Power over Prosecutors Corrupts Politicians Cross Country在检察官的腐败政客越野

1、Power over Prosecutors Corrupts Politicians:Cross Country Evidence Using a New Indicator,Stefan VoigtUniversity of Kassel and ICER, Lars P. Feld University of Marburg and CESifo, Anne van AakenMax Planck Institute Heidelberg,1. Introduction,Possible reforms of prosecution agencies discussed in quite

2、 a few countries One reason: members of executive had put pressure on prosecutors Hypotheses here:,pressure is a function of institutional set-up of prosecution agencies high degree of government influence on prosecutors will, c.p., lead to higher levels of government crimes, including corruption,Pa

3、per combines economics of prosecution agencies with economics of corruption. Very little on first topic (Aaken, Salzberger, Voigt 2004 first attempt); Two branches within the analysis of corruption: (1) (Economic) consequences of corruption (c. exogenous) (2) Causes of corruption (c. as endogenous)

4、Second branch here relevant: Corruption can be explained by drawing on regulatory policies (Ades/di Tella 1999), the level of economic development (Treisman 2000), historical and cultural factors (Treisman 2000) electoral institutions (Persson et al. 2003, Golden/Chang 2001),and in addition to these

5、 hypotheses by drawing on the structure of institutions set up for prosecuting crimes. This paper: Makes organizational structure of prosecution agencies comparable by introducing a de jure and a de facto indicator; Estimates effects of organizational set-up on (perceived) corruption. Main finding:

6、De facto prosecutorial independence leads to lower levels of corruption.,Organization Introduction Some Theory Introducing Two New Indicators Estimation Approach Estimation Results Conclusions and Open Questions,2. Some Theory,“Procuracy” as generic term for prosecution agencies Corruption := the mi

7、suse of entrusted power for private benefit Institutional Structure of procuracy incentives of prosecutors More specifically: prosecutors who are subject to pressure from the executive (and/or legislature) less likely to prosecute crimes committed by government members expected utility of committing

8、 crime ( corruption ) Additionally: higher degrees of separation of powers likelihood prosecution higher degrees of federalism likelihood prosecution ,3. Two New Indicators for Prosecutorial Independence,3.1 De Jure Prosecutorial Independence 16 variables grouped into 5 “subindicators” each variable

9、 can take on value between 0 and 1; sum of variables divided by number of variables for which data available; indicator between 0 and 1 with higher values indicating more independence.,Subindicator 1: General Institutional Traits of Procuracy Procuracy mentioned in the Constitution? Formal qualifica

10、tion requirements? Difficulty of removing prosecutors General rule for allocating incoming cases? Subindicator 2: Personal Independence of Prosecutors Term length Renewability of term Appointing organ Promotion Removal from office Transfer against own will,Subindicator 3: Formal Independence of Pros

11、ecutors Internal Orders? External Orders? Right to Substitute Prosecutors working on specific case? Subindicator 4: Monopoly to Prosecute? Monopoly to Prosecute? Judicial Review of (Non-)Prosecution Decisions? Subindicator 5: Degree of Discretion in Prosecution Legality vs. Opportunity Principle,3.2

12、 De facto Prosecutorial Independence,Constructed in the same way as de jure indicator But: very sticky (1990-2000; 1960-2000) 6 variables Prosecutors forced to retire against their will? Prosecutors removed from office against their will? Number of changes in legal foundations? Income of prosecutors

13、 at least constant in real terms since 1960? Budget of procuracy at least constant in real terms since 1960? Number of cases initiated by others than procuracy?,3.3 Some Stock Taking,De jure and de facto PI deviate strongly from each other: R2 = -0.338,4. The Estimation Approach,with: CPI Corruption

14、 Perception Index, average from 1998 2003, (source: Transparency International); JI vector of de jure and de facto judicial independence, (source: Feld and Voigt 2003); LegOrLegal Origin, RegimeVector of political regime variables (federalism; parl./pres.systems) XVector of economic controls (GDP/cap., pop.size, trade openness etc.),CPI = 0 + 1 de jure PI + 2 de facto PI + 3 JI+ 4 LegOr + 5 Regime + 6 X+ ,5. Estimation Results,6 Conclusions and Open Questions,De facto PI has expected effect on corruption But: How to explain that de jure PI has opposite effect? Reverse