国际财务管理第六版中文版第二章

国际财务管理,EUN/RESNICK,SixthEdition,INTERNATIONALFINANCIALMANAGEMENT,EUN/RESNICK,FourthEdition,EvolutionoftheInternationalMonetarySystemCurrentExchangeRateArrangementsEuropeanMonetarySystemEuroandtheEuropeanMonetaryUnionTheMexicanPesoCrisisTheAsianCurrencyCrisisTheArgentinePesoCrisisFixedversusFlexibleExchangeRateRegimes,ChapterTwoOutline,EvolutionoftheInternationalMonetarySystem,Bimetallism:Before1875ClassicalGoldStandard:1875-1914InterwarPeriod:1915-1944BrettonWoodsSystem:1945-1972TheFlexibleExchangeRateRegime:1973-Present,Bimetallism:Before1875,A“doublestandard”inthesensethatbothgoldandsilverwereusedasmoney.Somecountrieswereonthegoldstandard,someonthesilverstandard,someonboth.Bothgoldandsilverwereusedasinternationalmeansofpaymentandtheexchangeratesamongcurrenciesweredeterminedbyeithertheirgoldorsilvercontents.GreshamsLawimpliedthatitwouldbetheleastvaluablemetalthatwouldtendtocirculate.,ClassicalGoldStandard:1875-1914,Duringthisperiodinmostmajorcountries:GoldalonewasassuredofunrestrictedcoinageTherewastwo-wayconvertibilitybetweengoldandnationalcurrenciesatastableratio.Goldcouldbefreelyexportedorimported.Theexchangeratebetweentwocountryscurrencieswouldbedeterminedbytheirrelativegoldcontents.,Forexample,ifthedollarispeggedtogoldatU.S.$30=1ounceofgold,andtheBritishpoundispeggedtogoldat6=1ounceofgold,itmustbethecasethattheexchangerateisdeterminedbytherelativegoldcontents:,ClassicalGoldStandard:1875-1914,$30=6$5=1,ClassicalGoldStandard:1875-1914,Highlystableexchangeratesundertheclassicalgoldstandardprovidedanenvironmentthatwasconducivetointernationaltradeandinvestment.Misalignmentofexchangeratesandinternationalimbalancesofpaymentwereautomaticallycorrectedbytheprice-specie-flowmechanism.,Price-Specie-FlowMechanism,SupposeGreatBritainexportedmoretoFrancethanFranceimportedfromGreatBritain.Thiscannotpersistunderagoldstandard.NetexportofgoodsfromGreatBritaintoFrancewillbeaccompaniedbyanetflowofgoldfromFrancetoGreatBritain.ThisflowofgoldwillleadtoalowerpricelevelinFranceand,atthesametime,ahigherpricelevelinBritain.TheresultantchangeinrelativepricelevelswillslowexportsfromGreatBritainandencourageexportsfromFrance.,ClassicalGoldStandard:1875-1914,Thereareshortcomings:Thesupplyofnewlymintedgoldissorestrictedthatthegrowthofworldtradeandinvestmentcanbehamperedforthelackofsufficientmonetaryreserves.Eveniftheworldreturnedtoagoldstandard,anynationalgovernmentcouldabandonthestandard.,InterwarPeriod:1915-1944,Exchangeratesfluctuatedascountrieswidelyused“predatory”depreciationsoftheircurrenciesasameansofgainingadvantageintheworldexportmarket.Attemptsweremadetorestorethegoldstandard,butparticipantslackedthepoliticalwillto“followtherulesofthegame”.Theresultforinternationaltradeandinvestmentwasprofoundlydetrimental.,BrettonWoodsSystem:1945-1972,Namedfora1944meetingof44nationsatBrettonWoods,NewHampshire.Thepurposewastodesignapostwarinternationalmonetarysystem.Thegoalwasexchangeratestabilitywithoutthegoldstandard.TheresultwasthecreationoftheIMFandtheWorldBank.,BrettonWoodsSystem:1945-1972,UndertheBrettonWoodssystem,theU.S.dollarwaspeggedtogoldat$35perounceandothercurrencieswerepeggedtotheU.S.dollar.Eachcountrywasresponsibleformaintainingitsexchangeratewithin1%oftheadoptedparvaluebybuyingorsellingforeignreservesasnecessary.TheBrettonWoodssystemwasadollar-basedgoldexchangestandard.,BrettonWoodsSystem:1945-1972,U.S.dollar,Gold,Peggedat$35/oz.,TheFlexibleExchangeRateRegime:1973-Present.,FlexibleexchangeratesweredeclaredacceptabletotheIMFmembers.Centralbankswereallowedtointerveneintheexchangeratemarketstoironoutunwarrantedvolatilities.Goldwasabandonedasaninternationalreserveasset.Non-oil-exportingcountriesandless-developedcountriesweregivengreateraccesstoIMFfunds.,CurrentExchangeRateArrangements,FreeFloatThelargestnumberofcountries,about48,allowmarketforcestodeterminetheircurrencysvalue.ManagedFloatAbout25countriescombinegovernmentinterventionwithmarketforcestosetexchangerates.PeggedtoanothercurrencySuchastheU.S.dollaroreuro(throughfrancormark).NonationalcurrencySomecountriesdonotbotherprintingtheirown,theyjustusetheU.S.dollar.Forexample,Ecuador,Panama,andElSalvadorhavedollarized.,EuropeanMonetarySystem,ElevenEuropeancountriesmaintainexchangeratesamongtheircurrencieswithinnarrowbands,andjointlyfloatagainstoutsidecurrencies.Objectives:ToestablishazoneofmonetarystabilityinEurope.Tocoordinateexchangeratepoliciesvis-visnon-Europeancurrencies.TopavethewayfortheEuropeanMonetaryUnion.,WhatIstheEuro?,TheeuroisthesinglecurrencyoftheEuropeanMonetaryUnionwhichwasadoptedby11MemberStateson1January1999.Theseoriginalmemberstateswere:Belgium,Germany,Spain,France,Ireland,Italy,Luxemburg,Finland,Austria,PortugalandtheNetherlands.,Whatarethedifferentdenominationsoftheeuronotesandcoins?,Thereare7euronotesand8eurocoins.500,200,100,50,20,10,and5.Thecoinsare:2euro,1euro,50eurocent,20eurocent,10,eurocent,5eurocent,2eurocent,and1eurocent.Theeuroitselfisdividedinto100cents,justliketheU.S.dollar.,Howdidtheeuroaffectcontractsdenominatedinnationalcurrency?,Allinsuranceandotherlegalcontractscontinuedinforcewiththesubstitutionofamountsdenominatedinnationalcurrencieswiththeirequivalentsineuro.,EuroArea,AustriaBelgiumCyprusCzechRepublicEstoniaFinlandFranceGermanyGreeceHungaryIreland,22Countriesparticipatingintheeuro:,ItalyLatviaLithuaniaLuxembourgMaltaPolandPortugalSlovakRepublicSloveniaSpainTheNetherlands,TheLong-TermImpactoftheEuro,Iftheeuroprovessuccessful,itwilladvancethepoliticalintegrationofEuropeinamajorway,eventuallymakinga“UnitedStatesofEurope”feasible.ItislikelythattheU.S.dollarwillloseitsplaceasthedominantworldcurrency.TheeuroandtheU.S.dollarwillbethetwomajorcurrencies.,TheMexicanPesoCrisis,On20December,1994,theMexicangovernmentannouncedaplantodevaluethepesoagainstthedollarby14percent.Thisdecisionchangedcurrencytradersexpectationsaboutthefuturevalueofthepeso.Theystampededfortheexits.Intheirrushtogetoutthepesofellbyasmuchas40percent.,TheMexicanPesoCrisis,TheMexicanPesocrisisisuniqueinthatitrepresentsthefirstseriousinternationalfinancialcrisistouchedoffbycross-borderflightofportfoliocapital.Twolessonsemerge:Itisessentialtohaveamultinationalsafetynetinplacetosafeguardtheworldfinancialsystemfromsuchcrises.Aninfluxofforeigncapitalcanleadtoanovervaluationinthefirstplace.,TheAsianCurrencyCrisis,TheAsiancurrencycrisisturnedouttobefarmoreseriousthantheMexicanpesocrisisintermsoftheextentofthecontagionandtheseverityoftheresultanteconomicandsocialcosts.Manyfirmswithforeigncurrencybondswereforcedintobankruptcy.Theregionexperiencedadeep,widespreadrecession.,TheArgentineanPesoCrisis,In1991theArgentinegovernmentpassedaconvertibilitylawthatlinkedthepesototheU.S.dollaratparity.Theinitialeconomiceffectswerepositive:ArgentinaschronicinflationwascurtailedForeigninvestmentpouredinAstheU.S.dollarappreciatedontheworldmarkettheArgentinepesobecamestrongeraswell.,TheArgentineanPesoCrisis,ThestrongpesohurtexportsfromArgentinaandcausedaprotractedeconomicdownturnthatledtotheabandonmentofpesodollarparityinJanuary2002.Theunemploymentrateroseabove20percentTheinflationratereachedamonthlyrateof20percent,TheArgentineanPesoCrisis,Thereareatleastthreefactorsthatarerelatedtothecollapseofthecurrencyboardarrangementandtheensuingeconomiccrisis:LackoffiscaldisciplineLabormarketinflexibilityContagionfromthefinancialcrisesinBrazilandRussia,CurrencyCrisisExplanations,Intheory,acurrencysvaluemirrorsthefundamentalstrengthofitsunderlyingeconomy,relativetoothereconomies.Inthelongrun.Intheshortrun,currencytradersexpectationsplayamuchmoreimportantrole.Intodaysenvironment,tradersandlenders,usingthemostmoderncommunications,actbyfight-or-flightinstincts.Forexample,iftheyexpectothersareabouttosellBrazilianrealsforU.S.dollars,theywantto“gettotheexitsfirst”.Thus,fearsofdepreciationbecomeself-fulfillingprophecies.,FixedversusFlexibleExchangeRateRegimes,Argumentsinfavorofflexibleexchangerates:Easierexternaladjustments.Nationalpolicyautonomy.Argumentsagainstflexibleexchangerates:Exchangerateuncertaintymayhamperinternationaltrade.Nosafeguardstopreventcrises.,FixedversusFlexibleExchangeRateRegimes,Supposetheexchangerateis$1.40/today.Inthenextsli