典当信用与金融排斥的重要性[外文翻译]

1、本科毕业论文设计外 文 翻 译原文：Pawn Credit and the Importance of Financial ExclusionThe pawnbroking industry is thriving again. Recently, Reuters (2021) reported that the U.S. pawnbroking industry is growing at a rate not seen in the past 10 years. The Swedish pawnbroking industry forms no exception; in 2021 its

2、 outstanding loan balance rose by 20 percent for the second consecutive year to SEK 1.35 bn. In 2021 pawn credit is forecasted to grow to SEK 1.5 bn. Until recently, the demand for pawn credit in Sweden was relatively stable. As in the U.S., around four percent of the Swedish adult population uses t

3、he services of a pawnshop on a regular basis. Interestingly, given the presence of collateral and the higher interest rates typically charged on pawn credit, 90 percent of the customers pay back their loan.The average pawn loan in Sweden has a value of SEK 2500 (USD 350-400) and has a maturity of 14

4、1 days. The cost, including interest and fees, associated with such a loan amounts to 20 percent of the loans principal and two percent of the average after tax income earned during the maturity by the pawn borrowers. In order to justify borrowing at such high cost, standard life cycle consumption m

5、odels requires very high discount rates or events that cause large unanticipated variation in the marginal utility of consumption. As Skiba (2007) point out, borrowing at such rates is even more difficult to explain if consumers would have lower-cost credit alternatives.Conventional economic theory

6、says that consumer credit - even if it has high interest rates - is a means to alleviate temporary liquidity constraints and a facilitator of consumption smoothing. Many policy makers and consumer advocates have a different view, deeming the high interest credit loans, like payday loans and pawn cre

7、dit, predatory and usurious. Compared to payday lending or "sms-loans", pawn credit lending has some particular characteristics that less likely lead borrowers onto a downward spiral of increased financial distress. The fact that the borrower physically hands over the collateral to the paw

8、nbroker eliminates - if the collateral is adequately appraised - most of the credit risk in case of a default. This near absence of risk has eliminated the need for credit scoring or an information sharing system among pawnbrokers. As a result, the consequences of defaulting on a pawn loan for futur

9、e credit access are limited in the pawn credit market and absent in the mainstream credit market. The costs that an average pawn credit borrower accumulates are nevertheless substantial. In Sweden, a pawn credit customer takes on average four loans per year and rolls over each loan once. For an aver

10、age loan duration and size, this amounts to an annual cost of 80 percent of the principal amount, compared to an average effective APR of 5.40 percent on collateral free credit supplied by the mainstream banking sector in Sweden during the sample period.Why is it economically of interest that people

11、 are liquidity constrained? At a fundamental level, liquidity constraints influence the marginal propensity to consume out of liquid wealth (including available credit). Even when liquidity constraints are not binding momentarily, their influence can be reinforced by precautionary motives because of

12、 a possibility that they will become binding in the future. The presence of liquidity constraints also has important implications in many areas of economics. For instance Hubbard (1986) demonstrates that they can amplify the effects of fiscal policy and other business cycle shocks. Pagano (1999) sho

13、ws that while they increase savings they can delay investment in human capital and thus slow growth. Gross and Souleles (2002) quantify the importance of liquidity constraints and precautionary motives. They find that the long run average elasticity of debt to the interest rate is -1.3 and that it i

14、s smaller for increases in interest rates and liquidity constrained people, who start near their credit limits. According to this, pawn credit customers increase their marginal propensity to consume because their liquidity constraints are temporarily eased, but this positive effect might be undercut

15、 by the fact that they pay such high interest rates.Pawnshop customers are typically thought of as using pawn credit to mitigate the effects from very short-lived liquidity constraints. I find two pieces of evidence, both based on the timing of the decision to take and repay their pawn loan, that in

16、dicate, given the small loan amounts at stake, the presence of tough constraints. First, I document an increased demand right before - and a higher repayment rate right after the two nation-wide monthly paydays. Overall, demand is 20 percent higher in the week before payday and repayments are almost

17、 120 percent higher in the three 7days after each of the two paydays. Second, I find a higher repayment rate after the annual tax returns in June. Taken together these findings point to an important role for pawn credit plays in alleviating credit constraints.As I show later on, pawn credit is used

18、both as a substitute for and complement to regular credit. Conditional on being rejected, the probability of obtaining a pawn loan is 11.3 percent and conditional on being accepted the probability is 7.8 percent. However, the vast majority of all pawn loans, 73 percent, is taken without first trying

19、 to get cheaper credit at a regular bank. In other words, 73 percent of all pawn credit is obtained by so called discouraged borrowers.Compared to medelsvensson, the average Swede, a typical pawnshop customer is more likely to be young, female, and living in a big city. She may be currently married,

20、 but is more likely to have experienced a divorce or widowhood in the year before taking the pawn loan. Her income is lower and she is less likely to have income from capital or own a house. If she does own a house, then her house is likely having a value below-average. Her regular bank history look

21、s worse, with more loan denials, a higher debt to income ratio and more payment remarks. In addition, she is also more likely to have utilized at least 90 percent of her existing credit lines at mainstream banks or have no credit line available. Discouraged borrowers broadly conform to this profile

22、but have a credit score that is even lower.The objective of this paper is threefold. First, it aims at improving our understanding of the factors that lead consumers in potentially very different economic situations to apply for sources of credit with substantially higher costs than mainstream bank

23、credit. This paper cannot give a final answer to the question why, for example, consumers with sound financial track records and available lines of credit use expensive pawn credit. However, my results make it clear that pawn credit demand is mainly driven by people who have not recently experienced

24、 a rejection when applying for mainstream credit. This implies that either expectations, e.g., an adequate or inadequate calculation by the borrower that he is ineligible for mainstream bank credit, or other behavioral factors, such as reputational concerns and repayment commitments, are likely to b

25、e important determinants of high-cost credit. These findings have important implications for policy makers who aim at increasing the access of households to lower-cost finance. Second, this paper attempts to document the factors behind households demand for pawn credit. Third, it provides an estimat

26、e of the effect that discouraged borrowers have on credit demand.Pawnshops make small loans collateralized by tangible personal property, such as jewelry, consumer electronics, musical instruments and art. The pawn lending business has a very long history, with informal pawnbroking dating back to an

27、cient China. Pawnbroking came to Europe in the 14th century; it started in Lombardy (now Italy) and from there it spread to the rest of Europe. Its Swedish origins can be traced back to the 17th century. In Sweden it was a government-owned business until the 1850s when it was gradually privatized. T

28、he most recent reform is from 1995 when a new pawn credit law abolished both entry restrictions and interest rate ceilings. Since then the number of pawnbroking companies operating in Sweden has increased from eight to 20; together they operate 46 pawnshops around Sweden of which eleven are located

29、in Stockholm. The three largest players in the pawnbroking market jointly have a national market share of 80 percent.In Sweden gold is by far the most commonly used collateral: 80 percent of all loans have gold as pledged collateral. Pawnbrokers do not attempt to assess the creditworthiness of their

30、 customers; rather, they rely upon the estimated value of the collateral in making their loan decisions. The amount loaned is determined as a percentage of the estimated resale value of the pledged collateral. In Sweden this percentage typically lies between 70 and 80 in the case of gold and between

31、 50 and 60 in the case of collateral with a more uncertain resale value. As I mentioned before, pawn loans have an average maturity of 141 days and the costs associated with such a loan amount to 20 percent of the loans principal. Pawnbrokers and pawn credit are typically governed by industry-specif

32、ic laws that differ from the ones that apply to mainstream financial institutions. Pawnbrokers in Sweden, for example, are legally forbidden to offer loan contracts with a duration longer than four months, but the usual loan is past due when paid. As a result, many customers repeatedly incur fixed c

33、osts because fees are charged every time the loan is rolled over, e.g. three times per year for a loan that has an effective duration of one year. For an average-sized pawn loan with an effective duration of one year the effective interest rate is approximately 72%. Previously existing legal limits

34、on the interest rates charged by pawnbrokers in Sweden and entry restrictions were abolished in the middle of the 1990s. These liberalizations coincided with a drop in interest rates that was ascribed to increased competition.Typically, pawn credit transactions are carried out as follows: After rece

35、iving a piece of collateral, appraising its value and dispensing cash, a pawn shop gives a borrower a pawn ticket. This ticket includes a loan number, a description of the pledged collateral, the date on which the loan was made, the loan amount, the maturity date and the interest rate charges that m

36、ust be paid to redeem the collateral. If the loan is not repaid at or prior to maturity, the customer is given a legally determined grace period of two months within which the pledged property can be redeem by paying the loan amount and all accrued charges. If at the end of the grace period, the cus

37、tomer has neither redeemed his property nor extended, the loan then the collateral is forfeited to the pawnshop. The pawnbroker then sells the property at an auction or in their stores to recover the principal amount of the loan. In the case that the revenues from the sale of the collateral exceed t

38、he borrowers obligations, the pawnbroker is legally obliged to return the excess proceeds to the pawnshop customer, minus the auction and transaction costs.The pawnbroking industry is often thought to be an easy outlet for criminals to dispose of their stolen goods. This association is enforced by t

39、he media's underexposure of the pawnbroking industry in general and overexposure of rare cases of illegal practices. The fact that more than 90 percent of all loans are paid back and the pledge retrieved suggest otherwise. Moreover, the whole system is set up to make it difficult to deal with st

40、olen goods in a structural way. To start with, when taking a pawn loan the customer has to show their ID and their personal number is subsequently registered in the pawnbrokers administration together with the pledged collateral. The police compares systematically their own list of stolen goods with

41、 the auction and inventory lists of the pawn brokers. But most importantly, pawn brokers themselves have no incentive to take stolen goods as a pledge. First they make the most money if customers keep returning, taking new loans and/or rolling over their loans so that they pay more fees and interest

42、. A pawn loan based on a stolen pledge, however will typically default. Second, if the police identifies the pledged collateral as stolen, which is likely given the regular checks, it is confiscated and the pawnbroker has to write off the loan, plus that risks negative media attention what will decr

43、ease future profits.Source: Marieke Bos,2021.“Pawn Credit and the Importance of Financial Exclusion. Doctoral Dissertation.Stockholm University.June.pp.2-11.译文：典当信用与金融排斥的重要性典当行业又兴旺了。最近，路透社2021报道了美国典当行业以过去10年里前所未有的速度增长。瑞典典当行业的产生也不例外；在2021年，未支付贷款余额连续两年增长百分之二十至1.35亿克朗。2021年典当信贷预计将增长到1.5亿克朗。直到最近，瑞典典当信贷的

44、需求才相对稳定。正如在美国，大约百分之四的瑞典成年人定期使用典当行效劳。有趣的是，考虑到附属担保物的存在和更高的利息率，特别是从典当贷款中收取的，百分之九十的客户会归还他们的贷款。在瑞典，平均典当贷款的价值为2500克朗350-400美元，期限为141天。本钱包括利息率和费用，与等于贷款资金百分之二十和贷款者贷款期内平均税后收入百分之二的贷款相关联。为了证明贷款的本钱之高，标准的生命周期消费模式需要非常高的贴现率或者在消费边际效用中引起不曾预料的大变化的事件。就像斯基巴2007指出，如果消费者有更低本钱的贷款可供选择，在这种利率下的借款更难以解释。传统经济理论认为，消费信贷即使它具有较高的利率

45、是一种以缓解暂时的资金流动性限制的手段和平滑消费的促进者。许多政策制定者和消费者权益保护组织有不同的看法，认为高息贷款就像是工资日贷款和典当信贷，掠夺的和放高利贷的。相较于发薪日贷款或“短信贷款，典当信用贷款有一定的特殊性，不太可能导致借款人财务困境的继续恶性循环。事实上，借款人将抵押品移交给典当商消除了如果典当物被充分地评价大局部的信用风险。这种几乎不存在的风险已经消除了对信贷计分或在典当商中信息共享制度的需要。因此，典当融资违约的后果是在未来典当融资市场上信贷的取得受到限制且缺席主流信贷市场。平均一个典当融资者积累的本钱仍然是巨大的。在瑞典，一个典当融资者平均一年四次贷款，每一笔贷款展期一

46、次。对于平均一笔贷款的期限和规模，这相当于年度本钱是理论本钱的80%，与瑞典主流银行界在样本期间提供免费抵押信贷的%相比。为什么是经济上的利益约束了人们的流动资金？在根底层面上，流动性约束影响了边际消费倾向没有影响流动性财富包括可行性信贷。即使流动性约束暂时没有约束力，他们的影响可以被预防动机加强，因为他们可能将在未来结合在一起。流动性约束的存在也对经济的许多领域产生了重要影响。例如哈伯德1986说明，它们可以放大财政政策和其他经济周期冲击的影响。帕加诺1999年显示，他们在增加储蓄的同时他们可以延迟人力资本的投资，从而增长缓慢。格罗斯和苏勒雷斯2002量化流动性约束和预防性动机的重要性。他们

47、发现，从长期来看，债券的平均利率弹性是-1.3，这在提高利息率和靠近信用额度的人的流动性约束方面较小。根据这一点，典当融资者提高他们的边际消费倾向，因为他们的流动性约束是暂时缓解，但这种积极影响可能会因为他们支付高利率而削弱。典当行的客户一般认为利用典当贷款可以减低寿命极短的流动性限制的影响。我发现两个证据，在进度安排上都决定采取和归还典当贷款，这说明，在危急关头筹集少量资金，存在强硬的限制。首先，我记载了刚好在全国每月发薪日之前的需求增加和刚好在全国每月发薪日之后的更高还款率。总体而言，需求是在发薪日前每周高20%，还款额在每两个发薪日间每三周几乎高120%。第二，我发现在每年6月份的年度纳

48、税申报后有较高的还款率。结合这些调查结果指出典当信贷在缓解信贷约束中扮演着重要角色。正如我后面显示的，典当贷款被用来作为常规信贷的替代和补充。有条件被拒回，能获取典当%，有%。然而，大量的典当贷款，73%，不会先试图取得比一个普通银行更廉价的信贷。换句话说，典当信贷的73%是被气馁的借款人得到。相比瑞典，平常的瑞典人，一个典型的典当行客户更可能是年轻人，女性，和生活在大城市。她可能是目前已婚，但更可能有离婚经验或是在采取典当贷款的前一年寡居。她的收入较低，她是不太可能有资本收入或拥有自己的房子。如果她拥有自己的房子，那么她的房子价值很可能低于平均水平。她的普通银行历史记录看上去不好，有较多贷款拒绝记录，较高的债务与收入的比例和更多的付款备注。此外，她也更可能已经利用了在主流银行现有信贷额度的至少90%或没有可用的信用额度。气馁的借款人大致符合此类描述，但有一个更低的信用分数。本文的目的有三。首先，它旨在提高我们对因素的理解，在潜在的非常不同的经济情况下导致消费者申请信贷来源比主流银行信贷本钱高很多。本文不能给问题提供最后的答案，例如，消费者提供良好的金融信用纪录和使用昂贵的典当信贷提供可行的信贷最高限额。然而，