BOT项目风险管理【外文翻译】.doc

本科毕业论文（设计）外 文 翻 译原文：Risk Management in BOT ProjectsRisk management in BOT projects is studied, following the risk management framework, i.e. risk identification, risk classification, risk analysis, risk attitude and risk response (or risk allocation).1.Risk identification in BOT projectsThe risks of BOT projects can be identified in the following categories (Baker, 1986; cited in Nadeem, 1998): political risks; construction completion risks; operating risks; finance risks and legal risks.2.Risk classification in BOT projectsThere have been several types of risk classification. The following are some examples of them: Construction phase: completion delay, cost overrun, force majeure, political risk, infrastructure risk (referring to other facilities in direct competition with the BOT project in question). Operational phase: raw material supply, market, performance/technical, operation/maintenance, foreign exchange, other contingencies (Tiong, 1990b). Development phase: technology risk, credit risk, bid risk. Construction phase: completion risk, cost overrun risk, performance risk, political risk. Operating phase: performance risk, cost overrun risk, liability risk, equity resale risk, offtake risk (Beidleman et al., 1990): Global risks: Political: government, technology. Legal: framework, type of agreement. Commercial: market, input, currency. Environment: impact, ecological. Construction, design,Elemental risks: Technical: physical conditions, training. Financial: form oftechnology. Operational: operation, maintenance, ownership, return, currency. Revenue: demand,financing, evaluation, development (toll/tariff, Woodward et al., 1992). There are some other classifications, some of which are: static or dynamic; fundamental or particular; government source or private source; speculative or pure; financial or non-financial; and measurable or immeasurable (Charoenpornpatiana, 1998). These classifications facilitate all the following steps of the risk management framework.3.Risk analysis in BOT projectsThe reasons of risk analysis in BOT projects are summarized by Walker and Smith (1995) as follows:A rigorous risk analysis is necessary before a project is embarked upon in order to establish its financial and technical feasibility. It can help to screen out financially unsound projects and get minds working together early enough to overcome foreseen technical difficulties. An increased understanding of the project risks leads to the formulation of more realistic plans in terms of cost estimates and programmes. Knowing the magnitude of the possible impact that may be caused by the contingent factors, the parties can seek for better allocation of the risks through the agreement of suitable contract clauses, procurement of insurance or other risk response measures. Apart from these, a more positive and rational risk-taking attitude will result from a carefully prepared risk analysis as the risk-takers know where they stand.There are several, or many, tools and techniques, which are applicable to risk analysis in BOT projects. The application is dependent on the contents and contexts of projects. 4.Risk attitude in BOT projectsThe government is moving away from taking on project risks (ASIAMONEY, 1996).Government see BOT schemes as a method with all the technical and financial risks being borne by the private promoter In a traditional method of contracting, risk-sharing may be allowed and the contractor may be able to negotiate with the client as far as claims for cost overrun is concerned. Under the BOT method, in which the contractor is normally also the developer, this is no longer possible It is very important for promoters to demonstrate to the government that they are able to take all the risks that the government is apprehensive about (Tiong, 1995a)These descriptions are particularly pointing out the governments attitude that it is expecting the private sectors to take as many risks as possible so that it be free from them. Tiong and Alum (1997a) analyzed the requirements in BOT projects from the viewpoint of governments. The topics in these studies are, proposal evaluation criteria, the financial and contractual elements in final negotiation, requirement in request for proposal (RFP) (Tiong, 1995a), financial commitment (Tiong and Alum, 1997b), and importance of equity in the financial package (Tiong, 1995b). Particularly in his one study (Tiong, 1995a), he testified a hypothesis: the ability to be awarded the concession in a BOT tender is strongly related to the ability of the project promoter to retain and reallocate risks and offer guarantees against risks and uncertainties.From an analysis of the study, he concluded: There is a positive agreement in the views of the promoter and government respondents with regard to the hypothesis.One thing governments should recognize is the additional cost of risk transfer. The government provides funds for public sector projects at cost and without charges for the project risks. The private sector prices risks and charges more for projects with highest risk (Saunders, 1998).Joshua and Gerber (1992) pointed out the potential problem that the public have to bear a higher toll price caused by unreasonable risk transfer in a privatized tollway. It is called value for money (VFM) paradox, which may occur in PFI projects in trying to achieve VFM through the transference of risks to private consortia (Owen and Merna, 1997). On the other hand, what is a contractors view is surveyed in the UK, and Walker and Smith (1995) summarized the reports as follows: “Major contractors in the UK would have to achieve higher levels of return, a quick pay-back or achieve other spin-off benefits such as development gains or business for other companies within their organization”, according to the report in 1989. “The 1993 report suggested that a market for private investment could be created by the transfer of a network of roads to tolled status within the public sector, the creation of a number of companies owning significant shares in the network and the subsequent privatization of those companies”. This report indicates that a market for private investment could not be created if the road networks were not transferred to particular independent bodies:Contractors stated that they would only be prepared to take the perceived increased risk in privatized projects if the government takes a positive stance on the subject rather than playing with the issue on a piecemeal basis The 1989 survey revealed that the private sector was expected to take the whole burden of risk, and this made many of them wary about their involvement.How about bankers in the UK? The 1989 report “gave the consensus view that the banks did not adopt a proactive role leaving the contractors to be the prime movers. One of the reasons cited for this rather passive approach is the long gestation period of these projects Indeed, bankers believed that their risk position was far worse than that facing contractors. It is also reported that banks would not make loans to finance public sector projects without risk capital also being available (Saunders, 1998). 5.Risk response and risk allocation in BOT projectsThe PFI guidelines in the UK recognize that the minimization of risk and the cost of accepting it is generally achieved by allocating risk to those best placed to accept it (Saunders, 1998).In cases of developing countries, some government guarantees are generally required for funding. McCarthy and Tiong (1991) described the common risks and securities considering the proper risk This section discusses the risk analysis from the standpoints of major project participants, i.e. host government, funders.Host government：The governments principal responsibility is to achieve VFM or cost efficiency (CE) by implementing a project. In this regard, the best alternative for infrastructure arrangement must be selected. However, VFM and CE of a project contain uncertainty and risk, because they are values of the project in the future. Therefore, evaluation of VFM and CE should be conducted in terms of risk analysis, too.Generally, VFM includes not only money terms, but also non-monetary terms, such as social welfare and time saving in transportation. If all of these non-monetary terms are convertible into monetary terms, a decision-maker can analyze risk by the money term as a single criterion. Monte Carlo simulation and sensitivity analysis are applicable in this case. On the other hand, if it is not the case, MCDM, which can incorporate plural criteria in a systematic way, is applicable to the analysis.Selection of the most cost-efficient concessionaire is also an important responsibility of government. Concessionaire selection under risk should be considered. In this regard, Hatush and Skitmore (1997) presented a potential use of probabilistic risk analysis to bid evaluation and pre-qualification of concessionaires. In addition, in order to recognize the cost-efficiency in a concessionaires bid, government needs to know how risk is anticipated and involved in the bid. For example, let us suppose Concessionaire A offered a higher bid price (or higher tariff rate, longer concession period) because he anticipates risk sufficiently and as a result included the risk premium in the bid price. Concessionaire B, in turn, offered a lower price simply because he does not analyze risk sufficiently. In such a case, awarding the concession to Concessionaire B may cause a disaster. Because BOT projects contain much more risk than traditional ones, governments must understand how risk is analyzed and anticipated by concessionaires so as to avoid the disaster as shown in the example.Another important point is risk transfer. In BOT projects, governments expect private companies to assume as much risk as possible. However, risk transfer is always accompanied by risk premium as an additional cost. By analyzing risk in terms of likelihood, severity, and risk premium, a government must consider the best risk transfer. Likelihood and severity of risk can be assessed subjectively but in a systematic manner by AHP and some other MCDM methods. Risk mapping technique is a simple and easily understood technique for this purpose. Once these two attributes of risk, i.e. likelihood and severity, are well assessed, risk premium can be considered. In so doing, the utility theory would be working. The suitable risk premium can be settled in a negotiation with concessionaires. Finally, the most essential thing governments have to do is to set up clear objectives, either single or plural. Without doing it, risk analysis cannot be conducted sufficiently.Funders：There are two major categories as funders in BOT projects. One is lender and the other is investor. “Lenders tend to focus on the downside risks while investors tend to look at the upside opportunity” (Walker and Smith, 1995). Lenders are mainly concerned with the cash flow of a project. Cash flow of a project is analyzed and measured by the following terms, as examples: return on investment (ROI); return on equity (ROE); net present value (NPV); pay back period (PBP); and internal rate of return (IRR). By constructing cash-flow models, lenders take a look at some of these terms of a project. One of the very important and difficult things in cash-flow modeling is how to predict an interest rate and an inflation rate, or, in other words, a discount rate, which must be involved in the modeling, over the concession period of a project as long as 20-30 years. A small change in these rates results in a very big change in the project cash flow.The cash-flow analysis is often conducted by means of Monte Carlo simulation and sensitivity analysis. Since lenders, such as bankers, cannot assume so much risk, their concern is directed to the down side, i.e. the worse cases in sensitivity analysis. In many cases of BOT projects, the loans are made on the limited or non-recourse basis, lenders need to be very aware of risk. Therefore, any worst-case scenario is necessary and needs to be examined by sensitivity analysis, and other analyses as well. The impacts of change in the interest rate and the inflation rate should be tested by sensitivity testing, too.However, cash-flow analysis is difficult to incorporate qualitative risk factors. These factors include political risks, risks in management by a concessionaire and so on. Since these factors are very important in BOT projects, they should be analyzed separately from cash-flow analysis.Things are more complicated and serious in BOT transport projects than in BOT power projects, because lenders are more exposed to the demand risk in the former than in the latter. Generally, there are many factors influential to the demand, and they interact in complex manners. In this case, risk factors and their relationship should be fully identified. Because income of a project solely depends on the demand, the lender should recognize the impact of various risk factors to the demand by sensitivity analysis.Sensitivity analysis is applicable when functions between input variables and output variables are explicit. On the other hand, neural network approach has great potential for sensitivity testing in BOT projects in case the functions are implicit. However, this approach requires a sufficient amount of recorded data. In many cases of BOT environments, a risk of currency exchange rate is one of the most concerns for project participants. This risk factor is inherent in BOT projects, particularly in developing countries. It must be fully understood through a thorough risk analysis process from identification to sensitivity testing. Lenders in general are supposed to be well-knowledged in financial techniques. Accordingly, techniques for financial risk hedging, such as exchange rate swap, can be employed as long as the risk is fully analyzed.On the other hand, for external investors, their equity investment to a BOT project normally forms one portion of their portfolio. Risk analysis for investors is directed to diversification of risk in their portfolio. Because BOT projects are highly risky by nature, much higher return is expected and required by investors.Source: Prasanta K. Dey, Stephen O. Ogunlana. Selection and application of risk management tools and techniques for build-operate-transfer projects. Industrial Management & Data Systems, 2004(4): P334-346.译文：BOT项目风险管理BOT项目风险管理研究证明：风险管理框架包括风险识别、风险分类、风险分析、风险态度和风险应对（或风险分担）。1BOT项目的风险识别BOT项目的风险可以划分为以下几个种类（贝克,1986;引用Nadeem,1998）：政治风险、完工风险、经营风险、财务风险和法律风险。2BOT项目的风险分类现有很多种风险分类，以下按不同的角度分类：施工阶段的风险：完工延迟风险、成本超支风险、不可抗力风险、政治风险、基础设施风险（是指其他设施建设与正在筹划中的BOT项目有直接竞争的风险）。运营阶段的风险：原料供应风险、市场风险、性能/技术风险、设备运营/维修风险、外汇风险、其他可能发生的意外（Tiong,1990b）。发展阶段的风险：技术风险、信用风险、投标风险。施工阶段的风险：完工风险、成本超支风险、性能风险、政治风险。运营阶段的风险：性能风险、成本超支风险、责任风险、公平转售风险、上升风险（Beidleman等,1990）。全球风险：政治方面包括：政府和科技风险。法律方面包括：框架和合同类型风险。商业方面包括：市场、输入和货币风险。 环境方面包括：影响和生态风险。建设、设计、元素风险：技术方面包括：物理状态和训练风险。 金融方面包括：科技形式风险。操作方面包括：运行风险、维护风险、所有权风险、回报和货币风险。收益方面包括：需求风险、融资风险、评估风险和发展风险（人数/关税, Woodward等,1992）。还有一些其他的风险分类：像静态或动态分类；理论或特定分类；政府消息来源或私人来源分类；投机或投资分类；金融或非金融分类；以及可衡量或不可估量的风险分类（Charoenpornpatiana,1998）。这些分类将有助于形成下列所有风险管理框架。3BOT项目的风险分析Walker and Smith（1995）总结BOT项目风险分析的原因如下：为了建立财务和技术的可行性，在实施项目之前进行严谨的可行性分析是很有必要的。它有助于筛选经济上不健全的项目，并且同时事先工作以克服可预见的技术困难。对项目风险认识的不断增加，可以推动制定基于成本估计和项目的更实际的计划。另外，了解由意外因素所可能引起的影响程度，从而当事人就可以通过合适的合同条款、保险采购或其他风险的应对措施寻求更好的风险分配办法。除此之外，完善的风险分析可以使冒险者知道他们的立场，从而采取更积极和理性的冒险态度。还有几个或更多的工具和技术可适用于BOT项目的风险分析，这是一个依赖于内容和环境项目的应用程序。4BOT项目中的风险态度政府正在远离承担项目的风险（ASIAMONEY,1996）。政府把BOT方案看作一种方法它所有的技术和金融风险均由私人发起者承担在订立合同的传统方法中允许风险分担，而且承包商还可与客户就与费用超支有关的要求进行谈判。而在BOT的方法下,由于承包商通常也是开发者，上述情况就不可能实现了。发起人向政府证明他们能承担所有政府所担忧的一切风险是很重要的（Tiong 1995a）。以上的描述中特别指出政府的态度是期望私人部门尽可能多的承担风险，这样政府就可以远离风险了。Tiong和Alum（1997）从政府的角度分析了BOT项目的要求。在这些研究中有以下几个主题：建议的评价标准、最后谈判中的财政和契约因素、要求计划建议书（RFP）（Tiong征求建议书,1995）、财务承诺（Tiong和Alum,1997b）以及财务软件平等的重要性（Tiong, 1995b）。特别是在他的一项研究中（Tiong 1995a）,他证明了一个假说：具有BOT招标特许权的能力，很大程度上与项目发起人保留和重新分配风险、提供担保规避风险和不确定性因素有密切联系。通过研究分析，他得出结论：在发起者和政府之间的假设也存在积极的协议达成。政府还应该意识到额外成本的风险转移。政府为公共部门项目按原价提供资金但是没有要求承担项目风险，而私人部门的价格风险却使政府对高风险的项目收费较多（Saunders, 1998）。Joshua and Gerber （1992）指出了一个潜在的问题，即由于收费公路私有化中不合理的风险转移而造成市民必须承担较高的收费价格。它被称为现金价值（VFM）悖论，这可能发生在以实现现金价值为目的的PFI项目中，这是通过努力把风险转移给私人财团的一个项目（Owen and Merna, 1997）。另一方面， 1989年报道称英国调查了对承包商的看法，Walker 和Smith（1995）总结的汇报如下：“英国主要的承包商必须获得一个快速回报或取得其他附带利益的较高回报水平，如发展取得或与组织中的其他公司交易取得”，“1993年的报告指出，公共部门通过把一系列的公路网转为收费公路，随后使在公路网中拥有大量股份的公司私有化，这样就可以创造一个私人投资市场”。 该报告指出，如果公路网不转移到特定的独立机构，那么私人投资市场将无法产生。承包商阐明，只要政府在此问题上不是随便玩玩而是采取积极的态度，他们将准备承担在私有化项目中不断增加的感知风险在1989年的一项调查中表明，私营部门预期会承担所有的风险重担，这使其中许多人对他们的参与持谨慎态度。英国银行家的看法又如何呢？1989年的报告指出“普遍观点也认为主要的推动力是因为银行没有采取积极主动的角色离开承包商。这种被动做法的原因之一是因为这些项目的酝酿时间长事实上，银行家认为他们所面临的风险状况相对于承包商要更糟”。 另据报道，银行不会贷款给没有可用风险资金的公共部门项目（Saunders, 1998）。5. BOT项目的风险应对和风险分担英国的PFI准则认为：风险最小化和成本分担通常是通过分配风险，使最有条件接受风险的人承担来实现（Saunders, 1998）。发展中国家要取得政府担保一般需要有资金。McCarthy 和 Tiong （1991）描述了考虑适当风险情况下的常见风险和证券。这部分从主要项目参与者即从东道国政府和资助者的立场来讨论风险分析。东道国政府：政府的主要责任是要在实施项目中取得现金价值悖论（VFM）或成本效率（CE）。在此方面选定基础设施的协议是最好的选择。然而，由于一个项目的现金价值悖论和和成本效率是对项目未来的价值而言，所以他们包含不确定性和风险。因此，现金价值悖论和和成本