英文翻译2020届毕业设计3

Land-based interests and the spatial distribution of affordable housing development: The case of Beijing, China Yunxiao Dang a,b, Zhilin Liuc,*, Wenzhong Zhanga aInstitute of Geographic Sciences and Natural Resources Research, Chinese Academy of Science, Beijing, China bUniversity of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China cSchool of Public Policy and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China a r t i c l e i n f o Article history: Available online 17 June 2014 Keywords: Affordable housing policy Land-based interests Policy implementation Inter-governmental relationship Beijing a b s t r a c t This paper provides an institutional explanation for the spatial distribution of affordable housing units biased toward the urban fringe in Chinese cities. We argue that, given Chinas inter-governmental relationship, the discriminatory site selection practice is a result of strategic policy implementation by city governments, who strive to balance the top-down political pressure with the local fi scal interests. The empirical analysis focuses on the implementation of the Economical and Comfortable Housing (ECH) Program in Beijing in 1999e2009. Binary logistic regression reveals that, holding local housing needs and socio-demographical attributes constant, sub-districts with a higher land price, a high ratio of old houses, and greater subway accessibility have a lower probability of being designated for affordable housing development. The empirical fi ndings confi rm the signifi cance of land-based interests of city governments that contribute to many unintended consequences of affordable housing programs at the local level. 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Introduction China is at a critical stage in restructuring its urban affordable housing policy to provide decent homes for its growing urban population in the next decade. As the central government redis- covered its responsibility to ensure equitable and affordable housing, unprecedented efforts have been channeled into afford- able housing programs. In 2010, affordable housing was offi cially included in the Twelfth Five-Year Plan as a critical componentof the social welfare and public service system. The central government even has sought to enhance political incentives for developing affordable housingby designating affordablehousing policy implementation as a critical responsibility for local offi cials (General Offi ce of State Council, 2011). Despite the heightened political will expressed by the central government, the local implementation of affordable housing pro- grams remains highly contentious and unsatisfactory. The media have consistently reported on the “unintended consequences” associated with affordable housing programs, such as low building quality, poor design (Y, 2010), inferior locations (Zheng Zou, 2014), and a lack of transparency and fairness in the allocation of affordable housing units (Wang Zou, 2014). Among these problems, the concentration of affordable housing units in inferior locations deserves particular attention from scholars and policy makers. As widely discussed in the interna- tional literature, discriminatory location choices for public housing projects have led to poverty concentration and residential segre- gationin westerncountries(Massey Schwartz, 2006; Stoloff, 2003). Chinese scholars also have warned about the potential for similar phenomena to emerge in Chinese cities because affordable housing projects often are located in areas without suffi cient access to employment opportunities and public services (Chai, Zhang, Li, 2012; Logan, Bian, Wang Huang, 2012; Wang, 2001, 2011; Wu, 1996; Zou, 2014). Few studies have focused on the local implementation of affordable housing pro- grams as determined by the strategic decision making of city gov- ernments. Although many scholars have stressed that land-based interests of city governments determine urban development pat- terns (e.g., Lin Zhu, 2004), empirical evidence on the impact of governments land-based interests on affordable housing policies has rarely been published. This paper is structured as follows. First, we review relevant literature and highlight the need to study the institutional dy- namics underlying the implementation of affordable housing pol- icy. We then discuss the policy design of the ECH program and the consequences for local implementation. We derive our hypotheses from an extensive review of policy documents, existing literature, and interviews with government offi cials and developers. After describing our research design and methodology, we present our empirical fi ndings and conclude with discussion and policy implications. Literature review In countries where the government subsidizes housing for the poor, location is recognized as a critical dimension of successful affordablehousingpolicy(e.g.,U.K.CommunitiesandLocal Government, 2006). The provision of affordable housing in conve- nient locations not only ensures decent housing for the poor but also offers economic and social opportunities to ensure self-suffi ciency. Unfortunately, historical lessons from public housing programs in the US and other countries have emphasized the danger of placing affordable housing projects in inferior locations where employment opportunities and public infrastructure are scarce (Gabriel, 1996; Holmans, 2005). Many scholars have noted devastating conse- quences brought by discriminatory site selection practices (Stoloff, 2003), such as poverty concentration, degradation of the living environmentinlow-incomecommunities,andlong-termeffectssuch as high unemployment and crime rates (DeKeseredy, Schwartz, Alvi, etal.Massey Schwartz, 2006, Zou, 2014). One particular problem that has received wide attention but insuffi cient systematic analysis is a discriminatory site selection practice for affordable housing projects. Unlike in the US cities, government- funded affordable housing projects in Chinese cities are often located in remote suburbs, locating low-income residents far from employment opportunities, public transportation, and public ser- vices. Scholars have warned that low-income households in Chi- nese cities could face a similar long-term deprivation of economic opportunities and decreased quality of life because of the inferior location of affordable housing opportunities (Chai et al., 2011; Zheng rules unspecifi ed and not enforced Local criteria is up to city governments; rules more specifi ed Local criteria is up to city governments; more rigorous rules and procedures Upper limit of Building SpaceNo rules80 m260 m2 AllocationSold by developersSold by developersSold by developers Tenure/Property RightsRestricted ownership, i.e., resale prohibited within fi ve years Partial property rights; resale prohibited within a certain number of years Partial property rights; resale prohibited within fi ve years LandAdministrative allocation: exempted from land-leasing fees Administrative allocation: exempted from land-leasing fees Administrative allocation: exempted from land-leasing fees Taxes and FeesExempted or reducedExempted or reducedExempted or reduced Price setting Mechanism Regulated price with restricted profi t (3%); Negotiated between government and developers Regulated price with little or no profi t (less than 3%); Regulated price with restricted profi t (3%) Sources: Authors own compilation from national policy documents, e.g., MOC et al., 1998; MOC et al., 2004; MOC et al., 2007. Y. Dang et al. / Habitat International 44 (2014) 137e145138 National policy design and micro-incentives for city governments Several studies (e.g., Denget al., 2011; Huang, 2012; Wang, 2011; Zou, 2014) have described a national policy framework for the ECH program and other affordable housing programs such as the Low- Rent Housing Program (lianzu zhufang) and the Public Rental Housing Program (gongong zulin zhufang). Unlike the other two programs, ECH is a homeownership-oriented affordable housing program that aims to provide incentives for developers to construct low-cost housing to be sold to qualifi ed households at government- controlled prices (State Council, 1998). Since its adoption in 1998, the ECH programs national policy framework has undergone several rounds of adjustments. Table 1 compares key elements of national policy documents concerning the ECH program. The most signifi cant change is a priority shift that emphasizes ECHs “welfare” purpose rather than its nature as a “commodity”. In 1998, ECH was designated “a special type of commercial housing” targeted at low to middle-income households, which are the ma- jority of urban households (MOC et al.,1998). The ECH programwas considered the main channel for providing housing for low- to middle-income households and a core pillar of a segmented housing provision system in Chinese cities (MOC et al., 1998). By 2004, ECH was viewed as “policy-oriented commercial housing” (MOC et al., 2004), and by 2007, it was considered “welfare-based subsidized housing” targeted only at low-income households (MOC et al., 2007). Following the change in the targeted benefi ciary group, the central government modifi ed and specifi ed many rules regarding building standards, eligibility, and allocation of ECH housing to improve the programs targeting and discourage un- qualifi ed families from obtaining ECH housing through rent seeking. For example, these changes included specifi cation of the upper limit of the building space for ECH units, local criteria for assessing household eligibility, and procedural rules for housing application and allocation (see Table 1). However, these policy changes had little effect on most rules and regulations that infl uence the incentives for policy imple- menters. ECH is essentiallyan indirect supply-side subsidy program in which city governments forfeit profi ts from land development to allow cost reduction and thereby lower prices for low-income housing (Wang, 2011). National policy design has focused on providing incentives for housing developers to participate in the program because the state aimed to increase their role (Table 1). The most important rule is most likely the exemption of ECH projects from land-leasing fees, a lump-sum rent paid by de- velopers to city governments when leasing the use rights for urban land (see Table 1). For housing developers, administrative land allocation is a key feature that distinguishes an ECH project from a typical commercial housing project.1ECH projects also enjoy a waiver or reduction of taxes and fees, a source of municipal reve- nues that are usually levied on real estate development activities. Thus, although the state claimed that the ECH program had the potential to incorporate market mechanisms into the provision of affordable housing, city governments shoulder the fi nancial and administrative costs involved in the program. Although city gov- ernments are not required to directly fund housing construction, they still face a substantial loss of local revenues, including land- leasing fees, other fees, and taxes, which they would otherwise collect from commercial development projects. Unfortunately, land-based revenues, particularly the land- leasing fees that the government collects by leasing land-use rights to private developers, have become a dominant source of municipal revenues in China (Cao, Feng, Tao, Su, Liu, Yeh Zhu, 2004). The importance of land-based revenues thus creates disincen- tives for city governments to implement a national affordable housing program such as ECH (Zou, 2014). Because national policy design emphasizes free land allocation and other incentives for developers, city governments must “give up part of their revenue from land and administrative fees to bring down the housing price”.2Affordable housing projects have much less potential than commercial housing development to contribute to local revenues. Conversely, local leaders are politically responsible for imple- menting the ECH program, which recently has involved a political accountability measure (xingzheng wenze) that holds local offi cials accountable for failing to fulfi ll top-down political mandates (GOOSC, 2011). Therefore, a rational strategy for city governments is to take advantage of the decentralized authority of policy implementation in a way that minimizes their fi scal and administrative costs. As the developer of an ECH project commented in an interview, “Local governments have no reason to put large ECH projects in the central area of the city, particularlyplaces near the Central Business District because these projects are exempt from many taxes and feesdat least 50% reductiondas well as land rent.” (Interview with developers, August 9, 2005) If locating a new ECH project “in those fast growing places”, city governments “would be concerned about its effects on their reve- nue income”.3However, city governments can reduce revenue loss simply by locating ECH projects in less-developed suburban areas where land is much cheaper (Zou, 2014). Furthermore, when city governments designate a site for ECH projects, they are responsible for acquiring the land from the original property owners, as well as the compensation costs incurred if land acquisition involves any demolition or relocation. The compensation costs are particularly high in certain neighbor- hoods with many old and dilapidated dwellings, which often have a high population density. Although developers eventually must pay compensation costs, in many cases, land acquisition involves a long process of negotiation with residents. It is not unusual to observe many residents refusing to be relocated or demanding favorable terms, placing tremendous pressure on local offi cials. As reported in some studies, demolition and relocation compensation to orig- inal land users could account for as much as half of total develop- ment costs (Wang, 2001). Therefore, city governments must face high fi nancial costs and political risks if they choose a site for an ECH project where previous residents strongly object relocation. In summary, anecdotal evidence has indicated that city gov- ernments, as the implementer of the ECH program, strive to reduce local fi scal and administrative costs when realizing ECH projects. First, such costs may involve opportunity costs such as land-leasing fees that city governments might collect if the site was used for commercial housing development instead of ECH projects. Thus, they are less willing to place ECH projects in areas that contribute a large amount of land-leasing fees to local budgets. In other words, 1 Interview with developers by authors, 10 October and 21 November, 2005. 2 Interview notes, 20 December, 2005 and 10 October, 2005. 3 Interview Notes, September 17, 2005. Y. Dang et al. / Habitat International 44 (2014) 137e145139 areas with higher land prices are less likely to be designated for affordable housing development. Second, in addition to attempting to minimize land-based revenue losses, city governments also try to minimize other fi nancial or administrative costs incurred during the land acquisition process. City governments are more likely to avoid sites with many old houses because of concerns over de- molition costs. Research design Case city This paper uses Beijing, the capital city of China, as the case city and focuses on the implementation of the ECH program from 1999 to 2009. Beijing was a pioneer in providing low-cost affordable housing under the ECH program. In 1998, the municipal govern- ment issued its own policy document for the ECH program and subsequently initiated the fi rst 19 ECH projects with a total of 5.6 million square meters of affordable housing to be constructed (Wang, 2011). Similar to many other Chinese cities, Beijings progress in ECH development has fl uctuated. The fi rst stage, from 1999 to 2004, was a period of rapid growth in ECH construction. Total affordable housing fl oorspaceunderconstructionincreasedfrom approximately 3 million m2in 1999 to nearly 8 million m2in 2004, an increase of over 160% (see Fig.1A). However, housing developed under the ECH program was never more than 20% of the total housing constructed or provided in the market. Moreover, its per- centage continued to decline after peaking in 2000 (see Fig. 1B) because market-rate housing also experienced an unprecedented boom and grew at a much faster pace than did affordable housing development during this time period. By 2004, the ECH program had attracted signifi cant criticism for failure to meet its stated policy goals, which eventually led to a period of refl ection and policy adjustments. As a result, affordable housing construction under the ECH program stagnated from 2003 to 2005 and started todecline after 2005 (Fig.1A). By 2007, the total fl oor space of ECH units under construction had declined to 4.4 million m2, 44.5% lower than the 2004 level. Although the amount of fl oor space under construction started increasing after 2007, the total completed ECH unit space steadily decreased to 0.98 million m2in 2009 (Fig. 1A). Model specifi cation We used a binary logistic regression model to test the extent to which the potential loss of land-based revenues in an urban area and compensation costs incurred during site demolition and Fig. 1. Construction of ECH projects from 1999 to 2009 in Beijing. Source: Beijing Statistical Yearbook, various years. Y. Dang et al. / Habitat International 44 (2014) 137e145140 relocation predict the probability of ECH projects being located in that area, controlling for local socio-demographical conditions. The unit of analysis for the regression model is the sub-district (jiedao), the smallest spatial unit for which most socio-economic indicators are available in Beijing. The regression model is as follows: Ln ? P 1 ? p ? a b1? LANDPRICE b12? OLDHOUSE b3 ? RENTER b4? SMALLHSG b5? EDU; Where the dependent variable is a binary