thegreatwallstreet.doc

中国国有银行增势迅猛 但成功会促使发展模式转变过去几十年，再没有比中国银行业的改革更能作为说明西方金融业衰退的有力标志了。 欧美银行业纷纷倒闭的时候，中国摆脱了旧账缠身的官僚作风，似乎蜕变成世界经济发展的助推者中国的银行似乎已经从充斥着坏账的瘫痪性共产主义官僚机构转化成具有足以击败欧美同僚的世界高水准机构了。这是网上译文，绕啊？（beater：搅拌器，打浆机，啥吗！）这场变革以农业银行（最后上市的五大国有因银行之一）的融资为完成标志。该行拥有3.2亿客户、44.1万名员工，分支机构甚至多于华尔街许多公司的部门。按照中国的标准衡量，其规模也是巨大的。全球市值排名前十的银行中，有四家来自中国，而在2004年，中国无一家银行进入该排名。相比之下，全球著名的信贷银行（lender）德意志银行和巴克雷银行业显得如此渺小。很自然，人们会猜想被比下去的是否只有西方企业（firm），如此自由宽松的金融体系是否会被奉行“北京共识的”国家强行控制所取代。虽然听起来很简单明了（neat），但这种结论似乎是错的。所有银行家都知道排名表会产生误导，但中国银行业的增长要比日本在19世纪80年代的增长稳定得多。金融业在中国发展潜力很大农业银行散户中持有抵押贷款的不到1%，而且中国的银行面临极小的风险（a good crisis）这个：中国经历了危机，但却从中获益。，这因为他们多多少少都被政府掌控，所以尽管效益不错，还是上市公司，但国家持有大部分股份，机构主管也由共产党任命，主管的收入却与西方同等职位人员相差甚远，这些拥有党政要员和机构主管双重身份的老板们要对高于股票市场的权利机构负责。于此同时，据说监管人员对银行实行借款上限和存款准备金率等强硬手段，然而在其他地区，这些手段早已被“低干涉”的经营模式取代。 另外，银行系统也十分排外，一些外国银行只拥有中国企业的小部分股份，国外银行在大陆的市场占有率占不足1%，相比中国银行业在国外的盈利占其总额的4%以上。这种（爱国主义）的发展模式卓有成效。财力雄厚Rich county 可以译成发达国家吗？的国家将中央银行的资金借给地方银行，试图刺激经济发展，但结果不如人意，资金流动受阻这句的主语我没想清楚，是中央银行限制了资金流动性吗？。1999年亚洲金融危机过后，中国政府官员不再通过中央银行，而是直接命令银行提供更多贷款，借款大幅攀升，由2008年GDP的102%升至2009年的127%，多用来资助水稻田里建起的高速公路，浦东公寓等一切商品。迅猛的经济涨势吸引无数赞美者的目光。印度和巴西也不再争论利用国有银行抵制经济循环一事，停止了倒退。这句没读懂，argue？甚至连富裕国家的私有银行主业开始留意总过信贷业的监管手段。中国共产党的强制命令被改称为“深谋远虑的宏观监管”但就连赞美者也会发现中国的坏账问题。那些认为只有资本主义才存在空头贷款的人应该看看中国，几十年管理不善，到二十世纪末大概有三分之一的信贷业务沦为不良贷款，而且大多来自毫无生气的国有企业。将这些不良贷款的彻底清除，无疑使中国成为合理利用财政援助的典范。截至1998年，但是注入五大国有银行的资产就达到4200亿美元，高于美国他人tarp的救助基金。中国的改革意在永久阻止该类情况的再次发生。最近，毫无节制的贷款再一次引发了恐慌。最令人担心的莫过于地方政府对基础设施项目的投资（占未偿还贷款的六分之一），对泡沫房地产市场的投资，和不动产融资抵押贷款（占未偿还贷款的五分之一，部分与基建重叠）。坏账虽有潜在隐患，但绝不会导致中国银行模式的衰退。即使勾销大量贷款，该模式也承受得起如此重击。这都归功于一个强有力的监管者，今年它刺激银行筹集资金，按计划应有八分之一的增幅。但这大部分是由于中国的高储蓄率，大笔的超额存款使得银行不必依赖变化无常的债务市场，为摆脱坏账问题赢得了时间。通过自身的贷款利息边可以补充资金，同时，作为后续保障的中国政府，财力雄厚而且拥有大量外汇储备，几乎无负债。Ps：考试的文章也会这么难吗？这是我改了又改了翻译，你是不知道我最开始的理解，能笑掉你大牙！有些专业词汇不查根本不会。Great Wall StreetThe rise of Chinas state-backed banks is stunning. But success will force the model to changeTHERE is no more potent symbol of the relative decline of Western finance than the revolution in Chinese banking over the past decade. While American and European banks have been busy blowing up, Chinas have been transformed from communist bureaucracies crippled by bad debts into something resembling world beaters.That metamorphosis has been completed by the flotation of Agricultural Bank of China, the last of the five big state-owned banks to list (see article). Even by Chinese standards it is colossal, with 320m customers, 441,000 staff and more branches than many Wall Street firms have desks. Four of the worlds ten biggest banks by market value are now Chinese. In 2004 none was. Better-known (and more global) lenders such as Deutsche Bank and Barclays look rather puny by comparison. Its natural to wonder if more than just firms are being eclipsed: whether a freewheeling era is being superseded by a “Beijing consensus” of state-managed finance. Though neat, such a conclusion looks wrongheaded.As all bankers know, league tables can mislead. Still, Chinas rise is more solid than that of Japans banks in the 1980s. Finance has huge potential in Chinaless than 1% of AgBanks retail customers have mortgages. And the countrys banks had a good crisis, largely because they never entirely left the governments embrace. So although they make money and have the trappings of public companies, the state owns a majority stake and the Communist Party appoints the top brass, whose pay is a fraction of that of their Western peers. Those bosses, with their dual role as party bigwigs and chief executives, are beholden to a higher authority than the stockmarket. Their regulators, meanwhile, wield supposedly crude tools to control banks, such as lending caps and reserve ratios, long dismissed by “light touch” supervisors elsewhere. And the system is pretty closed. Some foreign banks have minority stakes in Chinese firms. But foreigners own operations on the mainland have a market share of less than 1% by profits, while Chinese banks make less than 4% of their profits abroad.This patriotic model has done well. Rich countries tried to kick-start their economies by getting central banks to lend to banks, which, frustratingly, have hoarded the liquidity. As in 1999 after the Asian crisis, Chinas politicians just cut out the middleman and told the banks to supply more credit. Loans grew spectacularly, from 102% of GDP in 2008 to 127% in 2009, funding everything from motorways through paddy fields to yuppie flats in Pudong. Growth stayed strong and China won many admirers. In India and Brazil it is no longer retrograde to argue that state-controlled banks should help counteract the economic cycle. Even in rich countries with privately owned banks, supervisors are eyeing the tools used by Chinas regulators to control credit. Communist Party diktat has been relabelled as “macroprudential supervision”.Even admirers, though, cannot fail to spot Chinas bad-debt problem. Those who think capitalist democracies have an unrivalled talent for generating dud loans should consider the Middle Kingdom. After decades of mismanagement, by the late 1990s perhaps a third of all loans were sour, most of them owed by zombie state-owned enterprises. Cleaning that up left China a world leader in bail-outs. Since 1998 it has injected the equivalent of $420 billion into the biggest five banks alone, more than the outlays of Americas TARP bail-out fund. Chinas reforms were meant to stop this ever happening again.A repeat performance is exactly what some fear after the latest binge. Most worrying are loans to infrastructure projects sponsored by local governments (perhaps a sixth of outstanding loans) and, given a frothy property market, real-estate financing and mortgages (a fifth of the total, with some overlap with infrastructure loans). Chinas bankers say they are relaxed but some investors are kept awake by visions of corrupt officials, roads to nowhere and deserted shopping malls.Although potentially severe,