外文翻译浙江理工大学经济管理

1、浙江理工大学管理学院本科外文翻译原文 1Earninanagement, Audit Quality and Legal Environment: AnInternational ComparisonAbstract:This paper investigates the relationship between earnings management-audit quality andearnings management-legal system quality by using 1507 firms observations from listedcompanies in private

2、 firms across different 8 emerging countries. Consistent with previousresearch, differentiation between Big 4 and non-Big 4 audit firms are used as a audit quality proxyand discretionary accruals are used to measure the earninanagement. According to the results,only for Brazilian and Mexican compani

3、es, there is significant relationship between thediscretionary accruals and audit quality. For the other countries there is not significant relationship.Furthermore efficiency of the legal system helps decrease earninanagement incentives. Alongwith results, the big four auditors do not constrain the

4、 earninanagement incentives in everyemerging country but effective legal system does. In this analysis we used other earningsmanagement related variables like the size of the firms, leverage, lagged ROA of the firms whichhave loss in the previous year and Tobin Q as control variables.Keywords: Audit

5、 Quality; Earninanagement; Legal Enforcement1. IntroductionIn the aftermath of some financial scandals reported in certain firms and entities in recentyears, the role of legal arrangement and auditing in validating financial information of the firms isnow more crucial and urgent. The discrepancies r

6、esulted from the quality of auditing emerge in theform of discrepancies in the reliability of auditors and the quality of their clients earnings. Sinceauditing quality is ambiguous and multidimensional, there is no particular auditing criterion.Previous studies often rely on the auditors reputation

7、and have examined the relationship betweenreputation and earnings quality as a result.Agency theory based perspective states that audited financial statements are a monitoringmechanism to provide users assurance of financial information.1实际人类型、会计师事务所变更与盈余管理研究De Angelos definition of audit quality is

8、 two- dimensional. Audit quality is a function of theauditors ability; First; to detect material misstatements and errors in financial statements. Second;to report these materials misstatements and errors.Audit quality is assumed to be a function of auditors independence; however, the technicalcapab

9、ility of auditors or the probability that the auditor will discover material misstatements andgoing concern breaches is usually assumed to be invariant across auditors. Litigation anddisciplinary sanctions are supposed to ensure auditor independence. In lack of such enforcementmechanisms, auditors m

10、ight be tempted to compromise their independence and hence, neglect toconstrain earninanagement or issue a qualified opinion when necessary.Healy and Wahlennote that earnings management results in discretion in financialreporting with the intent of either misleading stakeholders about an entitys per

11、formance, orinfluencing contractual outcomes based on accounting numbers. Earnings management canmanipulate numbers because accrual basis income depends on the use of estimates in the financialreporting process. For example, current earnings could be boosted by underestimating bad debtson credit sal

12、es or expected warranty costs on the goods sold.The extent of earnings management may depend on the companys auditor. The companymay adopt a more conservative approach to financial reporting in the face of a higher quality audit.Accordingly, other researchers have examined audit quality as a measure

13、 of earnings quality. Theabove authors who studied U.S. companies used The Big Four auditors to distinguish audit quality.On the other hand, audit quality or auditor itself may not be able to reduce an earningsmanagement practice which was made with the intent of either misleading stakeholders about

14、 anentitys performance or affecting contractual outcomes. Earnings management is expected todecrease in countries which have efficient legal system to protect stakeholders right other thanaudit quality, because strong protection restricts insiders skills to gainal benefits.Previous international com

15、parative studies on legal systems have concentrated on investorprotection. Investor protection is defined as the power to prevent manager from expropriatingminority shareholders and creditors within the constraints imposed by law. In this aspect Leuz.investigated the relationship between investor pr

16、otection and earninanagement in 31 countriesfrom 1990 to 1999. They have found earninanagement decreases in countries with strongerinvestor protection. Boonlert. also examined the relationship between investor protection and2浙江理工大学管理学院本科earnings management in 31 countries from 1996 to 2002, and sugg

17、ested that earnings aresmoothed in countries where investor protection has progressed. Moreover, Shen and Chih studiedon banks in 48 countries and showed that earninanagement lower in countries with strongerinvestor protection and more transparent accounting disclosure.In this study, in addition to

18、audit quality, we will examine earnings management andquality/strength of legal system enforcement relationship by using Rule of Law and Control ofCorruption indices, which constructed by Kaufmann et al. . This study contributes to recentliterature by examining audit quality-earnings management, leg

19、al system quality-earningsmanagement in private firms across 8 different emerging countries. Section two providesdiscussion in literature, section three provides methodology and results and section fourconcludes.2. Literature ReviewAudit quality has been investigated within a variety of perspectives

20、 in the literature.According to Chadegani, efforts of measuring audit quality can be distinguished as directmeasures and indirect measures. Direct Measures include financial reporting compliance with GAAP, quality control review,bankruptcy desk review and SEC performance. Indirect Measures include a

21、udit company size, auditor tenure, industry expertise, audit fees,economic dependence, reputation and cost of capital.In line with our studies nature and content, we will focus on indirect measures. The mostcommonly used indirect measure of audit quality is Audit Company size. De Angelo proposes tha

22、tthe size of the audit firm is an indicator of audit quality because larger firms are better equipped.He theoretically introduces the relationship between audit quality and audit firm size consideringthat large audit firms are more independent. The quality of audits increase as the size of the firmg

23、ets larger. According to De Angelo, many researchers have empirically examined the relationshipbetween audit firm size and audit quality.There are some empirical papers that have provided additional support for the use of auditorsize as a proxy for audit quality. For example, Davidson and Neu argued

24、 that managers haveincentives to manipulate the reported earnings to meet the analysts forecasts. Therefore, if largeauditing firms provide higher-quality audits than small auditing firms, we may expect the forecast3实际人类型、会计师事务所变更与盈余管理研究errors of big auditing firms clients to be larger. Using data f

25、or Canadian firms, his results supportthat expectation, indicating that the auditor size is a good proxy for auditing quality.Lennox examined the two explanations of the hypothesized positive relationship betweenaudit quality and auditor size: the reputation hypothesis suggested by De Angelo, argues

26、 that largeauditors are more incentives to be accurate because they have more client-specific rents to lose iftheir reports are inaccurate. The deep pockets hypothesis argued by Dye, postulated that largeauditors will be more accurate because they have greater wealth that is exposed to risk in case

27、oflitigation. Lennox examined the relationship between auditor size and litigation and found greatersupport for the deep pocket hypothesis than reputation hypothesis.Author: Mehmet Ünsal Memi and Emin Hüseyin Çetenak Nationality: TurkeyOriginate from: International Journal of Economic

28、s and Financial Issues, 2012(2), 460-469.4浙江理工大学管理学院本科译文 1盈余管理、审计质量与法律环境：国际比较摘要：本文通过 1507 公司观察 8 个不同新兴的私营企业股票上市公司，探讨审计质量-盈余管理和法律制度质量-盈余管理。与以前的研究相一致，四大和非四大会计师事务所之间的分化被视作审计质量的和操控性应计利润来衡量的盈余管理。根据研究结果，只有巴西和墨西哥公司的盈余管理与审计质量之间有显著关系。其他都没有显著的关系。此外，法律制度的效率有助于减少盈余管理。在各新兴，四大会计师事务所不限制盈余管理而有效的法律制度会限制。在本文的分析中我们使用其

29、他盈余管理相关的变量如在过去一年有损失公司的公司规模、杠杆和滞后的 ROA 以及 Tobin Q 作为：审计质量，盈余管理，法律实施变量。一、简介近几年来，在某些企业和被报出一些金融之后，法律安排和审计确认企业财务信息的作用越来越重要。出现审计质量的差异的起因是审计师的可靠性及他们客户的质量。审计质量是模糊的，的，没有特定的审计准则。以往的研究往往依赖于审计师的声誉和研究声誉与盈余质量之间的关系来得出结果。理论基于视觉状态，经审计的财务报表是一种为用户提供保证财务信息的机制。De Angelo 所定义的审计质量是二维的。审计质量是审计师能力的体现；首先，发现财务报表中的错报；其次，报告这些材料

30、虚报和错报。审计质量也是审计师性的体现；然而，审计师的技术能力或者审计师会发现错报和持续经营的行为的可能性是不变的和行政处分都应该确保审计师的性。在机制的情况下，审计师的性可能会受到损害，从而忽视了约束盈余管理或忽视了在必要时刻出具保留意见。Healy 和 Wahlen 指出，为误导利益相关者对业绩结果的认识以及影响合同，财务报告是基于会计数据经过酌情处理的盈余管理的结果。因为权责发生制收入取决于在财务报告过程中使用估计数，所以盈余管理可以数字。例如，低估5实际人类型、会计师事务所变更与盈余管理研究销售收入的坏账和商品销售的预期保修成本，当期都可以被增加。盈余管理的程度可能取决于公司的审计师。

31、面对高质量审计师，在财务报告中，公司可以采取更为保守的方法。因此，其他研究已经将审计质量作为衡量盈余质量的标准来进行研究。在研究美国公司时，上述作者用四大会计师事务所来区分审计质量。另一方面，盈余管理是为了误导利益相关者对业绩结果的认识以及影响合同，所以审计质量和审计师本身未必能减少盈余管理的实行。保护限制内部的技能来获得个人利益，因而除了审计质量，还有有效法律制度保护利益相关者的权利的，盈余管理预计会减少。以往关于法律制度的国际性比较研究都集中在投资者保护。投资者保护是指以防止管理者在法律规定的约束内中小股东和债权人的权力。在这方面，Leuz 等人研究了31 个从1990 到1999 的投资

32、者保护与盈余管理之间的关系。他们发现具有较强的投资者保护的盈余管理降低了。Boonlert 还研究了 31个从 1996 至 2002 投资者保护与盈余管理之间的关系，并发现投资者保护已经实施的平滑。此外，Shen 和 Chih 研究了 48 个，发现具有较强的投资者保护和更透明的会计信息披露的，盈余管理程度比较低。在这项研究中，除了审计质量，利用由 Kaufmann 等人构建的法律和指数规则来研究盈余管理与质量/强度的法律制度实施的关系。这项研究通过检查 8 个不同新兴的私营企业的审计质量-盈余管理和法律制度质量-盈余管理有助于近期文献。第二部分是文学讨论，第三部分是研究方法和结果，第四部分

33、总结。二、文献回顾文献从不同的角度研究审计质量。根据 chadegani 所言，衡量审计质量的成果可分为直接衡量和间接衡量。直接衡量包括会计准则下财务报告的合规性、质量、和美国委员会的表现。间接衡量包括审计公司规模、审计师、行业专业知识、审计费用、经济依赖、声誉和成本。在我们研究的性质和内容中，重点放在间接衡量。审计质量最常用的6浙江理工大学管理学院本科间接衡量是审计公司的规模。因为公司越大装备越好，De Angelo 提出，会计师事务所的大小是审计质量的一个重要指标。考虑到大型会计师事务所更，他理论地介绍了审计质量与审计公司规模之间的关系。随着公司规模的变大，审计质量也有所提高。根据 De

34、Angelo 所言，许多学者都模与审计质量之间的关系。了会计师事务所规有一些实证文献对用会计师事务所规模作为审计质量的提供了额外的支持。例如，Davidson 和 Neu 认为管理者有盈余符合分析师的。因此，如果大型会计师事务所比小型会计师事务所提供更高的审计质量，我们可以预期大型会计师事务所客户的误差要更大一些。使用企业的数据，其结果支持预期，指出会计师事务所的规模是审计质量的一个很好的。Lennox 检查了审计质量与会计师事务所规模正相关假设的两个解释：由 DeAngelo 提出的声誉假说，认为大型会计师事务所出具的审计报告更准确，因为。由 Dye 提出的深口如果他们的报告确，他们会损失的

35、客户特定袋假说，假定大型会计师事务所出具的审计报告更准确，因为他们公司有更大的值，所以存在更大的风险。Lennox 研究了会计师事务所规模与之间的关系，发现深口袋假说比声誉假说得到更大的支持。作者：Mehmet Ünsal Memi and Emin Hüseyin Çetenak国籍：土耳其出处：与金融国际期刊，2012（2）：460-4697实际人类型、会计师事务所变更与盈余管理研究原文 2Earninanagement and Auditor QualityAbstract:This paper analyzes the relationship betwe

36、en a firms demand for different quality auditorsand opportunities for earnings management. In our m, the firm simultaneously chooses thebias it introduces into its pre-audited earnings and the quality of its auditor. We show that firmsthat choose a high level of bias also choose a low-quality audito

37、r, even though the market-makermakes a correction for the level of residual bias in audited reports. Firms that choose a low level ofbias choose a high-quality auditor. We also study the effect of changes in the regulatoryenvironment on the market equilibrium. Our analysis shows that stricter regula

38、tion leads to morefirms choosing low-quality auditors, thus it is not in the interest of high quality auditors to supportsuch measures.Keywords: Audit quality, Earninanagement, Accounting standards, Information precision,Bias, Auditor choice1. IntroductionManagers of public firms have incentives to

39、manage their earnings report, even though theirfinancial reports are certified by public auditors who have a duty to remove any bias they maycontain. Given this, one might expect to see management hire auditors who do low qualitywork, uncover little, if any, bias, and who are inexpensive. In reality

40、, we observe that many firmschoose high-quality auditors. One explanation is that because firms employing low qualityauditors, on average, introduce more bias in their reported earnings, investors protect themselvesby discounting the reported earnings of such firms more. Thus, a strategy of employin

41、g alow-quality auditor to allow more reported bias might unravel.In this paper we present a theoretical mthat sheds light on this apparent anomaly bydemonstrating a connection between earninanagement and the choice of auditors of differentquality. Our findings suggest that managers who intend to man

42、ipulate their firms financialstatements more would choose a lower quality auditor. The choice of a high-quality auditor thenbecomes a signal to the market that the manager has introduced little bias into the financial reports.Since the higher quality auditor removes more of the bias from the report

43、and might charge a8浙江理工大学管理学院本科higher fee, this is an expensive, hence, credible signal.In our m, firms differ with respect to the cost of earninanagement. Firms may varyin their ability to manage earnings due to constraints posed by the firms internal governancestructure (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney

44、 1995), previous accounting decisions that limit futurediscretionary choices (Sweeney 1994), the asset structure of the firm, and reputational concerns incase earnings management is revealed (see DeAngelo 1981, Becker et al 1998), all of whichimpose a cost on managers reporting biased earnings.Our m

45、ain result is that, in a setting in which firms have different costs of managing earningsand therefore exaggerate their earnings to different extents, those who exaggerate more choose anauditor of low quality. More formally, we prove the existence of a unique equilibrium in whichearninanagement and

46、the choice of a low quality auditor emerge as complementary choices.This is so even though the market punishes such firms by discounting the auditors report to agreater degree.Our study also provides a number of comparative statics regarding the sensitivity of theequilibrium to the firms cost of bia

47、s, changes in audit fees and average audit quality. Using a costparameter as a proxy for the strictness of the regulatory environment, we show that more firmswill choose lower quality auditors if accounting rules are strictly enforced, and that high qualityauditors are likely to object to stricter e

48、nforcement.The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we present the mand; inSection 3 we derive our main results and discuss properties of the equilibrium; in Section 4 wecarry out comparative statics exercises and analyze the economic consequences of changes in theeconomic settin

49、g; we conclude with some suggestions for future research in Section 5.All proofsare provided in the appendix.2. The MWe employ a single-period rational expectations mwith three participants an initialpublic offering (IPO) firm, an auditor who audits the IPO firms earnings, and a market-makerwho sets

50、 the firms stock price based on audited earnings. At the start of the period, the firmintroduces bias into its earnings, chooses an auditor, and gives the auditor the biased earnings. Theauditor then conducts the audit, removes some of the bias introduced by the firm, and issues thepublic report. Fi

51、nally, the market-maker sets the firms stock price at its expected end-of-period9实际人类型、会计师事务所变更与盈余管理研究value, taking all publicly available information into account.Our mis based on the asymmetry of information between firm managers and themarket-maker. Since the true state of a firms financial situa

52、tion is not public knowledge, themarket-makers valuation relies on public audits. Thus, managers have incentives to intentionallyintroduce a self-serving bias into the earnings of their firms.3. Equilibrium with a Linear Pricing FunctionTo motivate our definition of equilibrium, consider first the p

53、rocess by which themarket-maker sets the price for the firm using the pricing formula (2.3).In order to evaluate theformula, the market-maker must precisely compute the information revealed by the firms choiceof auditor as well as by the auditors report. At the start of the period, the market-maker

54、has noinformation about either the firms private cost or its private signal, apart from their prior jointdistribution. However, once the market-maker observes j, the quality of the auditor chosen at Date2, the set of possibilities narrows to a subset of firm types, viz. those that find it optimal to

55、 choosea j-quality auditor. Since this partitioning of firm types arises endogenously, the market-makermust start with a conjecture about the types of firms that choose different types of auditors.5.sThis paper develops a mof an IPO firm that simultaneously introduces bias into itsfinancial reports

56、and chooses an auditor of a given quality level. The firms management incurs aprivate cost for biasing financial reports that increases with the bias level. The market-maker doesnot know the managements private costs of earnings bias and the amount of bias introduced bythe firm. We show the existenc

57、e of an equilibrium where a firm whose management faces a high(low) private cost for biasing earnings chooses a high (low) quality auditor. A firm with highprivate managerial costs of bias biases its earnings less, and its choice of a high quality auditorattests to the firms smaller bias, which, in equilibrium, draws a favorable reaction by themarket-maker.Comparative