patent premiumPatent premium in weak IPR countries 080114

PatentPremiuminCountrieswithWeakIntellectualPropertyRightsProtection,黄灿浙江大学管理学院,1,MotivationandresearchquestionsTheoriesHypothesesDataEmpiricalstrategyResultsDiscussionandconclusion,Outline,2,Inmanyindustriesfirmsusesecrecyorleadtimeratherthanpatentasappropriationmethods(Levinetal.1987,BrookingsPapEcoAc;ArundelandKabla,1998,ResPolicy)Firmsthatpatentedinnovationsareexpectedtoearnalmost50%moreonaveragethaniftheyhadnotpatentedthoseinnovations(Aroraetal.,2008,IntJIndOrgan)Thisvalueincrementisdefinedaspatentpremium,1.Motivation,3,ItseemstobeparadoxicalthatdespitetheweakIPRprotectionandpossiblylowpatentpremiuminChina,patentingactivitiestherehavesurgedinthelasttenyears.,Increasingpatentingactivitiesinemergingeconomies(withweakIPRprotection),4,ProportionofTriadicPatentsinthe19Two-DigitManufacturingIndustriesthatwerealsofiledinChina,5,Source:Huang,CanFriesike,SaschaandvonZedtwitz,Maximilian,2012.Howdoforeignfirmspatentinemergingeconomieswithweakappropriabilityregimes?Archetypesandmotives,ResearchPolicy,41,8,1422-1439.,IstherepatentpremiumfordomesticfirmsandMultinationalCorporations(MNCs)inChina(acountrywithweakIPRprotection)?HowdoesmarketcompetitionmoderatethescaleofpatentpremiumfordomesticfirmsandMNCsinChina?Wedefinepatentpremiumasthehighertotalfactorproductivity(TFP)apatentingfirmcanachievethanhaditnotpatented.,Researchquestions,7,2.Theories:Competitiveadvantageandresourcebasedview,8,Source:Peteraf,1993,StrategicManageJ.,ResourceheterogeneityMNCsingeneralhavesuperiortechnologicalcapabilitythanlocalfirmsinemergingeconomiesMNCsingeneraldemonstrateforeignnessEx-postlimittocompetitionPatentprotectionisanisolatingmechanism(Rumelt,1984,CompetitiveStrategicManagement),whichbringspositivepremium.MNCsusepatentprotectiontolimitrivalsimitationtotheirsuperiortechnologiesInhostcountrieswithstrongIPRprotection,MNCscanobtainhighpatentpremiumInhostcountrieswithweakIPRprotection,MNCscanonlyobtainloworevennopatentpremiumLawisnotinlinewithinternationalstandardEnforcementisweakH1:MultinationalCorporations(MNCs)incountrieswithweakIPRprotectionobtainsloworevennopatentpremium.H2:LocalfirmsincountrieswithweakIPRprotectionobtainspatentpremium.,3.Hypothesesdevelopment(I),9,Ex-antelimittocompetitionItwouldbedifficulttobuildcompetitiveadvantagewithweakex-antelimittocompetition(i.e.withstrongmarketcompetition)Patentpremiumshouldbeevenhigher(Isolatingmechanismismoreimportant)underthestrongercompetitionH3andH4H3:ThepatentpremiumofMNCsincountrieswithweakIPRprotectionincreaseswiththeintensityofcompetition.H4:ThepatentpremiumoflocalfirmsincountrieswithweakIPRprotectionincreaseswiththeintensityofcompetition.ModerationeffectsofownershipstatusH5:ThepatentpremiumoflocalfirmsishigherthanthepatentpremiumofMNCsincountrieswithweakIPRprotection.H6:IntensityofcompetitionstimulateshigherpatentpremiumforlocalfirmsthanforMNCsincountrieswithweakIPRprotection.,Hypothesesdevelopment(II),10,AnnualSurveyofIndustrialEnterprises,NationalBureauofStatisticsofChinaCoverage:1999-2007;allstate-ownedfirmsandnon-state-ownedfirmswithmorethanRMBfivemillioninrevenueE.g.146,251and336,732manufacturingfirmsinthedatasetfortheyears1999and2007,respectively50firm-levelstatisticalindicators,includinginput,output,R947patentingfirms(677domesticand270foreign);2297non-patentingfirms(1,401domesticand896foreign),Dataset,12,Challengetomatchthewholedatabases,13,CalculationofTFPOlleyandPakes(1996,Econometrica)sestimatorLevinsohnandPetrin(2003,RevEconStud)sestimatorasrobustnesscheckHereIpresenttheresultbasedonfixed-effectsestimator(1)EstimationofPatentpremiumRescalethetimeperiodsthatallthefirmsstartedpatentingattheyeart=0.t=-1isthepre-patentingyearpriortotheyeart=0.DummyPatenti=1ifafirmiappliedforpatentsin1999-2007and0otherwise.Patentpremium(averagetreatmenteffectforthetreated)is(2)wherethesuperscriptequalsto1ifthefirmiappliedforpatentand0otherwise.Thekeyistoestimatetheunobservablecounterfactualorthetfpofapatentingfirmhaditnotappliedforpatents,5.Empiricalstrategy,14,TwoassumptionsAlldifferencesbetweenafocalpatentingfirmandthecontrolnon-patentingfirmscanbecapturedbyavectorofcovariates(unconfoundedness)Thefirmswiththesamevalueofcovariateshaveapositiveprobabilityofbeingbothpatentingandnon-patentingfirms(overlap/commonsupport)Usethenearest-neighbormatchingestimatordevelopedbyAbadieandImbens(2002,NBER)tofindagroupofcontrolfirmsthatareascloseaspossibletothefocalpatentingfirmintermsoftheirpre-patentingcharacteristicsCovariates:tfpi,-1,firmsize(li,-1),ownershipstatus(statei,-1,collectivei,-1,privatei,-1,HKMTi,-1andforeigni,-1),yearandfour-digitindustrydummies.UsetheweightedaveragetfpofthesecontrolfirmstoestimatethecounterfactualUsetheestimatorofpropensityscorematching(RosenbaumandRubin,1983,Biometrika)asrobustnesscheck.Theresultisnotmateriallydifferent.,Matchingestimator,15,CalculatetheHerfindahlindexforeachofthe24four-digitindustrieseveryyearAveragetheindexforeachindustryRanktheaverages,Intensityofcompetition,16,6.Results:Generaldomesticandforeignfirms,17,Domesticandforeignfacingstrongandweakcompetition,18,Note:1.Wedonotreportthematchingresultswhentheoverlap(commonsupport)assumptionisnotsatisfied.,ThereispatentpremiumfordomesticfirmsintheChineseprecisioninstrumentandofficemachineryindustryintheperiodof1999-2007.ThepatentpremiumlastedtillthesixthyearafteradomesticfirmfiledthefirstpatentThereisnosignificantpatentpremiumforMNCsintheC