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主观幸福感外文翻译 Subjective well-being1.Introduction Subjective measures of well-being aremeasures of well-being basedon questionssuch as:“Taking thingsall together,how would you saythings arethese dayswouldyousay youre very happy,pretty happy,or nottoo happythese days?”(Gurin,Veroff,&Feld,1960,p.411,italics inoriginal).1Subjects maybeprompted togive a number between1and7,where1represents“In general,I considermyself not a veryhappy person”and7“In general,I considermyself averyhappyperson”(Lyubomirsky&Lepper,1999,p.151).In thepast,they wereasked whether they satisfieddescriptions such as:“Cheerful,gay spiritsmost of the time.Oasionally botheredby somethingbut canusually laughit off,”“Ups anddowns,now happyabout things,now depressedabout balancedin thelong run,”and“Life oftenseems soworthless that there islittle tokeep onegoing.Nothing mattersvery much,there has been somuch ofhurt thatlaughter would be emptymockery”(Watson,1930,p.81).Answers tosuch questionsare usedto constructnumerical measures of both individual well-being(the well-being ofpersons)and socialwellbeing(the well-being ofgroups).Subjective measures of well-being havebee thesubject ofheated discussionin theacademy andbeyond.One reasonis that they are frequently presented as substitutesfor,or plementsto,traditional ine-based economicwelfare measuresand toindicators inspiredby thecapability approach(Kesebir&Diener,xx).Indeed,to encouragethe use of subjective measures for public policypurposes,proponents haveadvocated NationalWell-BeingAounts(NWBAs),which trackpopulation-level scoreson subjective measures overtime(Diener&Seligman,xx;Diener,xx;Kahneman,Krueger,Schkade,Schwarz,&Stone,xx).While it is hardto predictthe extentto which subjective measures will assumethe roletraditionally played by other measures,subjective measuresseem to be gainingground.For instance,their usewas recentlyendorsed byFrench PresidentNicholas Sarkozys Commissionon theMeasurement ofEconomic Performanceand SocialProgress.The Commission,which washeaded byNobel MemorialPrize laureatesJoseph E.Stiglitz andAmartya Sen,had beencharged withthe taskof exploringalternatives toGross DomesticProduct(GDP)as ameasure ofeconomic performanceand socialprogress(Stiglitz,Sen,&Fitoussi,xx).Subjectivemeasures of well-being arefrequently referred to asmeasuresof subjective well-being(Andrews&Robinson,1991).Thus,for example,Stiglitz andcoauthors write:“Remendation1:Measuresof subjective well-being providekey informationabout peoples quality of life.Statistical officesshould incorporatequestions to capture peoples lifeevaluations,hedonic experiencesand prioritiesin theirown surveys”(Stiglitz etal.,xx,p.58,italics inoriginal).The term“subjective well-being”(Diener,1984)denoting that which subjectivemeasuresof well-being aredesigned to representhas itsownencyclopedia entries(e.g.,Diener,xx)and handbookarticles(e.g.,Diener,Lucas,&Oishi,xx).By now,an establishedbody ofliteratureemploys subjective measuresof well-being toshed lighton the causesand correlatesof subjective well-being.Though issuesabout the reliabilityand validityof suchmeasures remain,scientificand validityand moreon examiningsubstantive empiricalrelationships.Nevertheless,considerable confusionremains when it es to what subjective well-being is and howit relatesto what I willcall well-being simpliciter:“what we have，when our lives are going well for us,when weare livinglives that are notnecessarily morallygood,but good for us”(Tiberius,xx,p.493,italics inoriginal).It has been pointedout thatsubjective measuresdiffer fromeconomic andcapability-based measureswith respectto theunderlying aount of welfare or well-being(Adler&Posner,xx;Angner,xx,xxa).2It has also been noted thatproponents of subjective measuresdiffer amongthemselves(Bruni,xx,pp.117120;Tiberius,xx,pp.494495).Yet,whenitestothe nature of subjective well-being and its relationto well-being simpliciter,existing literaturefails to capture thedegree ofdiversity,and disagreement,among proponents of subjective measures.The resultis afalse impressionof homogeneityand anobstacle tofruitful municationand cooperationwithin andacross disciplinaryboundaries.This paperexamines the notion of“subjective well-being”as the term isused inliterature on subjective measuresof well-being.In orderto examinewhat subjective well-being is and howit relatesto well-being simpliciter,I beginby exploringthe aountsof wellbeingimplicit in the literature onsubjective measuresas wellas therole thatsubjective well-being playsin thoseaountsand proceedto examinewhatsubjective well-being isthought to be.My aimis toestablish thatproponents of subjective measuresdiffer at least superficiallyon at least twopoints.First,they disagreeabout the relationship between subjective well-being andwellbeing simpliciter:about whether subjective well-being constitutes well-being simpliciteror merelyis a ponent of it.Second,they disagreeabout the nature of subjective well-being:about whetherit isconstituted bya cognitive,hedonic,emotional,or moodstate,or somebination,and about whether tocall thatstate“happiness,”“satisfaction,”or somethingelse entirely.In aneffort toreconcile thesedifferences,I proposean interpretationaording towhichsubjective measures presupposepreference hedonism:an aountaording towhich well-being is a matterof desiredmental states.This readinghas not(to myknowledge)been explicitlyendorsed byproponents of subjective measures.Yet,it sueedsin reconcilingmuch thathasbeenwritten aboutsubjective measuresandithas theadditional advantage of attributingto proponents of subjectivemeasure anaountof well-being thathas clearaxiological foundationsand isrelatively plausible.A properappreciation of thenatureof subjective well-being andits relationto well-being simpliciteris importantfor avariety ofreasons.Among otherthings,such anappreciation canhelp bothproponents andcritics ofsubjective measuresto developclearer andmore effectivearguments.Proponents ofsubjective measureslike those who arguefor the development ofNWBAswill want to identifythe mostplausible interpretationof thesemeasures,so as to permitthe developmentof asstrong acase aspossible in their favor.Criticslike thosewho arguefor thesuperiority oftraditional economicor capability-based measureswill wantto zeroin on the mostplausible interpretationofsubjective measures soastoavoid thecharge that they areattacking astraw man.My hopeis thatin theend,a clearerappreciation for the foundationsofsubjective measures canhelp removeobstacles toscientific munication,collaboration,and progress.2.Subjective well-being andwell-being simpliciterIn thissection,I explorethe relationship between subjective well-being andwell-being simpliciterin thewritings onsubjective measures.I willargue thatproponents ofsubjective measuresof well-being disagreeabout therelationship betweensubjective well-being andwell-being simpliciter:aboutwhethersubjective well-being constitutes well-being simpliciteror merelyis aponent of it.As mystarting point,I takethe concept of well-being,that is,whatIhave so far calledwell-being simpliciter:“what wehave whenourlivesaregoingwellfor us,when weare livinglives thatare notnecessarily morallygood,but good forus”(Tiberius,xx,p.493,italics inoriginal).Let uscall thisthe“core”concept of well-being.There aremany otherterms thatare usedin the same sense,including“a persons good,benefit,advantage,interest,prudential value,welfare,happiness,flourishing,eudaimonia,and utility”(Moore&Crisp,1996,p.599).Because theconcept of well-being isintended tocapture whatis ultimatelyand not just instrumentallygood for the individual,it is also supposedtocapturethat which wehavereason to promoteas anend and notjust as ameansbothinour ownlives andin thelives ofothers.As ThomasScanlon putsit:It ismonly supposedthat thereisasimple notionof individualwell-being thatplays thefollowing threeroles.First,it servesas animportant basisforthedecisions ofa singlerational individual,at leastfor thosedecisions in which heor shealone is concerned(that isto say,in whichmoral obligationsand concernsfor otherscan beleft aside).Second,it iswhat aconcerned benefactor,such as a friendor parent,has reasontopromote.Third,it isthe basison whichan individuals interestsare takeninto aountin moralargument(Scanlon,1998,p.93).3In particular,it isfrequently assumedthat well-being isone considerationor assome peoplewould argue,the onlyconsideration thatshould serveas anend,andnotjustameans forpublic policy.Here Iwill takeit forgranted thatwhen proponents ofsubjective measures talkabout suchmeasures asrepresenting well-being,they use the termin the core sense(Angner,xxa,in press).First,as indicatedabove,subjective measuresare oftenpresentedas alternatives toother measuresof welfareor well-being;this wouldmake littlesense if,in fact,subjectivemeasureswere notintended torepresent thatwhich theothermeasureswere designedtorepresentviz.welfareorwell-being.Second,the proponentsconcept of well-being playsthe verysame roleas thatplayedby thecoreconcept:thosewhodefend the useofsubjectivemeasuresof wellbeingoften emphasizethat theythink of well-being as thatwhich is ultimatelygoodforthe individual,asthatwhich isworth promotingin thelife ofothers,and asa central(sometimes theonly)ultimate goalforpublicpolicy(cf.Diener&Seligman,xx,quoted above).Third,anumberof proponentsexplicitly citeclassical philosophicalliterature inenthusiastic agreementwhile signalingthat theyuse“well-being”and/or“happiness”inthe same senseas philosophersdo(Kahneman,Wakker,&Sarin,1997;Layard,xx;Watson,1930).Over theyears,philosophers havetried toshed lighton theconcept of well-being bydeveloping anddefending variousaounts,or conceptions of well-being.Here,I followParfit(1984,pp.493502)in dividingsuch aountsinto threemain classes:mental stateaounts,preference-satisfaction ordesire-fulfillment aounts,and objective-list aounts.4Aording tomental-state aounts,well-being isa“mental state”or a“state of mind.”Because theseaounts allsee welfare“as havingto enterour experience,”they aresaid tosatisfy the experience requirement(Griffin,1986,p.13).Scanlon writes:“Experiential theorieshold that the quality of lifefortheperson wholives itis pletelydetermined byitsexperiential quality,”where“experiential quality”refers to“what itwouldbelike tolive it”(Scanlon,1998,pp.97,99).On this view,then,subjectively feltexperience isboth necessaryand sufficientfor a persons well-being.Aording todesire-fulfillment orpreference-satisfaction aounts,by contrast,a personis well off tothe extentthat her desires are fulfilled and/or her preferences are satisfied.Scanlon putsit thisway:Desire theoriesreject the experience requirementand allowthata persons lifecan bemade betterand worsenot onlyby changesin that persons states of consciousnessbut alsoby changeselsewhere inthe worldwhich fulfillthatpersons preferences(Scanlon,1993,p.186).Such aountsdo notrequire thata personwho is welloffexperience anyfeelings of happiness orsatisfaction.What theydo requireis thatherdesiresarefulfilled(or thatherpreferencesaresatisfied),which does not edown tothesamething.The twokinds of aount describedsofararefrequentlyreferredtoas subjectiveaounts,because theydescribe a personswell-being as(atleastpartly)a function of his or herfeelings,experiences,desires,and soon.Aording toso-called objectiveaounts,by contrast,apersonswell-being doesnot dependon suchsubjective factors.On suchaounts,“certain thingsare goodor badfor beings,independently inatleastsome casesof whether they aredesired orwhethertheygive riseto pleasurableexperiences”(Chappell&Crisp,1998,p.553).Identifying thelist ofthings thatare goodfor peopleregardless ofwhat theywant is notoriously difficult,but oneprovisional listof suchthings includes“moral goodness,rational activity,thedevelopmentof ones abilities,having childrenand beinga goodparent,knowledge,and theawareness oftrue beauty”(Parfit,1984,p.499).Obviously,there aremany versionsof aountsof eachkind.The tri-partite divisionpermits ustocapturea majordifference betweensubjectivemeasuresof well-being,traditional economicwelfare measures,and welfareindicators inspiredby thecapability approach.It hasbeennotedelsewhere thattraditional economicwelfare measuresare basedon preference-satisfaction aountsof well-being(Angner,xxa,b,in press;Harsanyi,1982;Hausman&McPherson,xx).This isevident,among otherthings,from thefact that welfare economiststraditionally havedefended theirmeasures byshowing that they areutility functions,that is,thatthey are indicesof preferencesatisfaction.It hasalso beennoted thatmeasures inspiredby thecapability approachare basedon objective-list aountsof well-being(Nussbaum,xx;Sen,1987).This is clear,among otherthings,from theassumption thatcertain thingsin particular,having alarge capabilitysetare thoughtto begoodforapersonregardless ofwhether thosethings wouldmake theperson happier,and ofwhethertheperson desiresthem.5Meanwhile,it isfairly obviousthat manyproponentsofsubjectivemeasuresthink of well-being asa mental state.There isabundant evidence,for ohing,thattheyadhere tothe experience requirement.In theliteratureonsubjectivemeasures,well-being isoften describedasamatter exclusivelyof individualsubjective,hedonic,or affectiveexperience.For example,David G.Myers quotesMadame dela Fayetteas saying:“If ohinks thatone ishappy,that isenough to be happy,”and adds that“like Madamede LaFayette,social scientists view well-being asa stateofmind.Well-being,sometimes calledsubjective well-beingto emphasize the point,isapervasive sensethat lifeis good”(Myers,1992,pp.23,27).Myers evidentlytakes well-being to be somethingthoroughly subjective;note,in particular,theuseof the term“subjective well-being”as synonymouswith“well-being.”The explicitreference tostatesofmind strongly suggests thatwhat hehas inmind issome typeof mental-state aount.Similarly,Ed Dienerwrites:“The areaofsubjective well-beingis subjective.Itresides withinthe experience of theindividual”(Diener,1984,p.543).Diener andEunkook Suhreinforcethe point:Subjective well-being researchisconcerned with individualssubjective experiencesof their lives.The underlyingassumptionis that well-being can be definedby peoples consciousexperiencesin termsof hedonicfeelings orcognitive satisfactions.The fieldis builtonthepresumption thatto understandthe individualsexperiential qualityof well-being,it isappropriateto directlyexamine howapersonfeels aboutlife inthecontext ofhisorher ownstandards(Diener&Suh,1997,p.191).Diener and Suh,like Myersand theauthors towhom herefers,apparently usethe term“well-being”interchangeably with“subjective well-being.”The factthat Dienerand Suhargue that well-being is not onlyconcerned withthe individuals subjectiveexperiences,but definedby them,stronglysuggests thattheyadhere totheexperiencerequirement.Several authorsemphasizethesubjective characterof well-being,as theyusethe term,by contrastingsubjectivemeasureswith“objective”ones,including socialand economicindicators.Diener makesthis pointinthefollowing way:Notably absentfrom definitionsof SWBsubjective well-beingare necessaryobjective conditionssuch ashealth,fort,virtue,or wealth.Although suchconditions areseen aspotential influenceson SWB,they are not seenas aninherent andnecessary partofit(Diener,1984,p.543).6This quoteconfirms that,in Dieners work,an individualswell-being isdefined notby the objective circumstances inwhichshe findsherself,but byhersubjectiveexperiences,though heallows theformer tobe causallyresponsible forthe latter.Daniel Kahneman,who identifieswell-being withhappiness,addsthathappiness“is nottobeconfused withgood fortune,whichisan assessmentof thecircumstances of someones life”(Kahneman,1999,p.5).In Kahnemans view,it ispossible toenjoy goodfortunepresumably ine,health,and soonwithout beinghappy.Angus Campbell (1976),quoted inDiener(1984,p.543),expands onthis point.Campbell maintains:“The grossnational product,important asit undoubtedlyis,is clearlynot theultimate touchstoneagainst whichthe quantumofhappinessin thiscountry can be assessed”(Campbell,1976,p.117).He continues:If weare primarilyconcernedwithdescribing thequalityoflife experienceof thepopulation,we willneed measuresdifferent fromthose thatare usedto describetheobjectivecircumstancesinwhich peoplelive.We will have todevelop measuresthat godirectly totheexperienceitself.These subjectivemeasureswillsurely nothave theprecision ofindicators thatare expressedin numberof dollars,units oftime,or numbersof squarefeet,but theywillhavethe greatadvantageofdealing directlywith whatit iswe wantto know,theindividuals sense of well-being(Campbell,1976,p.118,italics inoriginal).6Quality oflife,on Campbellsview,isafunctionofindividualssenseof well-being.If wewantto study thequalityoflife,then,we needtostudythe individualsexperienceof theirlives,not theobjective characteristicsof theirexistence.These writingsclearly give pride of place to subjectively experienced mental states.Indeed,the evidencesuggeststhatthese authorsadopt theexperiencerequirementand thinkof well-being asconstituted bysome subjectively experienced mentalstate.They are best understood as using the term“subjective well-being”to denotethe subjectively experienced mentalstate,so that well-being canbe saidtobeconstituted bysubjective well-being.The notionthatwell-being isconstituted bysubjective well-being,bytheway,explains theidentification of“subjectivemeasuresofwell-being”and“measuresofsubjective well-being.”Others,however,appear toresist theview thatwell-being isconstituted bysubjective well-being alone(cf.Angner,in press).Increasingly frequently,it issuggested that subjectively experienced mental statesconstitute butone ponent ofwell-being.For example,Kahneman writes:Objective happinessis notproposed asa prehensiveconceptofhuman well-being,but onlyasasignificant constituentofit.Maximizing thetime spentontheright sideoftheaffect grid is notthe mostsignificant valuein life,and adoptingthis criterionasaguide tolife may