bratton, William W. and Joseph A. McCahery. Comparative Corporate Governance and the Theory of the Firm: The Case Against Global Cross Reference. 38 Colum. J. Transnatl L. 213-297 (1999). 2.Coates, John C. IV. Empirical Evidence on Structural Takeover Defenses: Where Do We Stand? 54 U. Miami L. Rev. 783-797 (2000). 3.Coffee, John C., Jr. Privatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from Securities Market Failure. 25 J. Corp. L. 1-39 (1999). 4.Fisch, Jill E. The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate Charters. 68 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1061-1100 (2000). 5.Fox, Merritt B. Retained Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment. 85 Va. L. Rev. 1335-1419 (1999). 6.Fried, Jesse M. Insider Signaling and Insider Trading with Repurchase Tender Offers. 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 421-477 (2000). 7.Gulati, G. Mitu, William A. Klein and Eric M. Zolt. Connected Contracts. 47 UCLA L. Rev. 887-948 (2000). 8.Hu, Hey T.C. Faith and Magic: Investor Beliefs and * Neutrality. 78 Tex. L. Rev. 777-884 (2000). 9.Moll, Douglas K. Shareholder Oppression in Close Corporations: The Unanswered Question of Perspective. 53 Vand. L. Rev. 749-827 (2000). 10.Schizer, David M. Executives and Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundation of Incentive Compatibility. 100 Colum. L. Rev. 440-504 (2000). 11.Smith, Thomas A. The Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A Neotraditional Interpretation of Fiducia