研究储罐事故外文翻译.doc

重庆科技学院学生毕业设计（论文）外 文 译 文学 院 安全工程 专业班级 安全 132 学生姓名 陈春强 学 号 2013442145 译 文 要 求1. 外文翻译必须使用签字笔，手工工整书写，或用A4纸打印。2. 所选的原文不少于10000印刷字符，其内容必须与课题或专业方向紧密相关，由指导教师提供，并注明详细出处。3. 外文翻译书文本后附原文（或复印件）。A study of storage tank accidents James I. Changa, Cheng-Chung Linb【Abstract】 This paper reviews 242 accidents of storage tanks that occurred in industrial facilities over last 40 years. Fishbone Diagram is applied to analyze the causes that lead to accidents. Corrective actions are also provided to help operating engineers handling similar situations in the future. The results show that 74% of accidents occurred in petroleum refineries, oil terminals or storage. Fire and explosion account for 85%of the accidents. There were 80 accidents (33%) caused by lightning and 72 (30%) caused by human errors including poor operations and maintenance. Other causes were equipment failure, sabotage, crack and rupture, leak and line rupture, static electricity, open flames etc. Most of those accidents would have been avoided if good engineering have been practiced.Keywords: Fishbone Diagram; Accident statistics, fire and explosion1. Introduction Storage tanks in refineries and chemical plants contain large volumes of flammable and hazardous chemicals. A small accident may lead to million-dollar property loss and a few days of production interruption. A large accident results in lawsuits, stock devaluation, or company bank- ruptcy. In last 50 years, trade organizations and engineering societies such as American petroleum institute (API),American institute of chemical engineers (AIChE),American society of mechanical engineers (ASME), and national fire protection association (NFPA) have published strict engineering guidelines and standards for the construction, material selection, design and safe management of storage tanks and their accessories (AIChE, 1988;1993; API, 1988; 1990; ASME, 2004; NFPA, 1992; UL,1986; 1987). Most companies follow those standards and guidelines in the design, construction and operation, but tank accidents still occur. Learning from the past history is definitely important for the future safe operation of storage tanks. The purpose of this paper is to categorize the causes that lead to 242 tank accidents occurred in last 40 years. The fishbone diagram (The cause and effect diagram) invented by Dr Kaoru Ishikawa (Ishikawa and Lu, 1985) is used to summarize the effects and the causes that create or contribute to those effects. We hope that this work will be beneficial to tank operators and engineers.2. Overall statistics The information of 242 tank accidents reviewed in this work was collected from published reports (March and Mclennan, 1990; 1997; 2002; Persson and Lonnermark,2004), books (CPC, 1983; 2002; Pekalski, 1997; Lees,1996), CSB incident news (USCSB, 2000-2003) and databases (UQ, 2001; USCHSIB, 2004; ICHemE, 2002;PAJ, 2004; USNOAO, 1999). There were 114 occurred in North America, 72 in Asia and 38 in Europe (Table 1). USA had 105 accidents reviewed because of the easy accessibility to accident information. As indicated in Table 2, accidents occurred more frequently at petroleum refineries with 116 cases (47.9%). The second mostfrequently involved place was terminals andpumping stations (64 cases, 26.4%). Only 25.7% of accidents occurred in petrochemical plants (12.8%), oil fields (2.5%), and other types of industrial facilities (10.3%)such as power plants, gas plants, pipelines, fertilizer plants, etc. Crude oil, gasoline and oil products such as fuel oil, diesel,etc. were major contents (Table 3). The atmospheric external floating roof tank was the most frequent type and the atmospheric cone top tank was the second most frequent type. Both types were used extensively for the storage of crude oil, gasoline,Fire wasand diesel oil (Table 4).the most frequent type of loss with 145 cases and explosion was the second most frequent type of losswith 61 cases as indicated in Table 5. Fire and explosion together accounted for 85% of total cases. Oil spill and toxic gas/liquid release were the third and the fourth most frequent, respectively. The tank body distortion and the workers falling only occurred a few times. Property losses were rarely reported and the information was difficult to find. The average property loss of the 10 largest storage tank damage losses listed in Table 6 is 114 million in January 2002 dollars.3. Causes of accidents As indicated in Table 7, lightning was the most frequent cause of accident and the maintenance error was the secondmost frequent cause. The rest were operational error,equipment failure, sabotage, crack and rupture, leak and line rupture, static electricity, open flames etc. To illustrate causes and effects, a fishbone diagram as shown in Fig. 1 was developed. A fishbone diagram as shown in Fig. 2 was also developed for the prevention of accidents.3.1. Lightcicg There are two major causes of lightning related fires. The first one is a direct strike and the second is the secondary effects such as the bound charge, the electromagnetic pulse, the electrostatic pulse and the earth currents (Carpenter,1996). A direct lightning strike zone has a radius between 10and 10 m. When a storage tank is in the direct strike zone, flammable vapors exposed to the heating effect or the stroke channel may be ignited. Among the 80 lightning accidents, a dozen tanks were hit directly resulting in roof blowing off and massive destruction. A lighting strike to a floating roof tank containing naphtha on October 24, 1995 in Gilacap, Indonesia resulted in fires and property damages of 38 million dollars in January, 2002 dollars (March and Mclennan, 1997). Because of this incident, the refinery operated at approximately 70% of capacity as of July 1995,and was not expected to operate at full capacity until March 1997. A storm celland structures induces a charge on the surface of the earth prod ectlng The charged area varies in from the si ze from surface under the cell. 15 to 150 sq km, whichis much larger than a direct strike zone. The risk of secondary effects related fire is direct strike. After the nearby far higher than the risk of astrike, a well-grounded tankwill still take on the storm cell induced charge, but it releases the charge faster. The rim seal of a floating roof tank is the most likely place to be ignited in a thunderstorm. Most rim seal fires were extinguished in a few hours, but a 1989 lightning strike in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania led to a 360 0 rim seal fire around an 80,000 barrels external floating roof storage tank containing crude oil that lasted for five days (Persson and Lonnermark, 2004). A rim fire on a Singapore storage tank in 1991 escalated to a full surface and bund fire. Tight sealing to prevent the escape of liquids or vapors is definitely necessary for storage safety. Vent valve is also a likely place to be ignited. Flame arrestor should be installed. The existing lightning protection standards for the petroleum industry provide little help. The conventional radioactive lightning protection installed on a Nigerian 670,000-barrel crude oil tank did not prevent the tank fromthe lightning strike in 1990 (Carpenter, 1996). The National Fire Protection Publication on lightning protection, NFPA78/780, deibscres the problem and industrial standard policies, but provides no positive protection solutions.32. Maihtehahce error Welding is responsible for 18 accidents. Catastrophic failures of aboveground atmospheric storage tanks can occur when flammable vapors in the tank explode. In a 1995 accident, during a welding operation on the outside of a tank, combustible vapors inside two large, 30-ft. diameter by 30-ft. high, storage tanks exploded (USEPA, 1997). In a 1986 accident in Thessaloniki, Greece, sparks from a flame of a cutting torch ignited flammable vapors resulting in a fire spreading to other areas (Fewtrell and Hirst, 1998). The fire extended for seven days resulting in the destruction of10 out of 12 crude oil storage tanks and five deaths. Both OSHAs regulations concerning hot work and NFPAs standards on welding should be reviewed. Hazard reduction measures include proper hot-work procedures such as obtaining a hot work permit, having a fire watch and fire extinguishing equipment present, and proper testing for explosivity; covering and sealing all drains, vents, man-ways, open flanges and all sewers (USEPA,1997). Mechanical fractions also generate sparks that igniteflammable vapors. A 1988 accident in Memphis, Tennessee and a 1989 accident in Sandwich, Massachusetts, USA occurred during insulation installation. On October 28,1999, a spark from a man lift with two employees in PoncaCity, Oklahoma, USA ignited vapors (Persson&Lonnermark, 2004). The ignition tore the insulated cone roof into several pieces resulting a full surface fire. A fire destroyed an almost empty refinery gasoline tank during a 2002 tank inspection in Superior, Wisconsin (Persson& Lonnermark, 2004). In 1983, three Crinto, Nicaragua workers were killed in an explosion while repairing a purification duct on top of an oil storage tank. In a 1994 accident, during a grinding operation on a tank holding petroleum based sludge, the tank was propelled upward, injuring 17 workers and spilling its contents over a containment beam into a river (USEPA, 1997). In a 2000 incident, naphtha trapped in the seal ignited during a cleaning operation of a naphtha storage tank at an Anchorage, Alaska petroleum tank farm, (Persson& Lonnermark, 2004). In 1973, 40 workers at a Staten Island,New York City gas plant were killed in an explosion while cleaning an empty LNG tank (Juckett, 2002). The explosion was caused by the ignition of cleaning chemicals. Electric sparks and shocks also ignite flammable vapors or liquids resulting in fire or explosion also. A 1984 accident at a Kaohsiung, Taiwan refinery and a 2002 accident at a Lanjou, China refinery were caused by the electric sparks generated by electric motors (CPC, 2002). A 1996 accident at a Chaiyi chemical plant was caused by sparks from an electric soldering machine (CPC, 2002). To reduce the electric hazard, each room, section, or area must be considered individually in determining its classification defined in National Electrical Code, NFPA 70, Article 500, Hazardous (Classified) Locations (AIChE, 1993). Engineers must pay attention to the safe application of electric apparatus also.研究储罐事故 James I. Changa, Cheng-Chung Linb【摘要】 本文综述事故的242储油罐发生在40年前的工业时期，图表是用来分析出导致事故的原因。在未来，改正措施也给操作工程师处理类似的情况上提供帮助 。结果表明，74 的事故都发生在炼油厂、油库或加油站。火灾和爆炸大约为事故的85 。有80个事故（33）是雷击所造成的，有72个事故 （30 ）是人为错误所造成的包括不规范的操作和维修。其他原因是设备故障、破坏活动、打击和破裂、泄漏和线破裂、静电、明火等，如果已经在良好的管理上。多数这些事故本来是可以避免的。 关键词：鱼骨图；事故统计；火灾和爆炸1.导言 储油罐在炼油厂和化工厂中是用来存放大量的易燃和危险化学品的。一个小事故可能导致财产的大量损失和几天之中的生产中断。则大事故会导致诉讼、股票贬值或公司破产。 在过去50年里，贸易组织和工程社会如美国石油学（ API的），美国化学工程师学会（学会），美国机械工程师学会（美国机械工程师学会），以及国家防火协会（美国消防协会）已出版了工程的严格指导方针和标准施工，材料选择，设计和安全管理的储油罐及其配件（学会，1988年；1993年空气污染指数，1988年；1990年美国机械工程师协会，2004年;美国消防协会，1992年； UL认证，1986年，1987年）。大多数公司遵守这些标准和准则的设计，建造和操作，但油罐事故仍时有发生。从过去的教训中学习对未来储油罐的安全运行是相当重要的。本文的目的是要分析导致发生在过去的40年的242罐事故的原因。那个薰石川博士（ Ishikawa和陆，1985年）发明的图表（事故的原因及影响示意图）是用来总结了事故影响和原因，建立或有助于实现这些效果。我们希望这项工作将有利于储油罐的运行和管理。 2.总体统计 242储油罐事故的资料的审查工作是出版社报告收集的（3月麦克伦南， 1990年;1997年，2002年；佩尔松和Lonnermark ，2004年），书籍（共产党，1983年; 2002年； Pekalski ，1997年；储罐，1996年），公务员事务局新闻事件（USCSB 2000-2003年）和数据库（昆士兰大学，2001年; USCHSIB ，2004年； ICHemE ，2002年； PAJ ， 2004年； USNOAO， 1999年）。有114个发生在北美地区，72个在亚洲和欧洲38个（表1）。因为容易获得事故信息，美国已审查105宗意外。如表2所示，意外事故更频繁地发生在炼油厂116 例（47.9）。其次频繁发生的地方是收发作业区（64例，占26.4 ）。只有25.7 事故发生在石化厂（12.8 ），油区（2.5 ），以及其他类型的工业设施（10.3 ） 如发电厂，天然气加气站、管道、化肥厂等原油，汽油和石油产品，如燃料油、柴油， 等主要内容。外浮顶罐是最常见的类型和拱顶罐是第二个最常见的类型.这两种类型储罐广泛用于储存原油石油、汽油、柴油。 所示火灾是最常见的类型损失为145例，爆炸是第二个最常见的类型的损失61例。火灾和爆炸共占85 的案件总数。溢油和有毒气/液的释放分别第三和第四大频繁。罐体失真和人的过失仅发生过几次。财产损失很少被报道，这个信息很难查找。2002年1月平均财产损失的列在表6的10个最大的储罐损害损失是1.14亿美元。3.事故原因闪电是最常见的事故原因以及维修的过失是第二最常见的原因。其余的操作错误， 设备故障，破坏活动，打击和破裂，泄漏线破裂，静电，明火等，为了更清楚说明原因和后果，为防止发生意外。 3.1闪电 两个主要的原因有关雷电火灾。那个第一种是直接冲击，第二个是次要影响，如束缚电荷的电磁脉冲，静电脉冲和地球电流（卡彭特，1996年）。当储罐是在直接攻击区，直接雷击区的半径10 之间，易燃气体接触到的热效应或中风通道可点燃。在80雷击事故中，几十个储罐被击中造成的直接影响是罐顶吹掉和大规模的破坏。1995年10月24日印尼Gilacap地区，闪电的冲击对存有石油的浮顶罐了导致火灾并造成财产损失38 亿美元， 2002年1月（1997年3月麦克伦南）。由于这一事件发生后，1995年7月起炼油厂的操作约70 的库量预计不会全力开展工作，直到1997年3月有所改观。 风暴因素导致地球表面和地表下的结构预测细胞电荷发生巨大变化，该掌控不同领域的大小大约15到150平方公里，这要远远大于直接的冲击区域。有关火灾危险的次要影响是远远高于风险直接冲击。在周边冲击后，良好的接地储油罐仍然受到风暴因素诱导电荷的影响，但释放的速度更快。 浮顶罐的边缘突出处是最有可能点燃了雷暴的地方。大多数火灾密封环被扑灭需要