《有市场势力的定价》PPT课件.ppt

,Chapter11,PricingwithMarketPower,Chapter11,Slide2,TopicstobeDiscussed,CapturingConsumerSurplusPriceDiscriminationIntertemporalPriceDiscriminationandPeak-LoadPricing,Chapter11,Slide3,TopicstobeDiscussed,TheTwo-PartTariffBundlingAdvertising,Chapter11,Slide4,Introduction,Pricingwithoutmarketpower(perfectcompetition)isdeterminedbymarketsupplyanddemand.Theindividualproducermustbeabletoforecastthemarketandthenconcentrateonmanagingproduction(cost)tomaximizeprofits.,Chapter11,Slide5,Introduction,Pricingwithmarketpower(imperfectcompetition)requirestheindividualproducertoknowmuchmoreaboutthecharacteristicsofdemandaswellasmanageproduction.,Chapter11,Slide6,CapturingConsumerSurplus,Quantity,$/Q,IfpriceisraisedaboveP*,thefirmwilllosesalesandreduceprofit.,Chapter11,Slide7,CapturingConsumerSurplus,P*Q*:singleP&QMC=MRA:consumersurpluswithP*B:PMC&consumerwouldbuyatalowerpriceP1:lesssalesandprofitsP2:increasesales&andreducerevenueandprofitsPC:competitiveprice,Chapter11,Slide8,CapturingConsumerSurplus,Quantity,$/Q,D,MR,Pmax,MC,PC,A,P*,Q*,P1,B,P2,QuestionHowcanthefirmcapturetheconsumersurplusinAandsellprofitablyinB?,AnswerPricediscriminationTwo-parttariffsBundling,Chapter11,Slide9,CapturingConsumerSurplus,Pricediscriminationisthechargingofdifferentpricestodifferentconsumersforsimilargoods.,Chapter11,Slide10,PriceDiscrimination,FirstDegreePriceDiscriminationChargeaseparatepricetoeachcustomer:themaximumorreservationpricetheyarewillingtopay.,Chapter11,Slide11,AdditionalProfitFromPerfectFirst-DegreePriceDiscrimination,Quantity,$/Q,Pmax,Withperfectdiscrimination,eachconsumerpaysthemaximumpricetheyarewillingtopay.,Chapter11,Slide12,WithperfectdiscriminationEachcustomerpaystheirreservationpriceProfitsincrease,AdditionalProfitFromPerfectFirst-DegreePriceDiscrimination,Chapter11,Slide13,QuestionWhywouldaproducerhavedifficultyinachievingfirst-degreepricediscrimination?Answer1)Toomanycustomers(impractical)2)Couldnotestimatethereservationpriceforeachcustomer,AdditionalProfitFromPerfectFirst-DegreePriceDiscrimination,Chapter11,Slide14,PriceDiscrimination,FirstDegreePriceDiscriminationThemodeldoesdemonstratethepotentialprofit(incentive)ofpracticingpricediscriminationtosomedegree.,Chapter11,Slide15,PriceDiscrimination,FirstDegreePriceDiscriminationExamplesofimperfectpricediscriminationwherethesellerhastheabilitytosegregatethemarkettosomeextentandchargedifferentpricesforthesameproduct:Lawyers,doctors,accountantsCarsalesperson(15%profitmargin)Collegesanduniversities,Chapter11,Slide16,First-DegreePriceDiscriminationinPractice,Quantity,$/Q,Second-DegreePriceDiscrimination,Quantity,$/Q,Second-DegreePriceDiscrimination,Quantity,$/Q,P0,Q0,P1,Q1,1stBlock,P2,Q2,P3,Q3,2ndBlock,3rdBlock,Economiesofscalepermit:IncreaseconsumerwelfareHigherprofits,Chapter11,Slide19,PriceDiscrimination,ThirdDegreePriceDiscrimination1)Dividesthemarketintotwo-groups.2)Eachgrouphasitsowndemandfunction.,Chapter11,Slide20,PriceDiscrimination,ThirdDegreePriceDiscrimination3)Mostcommontypeofpricediscrimination.Examples:airlines,liquor,vegetables,discountstostudentsandseniorcitizens.,Chapter11,Slide21,PriceDiscrimination,ThirdDegreePriceDiscrimination4)Third-degreepricediscriminationisfeasiblewhenthesellercanseparatehis/hermarketintogroupswhohavedifferentpriceelasticitiesofdemand(e.g.businessairtravelersversusvacationairtravelers),Chapter11,Slide22,PriceDiscrimination,ThirdDegreePriceDiscriminationObjectivesMR1=MR2MC1=MR1andMC2=MR2MR1=MR2=MC,Chapter11,Slide23,PriceDiscrimination,ThirdDegreePriceDiscriminationP1:pricefirstgroupP2:pricesecondgroupC(Qr)=totalcostofQT=Q1+Q2Profit()=P1Q1+P2Q2-C(Qr),Chapter11,Slide24,PriceDiscrimination,ThirdDegreePriceDiscriminationSetincrementalforsalestogroup1=0,Chapter11,Slide25,PriceDiscrimination,ThirdDegreePriceDiscriminationSecondgroupofcustomers:MR2=MCMR1=MR2=MC,Chapter11,Slide26,PriceDiscrimination,ThirdDegreePriceDiscriminationDeterminingrelativeprices,Chapter11,Slide27,PriceDiscrimination,ThirdDegreePriceDiscriminationDeterminingrelativepricesPricing:Chargehigherpricetogroupwithalowdemandelasticity,Chapter11,Slide28,PriceDiscrimination,ThirdDegreePriceDiscriminationExample:E1=-2&E2=-4P1shouldbe1.5timesashighasP2,Chapter11,Slide29,Third-DegreePriceDiscrimination,Quantity,$/Q,Chapter11,Slide30,Third-DegreePriceDiscrimination,Quantity,D2=AR2,MR2,$/Q,D1=AR1,MR1,MRT,Chapter11,Slide31,NoSalestoSmallerMarket,Evenifthird-degreepricediscriminationisfeasible,itdoesntalwayspaytoselltobothgroupsofconsumersifmarginalcostisrising.,Chapter11,Slide32,NoSalestoSmallerMarket,Quantity,$/Q,Chapter11,Slide33,TheEconomicsofCouponsandRebates,Thoseconsumerswhoaremorepriceelasticwilltendtousethecoupon/rebatemoreoftenwhentheypurchasetheproductthanthoseconsumerswithalesselasticdemand.Couponsandrebateprogramsallowfirmstopricediscriminate.,PriceDiscrimination,Chapter11,Slide34,PriceElasticitiesofDemandforUsersVersusNonusersofCoupons,Toilettissue-0.60-0.66Stuffing/dressing-0.71-0.96Shampoo-0.84-1.04Cooking/saladoil-1.22-1.32Drymixdinner-0.88-1.09Cakemix-0.21-0.43,Chapter11,Slide35,Catfood-0.49-1.13Frozenentre-0.60-0.95Gelatin-0.97-1.25Spaghettisauce-1.65-1.81Crmerinse/conditioner-0.82-1.12Soup-1.05-1.22Hotdogs-0.59-0.77,PriceElasticitiesofDemandforUsersVersusNonusersofCoupons,Chapter11,Slide36,TheEconomicsofCouponsandRebates,CakeMixNonusersofcoupons:PE=-0.21Users:PE=-0.43,Chapter11,Slide37,TheEconomicsofCouponsandRebates,CakeMixBrand(Pillsbury)PE:8to10timescakemixPEExamplePEUsers:-4PENonusers:-2,Chapter11,Slide38,TheEconomicsofCouponsandRebates,Using:Priceofnonusersshouldbe1.5timesusersOr,ifcakemixsellsfor$1.50,couponsshouldbe50cents,Chapter11,Slide39,AirlineFares,Differencesinelasticitiesimplythatsomecustomerswillpayahigherfarethanothers.Businesstravelershavefewchoicesandtheirdemandislesselastic.Casualtravelershavechoicesandaremorepricesensitive.,Chapter11,Slide40,ElasticitiesofDemandforAirTravel,Price-0.3-0.4-0.9Income1.21.21.8,FareCategory,ElasticityFirst-ClassUnrestrictedCoachDiscount,Chapter11,Slide41,AirlineFares,Theairlinesseparatethemarketbysettingvariousrestrictionsonthetickets.Lessexpensive:notice,stayovertheweekend,norefundMostexpensive:norestrictions,Chapter11,Slide42,IntertemporalPriceDiscriminationandPeak-LoadPricing,SeparatingtheMarketWithTimeInitialreleaseofaproduct,thedemandisinelasticBookMovieComputer,Chapter11,Slide43,SeparatingtheMarketWithTimeOncethismarkethasyieldedamaximumprofit,firmslowerthepricetoappealtoageneralmarketwithamoreelasticdemandPaperbackbooksDollarMoviesDiscountcomputers,IntertemporalPriceDiscriminationandPeak-LoadPricing,Chapter11,Slide44,IntertemporalPriceDiscrimination,Quantity,$/Q,Chapter11,Slide45,Demandforsomeproductsmaypeakatparticulartimes.RushhourtrafficElectricity-latesummerafternoonsSkiresortsonweekends,IntertemporalPriceDiscriminationandPeak-LoadPricing,Peak-LoadPricing,Chapter11,Slide46,CapacityrestraintswillalsoincreaseMC.IncreasedMRandMCwouldindicateahigherprice.,Peak-LoadPricing,IntertemporalPriceDiscriminationandPeak-LoadPricing,Chapter11,Slide47,MRisnotequalforeachmarketbecauseonemarketdoesnotimpacttheothermarket.,Peak-LoadPricing,IntertemporalPriceDiscriminationandPeak-LoadPricing,Chapter11,Slide48,Peak-LoadPricing,Quantity,$/Q,Chapter11,Slide49,HowtoPriceaBestSellingNovel,WhatDoYouThink?1)Howwouldyouarriveatthepricefortheinitialreleaseofthehardboundeditionofabook?,Chapter11,Slide50,HowtoPriceaBestSellingNovel,WhatDoYouThink?2)Howlongdoyouwaittoreleasethepaperbackedition?Couldthepopularityofthebookimpactyourdecision?,Chapter11,Slide51,WhatDoYouThink?3)Howdoyoudeterminethepriceforthepaperbackedition?,HowtoPriceaBestSellingNovel,Chapter11,Slide52,TheTwo-PartTariff,Thepurchaseofsomeproductsandservicescanbeseparatedintotwodecisions,andtherefore,twoprices.,Chapter11,Slide53,TheTwo-PartTariff,Examples1)AmusementParkPaytoenterPayforridesandfoodwithinthepark2)TennisClubPaytojoinPaytoplay,Chapter11,Slide54,TheTwo-PartTariff,Examples3)RentalofMainframeComputersFlatFeeProcessingTime4)SafetyRazorPayforrazorPayforblades,Chapter11,Slide55,TheTwo-PartTariff,Examples5)PolaroidFilmPayforthecameraPayforthefilm,Chapter11,Slide56,TheTwo-PartTariff,Pricingdecisionissettingtheentryfee(T)andtheusagefee(P).Choosingthetrade-offbetweenfree-entryandhighusepricesorhigh-entryandzerouseprices.,Chapter11,Slide57,Two-PartTariffwithaSingleConsumer,Quantity,$/Q,Chapter11,Slide58,Two-PartTariffwithTwoConsumers,Quantity,$/Q,Chapter11,Slide59,TheTwo-PartTariff,TheTwo-PartTariffWithManyDifferentConsumersNoexactwaytodetermineP*andT*.Mustconsiderthetrade-offbetweentheentryfeeT*andtheusefeeP*.Lowentryfee:Highsalesandfallingprofitwithlowerpriceandmoreentrants.,Chapter11,Slide60,TheTwo-PartTariff,TheTwo-PartTariffWithManyDifferentConsumersTofindoptimumcombination,chooseseveralcombinationsofP,T.Choosethecombinationthatmaximizesprofit.,Chapter11,Slide61,Two-PartTariffwithManyDifferentConsumers,T,Profit,Chapter11,Slide62,TheTwo-PartTariff,RuleofThumbSimilardemand:ChoosePclosetoMCandhighTDissimilardemand:ChoosehighPandlowT.,Chapter11,Slide63,TheTwo-PartTariff,Two-PartTariffWithATwistEntryprice(T)entitlesthebuyertoacertainnumberoffreeunitsGilletterazorswithseveralbladesAmusementparkswithsometokensOn-linewithfreetime,Chapter11,Slide64,PolaroidCameras,1971PolaroidintroducedtheSX-70cameraWhatDoYouThink?Howwouldyoupricethecameraandfilm?,Chapter11,Slide65,PolaroidCameras,Hint,Chapter11,Slide66,PricingCellularPhoneService,QuestionWhydocellularphoneprovidersofferseveraldifferentplansinsteadofasingletwo-parttariffwithanaccessfeeandper-unitcharge?,Chapter11,Slide67,Bundling,Bundlingispackagingtwoormoreproductstogainapricingadvantage.ConditionsnecessaryforbundlingHeterogeneouscustomersPricediscriminationisnotpossibleDemandsmustbenegativelycorrelated,Chapter11,Slide68,Bundling,Anexample:Leasing“GonewiththeWind”&“GettingGertiesGarter.”Thereservationpricesforeachtheaterandmovieare:,GonewiththeWindGettingGertiesGarter,TheaterA$12,000$3,000TheaterB$10,000$4,000,Chapter11,Slide69,Bundling,Rentingthemoviesseparatelywouldresultineachtheaterpayingthelowestreservationpriceforeachmovie:MaximumpriceWind=$10,000MaximumpriceGertie=$3,000TotalRevenue=$26,000,Chapter11,Slide70,Bundling,Ifthemoviesarebundled:TheaterAwillpay$15,000forbothTheaterBwillpay$14,000forbothIfeachwerechargedthelowerofthetwoprices,totalrevenuewillbe$28,000.,Chapter11,Slide71,Bundling,NegativeCorrelated:ProfitabletoBundleApaysmoreforWind($12,000)thanB($10,000).BpaysmoreforGertie($4,000)thanA($3,000).,RelativeValuations,Chapter11,Slide72,Bundling,Ifthedemandswerepositivelycorrelated(TheaterAwouldpaymoreforbothfilmsasshown)bundlingwouldnotresultinanincreaseinrevenue.,GonewiththeWindGettingGertiesGarter,TheaterA$12,000$4,000TheaterB$10,000$3,000,RelativeValuations,Chapter11,Slide73,Bundling,Ifthemoviesarebundled:TheaterAwillpay$16,000forbothTheaterBwillpay$13,000forbothIfeachwerechargedthelowerofthetwoprices,totalrevenuewillbe$26,000,thesameasbysellingthefilmsseparately.,Chapter11,Slide74,Bundling,BundlingScenario:TwodifferentgoodsandmanyconsumersManyconsumerswithdifferentreservationpricecombinationsfortwogoods,Chapter11,Slide75,ReservationPrices,r2(reservationpriceGood2),r1(reservationpriceGood1),$5,$10,$5,$10,Chapter11,Slide76,ConsumptionDecisionsWhenProductsareSoldSeparately,r2,r1,Chapter11,Slide77,ConsumptionDecisionsWhenProductsareBundled,r2,r1,Chapter11,Slide78,Theeffectivenessofbundlingdependsuponthedegreeofnegativecorrelationbetweenthetwodemands.,ConsumptionDecisionsWhenProductsareBundled,Chapter11,Slide79,ReservationPrices,r2,r1,Chapter11,Slide80,ReservationPrices,r2,r1,Chapter11,Slide81,MovieExample,r2,r1,(Wind),(Gertie),5,000,14,000,10,000,5,000,10,000,Chapter11,Slide82,Bundling,MixedBundlingSellingbothasabundleandseparatelyPureBundlingSellingonlyapackage,Chapter11,Slide83,MixedVersusPureBundling,r2,r1,10,20,30,40,50,60,70,80,90,100,10,20,30,40,50,60,70,80,90,100,Chapter11,Slide84,Bundling,ScenarioPerfectnegativecorrelationSignificantmarginalcost,Mixedvs.PureBundling,Chapter11,Slide85,Bundling,ObservationsReservationpriceisbelowMCforsomeconsumersMixedbundlinginducestheconsumerstobuyonlygoodsforwhichtheirreservationpriceisgreaterthanMC,Mixedvs.PureBundling,Chapter11,Slide86,BundlingExample,SellSeparatelyConsumersB,C,andDbuy1andAbuys2PureBundlingConsumersA,B,C,andDbuythebundleMixedBundlingConsumerDbuys1,Abuys2,andB&Cbuysthebundle,Chapter11,Slide87,BundlingExample,Sellseparately$50$90-$150Purebundling-$100$200Mixedbundling$89.95$89.95$100$229.90C1=$20C2=$30,Chapter11,Slide88,Bundling,SellSeparately3($50-$20)+1($90-$30)=$150PureBundling4($100-$20-$30)=$200MixedBundling($89.95-$20)+($89.95-$30)-2($100-$20-$30)=$229.90C1=$20C2=$30,Chapter11,Slide89,Bundling,QuestionIfMC=0,wouldmixedbundlingstillbethemostprofitablestrategywithperfectnegativecorrelation?,Chapter11,Slide90,MixedBundlingwithZeroMarginalCosts,r2,r1,20,40,60,80,100,20,40,60,80,100,120,120,Chapter11,Slide91,Sellseparately$80$80-$320Purebundling-$100$400Mixedbundling$90$90$120$420,MixedBundlingwithZeroMarginalCosts,Chapter11,Slide92,Bundling,QuestionWhyismixedbundlingmoreprofitablewithMC=0?,Chapter11,Slide93,Bundling,BundlinginPracticeAutomobileoptionpackagesVacationtravelCabletelevision,Chapter11,Slide94,Bundling,MixedBundlinginPracticeUseofmarketsurveystodeterminereservationpricesDesignapricingstrategyfromthesurveyresults,Chapter11,Slide95,MixedBundlinginPractice,r2,r1,Chapter11,Slide96,TheCompleteDinnerVersusalaCarte:ARestaurantsPricingProblem,PricingtomatchconsumerpreferencesforvariousselectionsMixedbundlingallowsthecustomertogetmaximumutilityfromagivenexpenditurebyallowingagreaternumberofchoices.,Chapter11,Slide97,Bundling,TyingPracticeofrequiringacustomertopurchaseonegoodinordertopurchaseanother.ExamplesXeroxmachinesandthepaperIBMmainframeandcomputercards,Chapter11,Slide98,Bundling,TyingAllowsthesellertometerthecustomeranduseatwo-parttarifftodiscriminateagainsttheheavyuserMcDonaldsAllowsthemtoprotecttheirbrandname.,Chapter11,Slide99,Advertising,AssumptionsFirmsetsonlyonepriceFirmknowsQ(P,A)Howquantitydemandeddependsonpriceandadvertising,Chapter11,Slide100,EffectsofAdvertising,Quantity,$/Q,Chapter11,Slide101,Advertising,ChoosingPriceandAdvertisingExpenditure,Chapter11,Slide102,Advertising,ARuleo