【国际贸易理论课件】【International Trade Theories】CHAPTER 5Nontariff Barriers NTBs to Trade.ppt

1、ch 05,1,CHAPTER 5,Nontariff Barriers (NTBs) to Trade,ch 05,2,Import Quotas to Protect Domestic Industries,Common in Western Europe after WW II Not used for manufactured goods today by developed nations Prohibited by WTO Often used for agricultural products Tariff quotas Quotas used in all sectors in

2、 developing countries,ch 05,3,Economic Effects of Quotas,Raises domestic price of imported commodity Percentage increase is implicit tariff equivalent Tariff equivalent calculated by subtracting foreign from domestic price, dividing result by foreign price,ch 05,4,Economic Effects of Quotas,Import c

3、onsumption declines Consumption and Production of domestic substitutes expands Resources drawn from other (presumably more efficient) industries No revenue to government Quota rents Auctioning import licenses,ch 05,5,Economic Effects of Quotas,Replaced market mechanism with government decisions No l

4、imit to differential between domestic and world prices Rise in domestic demand raises domestic price, leaves admissible imports unchanged Raises production and consumption costs of protection, forces further misallocation of resources and less desirable consumption patterns A quota and tariff are eq

5、uivalent if demand and supply are stationary, perfect competition exists in all markets, and government auctions import licenses.,Domestic Market for Cars in aSmall Importing Country,FIGURE 5.1,C5-6,Tariff and QuotaWhen Domestic Demand Rises,FIGURE 5.2,C5-7,ch 05,8,Economic Effects of Quotas,With a

6、reduction in domestic supply, quotas are more harmful to welfare than tariffs. A reduction in domestic demand results in more harm from tariffs than from quotas. In case of tariff, price is constant, quantity adjusts. In case of quota, quantity is constant. price adjusts.,ch 05,9,Economic Effects of

7、 Quotas,Theory of effective protection Quotas on imported raw materials raise production costs of final output. Import duties on raw materials are sometimes rebated, no rebate occurs with quotas. Monopoly effect Cumbersome administrative apparatus Corruptibility of license prices,ch 05,10,Economic E

8、ffects of Quotas,Licenses usually distributed among importers functioning at time control is imposed System freezes situation Incentive for efficiency diminishes LDCs can least afford inefficiency, but impose quotas anyway WTO imposed tariffication,ch 05,11,Voluntary Export Restraints,VERs avoid vio

9、lating WTO prohibition against import quotas and avoid retaliation VERs restrict supply and raise prices in importing country Importing countries threatened with more restrictive action if they fail to agree Administered by government or export industries VERs under WTO phase-out agreement,ch 05,12,

10、Voluntary Export Restraints,10% of world trade covered by VERs Most affected products: steel, textiles, agriculture and food, electronics, footwear, machine tools Markets protected by VERs: U.S., EU, Canada Exporters limited by VERs: Japan, Korea Taiwan, LDCs,ch 05,13,Voluntary Export Restraints,Usu

11、ally discriminate between supply sources. Violate WTO nondiscriminatory rule Have effects similar to quotas Tend to produce raised prices, provide rents to exporters (exceeding $25 billion annually),ch 05,14,Voluntary Export Restraints,Trade barriers ranked in terms of damage to domestic welfare: Ta

12、riffs, least harmful Import quotas, more harmful VERs, most harmful Produce quality upgrading phenomenon Intended to save domestic jobs threatened by imports Inefficientannual cost per job saved greatly exceeds average wage in industry,ch 05,15,International Commodity Agreements,ICAs designed to sta

13、bilize world price of certain commodities (raw materials, agricultural products) or dispose of surpluses Initiated by producing nations to compensate for low consumer and producer response to price changes, to avoid huge price fluctuations If a countrys economy is devoted to one or two exports, enti

14、re level of economic activity fluctuates with these prices,ch 05,16,International Commodity Agreements,ICAs involve producing and consuming countries: export restriction schemes, buffer stocks, multilateral contracts Export restriction schemes: employ national quotas for production or export Buffer

15、stocks: set minimum and maximum stock prices Multilateral contracts: specify maximum selling price, minimum purchase price for stipulated quantities,Commodity Price StabilizationUnder a Buffer Stock ICA,FIGURE 5.3,C5-17,ch 05,18,International Commodity Agreements,All ICAs suffer from attempts to fix

16、 and maintain price different from long-run equilibrium Producers continuously pressure for higher prices, leading to more production, surpluses ICAs become subsidies paid by consumers paying above-equilibrium prices, encouraging greater production,ch 05,19,International Commodity Agreements,Declini

17、ng use in recent years Other ways must be found to combat effects of violent price fluctuations on developing countries IMF Compensatory financing Textile industry WTO administered Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) Losersconsumers in industrial countries, producers in LDCs 2005 phase-out,ch 05,20,Interna

18、tional Cartels,Group of corporations in different countries or group of supplying governments agree to restrict trade (OPEC) Cartel power may be restricted by supply increases from outside sources, development of substitutes, reduced consumption Cartels restrict output, misallocate resources, extrac

19、t artificially high prices from consumers, can negate government policies EC rules of competition in industry,ch 05,21,Local Content Requirements,Specify minimum portion of value of product to be produced domestically Pervasive form of trade control,ch 05,22,Border Tax Adjustments,An import tax on c

20、ommodity, rebate on its export, which equal or adjust for domestic indirect taxes (excise, value-added) Direct vs. indirect taxes U.S.-EU 2000-2001 trans-Atlantic dispute,ch 05,23,Dumping,Selling identical product abroad cheaper than domestically Identical difficult to establish, due to differences

21、in specifications, packaging, other features International standards for judging commodity dumping,ch 05,24,Dumping,Sporadic dumpingdisposal of occasional surplus, effects negligible Predatory dumpinglarge firm sells low abroad to drive out competition and exploit market, most harmful form of dumpin

22、g Persistent dumpingdomestic monopolistic supplier consistently sells lower abroad to attract sales from international competitors, harmful to producers in countries receiving dump, but consumers reap price benefit,A Monopolist Facing Separate Markets,FIGURE 5.4,C5-25,ch 05,26,Dumping,Dumping margin

23、 Anti-dumping import duty Equals dumping margin, offsets dumping Imposition elaborate, dumping must be proven and injury to competing domestic industry demonstrated Voluntary curtailment of exports to avoid duty Diversionary input dumping,ch 05,27,Export Subsidies,Government payment to domestic firm

24、 for each unit exported Despite WTO prohibitions, export subsidies abound Deadweight welfare loss Large countries incur added cost of world price reduction, deteriorated terms of trade Intended to promote exports, protect employment,ch 05,28,Export Subsidies,Importing country gains in terms of trade

25、 Other exporting countries lose in terms of trade Labor and capital harmed in importing countrys competing industries Countervailing duty to offset subsidy Disputes over forms of unreasonable trade restriction,ch 05,29,Export Subsidies,Below-market interest rates Direct resources to favored export i

26、ndustries Transfer income from exporting to importing country Two-thirds of such loans are made by industrial countries to LDCs OECD minimum interest rate for export credit,ch 05,30,Export Subsidies,Mixed credit programs Research and development aid WTO subsidies code,ch 05,31,NTBs vs. Tariffs,More

27、harmful to national economy VERs more harmful than import quotas NTBs displace market mechanism Hidden devices Difficult to negotiate,Less harmful to national economy Tariffs only distort market mechanism Transparent More easily negotiable,ch 05,32,Strategic Trade Policy?,In perfectly competitive en

28、vironment, government trade intervention justified by Imposition of optimum tariff to improve terms of Infant industry protection when direct subsidy infeasible Possible offset to domestic distortion when domestic measures unavailable,ch 05,33,Strategic Trade Policy?,Oligopolistic markets lead to ar

29、guments for strategic trade policy Government measures increasing global market share of countrys oligopolistic firms to increase profit at expense of foreign firms Boeing and Airbus subsidy case American and Japanese firms protection case,ch 05,34,Strategic Trade Policy?,Problems Governments lack i

30、nformation Resource transfer and subsequent loss in other industry Competition eliminates rents; subsidy costs to government or protection costs to consumers may exceed rent gains Inducement to enter industry, lower efficiency, higher average cost Retaliation may nullify gain,ch 05,35,Summary,Some N

31、TBs, common in recent years, more harmful than tariffs Import quotas and VERs limit quantity, raise prices, produce quality upgrading Import licenses VERS discriminatory, scheduled for phase-out VERs intended to save jobs, but cost per job saved is usually multiple of average industry wage ICAs apply to primary commodities and textiles Buffer stock MFA,ch 05,36,Su