外层空间遥感法律制度浅析法学论文

1、本文档来源于第一文库网：/news/43F1C89FB0DFBF64.html外层空间遥感法律制度浅析法学论文外层空间遥感法律制度浅析法学论文 PrematureLegalFrameworkofRemoteSensingfromOuterSpace Fromtheintroductionoftechnicaldoctrines，Remotesensingsatellitesmakeitpossibletogatherinformationonmineralresources，weatherandclimaticchanges，aswellasresou

2、rcesmanagementanditcanbedrawnaconclusionthatremotesensingisahumanactivitywhichhasalreadybeenpracticeinconnectionwithcommoninterestsallovertheworldforscoresofyears.InitialdiscussionsregardingremotesensingfromouterspacetookplaceattheFirstUNConferenceonPeacefulUsesofOuterSpaceinViennain1968.Intheearly1

3、970s，Argentina，BrazilandotherDevelopingcountriesassertedthateachStatehaspermanentsovereigntyovernaturalresourceswithintheirterritoryandthatanyinformationacquiredregardingthoseresourceswasincludedintheconceptofsovereignty.Thus，developingcountriesarguedthattheconsentofthesensedStatewasaprerequisitetoa

4、nyspace-basedremotesensingoftheirsovereignterritory.Moreover，theymaintainedthatifremotesensingdidoccur，theywereentitledtoanydatageneratedandthatthedistributionofsuchdatatothirdpartieswasimpermissiblewithouttheconsentoftheStatesensed. Actually，followingthelaunchofthefirstcivilianremotesensingsatellit

5、ein1972，developedaswellassomedevelopingcountrieshadbeendemandingsomespeciallegalregime，significantlysince1978，whentheWorkingGroupsetupunderUNCOPUOSfinallyfinishedtheirdraftof17principles.“EventsintheWorkingGroupmaywellhavebeenastrawinthewindforatrendthatwassoontobecomeapparentinanotherforum.Thistren

6、dclearlyreflectedthemountinginfluenceofdevelopingcountriesandthepressureoftheircombinedweightininternationalaffairs.ItwasmanifestintheSecondUNConferenceontheExplorationandPeacefulUsesofOuterSpace（UNISPACEII），whichwasconvenedinViennainAugust1982.”（1）However，ifthemisgivingsentertainedbysomeWesternindu

7、strializedpowersaboutpossiblecontroversyregardingtheinterpretationandapplicationofsomeofthepotentialprinciplestreaty，wereignored，theultimateresultwouldbecompletelydifferent.AfteralengthydebateontheConference，thePrinciplesRelatingtoRemoteSensingoftheEarthfromSpace（Principles），whichwasannexedinUNresol

8、ution41/65，wasapprovedandadoptedunanimouslyonDecember11th，1986. Thesefinal15principles，generalspeaking，recognizethegreatbenefitpossiblyderivedfromremotesensingandalsotheopportunitiespotentiallyarisingfromthemisuse.Afterall，itisunderstandableforaUNresolution，inandbyitself，beingnotlegallybindingornotl

9、eadingtoseriousconflicts.Rather，itsbeenhighlightedintheensuingdiscussionforacoupledecades.Beforefocusingonpossiblecontroversialissues，aglanceatthoseunlikelyfordisputeisnecessary.Apartfromthetechnicaldefinition（2），basically，thoseprinciples，asreiterationsofalreadyacceptedprinciplesofouterspacelaw，inpa

10、rticular，supervisedunderorevencopiedverbatimetliteratimfrom1967theTreatyonPrinciplesGoverningtheActivitiesofStatesintheExplorationandUseofOuterSpace，includingtheMoonandOtherCelestialBodies（OuterSpaceTreaty），arecandidatesofdisqualificationforcontroversy.Forexample，PrincipleII，“Remotesensingactivities

11、shallbecarriedoutforthebenefitandintheinterestsofallcountries”（3），III，“shallbeconductedinaccordancewithinternationallaw”（4），andIV，“irrespectiveoftheirdegreeofeconomicorscientificdevelopmentandstipulatestheprincipleoffreedomofexplorationanduseofouterspaceonthebasisofequality”（5）.TheseparticularUNPrin

12、ciplesaremerelyarestatementoftermsfromtheOuterSpaceTreatyorotherwell-establishedcustomaryinternationallaw.Inasense，suchprinciplesmightnotescapethecharacteristicsofobscurityorambiguity，eitherofwhich，however，isnotauniqueissuetothelevelofremotesensingframeworkbuttothelevelofinternationalspacelawanddoes

13、notrefertotheemergencyofdivergenttextualinterpretationsofsuchresolution. Additionally，thesameasforegoingcases，toprovideanaddedprotectionforthesensedstate，PrincipleIVaddsthatremotesensingactivitiesmustbeconductedwithrespecttoallStatespermanentsovereigntyoveritswealthandnaturalresources，andmaynotbecon

14、ductedinsuchamannerdetrimentaltothelegitimaterightsofthesensedState（6），eventhoughtheissueofsovereigntyofsatesovertheirownnaturalresources，includinginformationderivedfromremotesensingregardingsuchresourceshadbeenoneofthemostbothersomeissuesformanyyearsduringthedraftingprocessandhasservedasastumblingb

15、locktoachievingconsensus（7），whichwillbediscussedhereinafter.Besides，“Anassociatedprinciple，lackingexpectationsoffuturecontroversiality，istheprinciplethataStatecarryingoutremotesensingprogramsistoinformtheU.N.Secretary-GeneralinaccordancewithArticleIVoftheRegistrationConventionandArticleXIoftheOuterS

16、paceTreaty”（8）；“Also，theprinciplerelatingtothepromotionoftheprotectionoftheEarthsenvironmentanddisclosureofinformationthatiscapableofavertinganyphenomenonharmfultosuchenvironmentaswellastheprincipleapplicabletothepromotionoftheprotectionofmankindfromnaturaldisastersandthetransmittalofrelevantinforma

17、tiontoaffectedStates.”（9）（10）Hence，theUNPrinciplesalsomakeitclearthattheprotectionoftheearthsenvironmentandtheprotectionofmankindfromnaturaldisastersareofextremeimportance. Incontrasttothoseforegoingprinciples，thereareplentyofpossibleareaswheredifferencesofinterpretationmayarise.Firstofall，theUNPrin

18、ciplesapplyonlyto“naturalresourcesmanagement，landuse，andtheprotectionoftheenvironment，”（11）media，meteorologicalandmilitaryapplicationsaresupposednotincluded（12）.ThusitisconceivablethatnewsorganizationsmaydisregardtheentirePrinciplesifstrictlyinterpretedfromaliteralstandpoint.Andalso，thePrinciplesdon

19、otapplytomilitaryreconnaissanceorsurveillance.SuchkindofidentificationinnarrowsensewascontributedtothosesufficientlybroadtermsinthecontextofthePrinciples，inavoidanceoffailuretoachieveunanimityonasetofothercivilianactivities.Infact，inutmostcircumstances，unanimityplaysarolenomorethanadoptionbynegative

20、consensuswithoutmajorityvotes（13）.ThisisjustthebeautyofaUNresolutionwithtolerationondeliberationspermeatedthrough，ratherthananinternationalconvention，whichmaynotbetracedtoopposedpositions.Asmentionedhereinbefore，despitethegreatinfluencebydevelopingcountriesandtheircombinationssuchas“Group77”，thedeve

21、lopedcountriesespeciallytheWesternpowersendeavoroftryingnottoconcludeatreatywasevenmoresignificant.“OnechampionedbytheUnitedStatesandmanywesternnationsregardedthefreedomofacquiringandimpartinginformationasafundamentalhumanrightwhereasdevelopingnationsandtheSoviet-ledsocialistcountriespredictedtheirc

22、aseastheirinalienablerighttodisposeoftheirnaturalresourcesandofinformationconcerningsuchresources.”（14） Hence，thecontroversialissuesarecenteringonthoseprinciplesnewlyintroducedunderinternationalcooperation，whichcanbutbeledbytechnicallydevelopedcountriesandseeminglybenefitthedevelopingnations，payinga

23、ttentionto“andtakingintoparticularconsiderationtheneedsofthedevelopingcountries”（15）.Simplyspeaking，theUnitedSateshadlongbeenaproponentoftheinternationalavailabilityofremotelysenseddataonanondiscriminatorybasis，commonlyreferredtoasthe“OpenSkies”policy.TheUNPrincipleslargelyembodiedthispolicyintheway

24、oftripleconceptions，whichareequitableparticipation，technicalassistanceandaccesstodata.Althoughnon-binding，theU.S.commercialremotesensingregulatoryregimerecognizesthem，forthemostpart，asinternationalobligationsandrequiresthoselicensedintheU.S.tocomplywiththedataaccessibilityprinciple.Thereasonisthatth

25、ePrinciplesgivenbirthtoinmultilateralmovesweresubstantiallyinvirtueoftheAmericanpreviouspracticesinbilateralapproach. Toillustrate，thoseLandsatagreementsbeforethePrinciplesmaybestbetakenasanexample，whichareagreementsconcludedbetweentheNationalAeronauticsandSpaceAdministration（NASA）ofU.S.andanumberof

26、countriesspreadovertheworld：Argentina，Australia，Brazil，Canada，India，Italy，Japan，Swedenetc.（16）“TheauthorityforNASAtoenterintosuchagreementsderivesfromtheNASAActof195，whichprovidesthatactivitiesinspaceshouldbedevotedtopeacefulpurposesforthebenefitofallmankind，whileSection205ofthatActempowersNASAtoeng

27、ageinaprogramofinternationalcooperationinworkdonepursuanttothisAct，andinthepeacefulapplicationoftheresultsthereof。”（17）Forthosecountries，theLandsatagreementsinvolvedthebuildingofgroundstationsforacquisitionandprocessingofremotesensingsatellitedata，attheirownexpense.Inadditiontoeachcountrypayingforit

28、sownshareintheproject，itwasalsoagreedunderLandsatarrangementsthatdataobtainedfromexperimentswouldbemadeavailabletotheinternationalscientificcommunity.Besides，countrieswithoutLandsatfacilitiesbutwithintheovercastrangeofthegroundstationswouldbeservedwithinformation（18）bonafide，prevailingtheprincipleof

29、pactatertiisnecnocentnecprosunt.Suchpracticewasbornetheacquiescenceinmeetingofmindsthatasensorstatemightconductwithoutconsentinadvancefromsensedstate.Besides，advancedtechnologywasnotinmonopolybymutualagreementsandthedatawouldbeinpublicityfortheworld. Hence，imitationallyandcorrespondingly，PrincipleVs

30、ays，“Statescarryingoutremotesensingactivitiesshallpromoteinternationalcooperationintheseactivities.Tothisend，theyshallmakeavailabletootherStatesopportunitiesforparticipationtherein.Suchparticipationshallbebasedineachcaseonequitableandmutuallyacceptableterms”；andPrincipleVI，“Inordertomaximizetheavail

31、abilityofbenefitsfromremotesensingactivities，Statesareencouraged，throughagreementsorotherarrangements，toprovidefortheestablishmentandoperationofdatacollectingandstoragestationsandprocessingandinterpretationfacilities，inparticularwithintheframeworkofregionalagreementsorarrangementswhereverfeasible.”T

32、hemutualagreementsareherebyhighlightedasaguaranteeforfeasibilityofparticipation，becausewithoutcontractualtransactions，theterm“equitable”mayfallintoinconsequentialextensionofitssubjectsaswellasobjects，whereofthe“opportunities”seemsurprisingchanceratherthanrationalexpectation.Inanutshell，theUNPrincipl

33、esareconsideredtopermitStatestofreelysenseandpubliclydistributedatafromouterspacewithouttheconsentofthesensedState.Moreover，itisnowregardedaswell-establishedcustomaryinternationallawthatremotesensingmaybeconductedwithoutpriorconsent.Fordissemination，suchkindsofconclusionsareatleastdrawndirectlybysom

34、escholarsongroundoftheabsenceofspecificprovisionsinthePrinciplesconcerningdisseminationofdata. Asforsensing，“AlthoughithasbeenarguedbysomenationsthatpriorconsentforremotesensingofaStateshouldbesought，suchprotestationshaveneveradverselyaffectedoperationalprogress.PrincipleXIIIoftheResolutionmentionsp

35、riorconsultationandnotpriorconsent。Itisformulatedasfollows：topromoteandintensifyinternationalcooperation，especiallywithregardtotheneeds，ofdevelopingcountries，aStatecarryingoutremotesensingoftheearthfromspaceshall，uponrequest，enterintoconsultationwithaStatewhoseterritoryissensedinordertomakeavailable

36、opportunitiesforparticipationandenhancethemutualbenefitstobederivedtherefrom.Consensuscouldnotbereachedregardingpriorconsultation，butitisclear，nonetheless，thatastateconsideringthatitislikelytobesubjectedtoforeignremotesensinghasaright，andwithoutrestriction，torequestthatconsultationstakeplaceandthatt

37、herequestedStateshallenterintoconsultationswithaStatewhoseterritoryissensed.”（19）Suchinferencerepresentssomeoptimisticviewpointsbutdoesntstandadequatereasonsforitsfeasibility.AsMyerspointedout，“TheThirdWorldStatesarefacedwithseriousproblems，primarilybecausetheydonotpossessthetechnologyandmeanstocond

38、uctremotesensing.TheymustrelyonthedevelopedStatestoprovidethedataandtoassistintheanalysis”（20）. Inlightofthenegotiatingpositions，suchprinciplesprovidedformaymakenomoresensebutforanyStateinpossessionofripetechnology，whetheritsadevelopedcountryoradevelopingcountry.Asexemplified，therehasbeenabrightnova

39、intheouterspaceundertakinginrecentthreedecades，PeoplesRepublicofChina，sincetheChinesefirstrecoverableremotesensingwassuccessfullylaunchedandrecoveredin1975andChinaRemoteSensingSatelliteGroundStation（RSGS）beganoperatedfunctioningin1986.Chinahasmadesufficientlyrapidprogressinspatialundertakingandbecom

40、eoneoftheleadingcountriesinremotesensingtechnology，onthebasisofwhich，Chinaissubstantiallycapabletoparticipateininternationalcooperationwithotherforeignsatellitemanagementauthorities，forexample，in1999，theChina-BrazilEarthResourcesSatellite01（CBERS1）collectivelyexploredanddevelopedbybothcountrieswassu

41、ccessfullylaunchedasthebeginningofasatelliteseries（21）；in2003，ChinaRSGShadconcludedorcontinuedimplementingaseriesofinternationalorregionalagreements，includingLandsat-5/7withAmericaUSGS，Spot-1/2/4/5andEnvisatwithFranceCNESandSpotImage，Radarsat-1withCanadaCSAandRSI，ERS-2withESRINsubsidiarytoESA，Envisa

42、tDataReceptionwithNorwaysKongsbergSpacetec，attendanceonIndiaIRSConf.etc.ConsideringthepreviousexamplesofU.S.andChina，itsobviousthatavailableopportunitiesforequitableparticipationmustnotbelackofthereciprocaltechnicalabilityandnegotiations. Insummary，PrincipleVandVIaredeemedtoconfirmtheunrestrictedrig

43、httoremotesensingwithoutpriorconsentornotification.Additionally，remote-sensingStatesarerequiredtoenterintoconsultationswithsensedStatesuponrequest.Inthissense，PrincipleXIIIisattributedmuchmoreinreturnfortechnicaldiscrepancysituations.Furthermore，Statesconductingremotesensingarerequiredtoprovidetechn

44、icalassistanceonmutuallyagreedtermsandareencouraged，preferablythroughregionalagreements，toestablishdatacollection，storage，processingandinterpretationfacilities，byPrincipleVII（22）.Thereasonfortheseprovisionsisevidentinasmuchastheapplicationoftherelevantprinciplesinsuchcaseismadedependenton“mutuallyac

45、ceptableterms”。Concretely，suchmadeavailable“technicalassistance”shouldalsoapplytheprevioustwoprinciples，asstipulatingtheneedsofdevelopingcountriesand“wheneverfeasible”isathands.Moreover，inreturn，thestatesubjecttoremotesensinghasaccesstothedataonanon-discriminatorybasisandatareasonableprice.Thosestat

46、esconductingremotesensingactivitiesmustmakeavailabletoallStates，attheirrequestandtothegreatestextentfeasibleandpracticable，anyrelevantnon-discriminatoryaccessanditwaspartoftheU.S.“OpenSkies”policytobeginwithandcodifiedbyPrincipleXII（23）.Thisincludesaccesstoavailableanalyzedinformationinthepossession

47、ofanyStateparticipatinginremotesensingonthesamebasisandterms，andmostsignificantly，sensedStatesshallhaveaccesstoprimaryandprocesseddataconcerningtheterritoryundertheirjurisdictionassoonasitisproducedonanondiscriminatorybasisandonreasonablecostterms.Nevertheless，thiscouldnotbeviewedasavictorywhenitcom

48、estofurtheringthedevelopmentoflesserdevelopedcountriesinthattheyshouldhaveimmediateaccesstostateoftheartdataandinformationonreasonableterms，providedtheguaranteethattheyhavethemeanstopayforit. Problemsremain，certainly.HowwillthesensedStateknowthedataorinformationhasbeenproduced？Whatistherealmeaningof

49、informationregardingsuchactivities？Furthermore，apartfromthecontractualtransmission，isthereisocracyinremotesensinglegalframework，especiallyinthecaseoftechnicalassistance，whereasitisnotpureassistancebuttheassistedstatesconductpartialarmslengthdeals，interalia，bindingthedemandedaccesstodata？Lastbutnotth

50、eleast，apartfromthemethodofcovenantencouraged，evenalittlebitbroadlyinterpreting，fromtheangleofathirdpartystate，aretheacquirementandthedisseminationofremotesensingdataneedingthepriorapprovalofoperatorstateorsensedstate，orisitadlibitumonsovereignty？SuchproblemshavekeptGordianknotsinthecircumstancesofg

51、reattechnical，economicandpoliticaldiscrepancyamongstthecountries.Notonlythesensedstatesemphasizedsovereigntyinremotesensingactivities，butalsothesensorstateshighlighteditonverificationissue.Dataistreasure，andbeforeideallycontributedtoandsharedbytheworld，mustbeproprietarybysomesubjects，whetherthereisa

52、nyagreementornot.Toresolvesuchcommunicativeproblem，in1978，aproposaltocreateanInternationalSatelliteControlAgencywastabledbyFranceduringthefirstsessionoftheDisarmamentConferenceoftheUnitedNationsheldinNewYork.ThisproposalagaincameupfordebateattheSecondDisarmamentConferencein1982.Themainmotivationbehi

53、ndtheproposalwasinspiredbymilitaryconsiderations.（24） “AmongthemostimportanttaskstobeentrustedtotheAgencyundertheFrenchproposalwouldbetheacquisition，processinganddisseminationofdataand/orinformation.DatainthiscontextwouldincluderoughimagesandelectromagneticsignalsobtainedbytheAgencyssatellites，orput

54、atitsdisposalbysatellite-operatingStates.Informationwouldincludetheanalysedresultsofthedataaswellasallotherinformationonarmssystems，geographicalconditions，militaryinstallationsetc.，whichwouldbeusefultotheAgencyinaccomplishingitsduties.Suchauxiliaryinformationwouldbecomeavailableeitherfromfreelyacces

55、siblesourcesorbesuppliedbyindividualmemberStates.”（25）Regretfully，suchproposaldidnotseekforsupportivecommentsfromU.S.orUSSRatthattime，andwasnullifiedwithregardstoexcessiveexpenditureinvolved.（26）Albeit；intheUNPrinciples，suchdirectivespiritwasincorporatedinPrincipleVIII，“TheUnitedNationsandtherelevan

56、tagencieswithintheUnitedNationssystemshallpromoteinternationalcooperation，includingtechnicalassistanceandcoordinationintheareaofremotesensing”。However，withoutrealisticattractiontotechnicallydevelopedcountries，howcomeitseemsmuchchanceofthisstrategyrealizedintheforeseeablefuture？So，suchproblemsarestay

57、ingahostofdiscussioninthescholarlyliteratures. Finally，turningbackwardstoPrincipleIV，thedeclarationofsensedstateslegitimaterightsonsovereignty，deemedasnotincentiveforcontroversyasaforementioned，hadstrictlyinterpretedasonlyreferringtotheconductofremotesensingactivitiesbutnotincludingthedetrimentalres

58、ultscausedbydisseminationofdata，especiallytothenon-participantstates.WhiletheU.S.acceptedinternationalresponsibilityfortheouterspaceactivitiesofitsgovernmentalornon-governmentalentities，itcouldneveraccepttheextensionofsuchresponsibilitytoterrestrialactivities，aschampionedbytheSoviet-ledsocialistcountries，exceptinaccordancewithgenerallyrecognizedprincipleofinternationallaw.（27）Reachingcompromisesincorrespondencewithsuchattitudes，thePrincipless