讲义四 织架构与公司战略定位(长江商学院 陶志刚)

1、Strategies and Organizations组织架构与公司战略定位管理经济学1The field of business strategy is to explain sustained differences in the performance of firms that compete with one another in delivering products and in developing the ability to do so more effectively over time.在剧烈竞争的市场中，企业如何获得并保持高于竞争对手的盈利管理经济学2Source:

2、 Compustat, Value Line, Marakon Associates AnalysisAverage Economic Profits of U.S. Industry Groups, 1978-19961978至1996年美国各行业平均经济利润率Value Line Industry Groups管理经济学3The “Five Forces Framework for Industry Analysis “五种竞争力量的行业分析框架潜在竞争对手供给商行业现有竞争者替代品竞争者购置者管理经济学4Source: Compustat, Value Line, Marakon Ass

3、ociates AnalysisROE-Ke Spread(30%)(20%)(10%)0%10%20%30%40%$0$1$2$3$4$5$6$7$8$9$10$11$12$13$14$15Great Northern IronWorthington IndsNucorSteel TechnologiesOregon MillsCommercial MetalsCarpenterBirminghamBritish Steel PLCCleveland-CliffsQuanexLukensACME MetalsAmpcoUSX-US SteelInland SteelArmcoWHXBethl

4、ehemAverage Invested Equity ($B)Average Economic Profits of Individual Firms in the Steel Industry, 1978 1996 1978至1996年美国钢铁行业中各企业的平均利润率管理经济学5Source: Compustat, Value Line, Marakon Associates AnalysisROE-Ke Spread(80%)(60%)(40%)(20%)0%20%40%60%$0$5$10$15$20$25$30SmithKlineGlaxoAmericanHomeProductsAm

5、genMerckSchering PloughWatsonBristolMyersRhone-PoulencMylan LabsWarner LambertEli LillyPfizerPerrigoPharmacia & UpjohnForest LabsAlzaICNSchererIvaxGenetechBiogenRobertsGenzymeDuraChironCephalonGensiaCygnusImmunexAverage Invested Equity ($B)Average Economic Profits of Individual Firms in the Drug Ind

6、ustry, 1978 -19961978至1996年美国制药行业中各企业的平均利润率管理经济学6Competitive Advantages竞争优势Competitive Advantage竞争优势Lower Cost低成本Differentiation差异化管理经济学7How to achieve competitive advantages?如何获得竞争优势A firm obtains cost advantage (or achieves product differentiation) through efficient organization of activities invo

7、lving units within the firm, suppliers, customers, and even competitors. 有效地组织生产，包括与公司内各部门、供给商、客户及竞争对手的关系，是竞争优势的来源管理经济学8Three examples三个例子Airbus v. Boeing 空中客车 对 波音Toyota v. GM 丰田 对 通用汽车McDonalds 麦当劳管理经济学9Two approaches for organizing production activities两种组织生产的方式the organizational approach and the

8、 contractual approach 自造及外包What are the tradeoffs between the organizational approach compared with the contractual approach? 两种方法的比较管理经济学10Holdup套牢verticalIntegration纵向整合externalContractor外部合同加工者moral hazardinternal monopolylack of scale economies鼓励问题内部垄断缺乏规模经济Make or buy?自造还是外包?管理经济学11Organization

9、s and business strategies组织形式和竞争优势的关系Make production differentiation自造 差异化道路Buy cost advantage外包 低本钱优势管理经济学12Holdup套牢 Conflict of interest 利益冲突 Contractual incompleteness 不完全合同 Relationship-specific investment 专用投资 Renegotiation 重新谈判管理经济学13Resolving Holdup如何防止被套牢avoid specific investments 防止专用投资writ

10、e more detailed contracts 合同要具体详细管理经济学14Moral Hazard鼓励问题conflict of interest 利益冲突asymmetric information about effort 不了解具体努力程度管理经济学15Resolving Moral Hazard如何解决鼓励问题incentive scheme 鼓励机制conditional payment 有条件的付款Quota 指标monitoring system 监督系统管理经济学16Incentive vs Risk鼓励对风险Efficient scheme balances 有效的鼓励

11、方案会平衡:benefits of more effort 积极性的提高 costs of risk bearing 承担风险的本钱管理经济学17Motivating Dennis Rodman如何使美国职业篮球界的坏孩子变好1996: under guaranteed contract, he played only 55 of 82 regular season contests, and got paid $2.96m for games he didnt play in.1997: a new contract of $10.5m, but only $4.5m guaranteed

12、/ $0.5m for winning NBA rebounding title / $185,000 per game after the 59th game / In the end, he played 80 of the 1997s 82 games, and got $10.1m.管理经济学18AT&T Incentive SchemeAT&T的总裁鼓励方案1995: AT&T awarded CEO Robert E. Allen options for 108,000 shares at $43.94 exercise price 1995年: AT&T(美国电报及 公司)奖励总

13、裁Robert E. Allen 108000股的期权管理经济学19Relative Performance相对绩效employment - promote the best worker 雇用提拔最正确雇员sports - gold, silver, bronze 体育金银铜牌管理经济学20Incentive Pay for Portfolio Managers at Harvard Management Company哈佛大学资产管理公司采用相对绩效鼓励方案Case Study 案例管理经济学21Introduction回报远远高过基准回报Founded in 1974 to manage

14、 the endowment of Harvard UniversityAs of the end of 2000, this endowment totaled about $19 billion. Jack Meyer, the president, oversaw 185 employees, of which 45 were portfolio managersIn the five (ten) year period ending in 2001, the annual return on Harvards endowment was 16.9% (16.5%) while the

15、annual median performance of large institutional funds was 11.0% (11.9%).管理经济学22HMC compensation plan薪酬方案三局部：根本工资、中性奖金、浮动奖金The compensation structure for internal managers of public securities at HMC consisted of three components:Basic salary ($200K, not-a-risk)Neutral bonus ($100K, at-risk)Incentiv

16、e bonus (at-risk,based on performance, relative to the benchmark. Could be positive or negative)管理经济学23Neutral bonus ($100,000)管理不善，中性奖金可扣除The neutral bonus was netted against the incentive bonus for annual payment. If the incentive bonus was zero or positive, the FULL neutral bonus would be paid. I

17、f the incentive bonus was negative, the neutral bonus would be reduced accordingly, down to a minimum of zero. 管理经济学24Incentive bonus超过基准回报一个百分点可获50万美金浮动奖金The parameters for the incentive bonus included a pre-set, upside limit (a cap of $2,000,000) and an incentive bonus rate of $500,000 (or charged

18、 to the manager) for each 1% of performance above (or below) the specified benchmark. 管理经济学25Carryforward of incentive bonus超过上限的浮动奖金暂放在蓄水池里If the incentive pay earned in a particular year exceeded the cap, the excess was carried forward, i.e., invested in the endowment and payable at the end of the

19、 next fiscal year. The carryforward bonus and the endowment return on the carryforward were subject to a clawback for underperformance and were also subject (along with the currently payable portion of the current years incentive) to the maximum incentive cap. 管理经济学26Withholding on incentive bonus低于

20、上限的浮动奖金,其中30%也放在蓄水池里Thirty percentage of any positive incentive bonus (post-carryforward) was withheld, invested in the endowment, and payable at the end of the next fiscal year. The withheld bonus and the endowment return on the withheld bonus were subject to a clawback for underperformance but wer

21、e not subject to the maximum cap. 管理经济学27Negative incentive bonus假设回报低于基准回报，需从蓄水池及本年度中性奖金中扣除Negative incentive bonuses were netted against carryforward bonuses, endowment returns on carryforward bonuses, withheld incentive bonuses, endowment returns on withheld bonuses, and the neutral bonus in the

22、order listed. Negative incentive bonuses in excess of these bonuses and endowment returns were not carried forward.管理经济学28Multiple Responsibilities I多重责任 IExamples: high-school teachers, university professors, Hong Kong mini bus drivers例如: 中学老师, 大学教授, 香港小巴驾驶员管理经济学29Multiple Responsibilities II多重责任II

23、strong incentive induces more effort on that dimension but less effort on other dimensions 假设有强烈的鼓励机制引导某一个方面责任, 那么其他责任会被无视equal incentive principle 对等鼓励的原那么low-powered contracts 采用较弱的绩效指标OWNERSHIP 所有权变化管理经济学30Big Macs Pay Plans麦当劳自营店经理的薪酬方案Case Study 案例管理经济学311963 Plan 1963年的薪酬方案Bonus based on sales

24、 increase奖金基于销售额的增加independent of managers control不可控制的因素lack of concern for cost control对本钱控制的忽略管理经济学321964-67 Plan 1964至1967年的薪酬方案Bonus based on subjective evaluations奖金基于主观评估管理经济学331967 Plan1967年的薪酬方案Basic salaries tied to the satisfaction of QSC standards满足QSC(产品质量,优质效劳,店堂清洁)是获得根本工资的必要条件Quarterl

25、y bonus for profit contribution, which depends more on increased revenue (volume) than on cost control. 季度奖金取决于利润的增加管理经济学341972 plan 1972年的薪酬方案Three ranges of fixed salary depending on the cost of living根本工资与生活本钱指数挂钩Quarterly bonuses forlabor costs (5% of base salary)food and paper costs (5% of base

26、 salary)QSC objectives (up to 10% of base salary)2.5% of sales increase (up to 10% of base salary)季度奖金基于劳工本钱、食物及纸张本钱、QSC指标及销售额的增加管理经济学35Questions 思考问题Whats McDonalds business strategy? 麦当劳的经营策略对自营店经理薪酬方案的影响compensation based on QSC and costs alone (“cost centers)? 自营店可否成为专注于QSC的本钱中心？compensation for

27、 training of new managers 如何提高自营店经理培训新经理或特许经营者的积极性?compensation based on sales or sales increase? 奖金是基于销售额还是销售额的增加objective performance valuations only? 难道奖金只能基于客观评估？ 管理经济学36The Goldman Sachs IPO高盛集团首次公开募股Case Study 案例管理经济学37A Family Business家族业务1869: M. Goldman/commercial paper 1869年：债券1880: $100K

28、capital/$30 million turnover 1880年：10万美元资本/3000万美元营业额1882: teamed up with Sachs (son-in-law) 1882年：与女婿Sachs合伙1896: joined NYSE 1896年：参加纽约股票交易所1900: $2.5 million capital 1900年：250万资本1906: handled first IPO 1906年：第一次接手公司首次公开募股业务管理经济学38One Bad Year & 30 Good Years1年差光景与30年好时光1929: a mutual fund establi

29、shed in 28 fell from a height of $326 in Oct, 29 to $ 1.75 in Nov, 29. 1928年创立的互惠基金从1929年10月326美元下跌到1929Sidney Weinberg Era: 1930-1969 Sidney Weinberg 时代：1930年-1969年sit on more than 30 boards, and attended 250 board meetings per year for more than 20 years 坐镇30多个董事会，连续20多年每年参加250个董事会议cultivated a fi

30、rst-rate client list, and landed the Ford IPO deal ($650m) in 1956 赢得了一流客户，1956年帮助福特成功首次公开募股6.5亿美元管理经济学39Gus Levy Era: 1969-1976 Gus Levy 时代：1969年-1976年Risk taker 爱冒风险one-hour management committee meetings reduced to 15 minutes 管理委员会会议从一小时缩短到15分钟Penn Central Railways default on $87 million commercia

31、l paper/45 law suits for not disclosing the clients financial information/unlimited liability for 45 partners/settlements Penn Central Railway8700万美元债券拖欠/高盛因不披露客户财务信息而收到45项起诉/45个合伙人负担无限责任/庭外解决管理经济学40John Weinberg/John Whitehead: 1976-1990management committee 恢复管理委员会short-term profit/long-term relati

32、ons 不是考虑短期利润而是长期关系reckless risk-taking (making bridge loans, buying junk bonds, and putting capital in takeovers)/cautious business development 莽担风险过桥贷款，购置垃圾债券，公司资金直接参与兼并业务/谨慎地开展业务white-knight strategy in M&A 在企业并购中扮演救难英雄的角色管理经济学41Partnership合伙人制度Hiring quality people/internal promotion not lateral

33、hires/low turnovers/first 10 years of 14-18 hours with salaries lower than rival public firms for the elusive prize of a partnership (8-figure compensation)/partner selection every two years/partner compensation based on seniority not performance/teamwork and loyalty 聘用高素质的员工/高管人员主要来自公司员工的内部提拔/低人员流动

34、率/开始10年每天工作14-18小时而工资却低于同行水平，为的是成为合伙人后难以置信的薪酬/每两年挑选一次合伙人/合伙人的薪金基于资历而非业绩/强调团队精神和对公司的忠诚度管理经济学42Friedman and Rubin Era: 1990-1994Not competitive compensation/exodus of talented people/lateral hiring/grading partners/emotional toll/performance pay 93/360 degree review/no risk no return and hence princip

35、al transaction (Rubins idea)/$886 m profit in 90, $1b in 91, and $1.46b by 11/92 薪水不具有竞争力/高素质员工大量流失/开始从外部招募高管人员/对合伙人进行评估/士气低弱/1993年全面使用绩效工资/360度的评估/没有风险没有回报，公司进行直接投资/1990年8.86亿美元利润，1991年10亿美元，1992管理经济学43Substantial losses in 19941994年巨额亏损departure of 30% of the partnership by 11/94/Goldmans assets d

36、ropped from $115b end of 93 to $95b end of 94 截止1994年11月，30%的合伙人离开公司，带走了大量资金/ 高盛集团资产从1993年底的1150亿美元跌至1994年底的950亿美元“You cant run a multinational global business on partnership capital. “不能仅依靠合伙人资金来经营一个全球化的业务管理经济学44Corzine on Partnership Corzine对合伙人制的看法An economic system in which 1.5-1.75% of the peop

37、le capture a high percentage of the upside in good times and adjust the other 98.5% of the participants compensation and jobs on the downside is selfish. 1.5-1.75% 的人在年景好时占有大局部盈利，效益差时那么对其他98.5%的员工减薪或解雇，这种制度太自私The number of partners increased from 120 in 90 to 180 in 95/the average share per partner

38、decreased significantly. 合伙人数目从1990年的120人增长到1995年的180人/ 每个合伙人的平均股权份额大幅下跌管理经济学45Mary Kay Cosmetics:Sales Force Incentives美琳凯传销团队的鼓励机制Case Study 案例管理经济学46An Overviewset up in 1963 with a unique concept /listed, and then management buyout ($315m) by Mary Kay and her son in 12/85 /headquartered and manu

39、factured in Dallas, plus 5 regional distribution centers (1,436 employees) /175,000 independent salespersons in U.S. in 88 /$406m sales in 881988年公司员工仅1,436人，而独立销售人员传销人员高达175,000人；销售额为亿美元管理经济学47Sales Force Incentives独立销售人员的鼓励机制Entry-level: difference between retail and wholesale prices /a 4-12% comm

40、ission on the sales of personal recruits/sales director: 9-13% on the entire unit, extra bonuses for total sales and recruits/senior directors: 4% on offsprings and 5% for more than 8 offsprings/national directors: 5-8% and 2% on first-line and second-line offsprings, respectively 层层剥削管理经济学48Car Pro

41、grams 汽车奖励方案Pink Cadillac (69) and Pink Buick (lower standards) for directors/VIP for non-directors/1,000 Cadillacs, 1,000 Buicks, and 3,000 leased cars for VIP program (89)管理经济学49Questions 思考问题Multiple responsibilities (sales and recruiting) 多重责任销售及招募独立销售人员difference between Mary Kays incentive sys

42、tem from Goldman Sachs partnership 美琳凯鼓励机制与高盛合伙人制度的差异why car programs 为何引入汽车鼓励方案管理经济学50The debate Over Unbundling General Motors:关于分拆通用汽车的讨论The Delphi Divesture and Other Possible Transactions剥离Dephi及其他运作Case Study 案例管理经济学51Undervalued GMGM股票被低估90 years of vertical integration: GM (70%), Ford (50%),

43、 and Chrysler (30%) 长达90年的垂直一体化：GM(70%), Ford (50%), Chrysler (30%) The difference between benchmark investment strategy and actual value created is equal to $89 billion between 12/31/89 and 12/31/98 1989年12月31日到1998年12月31日之间，实际创造的价值比投资基准少890亿美元。管理经济学52A Breakup of GMGM的分拆1996: GM decided to spin off its shares in Electronic Data Systems (a computer business acquired in