奖金强度的影响工作的满意外文翻译

1、.奖金强度的影响工作的满意外文翻译 原文: Pay Enough,Dont Pay Too Much or DontPay at All? The Impact of Bonus Intensity on Job Satisfaction KonstantinosPouliakasThe principal-agent model, with its convincing illustration of the trade-off that arises between risk and incentive provision when attempting to align the Conf

2、licting interests of two contracting parties,remains central for our under- standing of the compensation strategies employed by firms Mirlees, 1976; Holmstrom, 1979. According to the standard model of agency theory, the introduction of financial incentives as part of an agents remuneration package w

3、ill increase his/her productivity,as it is assumed that individuals derive utility from income whilst the exertion of effort entails a utility cost.Importantly, if the additional disutility of higher e?ort is compensated byan adequate wage premium ,anim placation of the theoryis that them arginaluti

4、litiesof workers under fixed and variable compensations chemes should be equalized in the long-run.What this implies is that there should be nodi?erenc ebetweenthejobsatis faction of employees receiving monetary incentives and those on noncontingent payment arrangements,other things equal.The above

5、conclusion has been disputed by a psychological and, increas- ingly,economicsliterature,which has stressed that the incorporation of nonpecuniary motives into the economic paradigm, such as the desire for reciprocation or for engaging in interesting tasks, has important implications for an individua

6、ls motivation and job satisfaction Deci,1971; Lepperetal. 1973; Deci and Ryan, 1985; Frey, 1986, 1997; Kreps, 1997; Frey and Jegen, 2001. In addition, it has been argued that wrong monetary incentives may ncite dysfunctional behavioural responses by employees Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991; Baker, 1992

7、; Prendergast, 1999, or have a detrimental effect on employee morale and job security via the inequitable and risky pay distributions that arise as a consequenceBakeretal.,1988.Once these mechanisms are taken into consideration,it becomes clear that the theoretical impact of monetary incentives on w

8、orker effort and job satisfaction can be ambiguous. As corroborated in a number of economic experiments Falk and Kosfeld, 2006; Eriksson and Villeval, 2008, the incentive effects of monetary rewards are likely to becompromised in a world of imperfect labour mobility populated by heterogeneous agents

9、 with varying psychological dispositions. To the extent that incentive schemes allow for optimization of effort, facilitate worker autonomy and enhance self-determination they should increase job satisfaction,othe rthings equal.Yet increasing earnings risk, crowding out of the inherent pleasantness

10、in performing ones job and lower morale can lead to disgruntled employees.The study of the effect of monetary rewards on job satisfaction is therefore an empirical issue, which has only until recently received any attention. In particular, a number of studies have shown that in Britain bonuses resul

11、t in higher job satisfaction, although the effect of individual-based performancerelated pay PRP systems is not as clear-cut once unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account Drago et al., 1992; McCausland et al., 2005, Artz, 2008, Green and Heywood,2008;Pouliakas and Theodossiou,2009.Using US dat

12、a, Heywood and Wei2006have also confirmed that all types of PRPbar piece ratesyield greater job satisfaction relative to time rates.A potential deficiency of the above-mentioned studies is that they only focus on the discrete difference in job satisfaction between workers receiving PRP and those on

13、alternative schemes. Thus, they ignore the fact that worker performance and satisfaction may vary according to the magnitude of incentives.As suggested by a series of field experiments performed by Gneezy and Rustichini2000a,p.802,for all positive but small enough compensaions, there is a reduction

14、in performance as compared with the zero compensation, or, better, with the lack of any mention of compensation. Nevertheless,once the extrinsic motivation is large enough,it results in better performance than in the no-incentive case. This non-monotonicity in the reaction of worker effort to both p

15、ositive and negative /.uses or fines, respectively has consequently been termed the W effect of incentives Gneezy, 2004. By contrast, the recent experimental study of Pokorny 2008 finds an inverse U-shaped relationship between effort levels and incentive intensity.This paper attempts to test the abo

16、ve contrasting hypotheses by looking beyond the mere incidence of incentive pay and examining the impact of the intensity of incentives i.e. the proportion of workers salary that is tied to bonuses on job satisfaction instead.Specifically,10 waves1998?2007of the British Household Panel SurveyBHPSare

17、 used to investigate the association between the power of bonus payments and the utility derived from work, holding the incidence of individual-based PRP and other important determi- nants constant.After controlling for individual fixed effectssuch as ability or motivation that may bias the influenc

18、e of payment schemes on jobsatisfaction, jobutility is found to rise only in response tolarge bonus payments.Evidence is also presented that revoking a bonus from one year to the next is likely to have a detrimental effect on employee utility,and that over time job satisfaction tends to diminish as

19、employees potentially adapt to the payment of bonuses The empirical evidence of the paper is therefore consistent with Gneezy and Rustichinis 2000a assertion that employers wishing to motivate theirstaff should indeed pay enough or dont pay at all.The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2

20、engages in a review of the available literature on the effect of financial incentives on job satisfaction. In Section 3 the data used in the study are described and preliminary statistical correlations are outlined.Section 4 describes the basi ceconometric methodology used in the paper.Section5 outl

21、ines the main empirica lresults of the relationship between incentive intensity and the utility derived from employment.Section6 examines the heterogeneity in the sample further.Finally,Section7concludes.The growing economics literature on subjective well-being Frey and Stutzer, 2002; Blanchflower a

22、nd Oswald, 2004; Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2004; EPICURUS, 2007; Frey, 2008 has emphasized that measures of job satisfaction are significant predictors of employee behaviour/.tsFree man, 1978, absenteeism Clegg, 1983 or worker productivity Judge et al., 2001. It follows that understanding th

23、e influence of monetary incentives on job satisfaction is important given that the composition of an employees remuneration package is an integral element of his/her overall working conditions.The fact that firms typically employ a wide array of incentive instruments has been attributed to the funda

24、mental agency problem that plagues the employment relationship Gibbons and Waldman, 1999. In order to combat the problem of moral hazard,firms design incentivec ontracts that seek to achieve goal congruence with their employees Mirlees, 1976; Holmstrom, 1979.Furthermore, as shown by Lazear 1986, 200

25、0, the introduction of financial rewards should induce more highly geared workers to put forth extra effort to the point where the marginal value added equates the marginal cost of the additionallabour. In long-runequilibrium,however,one would not expect to observe any differences in the marginal ut

26、ilities of comparable workers under fixed or variable payment schemes, as the expected value of the higher wages paid under PRP should be just suffcient to compensate for the additional earnings risk and the disutility of extra effortMas-Colelletal.,1995.Once the standard assumptions of the agency m

27、odel are relaxed, though, there are many reasons to expect that PRP is likely to have a non-negligible impact on job satisfaction. Expectancy-based theories of organizational psychology have asserted that attitudes about work are shaped from the reward sproduced by performance, which are valued outc

28、omes in themselves Lawler and Porter, 1967. Furthermore, it has been argued that PRP is an integral element of so-called high performance workplace practices, which have been found to be positively related to job satisfactionBauer,2004.Other aspects of PRP may, nonetheless, diminish productivity and

29、 worker satisfaction.It has been illustrated that wrongly devised compensation schemes can have counterproductive consequences,as they may encourage workers togame the compensation system to their advantage by multitasking Baker 1992 or by engaging in rent-seeking behaviour aimed at influencing the

30、subjective evaluations of line managers Prendergast, 1999. Holmstroms 1982 semina lpaper has also showed that utilizing team production incentive schemes such as profit-sharingmay dilute individual performance as a result of free-riding. In the face of evidence suggesting that the job satisfaction o

31、f employees is intrinsically linked to their relative pay statusClark and Oswald, 1996;Clark,1999;Ferrer-i-Carbonell,2005;Clark et al.,2008a,the demor alising dispersion and variability in wages that ensues from PRP schemes is also likely to affect attitudes to work in a negative fashion. Furthermor

32、e,it has often been claimed that financial incentives undermine collaboration and team work, emphasize the power asymmetry between management and the workforce, and reduce employee risk-taking and innovation Kohn,1993.Added to the above is a prominent non-economic criticism of PRP which is Based on

33、the so-called cognitive evaluation or motivation crowding-out hypoth esis Deci and Ryan,1985;Frey and Jegen,2001.According to this theory of Social psychology once it is acknowledged that individuals may derive intrinsic satisfaction from their jobs, explicit rewards that are perceived as controllin

34、g devices, or as indicators that the employment relationship is a pure market exchange, are likely to compromise job satisfaction and performance Frey,1992; Kreps, 1997; Lindenberg, 2001; Bolle and Otto, 2010. Furthermore, there are now a number of experimental studies indicating that financial ncen

35、tives may backfire by acting as a signal of employer distrust Falk and Kosfeld, 2006 or by undermining reciprocity-based voluntary cooperation FehrandGachter,1998.Only until recently did the economics literature pay any attention to which of the aforementioned effects of PRP on job utility predomina

36、te. Drago et al. 1992 and McCausland et al. 2005 were among the first to contrast the satisfaction of employees receiving PRP with those on alternative arrange ments.The latter find that PRP may have demotivating consequences for thelower-paid segment of the populationafter correcting for potential

37、selectivity bias.Heywood and Weis2006analysis shows that profit sharing and PRP are associated with higher overall job satisfaction in the US,though they find evidence that piece rates in particular may have a negative effect.More recently,Green and Heywood 2008 and Pouliakas and Theodossiou 2009 us

38、e the BHPS to investigate the impact of PRP on a fuller set of facets of jobsatisfaction. They show that although bonuses and profit-sharing schemes result in higher mean job satisfaction, the effect of individual-specific PRP diminishes once unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account.They also

39、fail to find any supporting evidence in favour of arguments that PRP crowds-outthe intrinsic satisfaction of jobs or has an adverse impact on job security.Artz 2008, on the other hand, argues that, on the net, PRP increases job satisfaction but does so largely among union workers and males in larger

40、 firms.The above studies focus merely on the impact of theincidence of PRP on job satisfaction. This masks the possibility that the utility of workers may vary according to the magnitude and intensity of incentives, as suggested by the experiments of Gneezy and Rustichini 2000ab. In these experiment

41、s, the effect of the introduction of a monetary reward and the differential impact ofsmall and large payoffs is tested on the performance of students from Israel. The evidence indicates thatthe effect of monetary incentives can be,in small amounts,detrimental to performanceand that there isadisconti

42、nuity at the zero payment of the effect of monetary incentivesibida,p.801?802.An important common element of the above about experiments is that smallIncentives are likely to exert a negative effect on behaviourwith discontinuity close to zero, while for high powered rewards or punishments the stand

43、ard Price effect is expected to prevail. This prediction has been corroborated in the proposer-respondent game experiment of Gneezy2004,which ultimately gives Rise to aVW-shaped relationship between effort and the intensity of positive incentives. In contrast, the IQ and counting tasks experiments p

44、erformed by Pokorny 2008 on undergraduate German students indicate an inverse U shaped relationship between effort levels and the strength of monetary payoffs.The author attributes her contradicting findings to the existence of referencedependent preferences among subjects, which imply decreasing ef

45、fort choices with stronger incentives once a reference income level is exceeded. Another example of the non-monotonic motivation effect of incentives can be found in the field study of Marsden et al. 2001, who highlight that although a large number of workers in their sample experienced a deteriorat

46、ion of workplace relations and cooperation following the introduction of incentive pay, PRP motivated those who received above average of payments.The remainder of the paper now turns to an investigation of which of the aforementioned contrasting patterns, as depicted in Figure 1, describe the assoc

47、iation between job satisfaction and the intensity of monetary rewards received by Britishe mployees.Source:KYKLOS,Vol.63?November2010?No.4,597?626译文:奖金强度的影响工作的满意 KonstantinosPouliakas 至委托-代理模型,以其令人信服的阐述,而平衡风险与激励条款时,试图把承包双方之间的利益冲突,依然是中央为我们的欠站补偿策略Mirlees公司1976年;Holmstrom,1979年。根据委托代理理论的标准模型,引入财政刺激作为代理

48、人的薪酬将增加他/她的生产力,因为它是假定个人获得收入而发挥效用的努力包括公用事业的成本。重要的是,如果额外的无用支持高等吗?拜恩补偿保险费,理性足够的工资的以下的工人,他们是较为固定和可变补偿然后应该平等和拓展双方的长期合作这意味着什么, 这提醒,都不应该有任何差异生效的工作接受现金激励员工满意,n付款安排,其他的东西平等。 上述结论一直有争议的,由一种心理上的并且,越来越多的经济学文献强调在实际工作中,动机进入经济学范式,如渴望互惠或从事有趣的任务,具有重要意义,为个人的动机与工作满意度Deci,1971年,Lepperetal。1973年,Deci和瑞恩,1989;弗雷,1986年,19

49、97;,1997;弗雷和Jegen,2001。此外,它已经认为的错的货币报酬激励可能ncite不正常的行为反应员工Holmstrom和尔格若姆,1991年成立;贝克,1992;Prendergast,1999、或产生负面影响员工士气和工作安全通过不公正不危险的支付分布Bakeretal.后果出现,1988。 一旦这些机制是考虑在内,很清楚地表明的是理论的影响在职工的金钱刺激的努力和工作满意度可以含糊不清。为证实了许多经济实验2006;福克和Kosfeld埃里克森和Villeval,2008,激励效应的货币报酬很可能会受损的世界里充满了陈腐的不完美的劳动力流动人口异构代理商与不同心理部署。在某种

50、程度上,激励方案允许优化的努力,促进职工自治,提高自主他们应该增加工作满意度,其他条件相等平等然而增收节支的风险,占用了她们固有的执行一个人的工作和较低的公司的士气会导致不满的雇员。 究金钱奖励的影响,因此,对工作满意感的实证问题,只有直到最近收到任何的注意。特别是,许多研究表明,英国奖金导致更高的工作满意度的影响,虽然individual-based支付性能相关PRP系统不明确的一次考虑储层非均质性的时候“龙之心”等1992;套2005年,迈考斯兰德等,年绿色和海沃德的,2008年和2009 Theodossiou;Pouliakas型,美国的数据,海沃德和卫2006也证实了所有类型的PRP

51、酒吧的是计件工资产量获得更大的工作满意度相对于时间的利率。 一个潜在的缺乏上述研究,他们只专注在工作满意度的离散差异接受工人之间PRP和方案。因此,他们忽略了一个事实的工作效率和满足可以依照不同的激励的重要性提出的一系列的田间试验Gneezy和Rustichini进行2000a,p.802“为一切积极也足够小,compensaions降低性能比零赔偿,或、更好、缺乏任何提到补偿”。不过,一旦以为外在动机够大的,它带来更好的表no-incentive情况。这职工在反应中努力积极和消极刺激/.uses和罚款,分别被称为“W因而效应”刺Gneezy,2004。相反,在最近的实验研究Pokorny20

52、08找到了反向u形关系和奖励努力水准的强度。 文通过对比测试上述假说仅仅是在展望的发生率和检验奖金的影响激励强度如下。工人的工资的比例相联系,而不是对工作满意感的奖金具体地说,10波1998-2007的英国家庭面板调查BHPS之间的相关性用于研究的力量所使用的奖金金额和工作的发生率,抱着PRP和其他重要因素入渗不断在控制个人固定效应如能力或动机的影响倾向工作满意但创造付款方式,发现只有在回应上升的奖金给出了证据,撤销从奖金到下一年可能会产生负面影响,员工用途随时间会减少工作满意,员工潜在的适应支付奖金实证结果提出了Gneezy一致,因此Rustichini2000年j.断言雇主希望激发thei

53、rstaff“支付的确应该足够或不付”。 摘要的结构是这样的。第二节从事现有文献的回顾的影响对工作满意感的财政补贴。在第3部分,使用的数据进行了描述,并研究了初步统计公式第四节基本计量了本文方法概述了主要Section5需要的结果之间的关系所使用的激励强度和就业Section6调查了进一步样品.最后异质性Section7concludes。 越来越多的经济学文献,在主观幸福感弗雷;2002年,中,2003;以及奥斯瓦尔德的认可布兰迟福拉Praag和Ferrer-i-Carbonell货车,2003;2007年伊壁鸠鲁;弗雷,2008强调的是工作满意度的措施是员工的重要预测因子行为/.ts1978,自由的人,Clegg疾患1983年或劳工生产力、苏达权等,2001年法官。因此,理解的金钱刺激的影响对工作满意感的影响是很重要的构成了员工的薪酬是一个完整的星座的他/她所有的工作条