机场跑道状态灯光系统研究

1、 Aerodrome Study Runway Status LightsB.5.3 RWSLRunway IncursionsB.5.3 RWSLRunway Incursions27 Mar 1977, Canary Islands. Two 747s collide. 583 dead.1977年3月27加那利群岛两架747相撞，583人死亡。20 Dec 1983 , Sioux Falls, USA. DC9 collides with snow plow. 1 dead. 1983年12月20日，美国苏瀑市，DC9与除雪车相撞，1人死亡。3 Dec 1990 , Detroit,

2、USA. DC9 collides with B727. 8 dead.1990年12月3日，底特律，DC9与B727相撞，8人死亡。1 Feb 1991, Los Angeles. B737 lands on Fairchild Metro. 34 dead.1991年2月1日洛杉矶，B737着陆撞上了Fairchild MetroIII，34人死亡。Source: WikipediaB.5.3 RWSLRunway Incursions (contd)8 Oct 2001. MD87 collides with Citation, Milan. 118 dead.2001年10月8日，MD

3、87与塞斯纳引证公务机相撞，米兰连尼治机场，118人死亡。9 Jun 2005, Boston. Departing A330 flies over departing 737. None hurt.2005年7月9日波士顿，起飞的A330飞越过起飞的737，无人伤亡。30 Dec 2007, Otopeni, Romania. B737 hits repair car. None hurt.2007年12月30日，罗马尼亚欧特佩尼，B737撞上故障汽车，无人伤亡。Source: WikipediaB.5.3 RWSLCosts“One runway incursion happens dai

4、ly on average worldwide, at a cost to the industry of about $100 million a year.” TK Kallenbach, Honeywell Vice President of Product Management B.5.3 RWSLRunway Status LightsRWSL:Uses ASDE-X, other sources to detect potential conflicts in real time.使用机场场 面探测设备 ，实时监测潜在的冲突。Direct heads-up warning to p

5、ilots and vehicle drivers on the airport surface对飞行员和机场地面车辆司机发出直接引导警告Commercial, off-the-shelf hardware，商业上现成产品。Cost: 1 million USD per runway投入：每条跑道100万美元。B.5.3 RWSLOperating Principles (USA)No interference with normal ops.不干扰正常运行。No controller action required.无需专设控制器。Lights allow anticipated separ

6、ation.灯光可预先设定间隔Clearance by ATC only, as always. ATC控制跑道。Lights are on = Stop.灯亮=停止。Lights off = Proceed with clearance.关灯=跑道适用。Lights apply to vehicles also.灯适用于车辆。Automatic brightness in low visibility.在低能见度自动亮度。B.5.3 RWSLSchematicB.5.3 RWSLRunway Entrance LightsWarn of active traffic on runwayOn

7、centerlinePoint at aircraft nearing runwayActivated by 30+ knot trafficActivate during all runway activityRELB.5.3 RWSLTakeoff Hold LightsWarn of active traffic on runwayOn centerlinePoint at departing aircraftActivated only when departure in takeoff position and 2nd aircraft on or approaching runwa

8、yTHLB.5.3 RWSLRunway Intersection LightsWarn of active traffic on runwayOn centerlinePoint at departing aircraftActivated only when aircraft approaching runway and departure rolling at 30+ knotsRILB.5.3 RWSLPilots ViewIFALPA: Fully supports global standard Seeks “consistent, universally recognized d

9、isplays.”European Cockpit Association: Use red only Training, global standard Proceed only with clearanceB.5.3 RWSLPilot PolicyIFALPA: Fully supports global standard Seeks “consistent, universally recognized displays.”European Cockpit Association: Use red only Training, global standard Proceed only

10、with clearanceB.5.3 RWSLControllers ViewSurvey of US controllers with RWSL experience (Oct 2010):86% - Improves runway safety85% - Will lower runway incursions by at least 25%41% - Witnessed at least one “save” by RWSLB.5.3 RWSLController ConcernsFalse indicationsPilot and controller trainingConfusi

11、on with other lightsPilots asking when lights turn greenPilots proceed when lights turn offUse of tower display as radarVehicles on grassB.5.3 RWSLConfusion with Other LightsDisplaced thresholdStop barsApproach lightsRunway end lights alternating red and white last 900 meters, then red for last 300

12、metersB.5.3 RWSLKill SwitchB.5.3 RWSLGlobal ConsistencyEurocontrol E-RWSL, Dec 2010Two modes. Prevention Same as existing.Incursion - Lights flash to show emergency action needed.ICAO Aerodrome Panel, Oct 2010Orientation, spacing and use .only control.to disable.” B.5.3 RWSLChartingB.5.3 RWSLTower M

13、onitordeleted for uploadB.5.3 RWSLTower Monitor (contd)B.5.3 RWSLFinal Approach Runway Occupancy SystemWarn pilot on approach of traffic on runwayUse existing PAPIsFlash PAPIs to show conflictFAROSB.5.3 RWSLFAROS Action PointsB.5.3 RWSLFAROS Performance25% of US controllers surveyed negative effect

14、on safetyToo many nuisance alertsDeactivated at both test sites -Dallas and Long BeachFAA program on hold for improvementsB.5.3 RWSLExisting PolicyAAS 1.1: ACAS should only be considered as a safety net.ATS 3.18: A safety net is an airborne and/or ground based function, the sole purpose of which is

15、to alert the pilot or controller of the imminence of collision of aircraft, aircraft and terrain/obstacle, as well as penetration of dangerous airspace.B.5.3 RWSLExisting Policy (contd)AAS 3.21 addresses: Controller involvement and training Localized nuisance filters Use of simulation and studies Re

16、levance to safety caseB.5.3 RWSLConclusions 11. RWSL is promising. 2. Runway incursions are not reduced where no conflict is present.3. International leadership is critical. Non-uniform deployment is a risk.4. Training of pilots and controllers is vital to success.5. Interaction with other lighting

17、is a concern. Issues are largely local.B.5.3 RWSLConclusions 26. Any requirement to scan an additional monitor would increase workload and liability. 7. TOC is concerned RWSL monitors might be used as a surveillance tool without regulation.8. FAROS in its present state is an immature system.9. TOC c

18、onsiders RWSL a safety net.B.5.3 RWSLDebateB.5.3 RWSL4.1 - IFATCA Policy is:IFATCA supports RWSL provided the following criteria are met: The system will be used as a safety net. It will operate automatically with no controller input required. The system specifications are globally harmonized under

19、ICAO guidance. Potential confusion with other lighting systems is eliminated or mitigated. Clearance to proceed will still be required.Recommendations 1B.5.3 RWSLRecommendations 24.1 (continued):IFATCA supports RWSL provided the following criteria are met: All surface traffic will be required to comp