第10章-外部性-曼昆经济学原理第七版课件

Externalities1ppt课件Externalities1ppt课件ExternalitiesGovernmentactioncansometimesimproveuponmarketoutcomesWhymarketssometimesfailtoallocateresourcesefficientlyHowgovernmentpoliciescanpotentiallyimprovethemarket’sallocationWhatkindsofpoliciesarelikelytoworkbest2ppt课件ExternalitiesGovernmentactionExternalitiesExternalityTheuncompensatedimpactofoneperson’sactionsonthewell-beingofabystanderMarketfailureNegativeexternalityImpactonthebystanderisadversePositiveexternalityImpactonthebystanderisbeneficial3ppt课件ExternalitiesExternality3ppt课件ExternalitiesNegativeexternalitiesExhaustfromautomobilesBarkingdogsPositiveexternalitiesRestoredhistoricbuildingsResearchintonewtechnologies4ppt课件ExternalitiesNegativeexternalExternalitiesandMarketInefficiencyWelfareeconomics:arecapDemandcurve:valuetoconsumersPricestheyarewillingtopaySupplycurve:costtosuppliersEquilibriumquantityandpriceEfficientMaximizesthesumofproducerandconsumersurplus5ppt课件ExternalitiesandMarketIneffFigure1TheMarketforAluminumPriceofAluminumQuantityofAluminum0Demand(privatevalue)Supply(privatecost)Thedemandcurvereflectsthevaluetobuyers,andthesupplycurvereflectsthecostsofsellers.Theequilibriumquantity,QMARKET,maximizesthetotalvaluetobuyersminusthetotalcostsofsellers.Intheabsenceofexternalities,therefore,themarketequilibriumisefficient.QMARKETEquilibrium6ppt课件Figure1TheMarketforAluminuExternalitiesandMarketInefficiencyNegativeexternalitiesCosttosociety(ofproducingagood)Largerthanthecosttothegoodproducers“AllIcansayisthatifbeingaleadingmanufacturermeansbeingaleadingpolluter,sobeit.”7ppt课件ExternalitiesandMarketIneffExternalitiesandMarketInefficiencyNegativeexternalitiesSocialcostPrivatecostsoftheproducers(supply)PlusthecoststothosebystandersaffectedadverselybythenegativeexternalitySocialcostcurveisabovethesupplycurveTakesintoaccounttheexternalcostsimposedonsociety8ppt课件ExternalitiesandMarketIneffFigure2PollutionandtheSocialOptimumPriceofAluminumQuantityofAluminum0Demand(privatevalue)Supply(privatecost)Inthepresenceofanegativeexternality,suchaspollution,thesocialcostofthegoodexceedstheprivatecost.Theoptimalquantity,QOPTIMUM,isthereforesmallerthantheequilibriumquantity,QMARKET.QMARKETOptimumSocialcost(privatecostandexternalcost)ExternalCostQOPTIMUMEquilibrium9ppt课件Figure2PollutionandtheSociExternalitiesandMarketInefficiencyNegativeexternalitiesOptimumquantityproducedMaximizetotalwelfareSmallerthanmarketequilibriumquantityGovernment–correctmarketfailureInternalizingtheexternalityAlteringincentivessothatpeopletakeaccountoftheexternaleffectsoftheiractions10ppt课件ExternalitiesandMarketIneffExternalitiesandMarketInefficiencyPositiveexternalitiesEducationBenefitofeducationisprivateExternalities:bettergovernment,lowercrimerates,higherproductivityandwagesSocialvalueisgreaterthanprivatevalueSocialvaluecurveAbovethedemandcurve11ppt课件ExternalitiesandMarketIneffFigure3EducationandtheSocialOptimumPriceofEducationQuantityofEducation0Demand(privatevalue)Supply(privatecost)Inthepresenceofapositiveexternality,thesocialvalueofthegoodexceedstheprivatevalue.Theoptimalquantity,QOPTIMUM,isthereforelargerthantheequilibriumquantity,QMARKET.QMARKETEquilibriumSocialvalue(privatevalueandexternalbenefit)ExternalBenefitQOPTIMUMOptimum12ppt课件Figure3EducationandtheSociExternalitiesandMarketInefficiencyPositiveexternalitiesSociallyoptimalquantityisgreaterthanmarketequilibriumquantityGovernment–correctmarketfailureInternalizetheexternalitySubsidy13ppt课件ExternalitiesandMarketIneffExternalitiesandMarketInefficiencyNegativeexternalitiesMarketsproducealargerquantitythanissociallydesirableGovernment:taxPositiveexternalitiesMarketsproduceasmallerquantitythanissociallydesirableGovernment:subsidy14ppt课件ExternalitiesandMarketIneffTechnologyspillovers,industrialpolicy,andpatentprotectionTechnologyspillover=PositiveexternalityImpactofonefirm’sresearchandproductioneffortsonotherfirms’accesstotechnologicaladvanceGovernment:internalizetheexternalitySubsidy=valueofthetechnologyspillover15ppt课件Technologyspillovers,industrTechnologyspillovers,industrialpolicy,andpatentprotectionIndustrialpolicyGovernmentinterventionintheeconomythataimstopromotetechnology-enhancingindustriesPatentlawProtecttherightsofinventorsbygivingthemexclusiveuseoftheirinventionsforaperiodoftime16ppt课件Technologyspillovers,industrPublicPoliciesTowardExternalitiesCommand-and-controlpoliciesRegulatebehaviordirectlyRegulationMarket-basedpoliciesProvideincentivessothatprivatedecisionmakerswillchoosetosolvetheproblemontheirownCorrectivetaxesandsubsidiesTradablepollutionpermits17ppt课件PublicPoliciesTowardExternaPublicPoliciesTowardExternalitiesRegulationRegulatebehaviordirectly:makingcertainbehaviorseitherrequiredorforbiddenCannoteradicatepollutionEnvironmentalProtectionAgency(EPA)DevelopandenforceregulationsDictatesmaximumlevelofpollutionRequiresthatfirmsadoptaparticulartechnologytoreduceemissions18ppt课件PublicPoliciesTowardExternaPublicPoliciesTowardExternalitiesCorrectivetaxesandsubsidiesCorrectivetaxes(Pigoviantaxes)InduceprivatedecisionmakerstotakeaccountofthesocialcoststhatarisefromanegativeexternalityPlacesapriceontherighttopolluteReducepollutionatalowercosttosocietyRaiserevenueforthegovernmentEnhanceeconomicefficiency19ppt课件PublicPoliciesTowardExternaWhyisgasolinetaxedsoheavily?NegativeexternalitiesassociatedwithdrivingCongestion,accidents,pollution20ppt课件WhyisgasolinetaxedsoheaviWhyisgasolinetaxedsoheavily?Thegastax=correctivetaxDoesn’tcausedeadweightlossesMakestheeconomyworkbetterLesstrafficcongestionSaferroadsCleanerenvironment21ppt课件WhyisgasolinetaxedsoheaviWhyisgasolinetaxedsoheavily?Howhighshouldthetaxongasolinebe?MostEuropeancountriesHighergasolinetaxthanintheU.S.2007,JournalofEconomicLiteratureOptimalcorrectivetaxongasoline$2.28pergallonin2005dollars$2.70pergallonin2012dollarsActualtaxintheU.S.in2012:50centspergallon22ppt课件WhyisgasolinetaxedsoheaviWhyisgasolinetaxedsoheavily?TaxrevenuefromagasolinetaxUsedtolowertaxesthatdistortincentivesandcausedeadweightlossesSomegovernmentregulationsProductionoffuel-efficientcars–unnecessary23ppt课件WhyisgasolinetaxedsoheaviPublicPoliciesTowardExternalitiesTradablepollutionpermitsVoluntarytransferoftherighttopollutefromonefirmtoanotherNewscarceresource:pollutionpermitsMarkettotradepermitsFirm’swillingnesstopayDependonitscostofreducingpollution24ppt课件PublicPoliciesTowardExternaPublicPoliciesTowardExternalitiesAdvantageoffreemarketforpollutionpermitsInitialallocationofpollutionpermitsdoesn'tmatterIffirmscanreducepollutionatalowcost:SellwhateverpermitstheygetIffirmscanreducepollutiononlyatahighcost:buywhateverpermitstheyneedEfficientfinalallocation25ppt课件PublicPoliciesTowardExternaPublicPoliciesTowardExternalitiesReducingpollutionusingpollutionpermitsorcorrectivetaxesFirmspayfortheirpollutionCorrectivetaxes:paytothegovernmentPollutionpermits:paytobuypermitsInternalizetheexternalityofpollution26ppt课件PublicPoliciesTowardExternaFigure4TheEquivalenceofCorrectiveTaxesandPollutionPermitsPriceofpollutionInpanel(a),theEPAsetsapriceonpollutionbylevyingacorrectivetax,andthedemandcurvedeterminesthequantityofpollution.Inpanel(b),theEPAlimitsthequantityofpollutionbylimitingthenumberofpollutionpermits,andthedemandcurvedeterminesthepriceofpollution.Thepriceandquantityofpollutionarethesameinthetwocases.0Quantityofpollution(a)CorrectiveTax(b)PollutionPermitsDemandforpollutionrightsQPCorrectivetax1.Acorrectivetaxsetsthepriceofpollution...2....which,togetherwiththedemandcurve,determinesthequantityofpollution.Priceofpollution0QuantityofpollutionDemandforpollutionrightsPQSupplyofpollutionpermits1.Pollutionpermitssetthequantityofpollution...2....which,togetherwiththedemandcurve,determinesthepriceofpollution.27ppt课件Figure4TheEquivalenceofCorPublicPoliciesTowardExternalitiesObjectionstotheeconomicanalysisofpollution“Wecannotgiveanyonetheoptionofpollutingforafee.”-bylateSenatorEdmundMuskiePeoplefacetrade-offsEliminatingallpollutionisimpossibleCleanwaterandcleanair–opportunitycostLowerstandardofliving28ppt课件PublicPoliciesTowardExternaPublicPoliciesTowardExternalitiesCleanenvironmentisanormalgoodPositiveincomeelasticityRichcountriescanaffordacleanerenvironmentMorerigorousenvironmentalprotectionCleanairandcleanwater-lawofdemandThelowerthepriceofenvironmentalprotectionThemorethepublicwillwantit29ppt课件PublicPoliciesTowardExternaPrivateSolutionstoExternalitiesThetypesofprivatesolutionsMoralcodesandsocialsanctionsCharitiesSelf-interestoftherelevantpartiesIntegratingdifferenttypesofbusinessesInterestedpartiescanenterintoacontract30ppt课件PrivateSolutionstoExternaliPrivateSolutionstoExternalitiesTheCoasetheoremIfprivatepartiescanbargainwithoutcostovertheallocationofresourcesTheycansolvetheproblemofexternalitiesontheirownWhatevertheinitialdistributionofrightsInterestedpartiescanreachabargaininwhichEveryoneisbetteroffOutcomeisefficient31ppt课件PrivateSolutionstoExternaliPrivateSolutionstoExternalities1.Dickhasthelegalrighttokeepabarkingdog.Dickgetsa$500benefitfromthedogJanebearsan$800costfromthebarkingEfficientoutcome:JanecanofferDick$600togetridofthedogDickwillgladlyaccept32ppt课件PrivateSolutionstoExternaliPrivateSolutionstoExternalities2.Dickhasthelegalrighttokeepabarkingdog.Dickgetsa$1,000benefitfromthedogJanebearsan$800costfromthebarkingEfficientoutcome:Dickturnsdownanyofferbelow$1,000Janewillnotofferanyamountabove$800Dickkeepsthedog33ppt课件PrivateSolutionstoExternaliPrivateSolutionstoExternalities3.JanecanlegallycompelDicktogetridofthedogDickcanoffertopayJanetoallowhimtokeepthedogIfthebenefitofthedogtoDickexceedsthecostofthebarkingtoJaneThenDickandJanewillstrikeabargaininwhichDickkeepsthedog34ppt课件PrivateSolutionstoExternaliPrivateSolutionstoExternalitiesWhyprivatesolutionsdonotalwaysworkHightransactioncostsCoststhatpartiesincurintheprocessofagreeingtoandfollowingthroughonabargainBargainingsimplybreaksdownLargenumberofinterestedpartiesCoordinatingeveryoneiscostly35ppt课件PrivateSolutionstoExternaliExternalities36ppt课件Externalities1ppt课件ExternalitiesGovernmentactioncansometimesimproveuponmarketoutcomesWhymarketssometimesfailtoallocateresourcesefficientlyHowgovernmentpoliciescanpotentiallyimprovethemarket’sallocationWhatkindsofpoliciesarelikelytoworkbest37ppt课件ExternalitiesGovernmentactionExternalitiesExternalityTheuncompensatedimpactofoneperson’sactionsonthewell-beingofabystanderMarketfailureNegativeexternalityImpactonthebystanderisadversePositiveexternalityImpactonthebystanderisbeneficial38ppt课件ExternalitiesExternality3ppt课件ExternalitiesNegativeexternalitiesExhaustfromautomobilesBarkingdogsPositiveexternalitiesRestoredhistoricbuildingsResearchintonewtechnologies39ppt课件ExternalitiesNegativeexternalExternalitiesandMarketInefficiencyWelfareeconomics:arecapDemandcurve:valuetoconsumersPricestheyarewillingtopaySupplycurve:costtosuppliersEquilibriumquantityandpriceEfficientMaximizesthesumofproducerandconsumersurplus40ppt课件ExternalitiesandMarketIneffFigure1TheMarketforAluminumPriceofAluminumQuantityofAluminum0Demand(privatevalue)Supply(privatecost)Thedemandcurvereflectsthevaluetobuyers,andthesupplycurvereflectsthecostsofsellers.Theequilibriumquantity,QMARKET,maximizesthetotalvaluetobuyersminusthetotalcostsofsellers.Intheabsenceofexternalities,therefore,themarketequilibriumisefficient.QMARKETEquilibrium41ppt课件Figure1TheMarketforAluminuExternalitiesandMarketInefficiencyNegativeexternalitiesCosttosociety(ofproducingagood)Largerthanthecosttothegoodproducers“AllIcansayisthatifbeingaleadingmanufacturermeansbeingaleadingpolluter,sobeit.”42ppt课件ExternalitiesandMarketIneffExternalitiesandMarketInefficiencyNegativeexternalitiesSocialcostPrivatecostsoftheproducers(supply)PlusthecoststothosebystandersaffectedadverselybythenegativeexternalitySocialcostcurveisabovethesupplycurveTakesintoaccounttheexternalcostsimposedonsociety43ppt课件ExternalitiesandMarketIneffFigure2PollutionandtheSocialOptimumPriceofAluminumQuantityofAluminum0Demand(privatevalue)Supply(privatecost)Inthepresenceofanegativeexternality,suchaspollution,thesocialcostofthegoodexceedstheprivatecost.Theoptimalquantity,QOPTIMUM,isthereforesmallerthantheequilibriumquantity,QMARKET.QMARKETOptimumSocialcost(privatecostandexternalcost)ExternalCostQOPTIMUMEquilibrium44ppt课件Figure2PollutionandtheSociExternalitiesandMarketInefficiencyNegativeexternalitiesOptimumquantityproducedMaximizetotalwelfareSmallerthanmarketequilibriumquantityGovernment–correctmarketfailureInternalizingtheexternalityAlteringincentivessothatpeopletakeaccountoftheexternaleffectsoftheiractions45ppt课件ExternalitiesandMarketIneffExternalitiesandMarketInefficiencyPositiveexternalitiesEducationBenefitofeducationisprivateExternalities:bettergovernment,lowercrimerates,higherproductivityandwagesSocialvalueisgreaterthanprivatevalueSocialvaluecurveAbovethedemandcurve46ppt课件ExternalitiesandMarketIneffFigure3EducationandtheSocialOptimumPriceofEducationQuantityofEducation0Demand(privatevalue)Supply(privatecost)Inthepresenceofapositiveexternality,thesocialvalueofthegoodexceedstheprivatevalue.Theoptimalquantity,QOPTIMUM,isthereforelargerthantheequilibriumquantity,QMARKET.QMARKETEquilibriumSocialvalue(privatevalueandexternalbenefit)ExternalBenefitQOPTIMUMOptimum47ppt课件Figure3EducationandtheSociExternalitiesandMarketInefficiencyPositiveexternalitiesSociallyoptimalquantityisgreaterthanmarketequilibriumquantityGovernment–correctmarketfailureInternalizetheexternalitySubsidy48ppt课件ExternalitiesandMarketIneffExternalitiesandMarketInefficiencyNegativeexternalitiesMarketsproducealargerquantitythanissociallydesirableGovernment:taxPositiveexternalitiesMarketsproduceasmallerquantitythanissociallydesirableGovernment:subsidy49ppt课件ExternalitiesandMarketIneffTechnologyspillovers,industrialpolicy,andpatentprotectionTechnologyspillover=PositiveexternalityImpactofonefirm’sresearchandproductioneffortsonotherfirms’accesstotechnologicaladvanceGovernment:internalizetheexternalitySubsidy=valueofthetechnologyspillover50ppt课件Technologyspillovers,industrTechnologyspillovers,industrialpolicy,andpatentprotectionIndustrialpolicyGovernmentinterventionintheeconomythataimstopromotetechnology-enhancingindustriesPatentlawProtecttherightsofinventorsbygivingthemexclusiveuseoftheirinventionsforaperiodoftime51ppt课件Technologyspillovers,industrPublicPoliciesTowardExternalitiesCommand-and-controlpoliciesRegulatebehaviordirectlyRegulationMarket-basedpoliciesProvideincentivessothatprivatedecisionmakerswillchoosetosolvetheproblemontheirownCorrectivetaxesandsubsidiesTradablepollutionpermits52ppt课件PublicPoliciesTowardExternaPublicPoliciesTowardExternalitiesRegulationRegulatebehaviordirectly:makingcertainbehaviorseitherrequiredorforbiddenCannoteradicatepollutionEnvironmentalProtectionAgency(EPA)DevelopandenforceregulationsDictatesmaximumlevelofpollutionRequiresthatfirmsadoptaparticulartechnologytoreduceemissions53ppt课件PublicPoliciesTowardExternaPublicPoliciesTowardExternalitiesCorrectivetaxesandsubsidiesCorrectivetaxes(Pigoviantaxes)InduceprivatedecisionmakerstotakeaccountofthesocialcoststhatarisefromanegativeexternalityPlacesapriceontherighttopolluteReducepollutionatalowercosttosocietyRaiserevenueforthegovernmentEnhanceeconomicefficiency54ppt课件PublicPoliciesTowardExternaWhyisgasolinetaxedsoheavily?NegativeexternalitiesassociatedwithdrivingCongestion,accidents,pollution55ppt课件WhyisgasolinetaxedsoheaviWhyisgasolinetaxedsoheavily?Thegastax=correctivetaxDoesn’tcausedeadweightlossesMakestheeconomyworkbetterLesstrafficcongestionSaferroadsCleanerenvironment56ppt课件WhyisgasolinetaxedsoheaviWhyisgasolinetaxedsoheavily?Howhighshouldthetaxongasolinebe?MostEuropeancountriesHighergasolinetaxthanintheU.S.2007,JournalofEconomicLiteratureOptimalcorrectivetaxongasoline$2.28pergallonin2005dollars$2.70pergallonin2012dollarsActualtaxintheU.S.in2012:50centspergallon57ppt课件WhyisgasolinetaxedsoheaviWhyisgasolinetaxedsoheavily?TaxrevenuefromagasolinetaxUsedtolowertaxesthatdistortincentivesandcausedeadweightlossesSomegovernmentregulationsProductionoffuel-efficientcars–unnecessary58ppt课件WhyisgasolinetaxedsoheaviPublicPoliciesTowardExternalitiesTradablepollutionpermitsVoluntarytransferoftherighttopollutefromonefirmtoanotherNewscarceresource:pollutionpermitsMarkettotradepermitsFirm’swillingnesstopayDependonitscostofreducingpollution59ppt课件PublicPoliciesTowardExternaPublicPoliciesTowardExternalitiesAdvantageoffreemarketforpollutionpermitsInitialallocationofpollutionpermitsdoesn'tmatterIffirmscanreducepollutionatalowcost:SellwhateverpermitstheygetIffirmscanreducepollutiononlyatahighcost:buywhateverpermitstheyneedEfficientfinalallocation60ppt课件PublicPoliciesTowardExternaPublicPoliciesTowardExternalitiesReducingpollutionusingpollutionpermitsorcorrectivetaxesFirmspayfortheirpollutionCorrectivetaxes:paytothegovernmentPollutionpermits:paytobuypermitsInternalizetheexternalityofpollution61ppt课件PublicPoliciesTowardExternaFigure4TheEquivalenceofCorrectiveTaxesandPollutionPermitsPriceofpollutionInpanel(a),theEPAsetsapriceonpollutionbylevyingacorrectivetax,andthedemandcurvedeterminesthequantityofpollution.Inpanel(b),theEPAlimitsthequantityofpollutionbylimitingthenumberofpollutionpermits,andthedemandcurvedeterminesthepriceofpollution.Thepriceandquantityofpollutionarethesameinthetwocases.0Quantityofpollution(a)CorrectiveTax(b)PollutionPermitsDemandforpollutionrightsQPCorrectivetax1.Acorrectivetaxsetsthepriceofpollution...2....which,togetherwiththedemandcurve,determinesthequantityofpollution.Priceofpollution0QuantityofpollutionDemandforpollutionrightsPQSupplyofpollutionpermits1.Pollutionpermitssetthequantityofpollution...2....which,togetherwiththedemandcurve,determinesthepriceofpollution.62ppt课件Figure4TheEquivalenceofCorPublicPoliciesTowardExternalitiesObjectionstotheeconomicanalysisofpollution“Wecannotgiveanyonetheoptionofpollutingforafee.”-bylateSenatorEdmundMuskiePeoplefacetrade-offsEliminatingallpollutionisimpossibleCleanwaterandcleanair–opportunitycostLowe